We develop a two-stage game with vertically differentiated products and endogenous environmental quality to study unilateral carbon pricing and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). A home EU firm and a foreign exporter choose environmental...
Generative artificial intelligence has driven the cost of producing convincing artifacts of expertise toward zero. Signaling theory predicts that signals whose informational content rests on production cost lose that content when production becomes c...
The public goods game (PGG) serves as a powerful framework for investigating human cooperative behavior. While prevailing theories emphasize imitation as the primary driver of strategy updating, evidence from an empirical study on voluntary spatial P...
In this paper, we compare behavior in the dictator, ultimatum, and public goods games before and during the Gezi Park protests in laboratory experiments conducted in Türkiye. In May 2013, protests began against the proposed destruction of Gezi P...
Rare-disease treatment financing is challenging because high-cost therapies, clinical need, and budget constraints create interdependent decisions among manufacturers, public payers, and healthcare providers. This article combines patient-level time-...
In contemporary online environments, the dynamics of the attention economy drive payoff-seeking, irresponsible information diffusion, resulting in severe discourse polarization. This study defines the primary objective function for society as the mai...
Akerlof’s classical theory of the “Market for Lemons,” which conceptualizes adverse selection driven by information asymmetry, established the foundation of information economics. While the traditional model assumes static equilibri...
This paper studies the interaction between status incentives and organizational design in a two-agent moral hazard framework with limited liability. A risk-neutral principal chooses between two regimes: favouritism, under which one agent receives exc...
Multi-agent interaction in linear–quadratic (LQ) differential games gives rise to open-loop Nash equilibria that rarely admit closed-form expressions, motivating the development of reliable numerical solvers. Classical approaches such as shooti...
Many bargaining problems allocate control over heterogeneous issues rather than a single scalar surplus. This paper studies a two-player game-theoretic Nash bargaining problem over a continuum of issues with stochastic valuation fields. Taking the cl...
Fraud can cause markets for credence goods to collapse, but collective reputation has been suggested as a potential solution, especially when buyer valuations for quality are high. We develop a discrete model of a market for label credence goods and...
In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated Stag-hunt...
This paper investigates two marketing strategies a reward-based crowdfunding platform employs to align its preferences with an entrepreneur’s choice of pledge and target levels. These are (a) how to promote campaigns to potential backers, and (...
We propose a decentralized strategy for coordinating the bidirectional charging and discharging of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) in renewable-powered parking lots. The framework combines mean-field games (MFGs) and model predictive control (MPC) t...
Russian state-sponsored disinformation has been described in policy and the operational literature, but it is less often formalized in game-theoretic terms. Here, a two-layered formal model is developed showing how adversarial perturbation of a commu...
This paper studies a pursuit–evasion differential game in the Hilbert space
In this work we consider an evolutionary game in which a small population repeatedly plays the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game using the pairwise proportional imitation (PPI) revision protocol. Since we are dealing with a small populatio...
Scientific theories survive on institutional fitness, not empirical merit alone. Under Soviet Stalinism, Vygotsky and Luria’s cultural-historical psychology was suppressed while Leontiev’s Activity Theory flourished because it aligned wit...
Background: Standard consumer theory treats preferences as fixed primitives and demand as the solution to an individual optimisation problem; we instead model consumption styles as heritable strategies whose prevalence is shaped by selection and expe...
This paper considers a multi-period two-sided asymmetric information model with infinitely long-lived sellers and short-lived buyers. I assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in the market. Each period, a consumer, who is uncertain a...
This paper investigates the interplay between oil, critical minerals, and military expenditure in the U.S. and China. The research goal is to evaluate how sensitive the military expenditure of these countries is to shocks in energy markets. It develo...
Many engineering problems must account for the non-cooperative decisions and actions of multiple players. These problems can be modeled within a game-theoretic framework. The approach herein is to model such problems as mathematical games, convert th...
We study a continuous-time cooperative differential game of pollution control in which the pollution stock accumulates emissions and affects long-run welfare. The key feature is a one-time random increase in the public damage weight, interpreted as a...
Public goods provision is vulnerable to free riding, making sustained cooperation a central challenge in economics. Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity-aversion model explains how fairness concerns can support cooperation, but it treats preferences as...
Frequent occurrences of inter-regional emergencies constitute critical impediments to global security and sustainable development, necessitating enhanced intergovernmental emergency collaboration. This study employs a network evolutionary game model...
This paper examines drip pricing related to compulsory charges—a situation where firms intentionally make it costly for consumers to discover mandatory fees or surcharges that “drip” into the full (total) price, which is only reveal...
This paper investigates the evolution of public cooperation within a four-strategy public goods game that incorporates both consistently and inconsistently moralistic exclusion mechanisms. Using replicator dynamics in an infinite well-mixed populatio...
This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to evaluate market competitiveness in industries characterized by price competition and adjustment stickiness. We extend the dynamic oligopoly framework for estimating market competitiveness in the l...
This article offers a formal analysis of the paradoxes, dilemmas and strategic interactions explored in Liu Cixin’s trilogy The Three-Body Problem. Several games, such as the survival game, the deterrence game, the first contact game, and the b...
This paper examines downstream firms’ incentives to accept equity participation by an upstream supplier in a vertically related market. We develop a multi-stage model in which the upstream firm offers an equity stake and sets input prices under...
Eigenvector-based centrality captures recursive notions of importance in networks. While the direct problem computes centrality from given edge weights, the inverse eigenvector centrality problem seeks edge weights that reproduce a prescribed central...
This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The...
Randomized response is a widely used survey technique for measuring stigmatized populations, but it may provide limited information in small samples. This paper introduces a method of elicitation through perfectly correlated questions, showing that c...
The rapid rise of live-streaming e-commerce has fostered a new “content clipping” model, in which secondary creators edit and republish anchors’ live-streaming content to promote product sales. While this model can expand market rea...
The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of d...
This paper introduces fairer measures of individual pitcher performance in baseball using the Shapley Value from coalitional game theory. The paper’s key conceptual innovation is a novel two-stage procedure for constructing the coalitionary gam...
Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they d...
Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a unif...
In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent se...
Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining f...
We examine the moral dilemma of how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should be programmed to act in unavoidable crash scenarios involving trade-offs between saving one life and saving many. We report results from three experimental studies that investigate...
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual r...
This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study how exclusionary contracts affect firms’ incentives to invest in innovation. Several symmetric sellers compete to supply an identical product to a set of buyers, and each seller can invest in...
This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players’ types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose thei...
We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equ...
We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the diff...
We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX0—...
This paper considers how a system designer can program a team of autonomous agents to coordinate with one another such that each agent selects (or covers) an individual resource with the goal that all agents collectively cover the maximum number of r...
In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the...
This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues...
