The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of d...
This paper introduces fairer measures of individual pitcher performance in baseball using the Shapley Value from coalitional game theory. The paper’s key conceptual innovation is a novel two-stage procedure for constructing the coalitionary gam...
Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they d...
Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a unif...
In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent se...
Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining f...
We examine the moral dilemma of how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should be programmed to act in unavoidable crash scenarios involving trade-offs between saving one life and saving many. We report results from three experimental studies that investigate...
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual r...
This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study how exclusionary contracts affect firms’ incentives to invest in innovation. Several symmetric sellers compete to supply an identical product to a set of buyers, and each seller can invest in...
This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players’ types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose thei...
We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equ...
We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the diff...
We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX0—...
This paper considers how a system designer can program a team of autonomous agents to coordinate with one another such that each agent selects (or covers) an individual resource with the goal that all agents collectively cover the maximum number of r...
In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the...
This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues...
This paper introduces a novel framework for designing fair and sustainable unemployment benefits, grounded in cooperative game theory and real-time fiscal policy. The labor market is modeled as a coalitional game, where a random subset of participant...
This paper develops a formal model to analyze how foreign interventions—via resource transfers towards mobilization, technological upgrades of the mobilization technology, and various forms of conditional aid—reshape identity choices and...
Von Neumann’s minimax theorem defines optimal strategic unpredictability in zero-sum games. Empirical evidence from professional sports has been interpreted as positive behavioral evidence for minimax. In this article, we analyze the strategic...
This paper studies the influence of moral emotions and beliefs on understanding charitable giving. While specific moral emotions such as empathy, guilt, and shame have been associated with prosocial behavior, how they impact giving behavior may depen...
Wisdom in negotiation is increasingly vital in managing conflicts, yet its behavioural expression remains underexplored. This study explores the behavioural signatures of individuals nominated as wise negotiators within an organisational context. The...
We investigate a susceptible–exposed–infected–recovered
A series of articles has tested von Neumann’s minimax theory against behavioral evidence based on field data from professional sports. The evidence has been viewed and collectively cited as positive evidence that elite athletes in their familiar spor...
Linear programming and polyhedral representation conversion methods have been widely applied to game theory to compute equilibria. Here, we introduce new applications of these methods to two game-theoretic scenarios in which players aim to secure suf...
We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player’s...
This paper introduces the Bateson Game, a signaling game in which ambiguity over the governing rules of interaction (interpretive frames), rather than asymmetry of information about player types, drives strategic outcomes. We formalize the communicat...
Classifying games according to their strategic properties provides meaningful insights into the motivations driving the interacting parties, suggests possible future trajectories, and in some cases also points to potential interventions aiming to inf...
When a technology provider (entrant) enters an emerging end market, he may outsource critical components from a competing conventional manufacturer (incumbent) or insource critical components. Under the outsourcing strategy, brand reputation spills o...
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Fresh agricultural products have significant seasonality and perishability, and their cross-regional sales often face differences in market demand, price, and sales volume. In the context of government quality regulation, competition among retailers...
This paper delves into a multi-player non-renewable resource extraction differential game model, where the duration of the game is a random variable with a composite distribution function. We first explore the conditions under which the cooperative s...
In this paper, we study the multidimensional claims problem and introduce the eating algorithm to this problem. It is shown that a solution is efficient if and only if it is the outcome of the eating algorithm with a profile of specific eating functi...
The value principle in organizational economics states that the net market value of the goods that a firm sells is a key determinant of its organizational design. We survey and extend some recent developments in the theoretical literature at the nexu...
This paper introduces a novel ratio-based framework for analyzing how consumer heterogeneity translates into product differentiation in vertically structured monopoly markets. We consider a monopolist facing a continuum of consumers and a strictly co...
Mainstream experimental economics is characterized by its focus on theory testing and “treatment effects” on aggregate outcomes. The “agentic” alternative is concerned with the econometric specification of individual behavior....
We investigate the
This paper establishes dividend-based representations for two influence assessments. First, we define a system of min-dividends derived from the minimal-influence evaluation via a unique linear decomposition using unanimity-type spanning models. Buil...
Meningococcal meningitis is a deadly acute bacterial infection caused by the Neisseria meningitidis bacterium that affects the membrane covering the brain and spinal cord. The World Health Organization launched the “Defeating bacterial meningit...
Certifiers such as Stiftung Warentest (Germany), Which? (UK), and Consumer Reports (US) reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by providing credible information about product quality. However, due to their limited testing capacities...
Hirshleifer’s difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity...
This paper examines stochastic cooperation in markets with two sellers who exhibit one-sided dependency. The independent seller’s pricing influences the dependent seller’s demand, but not vice versa. We study the one-dimensional hybrid ga...
We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game...
This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the a...
Non-cooperative games in normal form are specified by a player set, sets of player strategies, and payoff functions. Cooperative games, meanwhile, are specified by a player set and a worth function that maps coalitions of players to payoffs they can...
Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that involves the overestimation of one’s own capabilities. We introduce a model in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation o...
In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between ga...
I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the “surprising” results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game....
We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibri...
Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two a...
Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules—the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract—...
