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Article

Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism †

by
Ulrike Vollstädt
1,*,
Patrick Imcke
2,
Franziska Brendel
2 and
Christiane Ehses-Friedrich
3
1
Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany
2
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45127 Essen, Germany
3
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, 07743 Jena, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
A previous version of this paper circulated as Ruhr Economic Paper #887.
Games 2025, 16(5), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 4 July 2025 / Revised: 23 August 2025 / Accepted: 26 August 2025 / Published: 29 August 2025

Abstract

Certifiers such as Stiftung Warentest (Germany), Which? (UK), and Consumer Reports (US) reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by providing credible information about product quality. However, due to their limited testing capacities, they face a set selection problem and test only a subset of all available product models. We show theoretically that, under any current mechanism to select product models for testing, buyers always end up buying suboptimal product models, unless all product models which would be sold under complete information (or all but the overall cheapest one) happen to be tested. Instead, we propose a novel mechanism based on voluntary disclosure, but with the same testing capacity, which always yields the maximum possible consumer surplus and thus weakly dominates any current mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm in a controlled laboratory experiment that our mechanism significantly increases consumer surplus.
Keywords: asymmetric information; product quality; certification; information disclosure; consumer surplus asymmetric information; product quality; certification; information disclosure; consumer surplus

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Vollstädt, U.; Imcke, P.; Brendel, F.; Ehses-Friedrich, C. Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism. Games 2025, 16, 44. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044

AMA Style

Vollstädt U, Imcke P, Brendel F, Ehses-Friedrich C. Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism. Games. 2025; 16(5):44. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044

Chicago/Turabian Style

Vollstädt, Ulrike, Patrick Imcke, Franziska Brendel, and Christiane Ehses-Friedrich. 2025. "Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism" Games 16, no. 5: 44. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044

APA Style

Vollstädt, U., Imcke, P., Brendel, F., & Ehses-Friedrich, C. (2025). Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism. Games, 16(5), 44. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044

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