This is an early access version, the complete PDF, HTML, and XML versions will be available soon.
Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism †
by
Ulrike Vollstädt
Ulrike Vollstädt
Dr. Ulrike Vollstaedt has been a research associate at the Chair of
Behavioral Social Policy, Otto [...]
Dr. Ulrike Vollstaedt has been a research associate at the Chair of
Behavioral Social Policy, Otto von Guericke University of Magdeburg
since 2021. She began her academic journey with studies in Business
Administration/Intercultural Management at the Friedrich Schiller
University of Jena (2002–2004), including a semester abroad at the
École Supérieure de Commerce in Le Havre, France. She then pursued
a Master’s in Economics at the Friedrich Schiller University of
Jena (2005–2008). From 2008 to 2012, she completed her PhD in
Economics (summa cum laude) at the International Max Planck Research
School “Uncertainty” in Jena, including a research stay at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2011). In 2012, she served as a
coordinator and researcher at the Jena Graduate School “Human
Behavior in Social and Economic Change” before joining the
University of Duisburg-Essen as a research associate at the Chair of
Quantitative Economic Policy (2012–2021). She was on leave to work
as a visiting researcher at the University of Michigan from 2019 to
2021. Grants include: “Program to promote excellent junior
scientists” at the University of Duisburg-Essen (ca. 30,000 EUR;
2016/2017), DFG Research fellowship for research stay at the
University of Michigan (ca. 135,000 EUR; 2019–2021). Research
interests include: behavioral and experimental economics, game theory
(markets with asymmetric information, information disclosure,
certification, bargaining, group behavior).
1,*
,
Patrick Imcke
Patrick Imcke 2,
Franziska Brendel
Franziska Brendel 2 and
Christiane Ehses-Friedrich
Christiane Ehses-Friedrich 3
1
Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany
2
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45127 Essen, Germany
3
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, 07743 Jena, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
†
A previous version of this paper circulated as Ruhr Economic Paper #887.
Games 2025, 16(5), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 4 July 2025
/
Revised: 23 August 2025
/
Accepted: 26 August 2025
/
Published: 29 August 2025
Abstract
Certifiers such as Stiftung Warentest (Germany), Which? (UK), and Consumer Reports (US) reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by providing credible information about product quality. However, due to their limited testing capacities, they face a set selection problem and test only a subset of all available product models. We show theoretically that, under any current mechanism to select product models for testing, buyers always end up buying suboptimal product models, unless all product models which would be sold under complete information (or all but the overall cheapest one) happen to be tested. Instead, we propose a novel mechanism based on voluntary disclosure, but with the same testing capacity, which always yields the maximum possible consumer surplus and thus weakly dominates any current mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm in a controlled laboratory experiment that our mechanism significantly increases consumer surplus.
Share and Cite
MDPI and ACS Style
Vollstädt, U.; Imcke, P.; Brendel, F.; Ehses-Friedrich, C.
Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism. Games 2025, 16, 44.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044
AMA Style
Vollstädt U, Imcke P, Brendel F, Ehses-Friedrich C.
Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism. Games. 2025; 16(5):44.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044
Chicago/Turabian Style
Vollstädt, Ulrike, Patrick Imcke, Franziska Brendel, and Christiane Ehses-Friedrich.
2025. "Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism" Games 16, no. 5: 44.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044
APA Style
Vollstädt, U., Imcke, P., Brendel, F., & Ehses-Friedrich, C.
(2025). Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism. Games, 16(5), 44.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g16050044
Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details
here.
Article Metrics
Article Access Statistics
For more information on the journal statistics, click
here.
Multiple requests from the same IP address are counted as one view.