Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research

The unequal status between manufacturers and live-streamers often undermines supply chain profitability and social welfare. However, the “volume guarantee” commission mode, designed to mitigate this issue, has proven ineffective in practice. This paper adopts a Nash bargaining fairness framework to analyze this paradox, incorporating two defining features of live-streaming commerce: the social network effect and the streamer’s cost of purchasing public domain traffic. We develop a dynamic game model involving the platform, manufacturer, streamer, and consumers to examine commission mode selection and supply chain decision-making. Our analysis yields four key findings: (1) Under Nash bargaining fairness, the “volume guarantee” mode is invariably redundant, regardless of who sets the sales threshold. Bargaining power only influences profit distribution via commission rates without distorting optimal product pricing or traffic acquisition decisions. (2) The social network effect boosts product prices, traffic purchases, total profit, and social welfare, with its impact amplified by the streamer’s fanbase size. Thus, collaborating with top-streamers is advantageous for manufacturers. (3) While higher platform traffic costs do not affect the optimal product price, they reduce traffic purchase volume, thereby decreasing supply chain profits and social welfare. (4) To enhance social welfare, platforms can implement differentiated traffic pricing, offering discounts to top-streamers. This study provides critical managerial insights for designing fair contracts and fostering equitable cooperation in live-streaming ecosystems.

This study exploits the promulgation of China’s E-commerce Law in 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment to construct a difference-in-differences (DID) model, examining the impact and mechanisms of digital economy governance on corporate cost stickiness. Using Chinese-listed manufacturing companies from 2013 to 2020 as research samples, we find that the implementation of the E-commerce Law significantly reduces corporate cost stickiness. Mechanism analysis reveals that the implementation of the E-Commerce Law promotes digital transformation in traditional manufacturing firms and strengthens their supply chain collaboration. These advancements lead to more efficient cost management decisions and reduce corporate cost stickiness. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this effect is more significant for mature and declining enterprises and state-owned enterprises, as well as in regions with relatively developed economies and low reliance on foreign trade. Further research shows that the implementation of the E-Commerce Law curbs managerial opportunism and enhances managerial ability.

With the rapid growth of social media platforms, short video advertisements (SVAs) have been a dominant channel for product sales. However, how to design SVAs that effectively drive product sales, especially in relation to previous SVAs and the related product information, remains underexplored. This study investigates how SVA title congruence influences sales performance through the mediating role of sociability. Specifically, we conceptualized video-video title congruence and video-product title congruence as two forms of content congruence and investigated their effects using data collected from Douyin, the leading short video platform. The empirical results with two-way fixed effects show that high video-video title congruence and low video-product title congruence are both associated with higher product sales. Sociability mediates the relationship between title congruence and sales performance. This study also finds that the creation frequency and product brand significantly moderate these relationships. Furthermore, this study develops several checks to ensure the robustness of the research model and findings, including the Heckman two-stage test. These findings provide theoretical insights into content creation strategies and offer practical implications for both creators and platform managers.