Games, Volume 13, Issue 1

Multi-player mean-payoff games are a natural formalism for modelling the behaviour of concurrent and multi-agent systems with self-interested players. Players in such a game traverse a graph, while attempting to maximise a (mean-)payoff function that...

Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the membe...

Given a fixed network that links various actors, we introduce a formal model that describes the structural stability of coalitions. To this end, we used the partition of the set of all actors in three distinct positions: members, i.e., those who are...

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In this study, we enrich a standard principal–agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent’s side. The agent’s misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent’s and the princi...

We investigate experimentally whether players deliberately use irrelevant market cues to shape their evaluations of a traded item. We implement a repeated Vickrey median price selling auction of an unusual bad where players are informed on the market...

We present a novel characterization of random rank-dependent expected utility for finite datasets and finite prizes. As a byproduct, we obtain a characterization of random expected utility that works for finite datasets. The test lends itself to stat...

Take the fort, then take the city. In a two-stage, two-party contest, victory in the initial stage can provide an advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a Pyrrhic...

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal p...

The effectiveness of control measures against the diffusion of the COVID-19 pandemic is grounded on the assumption that people are prepared and disposed to cooperate. From a strategic decision point of view, cooperation is the unreachable strategy of...

White Lists are lists of firms set up at each Italian prefecture. It is a relatively young instrument born as an experimental project designed to solve problems for particular conditions of crime and corruption in the Italian territory. This work aim...

In this article, we consider technology leaders (which are innovators) and technology followers (which are non-innovators) to provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competitio...

There has been much theoretical work aimed at understanding the evolution of social learning; and in most of it, individual and social learning are treated as distinct processes. A number of authors have argued that this approach is faulty because th...

This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets her demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of o...

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algori...

This study investigates the effect on nonprofessional investors’ judgements and decisions of discretionary measurement choices. Using a paper-and-pencil experience, we collect and analyze information regarding investment amounts as well as past...

Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement’s ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms...

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumsta...

We introduce a non-cooperative game model in which players’ decision nodes are partially ordered by a dependence relation, which directly captures informational dependencies in the game. In saying that a decision node v is dependent on decision...