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Article

Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council

1
Department of Finance, Corvinus University of Budapest, 1093 Budapest, Hungary
2
Department of Mathematics, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
3
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, 1097 Budapest, Hungary
4
Department of Finance, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, 1111 Budapest, Hungary
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Maria Montero and Ulrich Berger
Games 2022, 13(1), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010018
Received: 7 October 2021 / Revised: 17 January 2022 / Accepted: 19 January 2022 / Published: 7 February 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Weighted Majority Voting Games)
Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union. Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council. View Full-Text
Keywords: European Union; qualified majority voting; power index; Brexit European Union; qualified majority voting; power index; Brexit
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MDPI and ACS Style

Petróczy, D.G.; Rogers, M.F.; Kóczy, L.Á. Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council. Games 2022, 13, 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010018

AMA Style

Petróczy DG, Rogers MF, Kóczy LÁ. Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council. Games. 2022; 13(1):18. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010018

Chicago/Turabian Style

Petróczy, Dóra G., Mark F. Rogers, and László Á. Kóczy. 2022. "Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council" Games 13, no. 1: 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010018

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