Next Article in Journal
Conflicts with Momentum
Next Article in Special Issue
Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council
Previous Article in Journal
Identification and Control of Game-Based Epidemic Models
Previous Article in Special Issue
Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions
 
 
Article

Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

1
Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, 8210 Aarhus, Denmark
2
Department of Economics, Institute of Management and Economics, Clausthal University of Technology, 38678 Clausthal-Zellerfeld, Germany
3
Department of Economics & FOR 2104, Helmut-Schmidt University Hamburg, 22043 Hamburg, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Maria Montero and Ulrich Berger
Games 2022, 13(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010011
Received: 17 November 2021 / Revised: 8 January 2022 / Accepted: 12 January 2022 / Published: 17 January 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Weighted Majority Voting Games)
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects. View Full-Text
Keywords: bargaining; gender differences; laboratory experiment bargaining; gender differences; laboratory experiment
Show Figures

Figure 1

MDPI and ACS Style

Maaser, N.; Paetzel, F.; Traub, S. Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining. Games 2022, 13, 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010011

AMA Style

Maaser N, Paetzel F, Traub S. Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining. Games. 2022; 13(1):11. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010011

Chicago/Turabian Style

Maaser, Nicola, Fabian Paetzel, and Stefan Traub. 2022. "Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining" Games 13, no. 1: 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010011

Find Other Styles
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map by Country/Region

1
Back to TopTop