Games, Volume 9, Issue 4

We conducted a dynamic common pool resource experiment and found large differences among groups in the total benefits (surplus) obtained from the resource. To shed light on the factors underlying the differences, we characterized individual appropria...

We formally explore the idea that punishment of norm-breakers may be a vehicle for the older generation to teach youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing behavior. Peop...

Different strains of influenza viruses spread in human populations during every epidemic season. As the size of an infected population increases, the virus can mutate itself and grow in strength. The traditional epidemic SIR model does not capture vi...

Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they t...

The current study aims to investigate how the presence of social norms defines belief formation on future changes in social identity (i.e., diachronic identity), and how those beliefs affect individual decisions under uncertainty. The paper proposes...

This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom...

We studied gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams in a repeated teamwork setting. In our experiment, the participants (N = 168, 84 women and 84 men) chose whether to perform a cooperative task only with members of the own gende...

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a “partners” or a “strangers” protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Roun...

Charities operate at different levels: national, state, or local. We test the effect of the level of the organization on charitable giving in a sample of adults in two Texas communities. Subjects make four charitable giving “dictator game&rdquo...

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note “Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited” (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

We provide a game-theoretic account of endogenous intrinsic motivation within a principal–agent framework. We explore the incentives of an altruistic principal who, by exerting costly effort, can intrinsically motivate a present-biased agent to...

Schosser (Games 2018, 9, 26) claims to have found an alternative solution to design appropriate performance measures than the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation (RBCA) introduced by Ortner et al. (Management Accounting Research 2017, 3...

While preferences for conformity are commonly seen as an important driver of pro-social behaviour, only a small set of previous studies has explicitly tested the behavioural mechanisms underlying this proposition. In this paper, we report on two inte...

Theoretical models on network formation focus mostly on the stability and efficiency of equilibria, but they cannot deliver an understanding of why specific equilibrium networks are selected or whether they are all actually reachable from any startin...

In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction...

Evolution of cooperation has traditionally been studied by assuming that individuals adopt either of two pure strategies, to cooperate or defect. Recent work has considered continuous cooperative investments, turning full cooperation and full defecti...

In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum, non-cooperating, differential games where the players’ state dynamics solve backward stoch...

In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant&rsqu...

We show that a Bayesian game where the type space of each agent is a bounded set of m-dimensional vectors with non-negative components and the utility of each agent depends linearly on its own type only is equivalent to a simultaneous competition in...

We derive sufficient and necessary optimality conditions in terms of a stochastic maximum principle (SMP) for controls associated with cost functionals of mean-field type, under dynamics driven by a class of Markov chains of mean-field type which are...

Field studies of networks have uncovered a preference to befriend people we perceive as similar according to some dimensions of our identity (“homophily”). Lab studies of network formation games have found that adherence to social norms o...

This paper introduces a strategic element into the dictator game by allowing recipients to select their dictator. Recipients are presented with the photographs of two dictators and the envelopes containing their allocations, and are then asked to sel...

We study the determinants of borrowers’ default in P2P lending with a new data set consisting of 70,673 loan observations from the Lending Club. Previous research identified a number of default determining variables but did not distinguish betw...

In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a wi...

We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Be...

Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prosp...

We examine the impact of social distance in dictator game giving. The study is conducted in a field setting with high stakes (two days’ wages). The sample is a representative sample from eleven low-income Mexican villages. Subjects make multipl...

We consider a dominant platform provider operating both legacy and new platforms that connects users with suppliers in a two-sided market context. In addition to the typical indirect network effects in the two-sided market, backward compatibility wor...

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which...

Social preference models emphasize that perceived intentions motivate reciprocity. However, laboratory tests of this theory typically manipulate perceived intentions through changes in wealth resulting from a sacrifice in pay by another. There is lit...

Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness or conscious direction, yet there is reason to believe they may be influenced by social pressures. In this paper, I study social pressure as a motive to give, as well as giving itself und...