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Games, Volume 9, Issue 4 (December 2018)

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Open AccessArticle Playing a Game or Making a Decision? Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Distributional Preferences
Games 2018, 9(4), 80; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040080 (registering DOI)
Received: 24 August 2018 / Revised: 20 September 2018 / Accepted: 4 October 2018 / Published: 10 October 2018
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Abstract
In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and systemically vary role assignment as well as
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In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and systemically vary role assignment as well as the way information is displayed to subjects when measuring distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks as well as proper games. Specifically we examine choice behavior in the contexts of role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that there is large heterogeneity in the choices people make when deciding how to allocate resources between themselves and some other person under different contextual frames. For instance, people make more prosocial choices under role uncertainty as compared to role certainty. Furthermore, altering the way information is displayed given a particular situation can have a more dramatic effect on choice behavior than altering the situation itself. That is, depending on how information is displayed, people may behave as if they would perform a non-strategic decision making task when in fact they are playing a proper game characterized by strategic interdependence. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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Open AccessArticle Learning to Set the Reserve Price Optimally in Laboratory First Price Auctions
Games 2018, 9(4), 79; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040079
Received: 17 September 2018 / Revised: 27 September 2018 / Accepted: 28 September 2018 / Published: 9 October 2018
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Abstract
We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced
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We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was consistent with benchmark theory: average reserve price for these sellers was independent of the number of bidders and equaled the predicted level. Less experienced sellers however deviated from the theoretical benchmark: on average, they tended to shade reserve price below the predicted level and positively relate it to the number of bidders. Full article
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle How to Split Gains and Losses? Experimental Evidence of Dictator and Ultimatum Games
Games 2018, 9(4), 78; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040078
Received: 27 August 2018 / Revised: 26 September 2018 / Accepted: 3 October 2018 / Published: 5 October 2018
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Abstract
Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prospect theory predicts
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Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prospect theory predicts differences between behavior in both domains. In this study, we experimentally analyze players’ behavior in dictator and ultimatum games when they need to divide a monetary loss and then compare this to behavior when players have to divide a monetary gain. We find that players treat gains and losses differently in that they are less generous in games over losses and react differently to prior experiences. Players in the dictator game become more selfish after they have had the experience of playing an ultimatum game first. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
Open AccessArticle Social Distance Matters in Dictator Games: Evidence from 11 Mexican Villages
Games 2018, 9(4), 77; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040077
Received: 1 September 2018 / Revised: 27 September 2018 / Accepted: 29 September 2018 / Published: 2 October 2018
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Abstract
We examine the impact of social distance in dictator game giving. The study is conducted in a field setting with high stakes (two days’ wages). The sample is a representative sample from eleven low-income Mexican villages. Subjects make multiple dictator decisions simultaneously, in
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We examine the impact of social distance in dictator game giving. The study is conducted in a field setting with high stakes (two days’ wages). The sample is a representative sample from eleven low-income Mexican villages. Subjects make multiple dictator decisions simultaneously, in a comparative dictator game. We show the relationship between social distance and giving using several family members, a member of the same village, and a stranger from a different village. Dictator giving shows substantial variation across recipient types and varies directly with social distance. We find higher giving towards family members than towards community members and strangers. Furthermore, our results indicate that giving to community members and to strangers is not different. In light of our results, it is important to consider the impact of social distance on inter- and intra-household transfers in policy interventions that alleviate poverty, e.g., conditional transfers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle Equilibrium Analysis for Platform Developers in Two-Sided Market with Backward Compatibility
Games 2018, 9(4), 76; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040076
Received: 29 June 2018 / Revised: 7 September 2018 / Accepted: 28 September 2018 / Published: 1 October 2018
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Abstract
We consider a dominant platform provider operating both legacy and new platforms that connects users with suppliers in a two-sided market context. In addition to the typical indirect network effects in the two-sided market, backward compatibility works on the new platform. Thus, users
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We consider a dominant platform provider operating both legacy and new platforms that connects users with suppliers in a two-sided market context. In addition to the typical indirect network effects in the two-sided market, backward compatibility works on the new platform. Thus, users joining the new one can also enjoy the services provided by suppliers using the legacy platform. Users and suppliers are linearly differentiated between two platforms as in the Hotelling model and play a subscription game of choosing one platform at the lower level. The suppliers in the new platform may suffer from congestion, which can be alleviated by platform provider’s investment on the new one. The platform provider also determines price margins for the supplier sides. Our equilibrium (eq.) analysis in the subscription game identifies an interior eq. (coexistence of both platforms in both sides). Though the backward compatibility plays a stabilizing role for the interior eq., its stability is fragile due to the network effects. Rather, some boundary eq.’s, where at least one side tips to the legacy or the new platform, are more likely to be stable. The backward compatibility is a key factor that characterizes the stable boundary eq.’s. The upper stage game is led by the platform provider, which tries to maneuver the system toward one of the stable boundary eq.’s using price margins and investment. The platform provider prefers an all-new boundary eq. when the indirect network effect and the maximum price margin for the new platform are large; thus, it puts a significant investment in the new one. With a small indirect network effect for suppliers, however, the platform provider does not invest in the new platform and choose a separate boundary eq. where two sides split into different platforms. Whether the user side completely tips to the new one (completely separated eq.) or not (partially separated eq.) depends on the backward compatibility. The relative advantage of the all-new eq. over the separate eq.’s in terms of social welfare from both sides depends on the backward compatibility as well as the indirect network effects for the new platform. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Industrial Organization)
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Open AccessArticle Do Economists Punish Less?
Games 2018, 9(4), 75; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040075
Received: 28 August 2018 / Revised: 27 September 2018 / Accepted: 28 September 2018 / Published: 30 September 2018
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Abstract
A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social
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A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)
Open AccessArticle Intentions-Based Reciprocity to Monetary and Non-Monetary Gifts
Games 2018, 9(4), 74; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040074
Received: 1 September 2018 / Revised: 24 September 2018 / Accepted: 26 September 2018 / Published: 28 September 2018
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Abstract
Social preference models emphasize that perceived intentions motivate reciprocity. However, laboratory tests of this theory typically manipulate perceived intentions through changes in wealth resulting from a sacrifice in pay by another. There is little evidence on whether reciprocity occurs in response to perceived
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Social preference models emphasize that perceived intentions motivate reciprocity. However, laboratory tests of this theory typically manipulate perceived intentions through changes in wealth resulting from a sacrifice in pay by another. There is little evidence on whether reciprocity occurs in response to perceived intentions alone, independent of concurrent changes in pay and giver sacrifice (and any associated guilt from that sacrifice). This paper addresses this gap in the literature by implementing a modified dictator game where gifts to dictators are possible, but where gift transactions are also stochastically prevented by nature. This leads to instances of observed gift-giving intentions that yield no sacrifice or change in outcomes. In addition, this study uses both monetary and non-monetary gifts; previous studies typically use only monetary incentives, even though real-world applications of this literature often involve non-monetary incentives such as business or marketing gifts. The results show that on average, dictators reciprocated strongly to just the intention to give a gift, and they also reciprocated similarly to both monetary and non-monetary gifts. These results are consistent with intentions-based models of social preferences and with much of the marketing literature on business gifts. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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Open AccessArticle Does Implicit Bias Predict Dictator Giving?
Games 2018, 9(4), 73; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040073
Received: 1 August 2018 / Revised: 30 August 2018 / Accepted: 19 September 2018 / Published: 21 September 2018
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Abstract
Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness or conscious direction, yet there is reason to believe they may be influenced by social pressures. In this paper, I study social pressure as a motive to give, as well as giving itself under conditions
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Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness or conscious direction, yet there is reason to believe they may be influenced by social pressures. In this paper, I study social pressure as a motive to give, as well as giving itself under conditions of implicit bias. In doing so, I pair the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other social sciences, with a laboratory dictator game with sorting. I find that despite its popularity, the IAT does not predict dictator giving and social pressure does not explain acts of giving from biased dictators. These results are indicative of the meaningful difference between having an implicit bias and acting on one. As such, results can be thought of as a bound on the external validity of the IAT. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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