Special Issue "Self-Selection and Endogenous Entry in Experimental Games"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 April 2019

Special Issue Editors

Guest Editor
Prof. Henrik Orzen

Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Interests: experimental economics; applied game theory; industrial organization
Guest Editor
Prof. Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Department of Economics & Management, Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Website | E-Mail
Interests: experimental game theory; auctions; self-selection

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The large body of experimental research on behavior in games has provided invaluable insights into the general principles of strategic thinking, the role of fairness and social preferences, and the predictive power of various equilibrium concepts. Naturally, most of this work restricts attention to games with set payoffs and a fixed number of players. While there is a body of literature on multi-stage settings in which the players themselves choose which game to play, or whether to play at all, it is still relatively small. However, in many naturally-occurring settings, self-selection is extremely important. Multiple questions arise from such scenarios, such as what drives the players’ decisions? How does self-selection affect strategic behavior, and how does this evolve over time? Who chooses which type of game? Are there lessons to be learned for the design of experiments more generally? For this Special Issue, we invite papers that use experimental methods to examine these and other questions related to strategic behavior when self-selection and endogenous entry are relevant forces.

Prof. Henrik Orzen
Prof. Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 550 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.


  • experiments
  • endogenous entry and exit
  • self-selection
  • multi-stage games
  • opportunity costs
  • group formation

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle Endogenously Emerging Gender Pay Gap in an Experimental Teamwork Setting
Games 2018, 9(4), 98; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040098
Received: 14 October 2018 / Revised: 8 November 2018 / Accepted: 8 November 2018 / Published: 5 December 2018
PDF Full-text (1957 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
We studied gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams in a repeated teamwork setting. In our experiment, the participants (N = 168, 84 women and 84 men) chose whether to perform a cooperative task only with members of the own gender [...] Read more.
We studied gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams in a repeated teamwork setting. In our experiment, the participants (N = 168, 84 women and 84 men) chose whether to perform a cooperative task only with members of the own gender or in a mixed-gender team. We found that independent of the choice of team, in the initial period, men contributed significantly more to the team projects than women. Men preferred the successful men-only teams in the subsequent periods, resulting in significantly higher profits for men compared to women. This endogenously emerging “gender pay gap” only closed over time. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Self-Selection and Endogenous Entry in Experimental Games)

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