Special Issue "Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 December 2018).

Special Issue Editors

Guest Editor
Dr. Alberto Antonioni

University College London, UK; University of Zaragoza, Spain; Carlos III University of Madrid, Spain
Website | E-Mail
Interests: Evolutionary Game Theory; Complex Networks;Experimental Economics
Guest Editor
Dr. Jelena Grujić

Vrije Universiteit of Brussels, Belgium
Website | E-Mail
Interests: experimental game theory; evolutionary games on networks

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

We are glad to invite you to contribute to the special issue "Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments". Evolutionary Game Theory has been successfully applied to numerous biological, social, economic and physical systems, most of the time represented as networks of interaction among different system components. During the last two decades, network science has been proven to be a fundamental tool for analyzing and explaining game dynamics occurring within many of those systems. For instance, network reciprocity has been proposed as one of the leading mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods games. Evolutionary games on networks have been studied through analytical tools, massive computer simulations and within controlled laboratory and field experiments.

This Special Issue aims at bringing together researchers from various fields of complex systems interested in investigating game dynamics on networked systems. We accept contributions ranging from theoretical and agent-based modeling to more applied frameworks that include games occurring in static or evolving/dynamic network structures. Both short reviews and original papers will be considered for publication. Keywords below are merely indicative.

Dr. Alberto Antonioni
Dr. Jelena Grujić
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1000 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • evolutionary games
  • complex networks
  • evolution of cooperation
  • coordination games
  • chicken game
  • network reciprocity
  • dynamic networks
  • replicator dynamics
  • laboratory experiments
  • field experiments
  • network formation games

Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle
Investigating Peer and Sorting Effects within an Adaptive Multiplex Network Model
Games 2019, 10(2), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020016
Received: 28 December 2018 / Revised: 20 March 2019 / Accepted: 25 March 2019 / Published: 29 March 2019
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Abstract
Individuals have a strong tendency to coordinate with all their neighbors on social and economics networks. Coordination is often influenced by intrinsic preferences among the available options, which drive people to associate with similar peers, i.e., homophily. Many studies reported that behind coordination [...] Read more.
Individuals have a strong tendency to coordinate with all their neighbors on social and economics networks. Coordination is often influenced by intrinsic preferences among the available options, which drive people to associate with similar peers, i.e., homophily. Many studies reported that behind coordination game equilibria there is the individuals’ heterogeneity of preferences and that such heterogeneity is given a priori. We introduce a new mechanism which allows us to analyze the issue of heterogeneity from a cultural evolutionary point of view. Our framework considers agents interacting on a multiplex network who deal with coordination issues using social learning and payoff-driven dynamics. Agents form their heterogeneous preference through learning on one layer and they play a pure coordination game on the other layer. People learn from their peers that coordination is good and they also learn how to reach it either by conformism behavior or sorting strategy. We find that the presence of the social learning mechanism explains the rising and the endurance of a segregated society when members are diverse. Knowing how culture affects the ability to coordinate is useful for understanding how to reach social welfare in a diverse society. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments)
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Open AccessArticle
Learning Dynamics and Norm Psychology Supports Human Cooperation in a Large-Scale Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks
Games 2018, 9(4), 90; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040090
Received: 25 September 2018 / Revised: 25 October 2018 / Accepted: 30 October 2018 / Published: 2 November 2018
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Abstract
In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction learning model with some features [...] Read more.
In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction learning model with some features characterizing human norm psychology, namely the set of cognitive abilities humans have evolved to deal with social norms. We provide further evidence that this extended model—that we refer to as Experience Weighted Attraction with Norm Psychology—closely reproduces cooperative patterns of behavior observed in large-scale experiments with humans. In particular, we provide additional support for the finding that, when deciding to cooperate, humans balance between the choice that returns higher payoffs with the choice in agreement with social norms. In our experiment, agents play a prisoner’s dilemma game on various network structures: (i) a static lattice where agents have a fixed position; (ii) a regular random network where agents have a fixed position; and (iii) a dynamic lattice where agents are randomly re-positioned at each game iteration. Our results show that the network structure does not affect the dynamics of cooperation, which corroborates results of prior laboratory experiments. However, the network structure does seem to affect how individuals balance between their self-interested and normative choices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments)
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Open AccessArticle
Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation: An Experiment
Games 2018, 9(4), 89; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040089
Received: 25 September 2018 / Revised: 24 October 2018 / Accepted: 29 October 2018 / Published: 2 November 2018
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Abstract
Theoretical models on network formation focus mostly on the stability and efficiency of equilibria, but they cannot deliver an understanding of why specific equilibrium networks are selected or whether they are all actually reachable from any starting network. To study factors affecting equilibrium [...] Read more.
Theoretical models on network formation focus mostly on the stability and efficiency of equilibria, but they cannot deliver an understanding of why specific equilibrium networks are selected or whether they are all actually reachable from any starting network. To study factors affecting equilibrium selection, we designed a network formation experiment with multiple equilibria, which can be categorized in terms of the demand on players’ farsightedness and robustness to errors. In a second scenario, we increase the need for farsighted behavior by players, as well as the perceived riskiness of equilibria by adding a stage in which the network is disrupted. This setting allows us to analyze the interplay between the need for farsightedness and perceived risk of errors and its effect on network formation and equilibrium selection. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments)
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Open AccessArticle
Homophily and Social Norms in Experimental Network Formation Games
Games 2018, 9(4), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040083
Received: 21 September 2018 / Revised: 11 October 2018 / Accepted: 16 October 2018 / Published: 19 October 2018
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Abstract
Field studies of networks have uncovered a preference to befriend people we perceive as similar according to some dimensions of our identity (“homophily”). Lab studies of network formation games have found that adherence to social norms of reciprocity and inequity aversion are also [...] Read more.
Field studies of networks have uncovered a preference to befriend people we perceive as similar according to some dimensions of our identity (“homophily”). Lab studies of network formation games have found that adherence to social norms of reciprocity and inequity aversion are also drivers of network choices. No study so far has attempted to investigate the role of both homophily and social norms in a controlled environment. At the beginning of our experiment, each player fills in a personal profile. Each player then views the profile of all other players and expresses a degree of perceived similarity between his/her profile and the profile of the other player. At this point, a repeated network formation game ensues. We find that: (1) potential homophily considerations triggered by the profile rating task did not measurably change the players’ behavior compared to the baseline; (2) reciprocity plays a significant role in the formulation of the players’ strategies, in particular lowering the probability that the player naively best responds to the network observed in the previous period. We speculate that reciprocation of past choices might be a more “available” aid in strategy-formulation than considerations related to the similarity of the other players. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments)
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