Next Article in Journal
From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour
Previous Article in Journal / Special Issue
Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation: An Experiment
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2018, 9(4), 90; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040090

Learning Dynamics and Norm Psychology Supports Human Cooperation in a Large-Scale Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks

1
Instituto de Matemáticas Aplicadas, Universidad de Cartagena, 130001 Bolívar, Colombia
2
LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), 00185 Rome, Italy
3
Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
4
School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalens University, 722 20 Vasteras, Sweden
5
Institute for Futures Studies, 101 31 Stockholm, Sweden
6
Department of Informatics, Brandenburg University of Technology, 03046 Cottbus, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 25 September 2018 / Revised: 25 October 2018 / Accepted: 30 October 2018 / Published: 2 November 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games on Networks: From Theory to Experiments)
Full-Text   |   PDF [370 KB, uploaded 4 November 2018]   |  

Abstract

In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction learning model with some features characterizing human norm psychology, namely the set of cognitive abilities humans have evolved to deal with social norms. We provide further evidence that this extended model—that we refer to as Experience Weighted Attraction with Norm Psychology—closely reproduces cooperative patterns of behavior observed in large-scale experiments with humans. In particular, we provide additional support for the finding that, when deciding to cooperate, humans balance between the choice that returns higher payoffs with the choice in agreement with social norms. In our experiment, agents play a prisoner’s dilemma game on various network structures: (i) a static lattice where agents have a fixed position; (ii) a regular random network where agents have a fixed position; and (iii) a dynamic lattice where agents are randomly re-positioned at each game iteration. Our results show that the network structure does not affect the dynamics of cooperation, which corroborates results of prior laboratory experiments. However, the network structure does seem to affect how individuals balance between their self-interested and normative choices. View Full-Text
Keywords: cooperation; social norms; learning mechanisms; network reciprocity; computer simulations; laboratory experiments cooperation; social norms; learning mechanisms; network reciprocity; computer simulations; laboratory experiments
Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Realpe-Gómez, J.; Vilone, D.; Andrighetto, G.; Nardin, L.G.; Montoya, J.A. Learning Dynamics and Norm Psychology Supports Human Cooperation in a Large-Scale Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks. Games 2018, 9, 90.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top