Special Issue "The Evolution of Cooperation in Game Theory and Social Simulation"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 January 2019

Special Issue Editors

Guest Editor
Prof. Satoshi Uchida

Research Center for Ethi-Culture Studies, RINRI Institute
Website | E-Mail
Interests: Theoretical Ecology; Evolutionary Game Theory; Social Norm and Cooperation; Theoretical Ethics
Guest Editor
Prof. Hitoshi Yamamoto

Department of Business Administration, Rissho University
Website | E-Mail
Interests: Social Simulation; Evolution of Cooperation; Social Informatics; Agent-Based Modeling; Social Media
Guest Editor
Prof. Isamu Okada

Department of Business Administration, Soka University
Website | E-Mail
Interests: Evolutionary Game Theory; Social Simulation; Application of Social Dilemma; Computational Social Science

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Although cooperation is ubiquitous in the real world, it poses conundrums to game theoretical research. Workers in a company build a project team to perform a collective activity with other members. Social media users often provide beneficial information to the unspecified majority. Clearly, cooperative behaviors are useful to make real societies effective and smooth. On the other hand, the simplest model of cooperation in game theory predicts that, since cooperative behaviors incur costs to cooperators and free-riding is a better option, cooperation should not have emerged among rational people. Thus, there is a gap between what we observe in reality and what theory predicts. To fill this gap is an indispensable task to gain insights into real societies. Why do people cooperate? How can cooperation be promoted in real societies? Recently, theoreticians in a variety of fields such as economics, mathematics, and physics have been tackling these fundamental and practically important issues using tools developed in each discipline. Therefore, in this Special Issue, we collect papers that contribute to solving the conundrums of cooperation, using a wide range of tools including game theory, evolutionary dynamics, and social simulation methodologies.

Prof. Satoshi Uchida
Prof. Hitoshi Yamamoto
Prof. Isamu Okada
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 550 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Evolution of cooperation 
  • Game theory 
  • Evolutionary dynamics 
  • Social simulation 
  • Agent-based simulation 
  • Social dilemma

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Categorization and Cooperation across Games
Games 2019, 10(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010005
Received: 1 December 2018 / Revised: 30 December 2018 / Accepted: 8 January 2019 / Published: 14 January 2019
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Abstract
We study a model where agents face a continuum of two-player games and categorize them into a finite number of situations to make sense of their complex environment. Agents need not share the same categorization. Each agent can cooperate or defect, conditional on
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We study a model where agents face a continuum of two-player games and categorize them into a finite number of situations to make sense of their complex environment. Agents need not share the same categorization. Each agent can cooperate or defect, conditional on the perceived category. The games are fully ordered by the strength of the temptation to defect and break joint cooperation. In equilibrium agents share the same categorization, but achieve less cooperation than if they could perfectly discriminate games. All the equilibria are evolutionarily stable, but stochastic stability selects against cooperation. We model agents’ learning when they imitate successful players over similar games, but lack any information about the opponents’ categorizations. We show that imitation conditional on reaching an intermediate aspiration level leads to a shared categorization that achieves higher cooperation than under perfect discrimination. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Evolution of Cooperation in Game Theory and Social Simulation)
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions
Games 2018, 9(4), 100; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040100
Received: 29 September 2018 / Revised: 8 November 2018 / Accepted: 13 November 2018 / Published: 10 December 2018
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Abstract
Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they tolerate in a given round
[...] Read more.
Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they tolerate in a given round of a repeated game. Reciprocators are quicker to detect defectors to withdraw further cooperation when less generous, and better at maintaining a long-term cooperation in the presence of rare defectors when more generous. A previous analysis on a stochastic evolutionary model of the n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma has shown that the fixation probability of a single reciprocator in a population of defectors can be maximized for a moderate level of generosity. However, the analysis is limited in that it considers only tit-for-tat-type reciprocators within the conventional linear payoff assumption. Here we extend the previous study by removing these limitations and show that, if the games are repeated sufficiently many times, considering non-tit-for-tat type strategies does not alter the previous results, while the introduction of non-linear payoffs sometimes does. In particular, under certain conditions, the fixation probability is maximized for a “paradoxical” strategy, which cooperates in the presence of fewer cooperating opponents than in other situations in which it defects. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Evolution of Cooperation in Game Theory and Social Simulation)
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