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        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/66">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 66: Frankl&amp;ndash;Wilson Dividend Games: Compact Support and Tractable Shapley, Core, and Least-Core Computation</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/66</link>
	<description>Cooperative games with transferable utility are a standard framework for modeling collaboration, fair division, cost sharing, and coalition formation. Computing central solution concepts such as the Shapley value, the core, the least core, and the nucleolus is often computationally difficult because a general game contains exponentially many coalitions. Recent work on extremal dividend structures, such as sunflower-dividend games, shows that restricting the Harsanyi dividend support to a structured set family can restore substantial algorithmic tractability. This paper introduces Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend games, also called L-intersecting dividend games, a class of cooperative games in which the nonzero non-singleton Harsanyi dividends are supported on a structured intersection family. We distinguish two precise cases. In the uniform ordinary case, the dividend support is an r-uniform L-intersecting family: every two distinct dividend coalitions have an intersection size belonging to a fixed set L. In the modular Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson case, the dividend support satisfies prescribed intersection congruences modulo a prime p, together with the admissibility condition that coalition sizes avoid the allowed intersection residues modulo p. The algorithmic tools used in this paper are classical: the Shapley value is computed from Harsanyi dividends, and coalition-excess separation for non-negative dividends is performed via the standard maximum-weight closure construction. The paper does not propose a new Shapley algorithm, a new maximum-flow algorithm, or a new linear-programming method. Its main contribution is structural: it identifies Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson admissible dividend supports as a cooperative-game condition under which these classical procedures receive a polynomially compact input and therefore become polynomial-time algorithms in the number of players when the intersection complexity is fixed. We prove several results. First, for a modular Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend game with residue set A and s = &amp;amp;#8739;A&amp;amp;#8739;, the non-singleton dividend support has size at most &amp;amp;sum;i=0sni, which is polynomial in n for fixed s. In the uniform ordinary case with &amp;amp;#8739;L&amp;amp;#8739; = s, the support size is at most ns. Second, when the dividend support is explicitly given, the Shapley value is computable in time polynomial in n, the support size, and the input bit length. Third, for non-negative dividends, core and least-core separation can be performed through a maximum-weight closure construction whose graph size is polynomial in the dividend support. Hence, for fixed intersection complexity s, the least core is polynomial-time computable under explicit support. Fourth, we state a conditional nucleolus result. If the fixed constraints in the lexicographic scheme have a polynomial-size explicit representation and a polynomial-time constrained K-best closure oracle is available, then the nucleolus is polynomial-time computable. Without these additional assumptions, nucleolus computation for general Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend games remains open. Fifth, if a game&amp;amp;rsquo;s Harsanyi dividends can be approximated in dividend mass by an L-intersecting or Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson-admissible subfamily, then its Shapley value can be approximated with additive error bounded by the omitted dividend mass. We also show that total dividend approximation error gives explicit approximate least-core and approximate-core stability bounds. Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend games are closely related to several extremal dividend structures. Sunflower active coalitions with common kernel size &amp;amp;kappa; form a {&amp;amp;kappa;}-intersecting family; when the active coalitions are uniform, they fit the Type I case, and under additional modular admissibility conditions they may also fit Type II. Pairwise disjoint dividend coalitions correspond to L = {0}. Finite-geometric designs, block designs, and modular intersection families provide natural examples. The paper therefore extends the research program of using extremal set theory to create cooperative-game classes with exact or certified approximate tractability.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-11-04</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 66: Frankl&amp;ndash;Wilson Dividend Games: Compact Support and Tractable Shapley, Core, and Least-Core Computation</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/66">doi: 10.3390/g17060066</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Duc Nghia Vu
		Janos Demetrovics
		Duc Thi Vu
		</p>
	<p>Cooperative games with transferable utility are a standard framework for modeling collaboration, fair division, cost sharing, and coalition formation. Computing central solution concepts such as the Shapley value, the core, the least core, and the nucleolus is often computationally difficult because a general game contains exponentially many coalitions. Recent work on extremal dividend structures, such as sunflower-dividend games, shows that restricting the Harsanyi dividend support to a structured set family can restore substantial algorithmic tractability. This paper introduces Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend games, also called L-intersecting dividend games, a class of cooperative games in which the nonzero non-singleton Harsanyi dividends are supported on a structured intersection family. We distinguish two precise cases. In the uniform ordinary case, the dividend support is an r-uniform L-intersecting family: every two distinct dividend coalitions have an intersection size belonging to a fixed set L. In the modular Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson case, the dividend support satisfies prescribed intersection congruences modulo a prime p, together with the admissibility condition that coalition sizes avoid the allowed intersection residues modulo p. The algorithmic tools used in this paper are classical: the Shapley value is computed from Harsanyi dividends, and coalition-excess separation for non-negative dividends is performed via the standard maximum-weight closure construction. The paper does not propose a new Shapley algorithm, a new maximum-flow algorithm, or a new linear-programming method. Its main contribution is structural: it identifies Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson admissible dividend supports as a cooperative-game condition under which these classical procedures receive a polynomially compact input and therefore become polynomial-time algorithms in the number of players when the intersection complexity is fixed. We prove several results. First, for a modular Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend game with residue set A and s = &amp;amp;#8739;A&amp;amp;#8739;, the non-singleton dividend support has size at most &amp;amp;sum;i=0sni, which is polynomial in n for fixed s. In the uniform ordinary case with &amp;amp;#8739;L&amp;amp;#8739; = s, the support size is at most ns. Second, when the dividend support is explicitly given, the Shapley value is computable in time polynomial in n, the support size, and the input bit length. Third, for non-negative dividends, core and least-core separation can be performed through a maximum-weight closure construction whose graph size is polynomial in the dividend support. Hence, for fixed intersection complexity s, the least core is polynomial-time computable under explicit support. Fourth, we state a conditional nucleolus result. If the fixed constraints in the lexicographic scheme have a polynomial-size explicit representation and a polynomial-time constrained K-best closure oracle is available, then the nucleolus is polynomial-time computable. Without these additional assumptions, nucleolus computation for general Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend games remains open. Fifth, if a game&amp;amp;rsquo;s Harsanyi dividends can be approximated in dividend mass by an L-intersecting or Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson-admissible subfamily, then its Shapley value can be approximated with additive error bounded by the omitted dividend mass. We also show that total dividend approximation error gives explicit approximate least-core and approximate-core stability bounds. Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson dividend games are closely related to several extremal dividend structures. Sunflower active coalitions with common kernel size &amp;amp;kappa; form a {&amp;amp;kappa;}-intersecting family; when the active coalitions are uniform, they fit the Type I case, and under additional modular admissibility conditions they may also fit Type II. Pairwise disjoint dividend coalitions correspond to L = {0}. Finite-geometric designs, block designs, and modular intersection families provide natural examples. The paper therefore extends the research program of using extremal set theory to create cooperative-game classes with exact or certified approximate tractability.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Frankl&amp;amp;ndash;Wilson Dividend Games: Compact Support and Tractable Shapley, Core, and Least-Core Computation</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Duc Nghia Vu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Janos Demetrovics</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Duc Thi Vu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060066</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-11-04</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-11-04</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>66</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060066</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/66</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/65">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 65: Moderation Under Limited Reporting: Hidden Instability in Osaka&amp;rsquo;s High School Admissions</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/65</link>
	<description>Osaka&amp;amp;rsquo;s public high school admissions system uses a common score-based priority order and schools&amp;amp;rsquo; preferences, while restricting each student to reporting a single school. We show that the Osaka mechanism is neither priority-stable nor preference-stable, is not strategy-proof for students, and can conceal substantial instability in the admission records. Allowing students to report more schools weakly reduces underlying instability and the number of manipulable students, while making more of the remaining blocking pairs visible. Simulations show that tight reporting compresses quantitative differences across mechanisms. In the unstructured environment, the Osaka mechanism occupies an intermediate position between serial dictatorship and deferred acceptance, but this position disappears in the structured environment. The results show the benefits of broader reporting and the limits of Osaka&amp;amp;rsquo;s compromise between score-based priority and school discretion.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-11-03</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 65: Moderation Under Limited Reporting: Hidden Instability in Osaka&amp;rsquo;s High School Admissions</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/65">doi: 10.3390/g17060065</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yuanju Fang
		Zhaoying Lu
		</p>
	<p>Osaka&amp;amp;rsquo;s public high school admissions system uses a common score-based priority order and schools&amp;amp;rsquo; preferences, while restricting each student to reporting a single school. We show that the Osaka mechanism is neither priority-stable nor preference-stable, is not strategy-proof for students, and can conceal substantial instability in the admission records. Allowing students to report more schools weakly reduces underlying instability and the number of manipulable students, while making more of the remaining blocking pairs visible. Simulations show that tight reporting compresses quantitative differences across mechanisms. In the unstructured environment, the Osaka mechanism occupies an intermediate position between serial dictatorship and deferred acceptance, but this position disappears in the structured environment. The results show the benefits of broader reporting and the limits of Osaka&amp;amp;rsquo;s compromise between score-based priority and school discretion.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Moderation Under Limited Reporting: Hidden Instability in Osaka&amp;amp;rsquo;s High School Admissions</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yuanju Fang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Zhaoying Lu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060065</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-11-03</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-11-03</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>65</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060065</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/65</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/64">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 64: Employee Ownership and Entrenchment Strategies</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/64</link>
	<description>We study entrenchment in a signaling model of employee ownership. A manager, privately informed about their type, offers their employee a stake in the firm; the employee infers the manager&amp;amp;rsquo;s type from this offer and chooses their effort. A good manager finds it harder than a bad one to induce maximal effort, while both types rank contracts alike, which works against separation. When the dismissal threshold does not bind, the unique pure strategy equilibrium surviving a refinement of deviations is pooling. When it binds, a low-performing manager who keeps their position with positive probability grants more stock than under complete information only in equilibria in which the employee randomizes, and they are then exactly indifferent to doing so: over-granting appears, but it yields them nothing relative to the cheapest contract they offer, and it never reaches the level that entrenchment would require. In that regime, the cost of asymmetric information falls entirely on the low-performing manager, who may be expelled even when retaining them would make no party worse off and some strictly better off. With continuous effort, over-granting arises in every specification we compute, but it is unrelated to the threat of dismissal.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-11-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 64: Employee Ownership and Entrenchment Strategies</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/64">doi: 10.3390/g17060064</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Gwenaël Piaser
		</p>
	<p>We study entrenchment in a signaling model of employee ownership. A manager, privately informed about their type, offers their employee a stake in the firm; the employee infers the manager&amp;amp;rsquo;s type from this offer and chooses their effort. A good manager finds it harder than a bad one to induce maximal effort, while both types rank contracts alike, which works against separation. When the dismissal threshold does not bind, the unique pure strategy equilibrium surviving a refinement of deviations is pooling. When it binds, a low-performing manager who keeps their position with positive probability grants more stock than under complete information only in equilibria in which the employee randomizes, and they are then exactly indifferent to doing so: over-granting appears, but it yields them nothing relative to the cheapest contract they offer, and it never reaches the level that entrenchment would require. In that regime, the cost of asymmetric information falls entirely on the low-performing manager, who may be expelled even when retaining them would make no party worse off and some strictly better off. With continuous effort, over-granting arises in every specification we compute, but it is unrelated to the threat of dismissal.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Employee Ownership and Entrenchment Strategies</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Gwenaël Piaser</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060064</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-11-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-11-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>64</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060064</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/64</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/63">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 63: Potentials in Variable Network Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/63</link>
	<description>Variable network situations combine a network situation with a probability distribution on the set of all networks. In this framework, the decision maker does not know which particular network will materialize but has formed a well-defined probability distribution indicating the probabilities of the various networks materializing. I extend the concept of network potentials defined for network situations to variable network situations.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-11-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 63: Potentials in Variable Network Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/63">doi: 10.3390/g17060063</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Subhadip Chakrabarti
		</p>
	<p>Variable network situations combine a network situation with a probability distribution on the set of all networks. In this framework, the decision maker does not know which particular network will materialize but has formed a well-defined probability distribution indicating the probabilities of the various networks materializing. I extend the concept of network potentials defined for network situations to variable network situations.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Potentials in Variable Network Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Subhadip Chakrabarti</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060063</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-11-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-11-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>63</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060063</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/63</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/62">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 62: Explosive Radicalization, Hysteresis, and Peer Punishment on Hypergraphs: An Evolutionary Hawk&amp;ndash;Dove Game Approach to Cancel Culture</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/62</link>
	<description>In contemporary online social environments, the dynamics of the attention economy drive moral outrage and payoff-seeking diffusion, resulting in sudden collective ostracism and cancel culture. Extending recent adaptive network models of incomplete information games and the market for lemons, this study formulates an evolutionary Hawk&amp;amp;ndash;Dove game on simplicial complexes (hypergraphs) to capture multi-body collective interactions. We incorporate a nonlinear subjective payoff function parameterized by algorithmic boost and macro-level attention trends into 2-simplex group interactions. Both rigorous analytical derivations via higher-order replicator equations and large-scale tensor-based multi-agent simulations (N=102 to 5&amp;amp;times;104) reveal that group interactions induce a saddle-node bifurcation, triggering a discontinuous (first-order) phase transition toward explosive radicalization. Furthermore, we computationally prove that cancel culture dynamics exhibit strong collective hysteresis: post hoc cooling-off interventions fail to restore the system to baseline informational integrity due to an irreversible relaxation trap. Finally, by evaluating decentralized sanctions (peer punishment), we identify a sharp critical boundary (&amp;amp;alpha;punish&amp;amp;asymp;0.3) governed by punishment penalty rather than execution cost. Through novel sensitivity analysis, we demonstrate that this threshold is scale-free and remarkably invariant to algorithmic boost levels. Below this threshold, second-order free-riding causes systemic breakdown, whereas sufficient punishment establishes an absolute absorbing state of informational integrity. These findings establish optimal architectural prerequisites for next-generation platform governance.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-11-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 62: Explosive Radicalization, Hysteresis, and Peer Punishment on Hypergraphs: An Evolutionary Hawk&amp;ndash;Dove Game Approach to Cancel Culture</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/62">doi: 10.3390/g17060062</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yasuko Kawahata
		Shunsuke Hatadani
		</p>
	<p>In contemporary online social environments, the dynamics of the attention economy drive moral outrage and payoff-seeking diffusion, resulting in sudden collective ostracism and cancel culture. Extending recent adaptive network models of incomplete information games and the market for lemons, this study formulates an evolutionary Hawk&amp;amp;ndash;Dove game on simplicial complexes (hypergraphs) to capture multi-body collective interactions. We incorporate a nonlinear subjective payoff function parameterized by algorithmic boost and macro-level attention trends into 2-simplex group interactions. Both rigorous analytical derivations via higher-order replicator equations and large-scale tensor-based multi-agent simulations (N=102 to 5&amp;amp;times;104) reveal that group interactions induce a saddle-node bifurcation, triggering a discontinuous (first-order) phase transition toward explosive radicalization. Furthermore, we computationally prove that cancel culture dynamics exhibit strong collective hysteresis: post hoc cooling-off interventions fail to restore the system to baseline informational integrity due to an irreversible relaxation trap. Finally, by evaluating decentralized sanctions (peer punishment), we identify a sharp critical boundary (&amp;amp;alpha;punish&amp;amp;asymp;0.3) governed by punishment penalty rather than execution cost. Through novel sensitivity analysis, we demonstrate that this threshold is scale-free and remarkably invariant to algorithmic boost levels. Below this threshold, second-order free-riding causes systemic breakdown, whereas sufficient punishment establishes an absolute absorbing state of informational integrity. These findings establish optimal architectural prerequisites for next-generation platform governance.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Explosive Radicalization, Hysteresis, and Peer Punishment on Hypergraphs: An Evolutionary Hawk&amp;amp;ndash;Dove Game Approach to Cancel Culture</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yasuko Kawahata</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Shunsuke Hatadani</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060062</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-11-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-11-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>62</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060062</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/62</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/61">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 61: Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/61</link>
	<description>Auction theorists have long recognized that allocation mechanisms differ not only in outcomes but also in the information they reveal. Revelation of a winner&amp;amp;rsquo;s valuation, for example, may affect subsequent dealings with lenders, suppliers, regulators, labor unions, and other third parties. We examine the analogous question for the lottery contest with complete information and asymmetric values, in which a prize is awarded probabilistically on the basis of contestants&amp;amp;rsquo; efforts. We show that the equilibrium effort profile uniquely identifies the valuations of all active contestants. If information revelation to third parties carries economic consequences in contest environments, this transparency may itself have implications for equilibrium behavior.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-11-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 61: Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/61">doi: 10.3390/g17060061</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Sean F. Ellermeyer
		Jesse A. Schwartz
		</p>
	<p>Auction theorists have long recognized that allocation mechanisms differ not only in outcomes but also in the information they reveal. Revelation of a winner&amp;amp;rsquo;s valuation, for example, may affect subsequent dealings with lenders, suppliers, regulators, labor unions, and other third parties. We examine the analogous question for the lottery contest with complete information and asymmetric values, in which a prize is awarded probabilistically on the basis of contestants&amp;amp;rsquo; efforts. We show that the equilibrium effort profile uniquely identifies the valuations of all active contestants. If information revelation to third parties carries economic consequences in contest environments, this transparency may itself have implications for equilibrium behavior.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Sean F. Ellermeyer</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jesse A. Schwartz</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060061</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-11-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-11-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>61</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060061</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/61</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/60">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 60: Managerial Belief Bias and Risk Preference in Price&amp;ndash;Quality Competition: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/60</link>
	<description>Managerial belief bias and risk preference shape strategic decisions through different channels: beliefs affect perceived consumer valuations, whereas risk preference affects the valuation of profit volatility. We develop a differentiated-duopoly model in which firms choose quality before competing in prices. One manager may hold an optimistic or pessimistic assessment of consumers&amp;amp;rsquo; willingness to pay and exhibit risk-seeking, risk-neutral, or risk-averse preferences; the rival holds unbiased beliefs and is risk-neutral. Under simultaneous pricing, the biased firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s price increases with its willingness-to-pay assessment, while the rival&amp;amp;rsquo;s price may respond non-monotonically. Relative to the unbiased benchmark, either direction of nonzero belief bias raises the biased firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s unit margin but reduces its actual expected demand. The rival benefits from every nonzero admissible bias. Both firms gain when the biased manager is risk-averse and the distortion is sufficiently small relative to the degree of risk aversion. Under risk neutrality or risk seeking, bias reduces the focal firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s actual expected profit. Sequential-pricing extensions show that managerial characteristics can reverse leader&amp;amp;ndash;follower profit rankings. The price leader earns more than the follower over an intermediate range of risk aversion, while sufficiently large admissible belief distortions reverse the biased follower&amp;amp;rsquo;s profit advantage under risk neutrality. These findings identify risk preference as a condition governing the profitability of biased beliefs and explain how managerial heterogeneity shapes price&amp;amp;ndash;quality decisions and competitive spillovers.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-31</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 60: Managerial Belief Bias and Risk Preference in Price&amp;ndash;Quality Competition: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/60">doi: 10.3390/g17060060</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Minghua Xiong
		Weiting Yang
		Jiancong Liang
		Mingjun Zhan
		</p>
	<p>Managerial belief bias and risk preference shape strategic decisions through different channels: beliefs affect perceived consumer valuations, whereas risk preference affects the valuation of profit volatility. We develop a differentiated-duopoly model in which firms choose quality before competing in prices. One manager may hold an optimistic or pessimistic assessment of consumers&amp;amp;rsquo; willingness to pay and exhibit risk-seeking, risk-neutral, or risk-averse preferences; the rival holds unbiased beliefs and is risk-neutral. Under simultaneous pricing, the biased firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s price increases with its willingness-to-pay assessment, while the rival&amp;amp;rsquo;s price may respond non-monotonically. Relative to the unbiased benchmark, either direction of nonzero belief bias raises the biased firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s unit margin but reduces its actual expected demand. The rival benefits from every nonzero admissible bias. Both firms gain when the biased manager is risk-averse and the distortion is sufficiently small relative to the degree of risk aversion. Under risk neutrality or risk seeking, bias reduces the focal firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s actual expected profit. Sequential-pricing extensions show that managerial characteristics can reverse leader&amp;amp;ndash;follower profit rankings. The price leader earns more than the follower over an intermediate range of risk aversion, while sufficiently large admissible belief distortions reverse the biased follower&amp;amp;rsquo;s profit advantage under risk neutrality. These findings identify risk preference as a condition governing the profitability of biased beliefs and explain how managerial heterogeneity shapes price&amp;amp;ndash;quality decisions and competitive spillovers.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Managerial Belief Bias and Risk Preference in Price&amp;amp;ndash;Quality Competition: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Minghua Xiong</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Weiting Yang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jiancong Liang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Mingjun Zhan</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17060060</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-31</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-31</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>60</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17060060</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/6/60</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/59">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 59: A Fischer&amp;ndash;Burmeister Merit Function Approach to Neural Network Approximation of Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Continuous Actions and Types</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/59</link>
	<description>Bayesian games model interactions where players possess private information and have incomplete information about each other. Computing Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) in continuous Bayesian games remains challenging due to infinite-dimensional strategy spaces, multi-objective conditions, and intractable expected utilities. To address these computational bottlenecks, this paper proposes a novel learning framework. First, we reformulate the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s equilibrium problem into a tractable single-objective minimization task by leveraging the Fischer&amp;amp;ndash;Burmeister function to combine all players&amp;amp;rsquo; Karush&amp;amp;ndash;Kuhn&amp;amp;ndash;Tucker (KKT) conditions into a global merit function. Second, we introduce a dual neural network architecture per player&amp;amp;mdash;coupling strategy and Lagrange networks&amp;amp;mdash;to effectively approximate continuous strategy spaces. Third, we integrate Monte Carlo sampling to tractably evaluate expected utilities during training. We theoretically establish the asymptotic convergence of the cost function under stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and show that, conditional on the trained networks achieving a sufficiently small empirical merit loss, the resulting strategy profiles constitute an &amp;amp;#1013;-Bayesian Nash equilibrium (&amp;amp;#1013;-BNE) under sufficiently large sample sizes. Experiments and theoretical analysis demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for continuous incomplete-information games with strongly concave utilities that are thrice continuously differentiable and have bounded first and second derivatives.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-16</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 59: A Fischer&amp;ndash;Burmeister Merit Function Approach to Neural Network Approximation of Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Continuous Actions and Types</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/59">doi: 10.3390/g17050059</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Andres E. Ho Lee
		Lichun Li
		</p>
	<p>Bayesian games model interactions where players possess private information and have incomplete information about each other. Computing Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) in continuous Bayesian games remains challenging due to infinite-dimensional strategy spaces, multi-objective conditions, and intractable expected utilities. To address these computational bottlenecks, this paper proposes a novel learning framework. First, we reformulate the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s equilibrium problem into a tractable single-objective minimization task by leveraging the Fischer&amp;amp;ndash;Burmeister function to combine all players&amp;amp;rsquo; Karush&amp;amp;ndash;Kuhn&amp;amp;ndash;Tucker (KKT) conditions into a global merit function. Second, we introduce a dual neural network architecture per player&amp;amp;mdash;coupling strategy and Lagrange networks&amp;amp;mdash;to effectively approximate continuous strategy spaces. Third, we integrate Monte Carlo sampling to tractably evaluate expected utilities during training. We theoretically establish the asymptotic convergence of the cost function under stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and show that, conditional on the trained networks achieving a sufficiently small empirical merit loss, the resulting strategy profiles constitute an &amp;amp;#1013;-Bayesian Nash equilibrium (&amp;amp;#1013;-BNE) under sufficiently large sample sizes. Experiments and theoretical analysis demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for continuous incomplete-information games with strongly concave utilities that are thrice continuously differentiable and have bounded first and second derivatives.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Fischer&amp;amp;ndash;Burmeister Merit Function Approach to Neural Network Approximation of Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Continuous Actions and Types</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Andres E. Ho Lee</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Lichun Li</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050059</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-16</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-16</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>59</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050059</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/59</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/58">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 58: Finite-Horizon Collapse of Platforms Driven by Information Fatigue: An Agent-Based Threshold Model Inspired by Cheap Talk</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/58</link>
	<description>In recent years, within the attention economy centered on social media, the proliferation of sensational fake news and noise aimed at capturing attention (economic and social gains) has emerged as a severe social pathology. Focusing on the defining characteristic of the modern information environment&amp;amp;mdash;that the cost of information transmission is virtually zero&amp;amp;mdash;this paper adopts the &amp;amp;ldquo;Dynamic Cheap Talk Model&amp;amp;rdquo; originating from Crawford and Sobel (1982) as its theoretical foundation, rather than classical signaling theory (Spence, 1973), which separates high- and low-quality information through cost differentials. In a cheap-talk environment with zero transmission costs, the self-interested pursuit of senders boundlessly increases noise on the platform. This study computationally illustrates the mechanism by which this excessive noise irreversibly accumulates &amp;amp;ldquo;Information Fatigue&amp;amp;rdquo; among receivers, depleting the cognitive resources (a commons) required to infer the veracity of information, and ultimately leading to the collapse of the entire platform into a &amp;amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons.&amp;amp;rdquo; To demonstrate the validity of this approach, we constructed a large-scale multi-agent simulation where high-quality senders and low-quality senders (noise-makers) coexist, and conducted computational experiments. The analysis computationally illustrates that when the proliferation of noise variance exceeds a certain critical point, a finite-horizon collapse of total payoff occurs due to the simultaneous opt-out of receivers, resulting in a phenomenon where even high-quality senders are collaterally driven out (the failure of unraveling). Furthermore, we conducted extended computational experiments incorporating three advanced dynamics: (1) algorithmic amplification of noise (preferential attachment), (2) evolutionary game dynamics of sender strategy adaptation (the chain of degradation), and (3) the delay limits of ex post crowdsourced fact-checking (e.g., Community Notes). The results reveal that algorithmic intervention dramatically accelerates the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s self-destruction limit, and the senders&amp;amp;rsquo; adaptation process causes the system to experience catastrophic failure before the degradation of all agents is complete. Additionally, we quantitatively identified that to avert collapse through institutional intervention, corrections must be implemented within a strict &amp;amp;ldquo;Maximum Tolerable Delay.&amp;amp;rdquo; This research elucidates Gresham&amp;amp;rsquo;s dynamics of information in the attention economy through complex system simulation, providing simulation evidence for maintaining the hygiene of information spaces and designing sustainable platforms.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-14</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 58: Finite-Horizon Collapse of Platforms Driven by Information Fatigue: An Agent-Based Threshold Model Inspired by Cheap Talk</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/58">doi: 10.3390/g17050058</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yasuko Kawahata
		Shunsuke Hatadani
		</p>
	<p>In recent years, within the attention economy centered on social media, the proliferation of sensational fake news and noise aimed at capturing attention (economic and social gains) has emerged as a severe social pathology. Focusing on the defining characteristic of the modern information environment&amp;amp;mdash;that the cost of information transmission is virtually zero&amp;amp;mdash;this paper adopts the &amp;amp;ldquo;Dynamic Cheap Talk Model&amp;amp;rdquo; originating from Crawford and Sobel (1982) as its theoretical foundation, rather than classical signaling theory (Spence, 1973), which separates high- and low-quality information through cost differentials. In a cheap-talk environment with zero transmission costs, the self-interested pursuit of senders boundlessly increases noise on the platform. This study computationally illustrates the mechanism by which this excessive noise irreversibly accumulates &amp;amp;ldquo;Information Fatigue&amp;amp;rdquo; among receivers, depleting the cognitive resources (a commons) required to infer the veracity of information, and ultimately leading to the collapse of the entire platform into a &amp;amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons.&amp;amp;rdquo; To demonstrate the validity of this approach, we constructed a large-scale multi-agent simulation where high-quality senders and low-quality senders (noise-makers) coexist, and conducted computational experiments. The analysis computationally illustrates that when the proliferation of noise variance exceeds a certain critical point, a finite-horizon collapse of total payoff occurs due to the simultaneous opt-out of receivers, resulting in a phenomenon where even high-quality senders are collaterally driven out (the failure of unraveling). Furthermore, we conducted extended computational experiments incorporating three advanced dynamics: (1) algorithmic amplification of noise (preferential attachment), (2) evolutionary game dynamics of sender strategy adaptation (the chain of degradation), and (3) the delay limits of ex post crowdsourced fact-checking (e.g., Community Notes). The results reveal that algorithmic intervention dramatically accelerates the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s self-destruction limit, and the senders&amp;amp;rsquo; adaptation process causes the system to experience catastrophic failure before the degradation of all agents is complete. Additionally, we quantitatively identified that to avert collapse through institutional intervention, corrections must be implemented within a strict &amp;amp;ldquo;Maximum Tolerable Delay.&amp;amp;rdquo; This research elucidates Gresham&amp;amp;rsquo;s dynamics of information in the attention economy through complex system simulation, providing simulation evidence for maintaining the hygiene of information spaces and designing sustainable platforms.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Finite-Horizon Collapse of Platforms Driven by Information Fatigue: An Agent-Based Threshold Model Inspired by Cheap Talk</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yasuko Kawahata</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Shunsuke Hatadani</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050058</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-14</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-14</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>58</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050058</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/58</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/57">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 57: Suboptimality of Probability Matching: A Formal Characterization, a Graphical Analysis and an Impulse Balance Interpretation</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/57</link>
	<description>We characterize the suboptimality of probability matching in prediction tasks with an arbitrary (finite) number of equally rewarded, independent and identically distributed outcomes and an arbitrary number of repetitions, for deterministic, randomized and history-dependent guessing. The characterization gives the condition under which probability matching attains the maximal expected payoff and quantifies the loss it entails otherwise. For the common case of binary prediction tasks, we also provide a graphical representation of the result. Finally, we relate probability matching to impulse balance equilibrium theory and show when probability matching is consistent with its predictions.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-13</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 57: Suboptimality of Probability Matching: A Formal Characterization, a Graphical Analysis and an Impulse Balance Interpretation</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/57">doi: 10.3390/g17050057</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Vittorio Larocca
		Luca Panaccione
		</p>
	<p>We characterize the suboptimality of probability matching in prediction tasks with an arbitrary (finite) number of equally rewarded, independent and identically distributed outcomes and an arbitrary number of repetitions, for deterministic, randomized and history-dependent guessing. The characterization gives the condition under which probability matching attains the maximal expected payoff and quantifies the loss it entails otherwise. For the common case of binary prediction tasks, we also provide a graphical representation of the result. Finally, we relate probability matching to impulse balance equilibrium theory and show when probability matching is consistent with its predictions.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Suboptimality of Probability Matching: A Formal Characterization, a Graphical Analysis and an Impulse Balance Interpretation</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Vittorio Larocca</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Luca Panaccione</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050057</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-13</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-13</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>57</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050057</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/57</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/56">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 56: A Failed Cartel: When Collusive Firms Become Competitors</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/56</link>
	<description>Collusive agreements may break down completely or leave behind a surviving coalition of firms that continues to coordinate its production. We study an exogenously specified partial-cartel structure in which one firm operates independently while the remaining firms maximize their joint profit. We use the term failed cartel to indicate the institutional origin of this market configuration, without claiming that the breakdown, the identity of the outsider, or the persistence of the surviving coalition is determined endogenously. For comparison, we also consider a Cournot&amp;amp;ndash;Stackelberg structure in which the former cartel members compete non-cooperatively while anticipating the quantity choice of a common follower. We therefore reformulate the stationary first-order conditions as a fixed-point problem in which the follower&amp;amp;rsquo;s implicitly defined stationary response b3(x,y), rather than the derivative-generated mapping F3&amp;amp;lambda;3(x,y,z), forms the third component of the corresponding operator. Fixed points of this operator characterize stationary solutions and provide conditional criteria for uniqueness and numerical approximation on an invariant region. When feasibility and the relevant sufficient optimality conditions are satisfied, these stationary solutions determine market equilibria. The linear n-firm analysis compares equilibrium output, prices, profits, market shares, asymmetry, and concentration across the considered market structures. Consumer surplus and total surplus comparisons are provided separately for the illustrative linear quadratic triopoly and are not asserted for general nonlinear demand. A separate isoelastic triopoly with linear costs provides a globally optimal partial-cartel outcome and a verified scalar contraction algorithm, with full-cartel and Cournot benchmarks.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-10</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 56: A Failed Cartel: When Collusive Firms Become Competitors</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/56">doi: 10.3390/g17050056</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Anton Badev
		Vanya Ivanova
		Diana Nedelcheva
		Martin Pavlov
		Boyan Zlatanov
		</p>
	<p>Collusive agreements may break down completely or leave behind a surviving coalition of firms that continues to coordinate its production. We study an exogenously specified partial-cartel structure in which one firm operates independently while the remaining firms maximize their joint profit. We use the term failed cartel to indicate the institutional origin of this market configuration, without claiming that the breakdown, the identity of the outsider, or the persistence of the surviving coalition is determined endogenously. For comparison, we also consider a Cournot&amp;amp;ndash;Stackelberg structure in which the former cartel members compete non-cooperatively while anticipating the quantity choice of a common follower. We therefore reformulate the stationary first-order conditions as a fixed-point problem in which the follower&amp;amp;rsquo;s implicitly defined stationary response b3(x,y), rather than the derivative-generated mapping F3&amp;amp;lambda;3(x,y,z), forms the third component of the corresponding operator. Fixed points of this operator characterize stationary solutions and provide conditional criteria for uniqueness and numerical approximation on an invariant region. When feasibility and the relevant sufficient optimality conditions are satisfied, these stationary solutions determine market equilibria. The linear n-firm analysis compares equilibrium output, prices, profits, market shares, asymmetry, and concentration across the considered market structures. Consumer surplus and total surplus comparisons are provided separately for the illustrative linear quadratic triopoly and are not asserted for general nonlinear demand. A separate isoelastic triopoly with linear costs provides a globally optimal partial-cartel outcome and a verified scalar contraction algorithm, with full-cartel and Cournot benchmarks.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Failed Cartel: When Collusive Firms Become Competitors</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Anton Badev</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Vanya Ivanova</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Diana Nedelcheva</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Martin Pavlov</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Boyan Zlatanov</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050056</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-10</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-10</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>56</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050056</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/56</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/55">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 55: Regret Aversion and Market Provision of (Cyber)Security</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/55</link>
	<description>This paper studies the effect of market structure on cybersecurity under alternative behavioral models of consumer risk preference. I show that consumer regret aversion can reverse the competitive effect on security provision. If consumers are expected utility maximizers, competition between service providers leads to lower security. By contrast, if consumers are regret averse, competition instead leads to higher market-level security. I also characterize the conditions under which the results extend to a general regret function and a general demand system. I conclude with implications for antitrust law and cyber policy. The findings provide a rationale for behavioral interventions in cybersecurity such as ranking-and-shaming programs.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 55: Regret Aversion and Market Provision of (Cyber)Security</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/55">doi: 10.3390/g17050055</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Pengfei Zhang
		</p>
	<p>This paper studies the effect of market structure on cybersecurity under alternative behavioral models of consumer risk preference. I show that consumer regret aversion can reverse the competitive effect on security provision. If consumers are expected utility maximizers, competition between service providers leads to lower security. By contrast, if consumers are regret averse, competition instead leads to higher market-level security. I also characterize the conditions under which the results extend to a general regret function and a general demand system. I conclude with implications for antitrust law and cyber policy. The findings provide a rationale for behavioral interventions in cybersecurity such as ranking-and-shaming programs.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Regret Aversion and Market Provision of (Cyber)Security</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Pengfei Zhang</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050055</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>55</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050055</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/55</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/54">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 54: Bertrand Competition with Cost Uncertainty and a Discrete Strategic Space</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/54</link>
	<description>We consider a Bertrand duopoly in which firms do not know the rival&amp;amp;rsquo;s cost and choose their prices from a discrete set. Contrary to the case of a continuous strategic space, there might be multiple separating equilibria and a unique pooling equilibrium. The analysis shows the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium is more profitable than a separating equilibrium.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-08</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 54: Bertrand Competition with Cost Uncertainty and a Discrete Strategic Space</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/54">doi: 10.3390/g17050054</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Stefano Colombo
		Gülen Karakoç
		Aldo Pignataro
		</p>
	<p>We consider a Bertrand duopoly in which firms do not know the rival&amp;amp;rsquo;s cost and choose their prices from a discrete set. Contrary to the case of a continuous strategic space, there might be multiple separating equilibria and a unique pooling equilibrium. The analysis shows the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium is more profitable than a separating equilibrium.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Bertrand Competition with Cost Uncertainty and a Discrete Strategic Space</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Stefano Colombo</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Gülen Karakoç</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Aldo Pignataro</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050054</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-08</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-08</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>54</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050054</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/54</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/53">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 53: Passive Partial Forward Ownership and Strategic Trade Policy in Vertically Related Industries</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/53</link>
	<description>Forward ownership allows upstream suppliers to internalize part of downstream profit, but its implications for strategic trade policy under competition between independent supply chains remain unclear. This paper develops a three-stage third-market model with two exclusive vertical supply chains whose upstream suppliers are located in the Rest of the World. Solving the model for general passive ownership shares, we compare no ownership (NN), unilateral ownership (YN), and bilateral ownership (YY). Within the maintained interior region, forward ownership lowers intermediate-input prices, mitigates double marginalization, and increases aggregate output; bilateral ownership produces the lowest input prices and the highest total output. Nevertheless, all three regimes yield export taxes because upstream operating profit and ownership income are excluded from the exporting countries&amp;amp;rsquo; welfare. Under YN, the affiliated downstream producer&amp;amp;rsquo;s operating profit rises, whereas the profit retained by its original domestic shareholders, excluding the acquisition payment, falls. A fixed-transfer stability test shows that a mutually acceptable acquisition payment exists only when the ownership share is sufficiently small. These results distinguish the input-pricing effect of forward ownership from the welfare effect of domestic upstream-rent internalization: the former changes the magnitude of equilibrium policies, but without the latter, it does not reverse export taxation.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-10-01</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 53: Passive Partial Forward Ownership and Strategic Trade Policy in Vertically Related Industries</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/53">doi: 10.3390/g17050053</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yun-Ru Li
		Chien-Hui Lee
		Jen-Yao Lee
		Hsiu-Tao Teng
		</p>
	<p>Forward ownership allows upstream suppliers to internalize part of downstream profit, but its implications for strategic trade policy under competition between independent supply chains remain unclear. This paper develops a three-stage third-market model with two exclusive vertical supply chains whose upstream suppliers are located in the Rest of the World. Solving the model for general passive ownership shares, we compare no ownership (NN), unilateral ownership (YN), and bilateral ownership (YY). Within the maintained interior region, forward ownership lowers intermediate-input prices, mitigates double marginalization, and increases aggregate output; bilateral ownership produces the lowest input prices and the highest total output. Nevertheless, all three regimes yield export taxes because upstream operating profit and ownership income are excluded from the exporting countries&amp;amp;rsquo; welfare. Under YN, the affiliated downstream producer&amp;amp;rsquo;s operating profit rises, whereas the profit retained by its original domestic shareholders, excluding the acquisition payment, falls. A fixed-transfer stability test shows that a mutually acceptable acquisition payment exists only when the ownership share is sufficiently small. These results distinguish the input-pricing effect of forward ownership from the welfare effect of domestic upstream-rent internalization: the former changes the magnitude of equilibrium policies, but without the latter, it does not reverse export taxation.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Passive Partial Forward Ownership and Strategic Trade Policy in Vertically Related Industries</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yun-Ru Li</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Chien-Hui Lee</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jen-Yao Lee</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Hsiu-Tao Teng</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050053</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-10-01</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>53</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050053</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/53</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/52">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 52: Bride Price, Circumstance-Contingent Repayment, and Marital Investment in China: A Two-Stage Investment and Nash Bargaining Model</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/52</link>
	<description>This paper develops a two-stage investment-and-bargaining model of marital behavior under circumstance-contingent bride-price repayment in China. In Stage 1, spouses simultaneously choose relationship-specific investments in a non-cooperative game. In Stage 2, after investments and the legally relevant state are realized, they divide marital surplus according to a generalized Nash bargaining solution with divorce as the fixed disagreement outcome. Under the benchmark legal-state mapping, the legal rule shifts the wife&amp;amp;rsquo;s investment incentives directly because observable consequences of her investment can affect anticipated repayment and hence her future disagreement payoff; the husband&amp;amp;rsquo;s own investment condition contains no analogous direct legal-return term. Under a quadratic-linear specification, the best-response slopes have the sign of the technological interaction parameter, so technological complementarity generates strategic complementarity and technological substitutability generates strategic substitutability. A larger bride price, as a partial effect holding the anticipated repayment schedule fixed, or a steeper circumstance-contingent schedule shifts the wife&amp;amp;rsquo;s best response outward. The husband&amp;amp;rsquo;s equilibrium investment then rises under strategic complementarity and falls under strategic substitutability. Within the maintained agreement, affine-branch, positive-determinant, and strict-interiority regime, the quadratic-linear model has a unique Stage-1 Nash equilibrium, and the legal return can reduce, eliminate, or reverse the wife&amp;amp;rsquo;s direct marginal hold-up wedge. The analysis illustrates how a legal rule affecting a future disagreement payoff can reshape pre-bargaining strategies.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-09-22</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 52: Bride Price, Circumstance-Contingent Repayment, and Marital Investment in China: A Two-Stage Investment and Nash Bargaining Model</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/52">doi: 10.3390/g17050052</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Wenjun Fan
		Yong Yoon
		</p>
	<p>This paper develops a two-stage investment-and-bargaining model of marital behavior under circumstance-contingent bride-price repayment in China. In Stage 1, spouses simultaneously choose relationship-specific investments in a non-cooperative game. In Stage 2, after investments and the legally relevant state are realized, they divide marital surplus according to a generalized Nash bargaining solution with divorce as the fixed disagreement outcome. Under the benchmark legal-state mapping, the legal rule shifts the wife&amp;amp;rsquo;s investment incentives directly because observable consequences of her investment can affect anticipated repayment and hence her future disagreement payoff; the husband&amp;amp;rsquo;s own investment condition contains no analogous direct legal-return term. Under a quadratic-linear specification, the best-response slopes have the sign of the technological interaction parameter, so technological complementarity generates strategic complementarity and technological substitutability generates strategic substitutability. A larger bride price, as a partial effect holding the anticipated repayment schedule fixed, or a steeper circumstance-contingent schedule shifts the wife&amp;amp;rsquo;s best response outward. The husband&amp;amp;rsquo;s equilibrium investment then rises under strategic complementarity and falls under strategic substitutability. Within the maintained agreement, affine-branch, positive-determinant, and strict-interiority regime, the quadratic-linear model has a unique Stage-1 Nash equilibrium, and the legal return can reduce, eliminate, or reverse the wife&amp;amp;rsquo;s direct marginal hold-up wedge. The analysis illustrates how a legal rule affecting a future disagreement payoff can reshape pre-bargaining strategies.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Bride Price, Circumstance-Contingent Repayment, and Marital Investment in China: A Two-Stage Investment and Nash Bargaining Model</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Wenjun Fan</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Yong Yoon</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050052</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-09-22</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-09-22</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>52</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050052</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/52</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/51">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 51: When Can the Weaker Player Win? A Game-Theoretic Model of Humans Against a More Powerful AI</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/51</link>
	<description>As AI systems approach and surpass human ability across more and more tasks, we ask a deliberately pessimistic question: if a far more capable AI turned adversarial, are there still games a human could win, and how? We give a game-theoretic answer. The intuition that &amp;amp;ldquo;more capable means it wins everything&amp;amp;rdquo; treats capability as a single number; we instead model it as a seven-component vector: optimization depth, predictive accuracy, observability, action breadth, tempo, commitment, and creativity. A human out-matched on the five computational components can still retain decisive leverage on the remaining two: outright superiority on creativity, the ability to play moves outside the AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s model of the human, formalized through games with unawareness; and parity on commitment, the ability to move first and bind oneself. We prove that in closed, strictly competitive games enough computation drives the human to the classical security value and creativity is worthless; that creativity has value exactly when an unmodeled move beats the AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s best defense; that a single inequality decides whether the human is favored; that commitment helps only under partial alignment; and that a creativity advantage is sustainable only if the human innovates faster than the AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s combined learning-and-consumption rate. Reproducible Monte Carlo simulations numerically corroborate the quantitative results, and we connect the resulting taxonomy of human&amp;amp;ndash;AI games to corrigibility and assistance-game designs in AI safety.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-09-18</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 51: When Can the Weaker Player Win? A Game-Theoretic Model of Humans Against a More Powerful AI</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/51">doi: 10.3390/g17050051</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Iman Vakilinia
		</p>
	<p>As AI systems approach and surpass human ability across more and more tasks, we ask a deliberately pessimistic question: if a far more capable AI turned adversarial, are there still games a human could win, and how? We give a game-theoretic answer. The intuition that &amp;amp;ldquo;more capable means it wins everything&amp;amp;rdquo; treats capability as a single number; we instead model it as a seven-component vector: optimization depth, predictive accuracy, observability, action breadth, tempo, commitment, and creativity. A human out-matched on the five computational components can still retain decisive leverage on the remaining two: outright superiority on creativity, the ability to play moves outside the AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s model of the human, formalized through games with unawareness; and parity on commitment, the ability to move first and bind oneself. We prove that in closed, strictly competitive games enough computation drives the human to the classical security value and creativity is worthless; that creativity has value exactly when an unmodeled move beats the AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s best defense; that a single inequality decides whether the human is favored; that commitment helps only under partial alignment; and that a creativity advantage is sustainable only if the human innovates faster than the AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s combined learning-and-consumption rate. Reproducible Monte Carlo simulations numerically corroborate the quantitative results, and we connect the resulting taxonomy of human&amp;amp;ndash;AI games to corrigibility and assistance-game designs in AI safety.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>When Can the Weaker Player Win? A Game-Theoretic Model of Humans Against a More Powerful AI</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Iman Vakilinia</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050051</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-09-18</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-09-18</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>51</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050051</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/51</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/50">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 50: Carbon Border Adjustment and Strategic Environmental Quality: Quality Backfire and Market Contraction</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/50</link>
	<description>We develop a two-stage game with vertically differentiated products and endogenous environmental quality to study unilateral carbon pricing and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). A home EU firm and a foreign exporter choose environmental quality, then compete in prices. Under unilateral pricing, only the home firm is taxed, so the foreign exporter&amp;amp;rsquo;s quality choice responds only indirectly through competition, not a direct tax-saving motive. CBAM corrects this by taxing imports, too. We show that this correction can defeat itself: the same charge that incentivizes upgrading also contracts the foreign firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s margin and market share, and once the carbon price exceeds a parameter-dependent threshold, this contraction can dominate, leaving the firm choosing lower quality under CBAM than under unilateral pricing. We analytically show that, sufficiently close to free trade, the foreign firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s equilibrium quality is higher under CBAM than under unilateral pricing, so quality backfire is a finite-carbon-price equilibrium reversal rather than a local artifact, and numerically show that the reversal occurs over a substantial part of the admissible parameter region and survives several robustness checks. A second channel, where CBAM narrows the quality gap, could increase aggregate emissions, but the backfire is not realized in our calibration. The results provide a game-theoretic explanation of how border carbon policies shape strategic quality competition in carbon-intensive trade.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-09-15</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 50: Carbon Border Adjustment and Strategic Environmental Quality: Quality Backfire and Market Contraction</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/50">doi: 10.3390/g17050050</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Subhadip Ghosh
		Anindita Sen
		Arka Mukherjee
		</p>
	<p>We develop a two-stage game with vertically differentiated products and endogenous environmental quality to study unilateral carbon pricing and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). A home EU firm and a foreign exporter choose environmental quality, then compete in prices. Under unilateral pricing, only the home firm is taxed, so the foreign exporter&amp;amp;rsquo;s quality choice responds only indirectly through competition, not a direct tax-saving motive. CBAM corrects this by taxing imports, too. We show that this correction can defeat itself: the same charge that incentivizes upgrading also contracts the foreign firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s margin and market share, and once the carbon price exceeds a parameter-dependent threshold, this contraction can dominate, leaving the firm choosing lower quality under CBAM than under unilateral pricing. We analytically show that, sufficiently close to free trade, the foreign firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s equilibrium quality is higher under CBAM than under unilateral pricing, so quality backfire is a finite-carbon-price equilibrium reversal rather than a local artifact, and numerically show that the reversal occurs over a substantial part of the admissible parameter region and survives several robustness checks. A second channel, where CBAM narrows the quality gap, could increase aggregate emissions, but the backfire is not realized in our calibration. The results provide a game-theoretic explanation of how border carbon policies shape strategic quality competition in carbon-intensive trade.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Carbon Border Adjustment and Strategic Environmental Quality: Quality Backfire and Market Contraction</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Subhadip Ghosh</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Anindita Sen</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Arka Mukherjee</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050050</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-09-15</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-09-15</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>50</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050050</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/50</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/49">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 49: The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/49</link>
	<description>Generative artificial intelligence has driven the cost of producing convincing artifacts of expertise toward zero. Signaling theory predicts that signals whose informational content rests on production cost lose that content when production becomes cheap. We formalize this for markets for expert services, a class of credence goods, modeling AI as a compression of the discernible headroom between what machines produce at negligible cost and what buyers can distinguish. Below a critical headroom no separating equilibrium in artifact-based production-side signals exists&amp;amp;mdash;for any single-crossing cost family, with the buyers&amp;amp;rsquo; discernment ceiling held fixed: the market pools, the competence premium vanishes, and able providers exit. We show that an outcome-contingent signal&amp;amp;mdash;a warranty backed by damages D with ex-post verifiability &amp;amp;phi;&amp;amp;mdash;sustains a fully separating equilibrium at any level of AI capability whenever &amp;amp;phi;D&amp;amp;ge;v (strictly for &amp;amp;phi;D&amp;amp;gt;v), where v is the value of a solved problem, under four institutional preconditions stated explicitly and priced in turn. The expected cost of liability turns on whether the problem is solved, not on how cheaply documents are produced, and is invariant to AI capability. Provenance certification priced as a type-independent stamp cannot restore full separation; a verified commitment to produce without generative assistance can, at the pre-AI signaling cost. Two further results endogenize the contract&amp;amp;rsquo;s institutions: liability signaling has a minimum ticket size set by the fixed costs of a civil procedure and, under insurance, the signal-effective quantity is the retained, collectible exposure.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-09-15</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 49: The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/49">doi: 10.3390/g17050049</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Andreas Bauer
		</p>
	<p>Generative artificial intelligence has driven the cost of producing convincing artifacts of expertise toward zero. Signaling theory predicts that signals whose informational content rests on production cost lose that content when production becomes cheap. We formalize this for markets for expert services, a class of credence goods, modeling AI as a compression of the discernible headroom between what machines produce at negligible cost and what buyers can distinguish. Below a critical headroom no separating equilibrium in artifact-based production-side signals exists&amp;amp;mdash;for any single-crossing cost family, with the buyers&amp;amp;rsquo; discernment ceiling held fixed: the market pools, the competence premium vanishes, and able providers exit. We show that an outcome-contingent signal&amp;amp;mdash;a warranty backed by damages D with ex-post verifiability &amp;amp;phi;&amp;amp;mdash;sustains a fully separating equilibrium at any level of AI capability whenever &amp;amp;phi;D&amp;amp;ge;v (strictly for &amp;amp;phi;D&amp;amp;gt;v), where v is the value of a solved problem, under four institutional preconditions stated explicitly and priced in turn. The expected cost of liability turns on whether the problem is solved, not on how cheaply documents are produced, and is invariant to AI capability. Provenance certification priced as a type-independent stamp cannot restore full separation; a verified commitment to produce without generative assistance can, at the pre-AI signaling cost. Two further results endogenize the contract&amp;amp;rsquo;s institutions: liability signaling has a minimum ticket size set by the fixed costs of a civil procedure and, under insurance, the signal-effective quantity is the retained, collectible exposure.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Andreas Bauer</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050049</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-09-15</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-09-15</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>49</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050049</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/49</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/48">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 48: Research on the Game Dynamics of Optional Public Goods</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/48</link>
	<description>The public goods game (PGG) serves as a powerful framework for investigating human cooperative behavior. While prevailing theories emphasize imitation as the primary driver of strategy updating, evidence from an empirical study on voluntary spatial PGG revealed that human decision adjustments correlate more closely with historical payoffs than with imitative behavior. The objective of this study is to validate this conclusion and to quantify the optimal strategy-updating parameters through computational modeling. We develop an agent-based model on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, integrating prospect theory with a mixed-strategy evolutionary framework. The model systematically examines the effects of the proportion of self-adjustment (POS), mutation rate (MIS), and sensitivity coefficient (SEN) on the stationary distribution of cooperators, defectors, and loners. Our main findings demonstrate that individuals update strategies primarily through self-adjustment based on historical payoffs, with imitation playing merely an auxiliary role. The optimal self-adjustment proportion is approximately 0.9, and low sensitivity coefficients and mutation rates favor the emergence of cooperation. These results provide quantitative support for the memory-based self-regulation mechanism and offer managerial insights into promoting cooperation in social dilemma situations.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-09-07</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 48: Research on the Game Dynamics of Optional Public Goods</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/48">doi: 10.3390/g17050048</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Haocheng Wu
		Mengcheng Sun
		Luhe Yang
		Yunhua Xue
		Lianzhong Zhang
		</p>
	<p>The public goods game (PGG) serves as a powerful framework for investigating human cooperative behavior. While prevailing theories emphasize imitation as the primary driver of strategy updating, evidence from an empirical study on voluntary spatial PGG revealed that human decision adjustments correlate more closely with historical payoffs than with imitative behavior. The objective of this study is to validate this conclusion and to quantify the optimal strategy-updating parameters through computational modeling. We develop an agent-based model on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, integrating prospect theory with a mixed-strategy evolutionary framework. The model systematically examines the effects of the proportion of self-adjustment (POS), mutation rate (MIS), and sensitivity coefficient (SEN) on the stationary distribution of cooperators, defectors, and loners. Our main findings demonstrate that individuals update strategies primarily through self-adjustment based on historical payoffs, with imitation playing merely an auxiliary role. The optimal self-adjustment proportion is approximately 0.9, and low sensitivity coefficients and mutation rates favor the emergence of cooperation. These results provide quantitative support for the memory-based self-regulation mechanism and offer managerial insights into promoting cooperation in social dilemma situations.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Research on the Game Dynamics of Optional Public Goods</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Haocheng Wu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Mengcheng Sun</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Luhe Yang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Yunhua Xue</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Lianzhong Zhang</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050048</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-09-07</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-09-07</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>48</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050048</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/48</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/47">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 47: Cooperation During the Gezi Park Protests</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/47</link>
	<description>In this paper, we compare behavior in the dictator, ultimatum, and public goods games before and during the Gezi Park protests in laboratory experiments conducted in T&amp;amp;uuml;rkiye. In May 2013, protests began against the proposed destruction of Gezi Park&amp;amp;mdash;one of the few remaining green spaces in Istanbul&amp;amp;rsquo;s city center&amp;amp;mdash;for the construction of a shopping mall. Quickly spreading across T&amp;amp;uuml;rkiye, many ordinary citizens participated in the protests in the following weeks. The collective action demonstrated in these protests is similar to the types of behavior economists study in games where individuals accept personal costs for the benefit of others. We find that participants in the protests were just as likely to choose the equal payoff option as it increased in value in the modified dictator game, punish uncooperative behavior in the ultimatum game, and reward cooperative behavior in the public goods game as those who participated in the experiments before the protests. This was true of the behavior of the nonparticipants in the protests in the ultimatum and public goods games. In contrast, nonparticipants in the protests were less willing to forgo the selfish payoff option for their coplayer&amp;amp;rsquo;s benefit in the modified dictator game.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-09-03</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 47: Cooperation During the Gezi Park Protests</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/47">doi: 10.3390/g17050047</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Benjamin Beranek
		</p>
	<p>In this paper, we compare behavior in the dictator, ultimatum, and public goods games before and during the Gezi Park protests in laboratory experiments conducted in T&amp;amp;uuml;rkiye. In May 2013, protests began against the proposed destruction of Gezi Park&amp;amp;mdash;one of the few remaining green spaces in Istanbul&amp;amp;rsquo;s city center&amp;amp;mdash;for the construction of a shopping mall. Quickly spreading across T&amp;amp;uuml;rkiye, many ordinary citizens participated in the protests in the following weeks. The collective action demonstrated in these protests is similar to the types of behavior economists study in games where individuals accept personal costs for the benefit of others. We find that participants in the protests were just as likely to choose the equal payoff option as it increased in value in the modified dictator game, punish uncooperative behavior in the ultimatum game, and reward cooperative behavior in the public goods game as those who participated in the experiments before the protests. This was true of the behavior of the nonparticipants in the protests in the ultimatum and public goods games. In contrast, nonparticipants in the protests were less willing to forgo the selfish payoff option for their coplayer&amp;amp;rsquo;s benefit in the modified dictator game.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Cooperation During the Gezi Park Protests</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Benjamin Beranek</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050047</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-09-03</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-09-03</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>47</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050047</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/47</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/46">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 46: Patient-Level Costing, Strategic Reimbursement, and Budget-Constrained Coverage in Rare Diseases: A TDABC-Based Analysis of Severe Haemophilia A</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/46</link>
	<description>Rare-disease treatment financing is challenging because high-cost therapies, clinical need, and budget constraints create interdependent decisions among manufacturers, public payers, and healthcare providers. This article combines patient-level time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC) with a sequential reimbursement benchmark and a fixed-budget coverage analysis for severe haemophilia A. Using institutional pathway data and a representative clinical profile, the study estimates an annual treatment cost of EUR 105,429.14 for the representative patient, of which EUR 98,514.04, or 93.4%, corresponds to pharmaceutical expenditure. TDABC is used to identify the clinical and operational resources consumed throughout the treatment pathway and the practical capacity allocated to its delivery. The analytical model then translates the resulting cost structure into reimbursement, provider-adoption, and population-coverage conditions. The results show that treatment feasibility and budget-constrained coverage are driven primarily by drug price, body weight, dose intensity, and administration frequency, while non-drug operational costs have a comparatively limited effect. The article contributes by connecting institution-specific patient-level costing with the interdependent implications of treatment cost for manufacturers, payers, providers, and patient access. The framework provides a transparent reimbursement benchmark rather than a complete bargaining model and supports affordability, budget-impact, and treatment-capacity assessments in rare diseases.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-08-31</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 46: Patient-Level Costing, Strategic Reimbursement, and Budget-Constrained Coverage in Rare Diseases: A TDABC-Based Analysis of Severe Haemophilia A</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/46">doi: 10.3390/g17050046</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Tânia Saraiva
		Tiago José Leite Cardoso
		</p>
	<p>Rare-disease treatment financing is challenging because high-cost therapies, clinical need, and budget constraints create interdependent decisions among manufacturers, public payers, and healthcare providers. This article combines patient-level time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC) with a sequential reimbursement benchmark and a fixed-budget coverage analysis for severe haemophilia A. Using institutional pathway data and a representative clinical profile, the study estimates an annual treatment cost of EUR 105,429.14 for the representative patient, of which EUR 98,514.04, or 93.4%, corresponds to pharmaceutical expenditure. TDABC is used to identify the clinical and operational resources consumed throughout the treatment pathway and the practical capacity allocated to its delivery. The analytical model then translates the resulting cost structure into reimbursement, provider-adoption, and population-coverage conditions. The results show that treatment feasibility and budget-constrained coverage are driven primarily by drug price, body weight, dose intensity, and administration frequency, while non-drug operational costs have a comparatively limited effect. The article contributes by connecting institution-specific patient-level costing with the interdependent implications of treatment cost for manufacturers, payers, providers, and patient access. The framework provides a transparent reimbursement benchmark rather than a complete bargaining model and supports affordability, budget-impact, and treatment-capacity assessments in rare diseases.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Patient-Level Costing, Strategic Reimbursement, and Budget-Constrained Coverage in Rare Diseases: A TDABC-Based Analysis of Severe Haemophilia A</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Tânia Saraiva</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Tiago José Leite Cardoso</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050046</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-08-31</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-08-31</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>46</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050046</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/46</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/45">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 45: The Trap of Incomplete Information Games in the Attention Economy: A Simulation Study of Network Collapse and Restoration Strategies for Informational Hygiene</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/45</link>
	<description>In contemporary online environments, the dynamics of the attention economy drive payoff-seeking, irresponsible information diffusion, resulting in severe discourse polarization. This study defines the primary objective function for society as the maintenance of &amp;amp;ldquo;Informational Hygiene.&amp;amp;rdquo; To capture these dynamics, we propose an Adaptive Co-evolution model that integrates incomplete information games with bounded rationality and evolutionary opinion dynamics. We incorporate a subjective expected payoff function, based on information asymmetry, into a scale-free network model. The interaction between agents&amp;amp;rsquo; internal states (infection degree, psychological damage, resilience) and network topology changes (edge deletion and rewiring) is formulated as a hybrid dynamical system of coupled ordinary differential equations and discrete topological updates. Extended computational experiments evaluate the coupled dynamics of autonomous edge deletion (structural bypass) and global propagation suppression (circuit breakers). The simulation results demonstrate that &amp;amp;ldquo;subtractive interventions&amp;amp;rdquo;&amp;amp;mdash;creating discriminatory boundaries by completely severing ties with contamination sources&amp;amp;mdash;can halt information spread but tend to fragment the social network irreversibly. Depending on inherent resilience parameters, this structural collapse conditionally isolates agents from social buffering mechanisms, causing a &amp;amp;ldquo;Paradox of Isolation&amp;amp;rdquo; characterized by strong hysteresis, where internal damage diverges. To ensure informational hygiene and prevent irreversible polarization, we suggest that platforms must implement &amp;amp;ldquo;reasonable accommodation.&amp;amp;rdquo; Specifically, &amp;amp;ldquo;additive interventions&amp;amp;rdquo;&amp;amp;mdash;comprising autonomous rewiring to healthy nodes to maintain inclusive boundaries (weak ties) and foster the complex contagion of resilience&amp;amp;mdash;are mathematically optimal prerequisites for next-generation intervention platforms.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-08-26</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 45: The Trap of Incomplete Information Games in the Attention Economy: A Simulation Study of Network Collapse and Restoration Strategies for Informational Hygiene</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/45">doi: 10.3390/g17050045</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yasuko Kawahata
		Shunsuke Hatadani
		</p>
	<p>In contemporary online environments, the dynamics of the attention economy drive payoff-seeking, irresponsible information diffusion, resulting in severe discourse polarization. This study defines the primary objective function for society as the maintenance of &amp;amp;ldquo;Informational Hygiene.&amp;amp;rdquo; To capture these dynamics, we propose an Adaptive Co-evolution model that integrates incomplete information games with bounded rationality and evolutionary opinion dynamics. We incorporate a subjective expected payoff function, based on information asymmetry, into a scale-free network model. The interaction between agents&amp;amp;rsquo; internal states (infection degree, psychological damage, resilience) and network topology changes (edge deletion and rewiring) is formulated as a hybrid dynamical system of coupled ordinary differential equations and discrete topological updates. Extended computational experiments evaluate the coupled dynamics of autonomous edge deletion (structural bypass) and global propagation suppression (circuit breakers). The simulation results demonstrate that &amp;amp;ldquo;subtractive interventions&amp;amp;rdquo;&amp;amp;mdash;creating discriminatory boundaries by completely severing ties with contamination sources&amp;amp;mdash;can halt information spread but tend to fragment the social network irreversibly. Depending on inherent resilience parameters, this structural collapse conditionally isolates agents from social buffering mechanisms, causing a &amp;amp;ldquo;Paradox of Isolation&amp;amp;rdquo; characterized by strong hysteresis, where internal damage diverges. To ensure informational hygiene and prevent irreversible polarization, we suggest that platforms must implement &amp;amp;ldquo;reasonable accommodation.&amp;amp;rdquo; Specifically, &amp;amp;ldquo;additive interventions&amp;amp;rdquo;&amp;amp;mdash;comprising autonomous rewiring to healthy nodes to maintain inclusive boundaries (weak ties) and foster the complex contagion of resilience&amp;amp;mdash;are mathematically optimal prerequisites for next-generation intervention platforms.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Trap of Incomplete Information Games in the Attention Economy: A Simulation Study of Network Collapse and Restoration Strategies for Informational Hygiene</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yasuko Kawahata</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Shunsuke Hatadani</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050045</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-08-26</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-08-26</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>45</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050045</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/45</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/44">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 44: Nonlinear Dynamics of Social Exclusion via a Dynamic Extension of the Classical &amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons&amp;rdquo; Theory: Scapegoating as a Critical Phenomenon and Optimal Intervention Strategies</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/44</link>
	<description>Akerlof&amp;amp;rsquo;s classical theory of the &amp;amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons,&amp;amp;rdquo; which conceptualizes adverse selection driven by information asymmetry, established the foundation of information economics. While the traditional model assumes static equilibria among a limited number of agents, analyzing its behavioral dynamics within large-scale, complex network environments remains a highly relevant task in computational social science. This study extends the classical lemon market model into a nonlinear dynamical system on adaptive networks. We mathematically elucidate macro-level social phase transitions&amp;amp;mdash;specifically structural exclusion such as scapegoating and collective ostracism&amp;amp;mdash;induced by computational cognitive limits, and evaluate optimal intervention strategies to mitigate these systemic failures. Multi-agent simulations utilizing large-scale tensor operations demonstrate that autonomous edge rewiring under incomplete information does not merely result in the uniform displacement of high-quality goods as predicted by static theory. Instead, the network self-organizes into an irreversible structural division: a core group of influential agents monopolizes high-quality information, while marginalized agents are isolated into a peripheral &amp;amp;ldquo;lemon echo chamber&amp;amp;rdquo; where only low-quality information circulates. To address this structural pathology under a resource constraint limiting intervention to 10% of the total agents, we evaluated two distinct approaches. The results indicate that providing informational support to influential hubs functions as a trap that exacerbates systemic inequality, superficially elevating the overall market evaluation but permanently fixing the exclusion gap. Conversely, the forced maintenance and protection of &amp;amp;ldquo;weak ties&amp;amp;rdquo; bridging disconnected clusters constitutes the mathematically optimal solution to dissolve fragmentation, effectively eliminating the price gap and facilitating social inclusion. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the mechanism of social exclusion exhibits strong hysteresis effects. A distinct tipping point governs the progression toward a fragmented lemon echo chamber. Interventions implemented after crossing this critical threshold fail to restore the system to its baseline state despite identical resource expenditure, confirming the presence of an irreversible phase transition. These findings establish that the collapse dynamics outlined in the classical lemon market serve as a generalized model for explaining contemporary collective ostracism driven by information cascades. Consequently, the analysis highlights the necessity of early intervention prior to critical thresholds and the systemic preservation of structural bypasses rather than post-hoc remediation.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-08-24</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 44: Nonlinear Dynamics of Social Exclusion via a Dynamic Extension of the Classical &amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons&amp;rdquo; Theory: Scapegoating as a Critical Phenomenon and Optimal Intervention Strategies</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/44">doi: 10.3390/g17050044</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yasuko Kawahata
		</p>
	<p>Akerlof&amp;amp;rsquo;s classical theory of the &amp;amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons,&amp;amp;rdquo; which conceptualizes adverse selection driven by information asymmetry, established the foundation of information economics. While the traditional model assumes static equilibria among a limited number of agents, analyzing its behavioral dynamics within large-scale, complex network environments remains a highly relevant task in computational social science. This study extends the classical lemon market model into a nonlinear dynamical system on adaptive networks. We mathematically elucidate macro-level social phase transitions&amp;amp;mdash;specifically structural exclusion such as scapegoating and collective ostracism&amp;amp;mdash;induced by computational cognitive limits, and evaluate optimal intervention strategies to mitigate these systemic failures. Multi-agent simulations utilizing large-scale tensor operations demonstrate that autonomous edge rewiring under incomplete information does not merely result in the uniform displacement of high-quality goods as predicted by static theory. Instead, the network self-organizes into an irreversible structural division: a core group of influential agents monopolizes high-quality information, while marginalized agents are isolated into a peripheral &amp;amp;ldquo;lemon echo chamber&amp;amp;rdquo; where only low-quality information circulates. To address this structural pathology under a resource constraint limiting intervention to 10% of the total agents, we evaluated two distinct approaches. The results indicate that providing informational support to influential hubs functions as a trap that exacerbates systemic inequality, superficially elevating the overall market evaluation but permanently fixing the exclusion gap. Conversely, the forced maintenance and protection of &amp;amp;ldquo;weak ties&amp;amp;rdquo; bridging disconnected clusters constitutes the mathematically optimal solution to dissolve fragmentation, effectively eliminating the price gap and facilitating social inclusion. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the mechanism of social exclusion exhibits strong hysteresis effects. A distinct tipping point governs the progression toward a fragmented lemon echo chamber. Interventions implemented after crossing this critical threshold fail to restore the system to its baseline state despite identical resource expenditure, confirming the presence of an irreversible phase transition. These findings establish that the collapse dynamics outlined in the classical lemon market serve as a generalized model for explaining contemporary collective ostracism driven by information cascades. Consequently, the analysis highlights the necessity of early intervention prior to critical thresholds and the systemic preservation of structural bypasses rather than post-hoc remediation.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Nonlinear Dynamics of Social Exclusion via a Dynamic Extension of the Classical &amp;amp;ldquo;Market for Lemons&amp;amp;rdquo; Theory: Scapegoating as a Critical Phenomenon and Optimal Intervention Strategies</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yasuko Kawahata</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17050044</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-08-24</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-08-24</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>44</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17050044</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/5/44</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/43">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 43: Efficient Favouritism with Status Incentives: A Moral-Hazard Game of Delegation and Recognition</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/43</link>
	<description>This paper studies the interaction between status incentives and organizational design in a two-agent moral hazard framework with limited liability. A risk-neutral principal chooses between two regimes: favouritism, under which one agent receives exclusive decision rights and status recognition for successful project implementation, and fairness, under which both agents share equal decision rights and status is distributed across agents. We show that status incentives can make ex-post favouritism optimal even when the principal does not exhibit any ex-ante preferential bias toward any particular agent. Introduction of status incentives shrink the parameter region supporting interior inefficient favouritism, and eliminate it entirely whenever project returns are large enough to sustain interior contracts for both agents. We also show that, for a non-empty set of primitive parameter values, the principal&amp;amp;rsquo;s optimal regime can be non-monotonic in status: favouritism is optimal when status valuation is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, while fairness may dominate for intermediate values. The results shed light on why selective, hierarchical recognition systems coexist with flat team-credit structures across organizations.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-08-07</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 43: Efficient Favouritism with Status Incentives: A Moral-Hazard Game of Delegation and Recognition</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/43">doi: 10.3390/g17040043</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Swapnendu Banerjee
		Oindrila Dey
		Subhadip Ghosh
		</p>
	<p>This paper studies the interaction between status incentives and organizational design in a two-agent moral hazard framework with limited liability. A risk-neutral principal chooses between two regimes: favouritism, under which one agent receives exclusive decision rights and status recognition for successful project implementation, and fairness, under which both agents share equal decision rights and status is distributed across agents. We show that status incentives can make ex-post favouritism optimal even when the principal does not exhibit any ex-ante preferential bias toward any particular agent. Introduction of status incentives shrink the parameter region supporting interior inefficient favouritism, and eliminate it entirely whenever project returns are large enough to sustain interior contracts for both agents. We also show that, for a non-empty set of primitive parameter values, the principal&amp;amp;rsquo;s optimal regime can be non-monotonic in status: favouritism is optimal when status valuation is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, while fairness may dominate for intermediate values. The results shed light on why selective, hierarchical recognition systems coexist with flat team-credit structures across organizations.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Efficient Favouritism with Status Incentives: A Moral-Hazard Game of Delegation and Recognition</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Swapnendu Banerjee</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Oindrila Dey</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Subhadip Ghosh</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040043</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-08-07</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-08-07</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>43</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040043</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/43</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/42">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 42: An Extreme Learning Machine-Based Method for Solving Linear&amp;ndash;Quadratic Nonzero-Sum Differential Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/42</link>
	<description>Multi-agent interaction in linear&amp;amp;ndash;quadratic (LQ) differential games gives rise to open-loop Nash equilibria that rarely admit closed-form expressions, motivating the development of reliable numerical solvers. Classical approaches such as shooting and spectral collocation are sensitive to the initial guess on the unknown boundary values and accumulate discretisation error over long horizons, while deep-learning alternatives require iterative gradient-based training with architecture- and convergence-specific overhead. To overcome these limitations, we recast the LQ nonzero-sum game as a linear two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP) via the Pontryagin maximum principle (PMP) and solve it with a single-layer feedforward neural network (SLFN) in which hidden-layer parameters are sampled once and fixed. The state and all player-specific costates are parameterised by random hidden features on a uniform time grid, the boundary conditions are appended as dedicated rows of the linear collocation system, and the output weights follow from a single Moore&amp;amp;ndash;Penrose pseudoinverse, entirely bypassing gradient-based iteration. For the scalar LQ optimal-control TPBVP, a residual-to-solution stability theorem converts the continuous equation and boundary residuals into uniform state, costate, control, and cost error bounds. Validation across two-player low- and high-dimensional benchmarks, a heterogeneous three-player game, and paired seed sweeps confirms high accuracy against analytical and matrix-exponential references, while revealing that no single activation function dominates across all problem types: tanh is most accurate in one-dimensional settings, and Gaussian RBF leads in multidimensional cases.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-08-06</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 42: An Extreme Learning Machine-Based Method for Solving Linear&amp;ndash;Quadratic Nonzero-Sum Differential Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/42">doi: 10.3390/g17040042</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Changdong Duan
		Yuefei Yuan
		</p>
	<p>Multi-agent interaction in linear&amp;amp;ndash;quadratic (LQ) differential games gives rise to open-loop Nash equilibria that rarely admit closed-form expressions, motivating the development of reliable numerical solvers. Classical approaches such as shooting and spectral collocation are sensitive to the initial guess on the unknown boundary values and accumulate discretisation error over long horizons, while deep-learning alternatives require iterative gradient-based training with architecture- and convergence-specific overhead. To overcome these limitations, we recast the LQ nonzero-sum game as a linear two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP) via the Pontryagin maximum principle (PMP) and solve it with a single-layer feedforward neural network (SLFN) in which hidden-layer parameters are sampled once and fixed. The state and all player-specific costates are parameterised by random hidden features on a uniform time grid, the boundary conditions are appended as dedicated rows of the linear collocation system, and the output weights follow from a single Moore&amp;amp;ndash;Penrose pseudoinverse, entirely bypassing gradient-based iteration. For the scalar LQ optimal-control TPBVP, a residual-to-solution stability theorem converts the continuous equation and boundary residuals into uniform state, costate, control, and cost error bounds. Validation across two-player low- and high-dimensional benchmarks, a heterogeneous three-player game, and paired seed sweeps confirms high accuracy against analytical and matrix-exponential references, while revealing that no single activation function dominates across all problem types: tanh is most accurate in one-dimensional settings, and Gaussian RBF leads in multidimensional cases.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>An Extreme Learning Machine-Based Method for Solving Linear&amp;amp;ndash;Quadratic Nonzero-Sum Differential Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Changdong Duan</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Yuefei Yuan</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040042</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-08-06</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>42</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040042</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/42</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/41">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 41: Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/41</link>
	<description>Many bargaining problems allocate control over heterogeneous issues rather than a single scalar surplus. This paper studies a two-player game-theoretic Nash bargaining problem over a continuum of issues with stochastic valuation fields. Taking the classical maximum Nash welfare cutoff allocation as a benchmark, we characterize the selected agreement as an endogenous excursion set of the log-relative valuation field. We then study its economic geometry: stationarity and ergodicity yield deterministic many-issue payoff limits, a finite-domain perturbation formula separates local shocks from global cutoff feedback, Kac&amp;amp;ndash;Rice methods describe boundary intensity, and a perimeter penalty for fragmented contracts turns the bargain into a finite perimeter variational problem. At regular boundary points, the complexity-penalized bargain satisfies a curvature-adjusted bargaining condition. The analysis connects cooperative game theory, Nash bargaining, fair division, random field geometry, and contract complexity.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-08-06</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 41: Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/41">doi: 10.3390/g17040041</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Alessio Staffini
		</p>
	<p>Many bargaining problems allocate control over heterogeneous issues rather than a single scalar surplus. This paper studies a two-player game-theoretic Nash bargaining problem over a continuum of issues with stochastic valuation fields. Taking the classical maximum Nash welfare cutoff allocation as a benchmark, we characterize the selected agreement as an endogenous excursion set of the log-relative valuation field. We then study its economic geometry: stationarity and ergodicity yield deterministic many-issue payoff limits, a finite-domain perturbation formula separates local shocks from global cutoff feedback, Kac&amp;amp;ndash;Rice methods describe boundary intensity, and a perimeter penalty for fragmented contracts turns the bargain into a finite perimeter variational problem. At regular boundary points, the complexity-penalized bargain satisfies a curvature-adjusted bargaining condition. The analysis connects cooperative game theory, Nash bargaining, fair division, random field geometry, and contract complexity.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Alessio Staffini</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040041</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-08-06</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>41</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040041</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/41</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/40">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 40: Credence Goods in Markets with Collective Reputation: Nature of Equilibria and the Value of Certification</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/40</link>
	<description>Fraud can cause markets for credence goods to collapse, but collective reputation has been suggested as a potential solution, especially when buyer valuations for quality are high. We develop a discrete model of a market for label credence goods and provide conditions for no-fraud equilibria based on collective reputation. We identify conditions under which all equilibria may be asymmetric or involve mixed strategies and hence sellers may face coordination problems. Our analysis suggests such coordination problems are the greatest when the size of the high-quality market is approximately half of the overall market (that incorporates both high- and low-quality goods), in the absence of any focal point or coordination device. Concerning certification, we find that it may not be particularly useful when buyer valuations for credence attributes are high under a well-performing collective reputation regime and a relatively small-sized low-quality market. However, we also determine that certification may serve its purpose the most when buyer valuations for credence attributes are low (contrary to standard intuition) and/or the size of the high-quality market is around half of the overall market (i.e., the high- and low-quality markets are of approximately equal size). Finally, our results indirectly indicate that agencies/NGOs concerned about fraudulent behavior may focus their attention on markets where heterogenous firms enjoy collective reputation.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-07-24</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 40: Credence Goods in Markets with Collective Reputation: Nature of Equilibria and the Value of Certification</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/40">doi: 10.3390/g17040040</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Erin Krupka
		Thomas P. Lyon
		Arnab Mitra
		</p>
	<p>Fraud can cause markets for credence goods to collapse, but collective reputation has been suggested as a potential solution, especially when buyer valuations for quality are high. We develop a discrete model of a market for label credence goods and provide conditions for no-fraud equilibria based on collective reputation. We identify conditions under which all equilibria may be asymmetric or involve mixed strategies and hence sellers may face coordination problems. Our analysis suggests such coordination problems are the greatest when the size of the high-quality market is approximately half of the overall market (that incorporates both high- and low-quality goods), in the absence of any focal point or coordination device. Concerning certification, we find that it may not be particularly useful when buyer valuations for credence attributes are high under a well-performing collective reputation regime and a relatively small-sized low-quality market. However, we also determine that certification may serve its purpose the most when buyer valuations for credence attributes are low (contrary to standard intuition) and/or the size of the high-quality market is around half of the overall market (i.e., the high- and low-quality markets are of approximately equal size). Finally, our results indirectly indicate that agencies/NGOs concerned about fraudulent behavior may focus their attention on markets where heterogenous firms enjoy collective reputation.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Credence Goods in Markets with Collective Reputation: Nature of Equilibria and the Value of Certification</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Erin Krupka</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Thomas P. Lyon</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Arnab Mitra</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040040</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-07-24</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-07-24</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>40</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040040</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/40</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/39">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 39: Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/39</link>
	<description>In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated Stag-hunt game played by two agents who are able to learn from the outcomes of each game, but do not know the payoff matrix. By modulating their learning capabilities, we show that agents are able to coordinate on the social optimum when they learn slowly from experience and are prone to making mistakes. A comparison with the results from a recent laboratory experiment is also provided.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-07-23</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 39: Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/39">doi: 10.3390/g17040039</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Ren Manfredi
		Daniele Vilone
		Tijan J. Cvetkovic
		Franco Bagnoli
		Andrea Guazzini
		</p>
	<p>In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated Stag-hunt game played by two agents who are able to learn from the outcomes of each game, but do not know the payoff matrix. By modulating their learning capabilities, we show that agents are able to coordinate on the social optimum when they learn slowly from experience and are prone to making mistakes. A comparison with the results from a recent laboratory experiment is also provided.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Ren Manfredi</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Daniele Vilone</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Tijan J. Cvetkovic</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Franco Bagnoli</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Andrea Guazzini</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040039</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-07-23</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-07-23</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>39</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040039</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/39</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/38">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 38: Promotion Thresholds, Revenue Sharing, and Delivery Risk in Reward-Based Crowdfunding</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/38</link>
	<description>This paper investigates two marketing strategies a reward-based crowdfunding platform employs to align its preferences with an entrepreneur&amp;amp;rsquo;s choice of pledge and target levels. These are (a) how to promote campaigns to potential backers, and (b) how to share campaign revenues with the entrepreneur. Kickstarter, for instance, promotes a set of campaigns by compiling a list of &amp;amp;ldquo;recommended&amp;amp;rdquo; projects. This research shows that the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s choice of the promotion rule may expose entrepreneurs to the risk of not generating sufficient funds to start production, which can damage their and the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s reputation. When the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s reputational risk is not very high, it reduces the risk of non-delivery by increasing the revenue share of the entrepreneur. The platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s strategies are likely to ensure production when backers derive warm glow from pledging, when the entrepreneur&amp;amp;rsquo;s development cost is low, or when the entrepreneur has minimal reputational cost if production fails. However, low reputational costs motivate the entrepreneur to lower the target, thus increasing the likelihood of insufficient funds to start production. We propose strategies the platform can use, including customizing the revenue share based on the campaign characteristics, to rectify such misalignments.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-07-21</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 38: Promotion Thresholds, Revenue Sharing, and Delivery Risk in Reward-Based Crowdfunding</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/38">doi: 10.3390/g17040038</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Joyaditya Laik
		Esther Gal-Or
		Prakash Mirchandani
		</p>
	<p>This paper investigates two marketing strategies a reward-based crowdfunding platform employs to align its preferences with an entrepreneur&amp;amp;rsquo;s choice of pledge and target levels. These are (a) how to promote campaigns to potential backers, and (b) how to share campaign revenues with the entrepreneur. Kickstarter, for instance, promotes a set of campaigns by compiling a list of &amp;amp;ldquo;recommended&amp;amp;rdquo; projects. This research shows that the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s choice of the promotion rule may expose entrepreneurs to the risk of not generating sufficient funds to start production, which can damage their and the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s reputation. When the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s reputational risk is not very high, it reduces the risk of non-delivery by increasing the revenue share of the entrepreneur. The platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s strategies are likely to ensure production when backers derive warm glow from pledging, when the entrepreneur&amp;amp;rsquo;s development cost is low, or when the entrepreneur has minimal reputational cost if production fails. However, low reputational costs motivate the entrepreneur to lower the target, thus increasing the likelihood of insufficient funds to start production. We propose strategies the platform can use, including customizing the revenue share based on the campaign characteristics, to rectify such misalignments.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Promotion Thresholds, Revenue Sharing, and Delivery Risk in Reward-Based Crowdfunding</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Joyaditya Laik</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Esther Gal-Or</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Prakash Mirchandani</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040038</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-07-21</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-07-21</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>38</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040038</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/38</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/37">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 37: Decentralized, Efficient, and Fair: Mean-Field Predictive Control for Bidirectional EV Coordination Under Uncertainty</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/37</link>
	<description>We propose a decentralized strategy for coordinating the bidirectional charging and discharging of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) in renewable-powered parking lots. The framework combines mean-field games (MFGs) and model predictive control (MPC) to address the coupled stochastic dynamics induced by uncertain renewable generation and random vehicle arrivals and departures. Solar and wind power fluctuations are modeled using autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) processes, while the time-varying vehicle population is represented through finite Poisson processes. The coordination problem is formulated as a large-scale game, where an aggregator designs individual cost functions to maximize available energy utilization while promoting fairness through near-equal states of charge (SOCs) at departure. Scalability is achieved through MFG theory, ensuring convergence and stability even under highly volatile generation and fluctuating agent populations. Numerical simulations validate the proposed strategy against two straightforward algorithms: capacity-ordered saturation allocation (COSA) and capacity-ordered fair allocation (COFA). These centralized approaches achieve high target fulfillment in static, low-intensity environments, where available energy accommodates a stable fleet without exceeding power limits. However, their efficacy degrades significantly in dynamic, high-intensity environments, where the interplay of volatile generation, continuous fleet turnover, and strict power constraints strains the system. In contrast, the proposed MFG-MPC framework provides a decentralized response that elegantly navigates the trade-offs between energy availability, demand stochasticity, and power limits. Ultimately, this approach ensures robust energy utilization while safeguarding vehicle equity, confirming its strong suitability for real-time deployment.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-07-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 37: Decentralized, Efficient, and Fair: Mean-Field Predictive Control for Bidirectional EV Coordination Under Uncertainty</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/37">doi: 10.3390/g17040037</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Samuel M. Muhindo
		</p>
	<p>We propose a decentralized strategy for coordinating the bidirectional charging and discharging of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) in renewable-powered parking lots. The framework combines mean-field games (MFGs) and model predictive control (MPC) to address the coupled stochastic dynamics induced by uncertain renewable generation and random vehicle arrivals and departures. Solar and wind power fluctuations are modeled using autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) processes, while the time-varying vehicle population is represented through finite Poisson processes. The coordination problem is formulated as a large-scale game, where an aggregator designs individual cost functions to maximize available energy utilization while promoting fairness through near-equal states of charge (SOCs) at departure. Scalability is achieved through MFG theory, ensuring convergence and stability even under highly volatile generation and fluctuating agent populations. Numerical simulations validate the proposed strategy against two straightforward algorithms: capacity-ordered saturation allocation (COSA) and capacity-ordered fair allocation (COFA). These centralized approaches achieve high target fulfillment in static, low-intensity environments, where available energy accommodates a stable fleet without exceeding power limits. However, their efficacy degrades significantly in dynamic, high-intensity environments, where the interplay of volatile generation, continuous fleet turnover, and strict power constraints strains the system. In contrast, the proposed MFG-MPC framework provides a decentralized response that elegantly navigates the trade-offs between energy availability, demand stochasticity, and power limits. Ultimately, this approach ensures robust energy utilization while safeguarding vehicle equity, confirming its strong suitability for real-time deployment.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Decentralized, Efficient, and Fair: Mean-Field Predictive Control for Bidirectional EV Coordination Under Uncertainty</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Samuel M. Muhindo</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040037</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-07-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-07-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>37</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040037</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/37</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/36">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 36: Engineered Misunderstanding Under Psychological Warfare: A Bayesian Signaling Game of Felt-Understanding Collapse in the German Atomausstieg</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/36</link>
	<description>Russian state-sponsored disinformation has been described in policy and the operational literature, but it is less often formalized in game-theoretic terms. Here, a two-layered formal model is developed showing how adversarial perturbation of a communication channel can collapse cross-group felt understanding&amp;amp;mdash;the third-order intentional state/belief structure, established empirically by Livingstone, in which one group believes its perspectives are recognized and accepted as valid by another. The Analytical Model is a static Bayesian signaling game with binary types and a noisy channel parameterized by perturbation rate &amp;amp;pi;. The Analytical Model shows that when recognition benefits exceed signaling costs, there exists a perturbation threshold &amp;amp;pi;* = 1 &amp;amp;minus; cR/(uR &amp;amp;middot; p) above which mutual misrecognition becomes the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome. The Computational Model embeds this logic in an agent-based simulation on a homophilic stochastic block model and scale-free networks with continuous recognition capacity. Four substantive findings emerge: the closed-form analytical threshold from the Analytical Model predicts the boundary of collapse in the dynamic networked simulation; high network homophily protects cooperative behavior below &amp;amp;pi;* but provides no rescue above it; bridge seeding&amp;amp;mdash;the placement of recognition-capable agents at structurally central cross-group positions&amp;amp;mdash;is the most effective of three policy interventions tested, rescuing cooperation even above &amp;amp;pi;*; and uniform adversarial volume is approximately as damaging as strategically targeted adversarial precision across both small dense and large scale-free topologies, qualifying the operational claim that targeted disinformation should strictly outperform volume-based approaches. The model is illustrated with the German Atomausstieg (nuclear phase-out) case, and implications for clinical psychology, public policy, and intergroup recognition under psychological warfare are discussed.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-07-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 36: Engineered Misunderstanding Under Psychological Warfare: A Bayesian Signaling Game of Felt-Understanding Collapse in the German Atomausstieg</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/36">doi: 10.3390/g17040036</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Ryanne R. L. Fairchild
		</p>
	<p>Russian state-sponsored disinformation has been described in policy and the operational literature, but it is less often formalized in game-theoretic terms. Here, a two-layered formal model is developed showing how adversarial perturbation of a communication channel can collapse cross-group felt understanding&amp;amp;mdash;the third-order intentional state/belief structure, established empirically by Livingstone, in which one group believes its perspectives are recognized and accepted as valid by another. The Analytical Model is a static Bayesian signaling game with binary types and a noisy channel parameterized by perturbation rate &amp;amp;pi;. The Analytical Model shows that when recognition benefits exceed signaling costs, there exists a perturbation threshold &amp;amp;pi;* = 1 &amp;amp;minus; cR/(uR &amp;amp;middot; p) above which mutual misrecognition becomes the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome. The Computational Model embeds this logic in an agent-based simulation on a homophilic stochastic block model and scale-free networks with continuous recognition capacity. Four substantive findings emerge: the closed-form analytical threshold from the Analytical Model predicts the boundary of collapse in the dynamic networked simulation; high network homophily protects cooperative behavior below &amp;amp;pi;* but provides no rescue above it; bridge seeding&amp;amp;mdash;the placement of recognition-capable agents at structurally central cross-group positions&amp;amp;mdash;is the most effective of three policy interventions tested, rescuing cooperation even above &amp;amp;pi;*; and uniform adversarial volume is approximately as damaging as strategically targeted adversarial precision across both small dense and large scale-free topologies, qualifying the operational claim that targeted disinformation should strictly outperform volume-based approaches. The model is illustrated with the German Atomausstieg (nuclear phase-out) case, and implications for clinical psychology, public policy, and intergroup recognition under psychological warfare are discussed.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Engineered Misunderstanding Under Psychological Warfare: A Bayesian Signaling Game of Felt-Understanding Collapse in the German Atomausstieg</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Ryanne R. L. Fairchild</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040036</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-07-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-07-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>36</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040036</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/36</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/35">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 35: Fixed-Time Pursuit&amp;ndash;Evasion Differential Game with Gr&amp;ouml;nwall Constraints in Hilbert Space l2</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/35</link>
	<description>This paper studies a pursuit&amp;amp;ndash;evasion differential game in the Hilbert space l2 involving countably many pursuers and one evader. The players follow simple motion dynamics, while their control functions are subject to Gr&amp;amp;ouml;nwall-type constraints. The value of the game &amp;amp;lambda; is defined as the infimum of the distances between the evader and the pursuers at a given terminal time &amp;amp;theta;. The pursuers aim to minimize this distance &amp;amp;lambda; by the end of the game, while the evader aims to keep it as large as possible. Optimal strategies for the pursuers are constructed via the method of fictitious pursuers, and an explicit evasion strategy is derived. As a result, the optimal strategies of both sides and the value of the game are obtained.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-07-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 35: Fixed-Time Pursuit&amp;ndash;Evasion Differential Game with Gr&amp;ouml;nwall Constraints in Hilbert Space l2</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/35">doi: 10.3390/g17040035</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Gafurjan Ibragimov
		Saidakbar Gulomov
		Bruno Antonio Pansera
		</p>
	<p>This paper studies a pursuit&amp;amp;ndash;evasion differential game in the Hilbert space l2 involving countably many pursuers and one evader. The players follow simple motion dynamics, while their control functions are subject to Gr&amp;amp;ouml;nwall-type constraints. The value of the game &amp;amp;lambda; is defined as the infimum of the distances between the evader and the pursuers at a given terminal time &amp;amp;theta;. The pursuers aim to minimize this distance &amp;amp;lambda; by the end of the game, while the evader aims to keep it as large as possible. Optimal strategies for the pursuers are constructed via the method of fictitious pursuers, and an explicit evasion strategy is derived. As a result, the optimal strategies of both sides and the value of the game are obtained.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Fixed-Time Pursuit&amp;amp;ndash;Evasion Differential Game with Gr&amp;amp;ouml;nwall Constraints in Hilbert Space l2</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Gafurjan Ibragimov</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Saidakbar Gulomov</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Bruno Antonio Pansera</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040035</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-07-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-07-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>35</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040035</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/35</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/34">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 34: Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner&amp;rsquo;s Dilemma Game</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/34</link>
	<description>In this work we consider an evolutionary game in which a small population repeatedly plays the Iterated Prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s Dilemma (IPD) game using the pairwise proportional imitation (PPI) revision protocol. Since we are dealing with a small population, we can explicitly formulate a Markov chain (MC) model of the evolutionary game and study its properties. In particular, we identify the absorbing states and their basins of attraction. In addition, we briefly study the replicator dynamics of the same game for the case of a large population. We find that, as the size of the population increases, the Markovian dynamics approximate the replicator dynamics.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-06-25</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 34: Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner&amp;rsquo;s Dilemma Game</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/34">doi: 10.3390/g17040034</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Athanasios Kehagias
		</p>
	<p>In this work we consider an evolutionary game in which a small population repeatedly plays the Iterated Prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s Dilemma (IPD) game using the pairwise proportional imitation (PPI) revision protocol. Since we are dealing with a small population, we can explicitly formulate a Markov chain (MC) model of the evolutionary game and study its properties. In particular, we identify the absorbing states and their basins of attraction. In addition, we briefly study the replicator dynamics of the same game for the case of a large population. We find that, as the size of the population increases, the Markovian dynamics approximate the replicator dynamics.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s Dilemma Game</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Athanasios Kehagias</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17040034</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-06-25</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-06-25</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>34</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17040034</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/4/34</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/33">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 33: Politically Dangerous Minds: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Vygotsky, Luria, and the Socially Mediated Survival of Knowledge</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/33</link>
	<description>Scientific theories survive on institutional fitness, not empirical merit alone. Under Soviet Stalinism, Vygotsky and Luria&amp;amp;rsquo;s cultural-historical psychology was suppressed while Leontiev&amp;amp;rsquo;s Activity Theory flourished because it aligned with Marxist-Pavlovian materialism. A game-theoretic framework formalizes this dynamic through three coupled mechanisms: a researcher utility function (Ur = &amp;amp;alpha;T + &amp;amp;beta;R &amp;amp;minus; &amp;amp;gamma;C), a state utility function (Us(e) = &amp;amp;delta;I(e) &amp;amp;minus; &amp;amp;epsilon;D(e) &amp;amp;minus; &amp;amp;kappa;(e)), and a replicator dynamic for institutional selection. Under sufficiently high punishment coefficients, the unique Nash equilibrium is aligned with the ideologically safe theory regardless of empirical truth, and the replicator dynamics drive empirically stronger theories to extinction in the institutional population. Classical findings on conformity and obedience from Sherif, Asch, Festinger, Schachter, and Milgram supply the foundations for the model&amp;amp;rsquo;s parameters. This pattern&amp;amp;mdash;termed here as epistemological selection pressure&amp;amp;mdash;explains the Vygotsky case. Because the model assumes severe punishment, active enforcement, complete information, and a binary choice, it applies most directly to authoritarian science; contemporary liberal institutions correspond to the low-punishment regime in which the same model predicts that empirical merit can prevail, so the mechanism is expected to recur only in attenuated form within specific high-pressure domains where scientific truth and institutional power remain entangled.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-06-22</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 33: Politically Dangerous Minds: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Vygotsky, Luria, and the Socially Mediated Survival of Knowledge</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/33">doi: 10.3390/g17030033</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Ryanne R. L. Fairchild
		</p>
	<p>Scientific theories survive on institutional fitness, not empirical merit alone. Under Soviet Stalinism, Vygotsky and Luria&amp;amp;rsquo;s cultural-historical psychology was suppressed while Leontiev&amp;amp;rsquo;s Activity Theory flourished because it aligned with Marxist-Pavlovian materialism. A game-theoretic framework formalizes this dynamic through three coupled mechanisms: a researcher utility function (Ur = &amp;amp;alpha;T + &amp;amp;beta;R &amp;amp;minus; &amp;amp;gamma;C), a state utility function (Us(e) = &amp;amp;delta;I(e) &amp;amp;minus; &amp;amp;epsilon;D(e) &amp;amp;minus; &amp;amp;kappa;(e)), and a replicator dynamic for institutional selection. Under sufficiently high punishment coefficients, the unique Nash equilibrium is aligned with the ideologically safe theory regardless of empirical truth, and the replicator dynamics drive empirically stronger theories to extinction in the institutional population. Classical findings on conformity and obedience from Sherif, Asch, Festinger, Schachter, and Milgram supply the foundations for the model&amp;amp;rsquo;s parameters. This pattern&amp;amp;mdash;termed here as epistemological selection pressure&amp;amp;mdash;explains the Vygotsky case. Because the model assumes severe punishment, active enforcement, complete information, and a binary choice, it applies most directly to authoritarian science; contemporary liberal institutions correspond to the low-punishment regime in which the same model predicts that empirical merit can prevail, so the mechanism is expected to recur only in attenuated form within specific high-pressure domains where scientific truth and institutional power remain entangled.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Politically Dangerous Minds: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Vygotsky, Luria, and the Socially Mediated Survival of Knowledge</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Ryanne R. L. Fairchild</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030033</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-06-22</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-06-22</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>33</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030033</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/33</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/32">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 32: Relative Consumption as Fitness: A Replicator&amp;ndash;Mutator Model of Reference-Dependent Demand and Status Competition</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/32</link>
	<description>Background: Standard consumer theory treats preferences as fixed primitives and demand as the solution to an individual optimisation problem; we instead model consumption styles as heritable strategies whose prevalence is shaped by selection and experimentation, and ask when status competition produces an over-consumption trap. Methods: We embed a reference-dependent payoff&amp;amp;mdash;private utility concave in own consumption, a positional benefit proportional to consumption relative to the social mean, a financial-fragility cost, and a loss-averse relative-deprivation term&amp;amp;mdash;into replicator&amp;amp;ndash;mutator dynamics over three strategies (frugal, balanced, conspicuous). Results: Status concern induces strategic complementarity, so that a rising consumption norm penalises moderate consumers and makes imitation self-reinforcing. For intermediate status weight, the system is bistable: an efficient balanced equilibrium and a Pareto-inferior conspicuous trap are separated by a tipping threshold, and the width of the bistable window equals the deprivation weight, producing hysteresis in the consumption norm. The trap persists even though the positional benefit nets to zero in any monomorphic state. Mutation&amp;amp;mdash;behavioural experimentation&amp;amp;mdash;shrinks the bistable window and can dissolve the lock-in. Conclusions: Reference-dependent demand is better captured by evolutionary dynamics than by static equilibrium, and positional externalities can lock a population into self-defeating over-consumption that interventions on the deprivation or fragility channel may unlock.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-06-18</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 32: Relative Consumption as Fitness: A Replicator&amp;ndash;Mutator Model of Reference-Dependent Demand and Status Competition</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/32">doi: 10.3390/g17030032</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Aras Yolusever
		</p>
	<p>Background: Standard consumer theory treats preferences as fixed primitives and demand as the solution to an individual optimisation problem; we instead model consumption styles as heritable strategies whose prevalence is shaped by selection and experimentation, and ask when status competition produces an over-consumption trap. Methods: We embed a reference-dependent payoff&amp;amp;mdash;private utility concave in own consumption, a positional benefit proportional to consumption relative to the social mean, a financial-fragility cost, and a loss-averse relative-deprivation term&amp;amp;mdash;into replicator&amp;amp;ndash;mutator dynamics over three strategies (frugal, balanced, conspicuous). Results: Status concern induces strategic complementarity, so that a rising consumption norm penalises moderate consumers and makes imitation self-reinforcing. For intermediate status weight, the system is bistable: an efficient balanced equilibrium and a Pareto-inferior conspicuous trap are separated by a tipping threshold, and the width of the bistable window equals the deprivation weight, producing hysteresis in the consumption norm. The trap persists even though the positional benefit nets to zero in any monomorphic state. Mutation&amp;amp;mdash;behavioural experimentation&amp;amp;mdash;shrinks the bistable window and can dissolve the lock-in. Conclusions: Reference-dependent demand is better captured by evolutionary dynamics than by static equilibrium, and positional externalities can lock a population into self-defeating over-consumption that interventions on the deprivation or fragility channel may unlock.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Relative Consumption as Fitness: A Replicator&amp;amp;ndash;Mutator Model of Reference-Dependent Demand and Status Competition</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Aras Yolusever</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030032</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-06-18</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-06-18</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>32</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030032</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/32</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/31">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 31: The Effect of Competition on Dishonesty, Trade, and Consumer Trust</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/31</link>
	<description>This paper considers a multi-period two-sided asymmetric information model with infinitely long-lived sellers and short-lived buyers. I assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in the market. Each period, a consumer, who is uncertain about the quality of the offered product, observes her pairwise matched seller&amp;amp;rsquo;s price and a noisy signal of quality that cannot be manipulated by the seller. Prices are fixed and it is common knowledge that consumers are not willing to pay a high price for the low-quality product. A matched seller with a low-quality good can choose to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price). Sellers&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to misrepresent quality depend on how current trade outcomes affect future access to consumer traffic. I show that the strength of the informational role of prices is non-decreasing in the intensity of competition for future consumer traffic in equilibrium and that consumers do not benefit from more intense competition.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-06-17</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 31: The Effect of Competition on Dishonesty, Trade, and Consumer Trust</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/31">doi: 10.3390/g17030031</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Silvia Martinez-Gorricho
		</p>
	<p>This paper considers a multi-period two-sided asymmetric information model with infinitely long-lived sellers and short-lived buyers. I assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in the market. Each period, a consumer, who is uncertain about the quality of the offered product, observes her pairwise matched seller&amp;amp;rsquo;s price and a noisy signal of quality that cannot be manipulated by the seller. Prices are fixed and it is common knowledge that consumers are not willing to pay a high price for the low-quality product. A matched seller with a low-quality good can choose to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price). Sellers&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to misrepresent quality depend on how current trade outcomes affect future access to consumer traffic. I show that the strength of the informational role of prices is non-decreasing in the intensity of competition for future consumer traffic in equilibrium and that consumers do not benefit from more intense competition.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Effect of Competition on Dishonesty, Trade, and Consumer Trust</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Silvia Martinez-Gorricho</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030031</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-06-17</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-06-17</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>31</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030031</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/31</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/30">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 30: The Relationships Between Oil, Critical Minerals, and Military Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S. and China</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/30</link>
	<description>This paper investigates the interplay between oil, critical minerals, and military expenditure in the U.S. and China. The research goal is to evaluate how sensitive the military expenditure of these countries is to shocks in energy markets. It develops a stylized dynamic model of the arms race and conflict, with a particular focus on U.S.&amp;amp;ndash;China tensions surrounding access to these vital resources. Empirical analysis using VAR estimations reveals that: (1) shocks to China&amp;amp;rsquo;s military spending prompt increases in U.S. military expenditure, whereas the reverse effect is not observed; (2) critical mineral production significantly influences China&amp;amp;rsquo;s military spending; and (3) U.S. military expenditure is affected by both Chinese military spending and fluctuations in oil prices.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-06-16</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 30: The Relationships Between Oil, Critical Minerals, and Military Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S. and China</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/30">doi: 10.3390/g17030030</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Luccas Assis Attílio
		Joao Ricardo Faria
		Mauro Rodrigues
		Emilson Silva
		</p>
	<p>This paper investigates the interplay between oil, critical minerals, and military expenditure in the U.S. and China. The research goal is to evaluate how sensitive the military expenditure of these countries is to shocks in energy markets. It develops a stylized dynamic model of the arms race and conflict, with a particular focus on U.S.&amp;amp;ndash;China tensions surrounding access to these vital resources. Empirical analysis using VAR estimations reveals that: (1) shocks to China&amp;amp;rsquo;s military spending prompt increases in U.S. military expenditure, whereas the reverse effect is not observed; (2) critical mineral production significantly influences China&amp;amp;rsquo;s military spending; and (3) U.S. military expenditure is affected by both Chinese military spending and fluctuations in oil prices.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Relationships Between Oil, Critical Minerals, and Military Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S. and China</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Luccas Assis Attílio</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Joao Ricardo Faria</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Mauro Rodrigues</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Emilson Silva</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030030</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-06-16</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-06-16</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>30</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030030</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/30</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/29">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 29: A Provable Semi-Infinite Programming Approach for Solving Constrained Dynamic Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/29</link>
	<description>Many engineering problems must account for the non-cooperative decisions and actions of multiple players. These problems can be modeled within a game-theoretic framework. The approach herein is to model such problems as mathematical games, convert them to semi-infinite programs, and utilize a semi-infinite program solver whose output is provably an &amp;amp;#1013;-optimal Nash equilibrium. The approach is successfully benchmarked on two low-dimensional problems. Two types of higher-dimensional linear quadratic dynamic games are then investigated: ones where each player&amp;amp;rsquo;s problem is convex and ones where at least one player&amp;amp;rsquo;s problem is nonconvex. Within each type, variations based on information structure, control constraints, number of players, and semi-infinite objective are considered. The algorithm is tested with different internal solvers, and it successfully solves all test problems using MATLAB&amp;amp;rsquo;s fmincon. The numerical solutions approximate analytical solutions (when they are known) within approximately one percent. For a three-player game with input saturation constraints, hundreds of variables, and no analytical solution, the computational time is approximately five minutes.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-06-03</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 29: A Provable Semi-Infinite Programming Approach for Solving Constrained Dynamic Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/29">doi: 10.3390/g17030029</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Tyler C. Gardner
		Matthew W. Harris
		Logan Lancaster
		</p>
	<p>Many engineering problems must account for the non-cooperative decisions and actions of multiple players. These problems can be modeled within a game-theoretic framework. The approach herein is to model such problems as mathematical games, convert them to semi-infinite programs, and utilize a semi-infinite program solver whose output is provably an &amp;amp;#1013;-optimal Nash equilibrium. The approach is successfully benchmarked on two low-dimensional problems. Two types of higher-dimensional linear quadratic dynamic games are then investigated: ones where each player&amp;amp;rsquo;s problem is convex and ones where at least one player&amp;amp;rsquo;s problem is nonconvex. Within each type, variations based on information structure, control constraints, number of players, and semi-infinite objective are considered. The algorithm is tested with different internal solvers, and it successfully solves all test problems using MATLAB&amp;amp;rsquo;s fmincon. The numerical solutions approximate analytical solutions (when they are known) within approximately one percent. For a three-player game with input saturation constraints, hundreds of variables, and no analytical solution, the computational time is approximately five minutes.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Provable Semi-Infinite Programming Approach for Solving Constrained Dynamic Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Tyler C. Gardner</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Matthew W. Harris</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Logan Lancaster</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030029</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-06-03</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-06-03</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>29</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030029</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/29</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/28">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 28: A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/28</link>
	<description>We study a continuous-time cooperative differential game of pollution control in which the pollution stock accumulates emissions and affects long-run welfare. The key feature is a one-time random increase in the public damage weight, interpreted as a regime shift in environmental policy, social damage assessment, or regulatory pressure. Using dynamic programming, we characterize the grand-coalition feedback solution from the Hamilton&amp;amp;ndash;Jacobi&amp;amp;ndash;Bellman equations and derive closed-form expressions for cooperative emissions, pollution dynamics, regime-specific steady states, and transition paths. Under emission caps, we construct the coalition characteristic function using a conservative worst-case benchmark for outsider behavior rather than an unlimited-pollution assumption. For payoff allocation, we derive a dynamic payment schedule that implements the Shapley allocation along the stochastic pollution path and keeps the remaining payoff consistent with the corresponding continuation game. Finally, we extend the framework to a threshold-triggered shifted-exponential switching mechanism. This extension gives a computable objective for the optimal threshold-hitting time and clarifies how the pollution threshold and switching hazard can be interpreted as policy-relevant indicators of regulatory or ecological regime change.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-05-29</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 28: A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/28">doi: 10.3390/g17030028</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Feiran Xu
		Anna Tur
		</p>
	<p>We study a continuous-time cooperative differential game of pollution control in which the pollution stock accumulates emissions and affects long-run welfare. The key feature is a one-time random increase in the public damage weight, interpreted as a regime shift in environmental policy, social damage assessment, or regulatory pressure. Using dynamic programming, we characterize the grand-coalition feedback solution from the Hamilton&amp;amp;ndash;Jacobi&amp;amp;ndash;Bellman equations and derive closed-form expressions for cooperative emissions, pollution dynamics, regime-specific steady states, and transition paths. Under emission caps, we construct the coalition characteristic function using a conservative worst-case benchmark for outsider behavior rather than an unlimited-pollution assumption. For payoff allocation, we derive a dynamic payment schedule that implements the Shapley allocation along the stochastic pollution path and keeps the remaining payoff consistent with the corresponding continuation game. Finally, we extend the framework to a threshold-triggered shifted-exponential switching mechanism. This extension gives a computable objective for the optimal threshold-hitting time and clarifies how the pollution threshold and switching hazard can be interpreted as policy-relevant indicators of regulatory or ecological regime change.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Feiran Xu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Anna Tur</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030028</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-05-29</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-05-29</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>28</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030028</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/28</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/27">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 27: When Context Shapes Preferences: Norm Erosion and Context-Dependent Fairness Concerns in Public Goods Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/27</link>
	<description>Public goods provision is vulnerable to free riding, making sustained cooperation a central challenge in economics. Fehr and Schmidt&amp;amp;rsquo;s inequity-aversion model explains how fairness concerns can support cooperation, but it treats preferences as fixed. Motivated by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov&amp;amp;rsquo;s norm-sensitivity framework, this paper develops a reduced-form dynamic framework in which observed norm violations erode normative commitment over time. As normative commitment declines, the model maps this change into Fehr&amp;amp;ndash;Schmidt-style fairness parameters: guilt weakens and envy rises. These parameters provide an interpretive representation of norm erosion, while behavior is generated through a tractable contribution-scaling rule. The framework is calibrated illustratively to the public goods experiment of Fischbacher and G&amp;amp;auml;chter. The calibration is not causal evidence of preference change and does not directly identify inequity-aversion parameters. It shows that a context-dependent preference channel can reproduce the observed aggregate decline in cooperation and generate testable implications. When no free-rider exposure is present, cooperation does not decline within the model. The model also predicts a nonlinear relationship between population-level free-rider prevalence and cooperation. Finally, because the model imposes a lower bound on normative commitment, this institutional floor determines long-run cooperation. The findings should be interpreted as model-based hypotheses for future experimental and field research.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-05-26</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 27: When Context Shapes Preferences: Norm Erosion and Context-Dependent Fairness Concerns in Public Goods Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/27">doi: 10.3390/g17030027</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Chanalak Chaisrilak
		Thanee Chaiwat
		</p>
	<p>Public goods provision is vulnerable to free riding, making sustained cooperation a central challenge in economics. Fehr and Schmidt&amp;amp;rsquo;s inequity-aversion model explains how fairness concerns can support cooperation, but it treats preferences as fixed. Motivated by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov&amp;amp;rsquo;s norm-sensitivity framework, this paper develops a reduced-form dynamic framework in which observed norm violations erode normative commitment over time. As normative commitment declines, the model maps this change into Fehr&amp;amp;ndash;Schmidt-style fairness parameters: guilt weakens and envy rises. These parameters provide an interpretive representation of norm erosion, while behavior is generated through a tractable contribution-scaling rule. The framework is calibrated illustratively to the public goods experiment of Fischbacher and G&amp;amp;auml;chter. The calibration is not causal evidence of preference change and does not directly identify inequity-aversion parameters. It shows that a context-dependent preference channel can reproduce the observed aggregate decline in cooperation and generate testable implications. When no free-rider exposure is present, cooperation does not decline within the model. The model also predicts a nonlinear relationship between population-level free-rider prevalence and cooperation. Finally, because the model imposes a lower bound on normative commitment, this institutional floor determines long-run cooperation. The findings should be interpreted as model-based hypotheses for future experimental and field research.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>When Context Shapes Preferences: Norm Erosion and Context-Dependent Fairness Concerns in Public Goods Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Chanalak Chaisrilak</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Thanee Chaiwat</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030027</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-05-26</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-05-26</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>27</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030027</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/27</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/26">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 26: Diffusion Mechanism of Regional Collaborative Strategy in Public Health Emergencies Considering Vertical Intervention</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/26</link>
	<description>Frequent occurrences of inter-regional emergencies constitute critical impediments to global security and sustainable development, necessitating enhanced intergovernmental emergency collaboration. This study employs a network evolutionary game model (NEGM) to examine how vertical interventions shape diffusion mechanisms of cooperative strategies among local governments. The results show that (1) solely intensifying penalties or rewards yields diminishing marginal returns in incentivizing local governments to adopt a proactive cooperative strategy; (2) elevating the cost-sharing index significantly accelerates the diffusion rate of cooperative strategies, effectively mobilizing broader subnational engagement in public health emergency response; and (3) the tripartite integration of penalty-based enforcement, reward incentives, and cost-sharing mechanisms demonstrates synergistic superiority over alternative policy instruments&amp;amp;mdash;whether implemented individually or in pairwise combinations.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-05-25</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 26: Diffusion Mechanism of Regional Collaborative Strategy in Public Health Emergencies Considering Vertical Intervention</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/26">doi: 10.3390/g17030026</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Xiaoli Li
		Luo Wu
		</p>
	<p>Frequent occurrences of inter-regional emergencies constitute critical impediments to global security and sustainable development, necessitating enhanced intergovernmental emergency collaboration. This study employs a network evolutionary game model (NEGM) to examine how vertical interventions shape diffusion mechanisms of cooperative strategies among local governments. The results show that (1) solely intensifying penalties or rewards yields diminishing marginal returns in incentivizing local governments to adopt a proactive cooperative strategy; (2) elevating the cost-sharing index significantly accelerates the diffusion rate of cooperative strategies, effectively mobilizing broader subnational engagement in public health emergency response; and (3) the tripartite integration of penalty-based enforcement, reward incentives, and cost-sharing mechanisms demonstrates synergistic superiority over alternative policy instruments&amp;amp;mdash;whether implemented individually or in pairwise combinations.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Diffusion Mechanism of Regional Collaborative Strategy in Public Health Emergencies Considering Vertical Intervention</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Xiaoli Li</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Luo Wu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030026</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-05-25</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-05-25</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>26</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030026</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/26</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/25">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 25: Search Costs, Hassle Costs, and Drip Pricing: Equilibria with Rational Consumers and Firms</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/25</link>
	<description>This paper examines drip pricing related to compulsory charges&amp;amp;mdash;a situation where firms intentionally make it costly for consumers to discover mandatory fees or surcharges that &amp;amp;ldquo;drip&amp;amp;rdquo; into the full (total) price, which is only revealed after incurring the hassle cost of completing a purchase. We show that drip pricing can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon with fully rational consumers and profit-maximizing firms. We also show that when consumers and firms are rational (a) situations where drip pricing raises prices and harms consumers are unlikely to arise from unilateral business decisions and (b) the most likely avenue by which drip pricing harms consumers is through the coordinated adoption of drip pricing.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-05-21</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 25: Search Costs, Hassle Costs, and Drip Pricing: Equilibria with Rational Consumers and Firms</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/25">doi: 10.3390/g17030025</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Michael R. Baye
		John Morgan
		</p>
	<p>This paper examines drip pricing related to compulsory charges&amp;amp;mdash;a situation where firms intentionally make it costly for consumers to discover mandatory fees or surcharges that &amp;amp;ldquo;drip&amp;amp;rdquo; into the full (total) price, which is only revealed after incurring the hassle cost of completing a purchase. We show that drip pricing can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon with fully rational consumers and profit-maximizing firms. We also show that when consumers and firms are rational (a) situations where drip pricing raises prices and harms consumers are unlikely to arise from unilateral business decisions and (b) the most likely avenue by which drip pricing harms consumers is through the coordinated adoption of drip pricing.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Search Costs, Hassle Costs, and Drip Pricing: Equilibria with Rational Consumers and Firms</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Michael R. Baye</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>John Morgan</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030025</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-05-21</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-05-21</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>25</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030025</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/25</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/24">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 24: Nonlinear Dynamics of Evolutionary Public Goods Games with Consistent- and Inconsistent-Moral-Standard Exclusive Sanctions</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/24</link>
	<description>This paper investigates the evolution of public cooperation within a four-strategy public goods game that incorporates both consistently and inconsistently moralistic exclusion mechanisms. Using replicator dynamics in an infinite well-mixed population, we demonstrate that the presence of Inconsistent Moralists (IMs), i.e., non-contributors who hypocritically exclude other defectors, fundamentally reshapes the dynamical structure of the multi-player social dilemma game. While the system admits no interior fixed point and the IM strategy itself is evolutionarily unstable, IM acts as a critical catalyst by destabilizing pure defection and redirecting evolutionary trajectories toward exclusion-based cooperation. Ultimately, these findings reveal that diverse enforcement strategies can qualitatively alter evolutionary outcomes by providing a previously overlooked indirect pathway for cooperation to emerge and persist in social dilemmas.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-05-18</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 24: Nonlinear Dynamics of Evolutionary Public Goods Games with Consistent- and Inconsistent-Moral-Standard Exclusive Sanctions</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/24">doi: 10.3390/g17030024</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yang Chen
		Xiaofeng Wang
		</p>
	<p>This paper investigates the evolution of public cooperation within a four-strategy public goods game that incorporates both consistently and inconsistently moralistic exclusion mechanisms. Using replicator dynamics in an infinite well-mixed population, we demonstrate that the presence of Inconsistent Moralists (IMs), i.e., non-contributors who hypocritically exclude other defectors, fundamentally reshapes the dynamical structure of the multi-player social dilemma game. While the system admits no interior fixed point and the IM strategy itself is evolutionarily unstable, IM acts as a critical catalyst by destabilizing pure defection and redirecting evolutionary trajectories toward exclusion-based cooperation. Ultimately, these findings reveal that diverse enforcement strategies can qualitatively alter evolutionary outcomes by providing a previously overlooked indirect pathway for cooperation to emerge and persist in social dilemmas.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Nonlinear Dynamics of Evolutionary Public Goods Games with Consistent- and Inconsistent-Moral-Standard Exclusive Sanctions</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yang Chen</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Xiaofeng Wang</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030024</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-05-18</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-05-18</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>24</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030024</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/24</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/23">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 23: A Dynamic Game Model to Estimate Market Competitiveness: An Application to the Chinese Retail Oil Market</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/23</link>
	<description>This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to evaluate market competitiveness in industries characterized by price competition and adjustment stickiness. We extend the dynamic oligopoly framework for estimating market competitiveness in the literature from a quantity-setting to a price-setting context with differentiated goods. By deriving the subgame perfect equilibrium in a linear-quadratic structure, we utilize an index analogous to the price conjectural variation to measure market competitiveness with differentiated goods. The model is applied to the Chinese retail oil market, and we find that the Chinese retail oil market, particularly dominated by two state firms, exhibits characteristics close to a collusive benchmark within the maintained model. The dynamic game model provides a tractable analytical tool for antitrust authorities to monitor strategic coordination in dynamic environments where price transparency or regulation may facilitate tacit coordination of pricing behavior to a high degree.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-04-30</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 23: A Dynamic Game Model to Estimate Market Competitiveness: An Application to the Chinese Retail Oil Market</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/23">doi: 10.3390/g17030023</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Ying Zheng
		Jiayi Xu
		Xiao-Bing Zhang
		</p>
	<p>This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to evaluate market competitiveness in industries characterized by price competition and adjustment stickiness. We extend the dynamic oligopoly framework for estimating market competitiveness in the literature from a quantity-setting to a price-setting context with differentiated goods. By deriving the subgame perfect equilibrium in a linear-quadratic structure, we utilize an index analogous to the price conjectural variation to measure market competitiveness with differentiated goods. The model is applied to the Chinese retail oil market, and we find that the Chinese retail oil market, particularly dominated by two state firms, exhibits characteristics close to a collusive benchmark within the maintained model. The dynamic game model provides a tractable analytical tool for antitrust authorities to monitor strategic coordination in dynamic environments where price transparency or regulation may facilitate tacit coordination of pricing behavior to a high degree.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Dynamic Game Model to Estimate Market Competitiveness: An Application to the Chinese Retail Oil Market</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Ying Zheng</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jiayi Xu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Xiao-Bing Zhang</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030023</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-04-30</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-04-30</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>23</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030023</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/23</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/22">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 22: Game Theory Narratives of the Three-Body Trilogy</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/22</link>
	<description>This article offers a formal analysis of the paradoxes, dilemmas and strategic interactions explored in Liu Cixin&amp;amp;rsquo;s trilogy The Three-Body Problem. Several games, such as the survival game, the deterrence game, the first contact game, and the big bang game, provide the foundations of cosmic sociology.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-04-27</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 22: Game Theory Narratives of the Three-Body Trilogy</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/22">doi: 10.3390/g17030022</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Noemi Navarro
		Jean-Christophe Pereau
		</p>
	<p>This article offers a formal analysis of the paradoxes, dilemmas and strategic interactions explored in Liu Cixin&amp;amp;rsquo;s trilogy The Three-Body Problem. Several games, such as the survival game, the deterrence game, the first contact game, and the big bang game, provide the foundations of cosmic sociology.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Game Theory Narratives of the Three-Body Trilogy</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Noemi Navarro</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jean-Christophe Pereau</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030022</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-04-27</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-04-27</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>22</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030022</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/22</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/21">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 21: Do Downstream Firms Strategically Accept Upstream Equity Participation?</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/21</link>
	<description>This paper examines downstream firms&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to accept equity participation by an upstream supplier in a vertically related market. We develop a multi-stage model in which the upstream firm offers an equity stake and sets input prices under price discrimination, while downstream firms subsequently compete &amp;amp;agrave; la Cournot. We show that upstream equity ownership induces the upstream firm to lower input prices by partially internalizing downstream profits. This mechanism generates a positive market-expansion effect for downstream firms through lower input costs, while equity ownership simultaneously creates a negative equity-dilution effect by reducing the share of profits retained by downstream firms. When products are homogeneous, the equity-dilution effect dominates the market-expansion effect, leading downstream firms into a Prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s Dilemma. In contrast, under product differentiation, when the ownership share is sufficiently small, the market-expansion effect dominates the equity-dilution effect, resulting in higher downstream profits. In this case, accepting equity participation can be individually optimal for downstream firms, even though mutual acceptance may reduce their retained profits.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-04-27</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 21: Do Downstream Firms Strategically Accept Upstream Equity Participation?</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/21">doi: 10.3390/g17030021</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Chiu-Hui Li
		Jen-Yao Lee
		</p>
	<p>This paper examines downstream firms&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to accept equity participation by an upstream supplier in a vertically related market. We develop a multi-stage model in which the upstream firm offers an equity stake and sets input prices under price discrimination, while downstream firms subsequently compete &amp;amp;agrave; la Cournot. We show that upstream equity ownership induces the upstream firm to lower input prices by partially internalizing downstream profits. This mechanism generates a positive market-expansion effect for downstream firms through lower input costs, while equity ownership simultaneously creates a negative equity-dilution effect by reducing the share of profits retained by downstream firms. When products are homogeneous, the equity-dilution effect dominates the market-expansion effect, leading downstream firms into a Prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s Dilemma. In contrast, under product differentiation, when the ownership share is sufficiently small, the market-expansion effect dominates the equity-dilution effect, resulting in higher downstream profits. In this case, accepting equity participation can be individually optimal for downstream firms, even though mutual acceptance may reduce their retained profits.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Do Downstream Firms Strategically Accept Upstream Equity Participation?</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Chiu-Hui Li</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jen-Yao Lee</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17030021</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-04-27</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-04-27</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>3</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>21</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17030021</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/3/21</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/20">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 20: A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/20</link>
	<description>Eigenvector-based centrality captures recursive notions of importance in networks. While the direct problem computes centrality from given edge weights, the inverse eigenvector centrality problem seeks edge weights that reproduce a prescribed centrality profile; for directed multigraphs, this inverse task is typically non-unique and depends on the admissible arc structure. We study the direct and inverse problems on directed multigraphs and derive an explicit linear characterization of the set of admissible edge-weight vectors that are compatible with a given centrality target. On this feasible set, we formulate a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared centrality constraints, in which multiple agents select edge weights to maximize economically interpretable payoffs that incorporate arc-level competition effects. We provide conditions under which the induced game admits a concave potential function, yielding equilibrium existence and, under standard strict concavity assumptions, uniqueness. Finally, we illustrate the model on an airport network where nodes represent airports and parallel arcs represent airline-specific routes, showing that equilibrium selection produces a feasible and interpretable weight configuration that preserves the prescribed centrality.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-04-07</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 20: A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/20">doi: 10.3390/g17020020</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Mauro Passacantando
		Fabio Raciti
		</p>
	<p>Eigenvector-based centrality captures recursive notions of importance in networks. While the direct problem computes centrality from given edge weights, the inverse eigenvector centrality problem seeks edge weights that reproduce a prescribed centrality profile; for directed multigraphs, this inverse task is typically non-unique and depends on the admissible arc structure. We study the direct and inverse problems on directed multigraphs and derive an explicit linear characterization of the set of admissible edge-weight vectors that are compatible with a given centrality target. On this feasible set, we formulate a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared centrality constraints, in which multiple agents select edge weights to maximize economically interpretable payoffs that incorporate arc-level competition effects. We provide conditions under which the induced game admits a concave potential function, yielding equilibrium existence and, under standard strict concavity assumptions, uniqueness. Finally, we illustrate the model on an airport network where nodes represent airports and parallel arcs represent airline-specific routes, showing that equilibrium selection produces a feasible and interpretable weight configuration that preserves the prescribed centrality.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Mauro Passacantando</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Fabio Raciti</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020020</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-04-07</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-04-07</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>20</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020020</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/20</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/19">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 19: Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/19</link>
	<description>This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The analysis shows that, in the linear case, the monopolist&amp;amp;rsquo;s optimal offer endogenously collapses to a single quality-price pair, where the quality equals the highest feasible level. In addition, welfare maximization is achieved if and only if the market is fully served in equilibrium.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-04-06</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 19: Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/19">doi: 10.3390/g17020019</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Amit Gayer
		</p>
	<p>This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The analysis shows that, in the linear case, the monopolist&amp;amp;rsquo;s optimal offer endogenously collapses to a single quality-price pair, where the quality equals the highest feasible level. In addition, welfare maximization is achieved if and only if the market is fully served in equilibrium.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Amit Gayer</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020019</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-04-06</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-04-06</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>19</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020019</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/19</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/18">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 18: The Correlated Response Technique: Estimation, Incentives, and Comparison with Randomized Response at Equal Statistical Precision</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/18</link>
	<description>Randomized response is a widely used survey technique for measuring stigmatized populations, but it may provide limited information in small samples. This paper introduces a method of elicitation through perfectly correlated questions, showing that correlation can substantially improve statistical performance and allow a dominant-strategy mechanism when either the interviewer or respondents hold symmetric beliefs. The framework also allows the interviewer to possess private information about the distribution of questions, further relaxing incentive constraints. Building on an existing survey design game framework, the paper introduces a novel efficiency-normalized comparison that holds statistical performance constant across mechanisms, enabling a direct comparison of incentives. The analysis characterizes incentive properties and estimation under correlated questions and randomized response, and identifies when it is optimal to ask respondents directly, use randomized response, or correlate questions.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-03-31</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 18: The Correlated Response Technique: Estimation, Incentives, and Comparison with Randomized Response at Equal Statistical Precision</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/18">doi: 10.3390/g17020018</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Timothy Flannery
		</p>
	<p>Randomized response is a widely used survey technique for measuring stigmatized populations, but it may provide limited information in small samples. This paper introduces a method of elicitation through perfectly correlated questions, showing that correlation can substantially improve statistical performance and allow a dominant-strategy mechanism when either the interviewer or respondents hold symmetric beliefs. The framework also allows the interviewer to possess private information about the distribution of questions, further relaxing incentive constraints. Building on an existing survey design game framework, the paper introduces a novel efficiency-normalized comparison that holds statistical performance constant across mechanisms, enabling a direct comparison of incentives. The analysis characterizes incentive properties and estimation under correlated questions and randomized response, and identifies when it is optimal to ask respondents directly, use randomized response, or correlate questions.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Correlated Response Technique: Estimation, Incentives, and Comparison with Randomized Response at Equal Statistical Precision</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Timothy Flannery</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020018</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-03-31</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-03-31</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>18</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020018</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/18</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/17">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 17: Cooperation or Confrontation? An Evolutionary Game Study on Content Clipping Authorization in Live Streaming E-Commerce Under Platform Regulation</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/17</link>
	<description>The rapid rise of live-streaming e-commerce has fostered a new &amp;amp;ldquo;content clipping&amp;amp;rdquo; model, in which secondary creators edit and republish anchors&amp;amp;rsquo; live-streaming content to promote product sales. While this model can expand market reach and enhance revenue, it also introduces copyright disputes, regulatory challenges, and profit-sharing conflicts among platforms, anchors, and secondary creators. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model to examine strategic choices regarding platform regulation, anchor authorization, and secondary content creation. Results reveal that excessive regulation may undermine equilibrium and profitability, while appropriate authorization can balance risk and reward. Secondary creators&amp;amp;rsquo; participation is sensitive to commission rates and cost&amp;amp;ndash;benefit trade-offs. This research contributes to the literature by integrating copyright governance into live-streaming e-commerce game theory and offers actionable insights for designing regulatory mechanisms, optimizing authorization policies, and fostering sustainable multi-party collaboration.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-03-27</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 17: Cooperation or Confrontation? An Evolutionary Game Study on Content Clipping Authorization in Live Streaming E-Commerce Under Platform Regulation</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/17">doi: 10.3390/g17020017</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Feng Luo
		Xinmiao Zhao
		Tiantong Xu
		</p>
	<p>The rapid rise of live-streaming e-commerce has fostered a new &amp;amp;ldquo;content clipping&amp;amp;rdquo; model, in which secondary creators edit and republish anchors&amp;amp;rsquo; live-streaming content to promote product sales. While this model can expand market reach and enhance revenue, it also introduces copyright disputes, regulatory challenges, and profit-sharing conflicts among platforms, anchors, and secondary creators. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model to examine strategic choices regarding platform regulation, anchor authorization, and secondary content creation. Results reveal that excessive regulation may undermine equilibrium and profitability, while appropriate authorization can balance risk and reward. Secondary creators&amp;amp;rsquo; participation is sensitive to commission rates and cost&amp;amp;ndash;benefit trade-offs. This research contributes to the literature by integrating copyright governance into live-streaming e-commerce game theory and offers actionable insights for designing regulatory mechanisms, optimizing authorization policies, and fostering sustainable multi-party collaboration.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Cooperation or Confrontation? An Evolutionary Game Study on Content Clipping Authorization in Live Streaming E-Commerce Under Platform Regulation</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Feng Luo</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Xinmiao Zhao</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Tiantong Xu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020017</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-03-27</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-03-27</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>17</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020017</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/17</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/16">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 16: Platform Empowerment and Digital Inclusion in Industrial Clusters: A Complex Network Game Analysis with Performance Feedback</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/16</link>
	<description>The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates whether platform enterprises, as core actors occupying structural holes in cluster networks, can foster the co-construction of a digitally inclusive ecosystem. We developed a complex network public goods game model, incorporating performance feedback into a modified Fermi learning to capture firms&amp;amp;rsquo; adaptive decision-making based on historical and social aspirations. The model simulates strategic interactions on both small-world and scale-free networks, characteristic of industrial clusters. Numerical simulations reveal that: (1) The core driver of co-construction is the investment return coefficient; (2) Performance feedback amplifies individual rationality, accelerating the formation or collapse of cooperation depending on the investment return coefficient; (3) Platform empowerment&amp;amp;mdash;specifically, selectively connecting and incentivizing cooperative firms&amp;amp;mdash;effectively promotes ecosystem co-construction, with this strategy proving most impactful when investment returns are moderate. Furthermore, while this selective empowerment strategy benefits the cluster overall, its effect on the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s own revenue is network-dependent, showing a more pronounced decline in small-world structures. This study provides a novel analytical framework for understanding strategic interactions in digital inclusion and offers practical insights for policymakers and platform leaders in orchestrating collaborative digital transformation.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-03-10</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 16: Platform Empowerment and Digital Inclusion in Industrial Clusters: A Complex Network Game Analysis with Performance Feedback</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/16">doi: 10.3390/g17020016</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Dingteng Wang
		Chengwei Liu
		Shuping Wang
		</p>
	<p>The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates whether platform enterprises, as core actors occupying structural holes in cluster networks, can foster the co-construction of a digitally inclusive ecosystem. We developed a complex network public goods game model, incorporating performance feedback into a modified Fermi learning to capture firms&amp;amp;rsquo; adaptive decision-making based on historical and social aspirations. The model simulates strategic interactions on both small-world and scale-free networks, characteristic of industrial clusters. Numerical simulations reveal that: (1) The core driver of co-construction is the investment return coefficient; (2) Performance feedback amplifies individual rationality, accelerating the formation or collapse of cooperation depending on the investment return coefficient; (3) Platform empowerment&amp;amp;mdash;specifically, selectively connecting and incentivizing cooperative firms&amp;amp;mdash;effectively promotes ecosystem co-construction, with this strategy proving most impactful when investment returns are moderate. Furthermore, while this selective empowerment strategy benefits the cluster overall, its effect on the platform&amp;amp;rsquo;s own revenue is network-dependent, showing a more pronounced decline in small-world structures. This study provides a novel analytical framework for understanding strategic interactions in digital inclusion and offers practical insights for policymakers and platform leaders in orchestrating collaborative digital transformation.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Platform Empowerment and Digital Inclusion in Industrial Clusters: A Complex Network Game Analysis with Performance Feedback</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Dingteng Wang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Chengwei Liu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Shuping Wang</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020016</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-03-10</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-03-10</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>16</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020016</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/16</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/15">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 15: Measuring Pitcher Production Fairly in Baseball Using the Shapley Value</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/15</link>
	<description>This paper introduces fairer measures of individual pitcher performance in baseball using the Shapley Value from coalitional game theory. The paper&amp;amp;rsquo;s key conceptual innovation is a novel two-stage procedure for constructing the coalitionary game value functions for runs allowed and outs recorded by a baseball team&amp;amp;rsquo;s defense. This procedure enables the Shapley Value calculation to fairly divide credit for runs and out between different pitchers and between pitchers and fielders. It also results in two new statistics&amp;amp;mdash;Shapley Pitcher Runs (SPR) and Shapley Pitcher Outs (SPO)&amp;amp;mdash;that, unlike traditional pitching statistics, consistently satisfy several mathematical fairness axioms. A third statistic, called Shapley Run Average, provides a fairer measure of pitcher efficiency. I calculate these statistics for the 2022 Major League Baseball regular season and the 1955&amp;amp;ndash;2022 World Series championships. Using SPR and SPO as the standard for fairness, empirical analysis reveals that the traditional pitching statistics systematically and unfairly overcredit pitchers by 40&amp;amp;ndash;50%, with starting pitchers miscredited more severely than relievers. Analysis of SRA identifies efficient pitchers whose performance is obscured by conventional statistics and enables a reassessment of historic World Series performances. Overall, this work demonstrates another application of the Shapley Value to creating new performance measures in team sports.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-03-10</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 15: Measuring Pitcher Production Fairly in Baseball Using the Shapley Value</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/15">doi: 10.3390/g17020015</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Michael McBride
		</p>
	<p>This paper introduces fairer measures of individual pitcher performance in baseball using the Shapley Value from coalitional game theory. The paper&amp;amp;rsquo;s key conceptual innovation is a novel two-stage procedure for constructing the coalitionary game value functions for runs allowed and outs recorded by a baseball team&amp;amp;rsquo;s defense. This procedure enables the Shapley Value calculation to fairly divide credit for runs and out between different pitchers and between pitchers and fielders. It also results in two new statistics&amp;amp;mdash;Shapley Pitcher Runs (SPR) and Shapley Pitcher Outs (SPO)&amp;amp;mdash;that, unlike traditional pitching statistics, consistently satisfy several mathematical fairness axioms. A third statistic, called Shapley Run Average, provides a fairer measure of pitcher efficiency. I calculate these statistics for the 2022 Major League Baseball regular season and the 1955&amp;amp;ndash;2022 World Series championships. Using SPR and SPO as the standard for fairness, empirical analysis reveals that the traditional pitching statistics systematically and unfairly overcredit pitchers by 40&amp;amp;ndash;50%, with starting pitchers miscredited more severely than relievers. Analysis of SRA identifies efficient pitchers whose performance is obscured by conventional statistics and enables a reassessment of historic World Series performances. Overall, this work demonstrates another application of the Shapley Value to creating new performance measures in team sports.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Measuring Pitcher Production Fairly in Baseball Using the Shapley Value</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Michael McBride</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020015</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-03-10</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-03-10</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>15</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020015</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/15</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/14">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 14: Cooperation Collapse in the Harmony Game: Revisiting Scodel and Minas Through Evolutionary Game Theory</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/14</link>
	<description>Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they documented a striking pattern: subjects frequently chose options that reduced an opponent&amp;amp;rsquo;s payoff by more than their own, even when mutual cooperation was both individually and collectively optimal. These results&amp;amp;mdash;especially the behavior observed in their so-called Game H4, a Harmony Game in which cooperation strictly dominated defection&amp;amp;mdash;anticipate a central insight of evolutionary game theory: what matters for adaptation is relative payoff, not absolute gain. This essay reinterprets the Scodel&amp;amp;ndash;Minas experiments through a Darwinian lens, arguing that they provide an early empirical challenge to Nash-equilibrium reasoning and to models that evaluate strategies solely in terms of absolute utility. By reconstructing the H4 payoff structure and embedding it within a simple evolutionary framework, I show how small levels of &amp;amp;ldquo;competitive&amp;amp;rdquo; behavior can destabilize cooperative equilibria that appear self-evident under standard assumptions. I then revisit three later &amp;amp;ldquo;puzzles&amp;amp;rdquo; in the evolution of cooperation&amp;amp;mdash;altruistic punishment, the fragility of &amp;amp;ldquo;win&amp;amp;ndash;win&amp;amp;rdquo; treaties, and rejections in ultimatum bargaining&amp;amp;mdash;to ask how differently they might have been framed had the Scodel&amp;amp;ndash;Minas findings been part of the canonical experimental literature. Rather than treating these phenomena as surprising anomalies, a historically informed, relative-payoff perspective suggests that they could have been recognized much earlier as natural expressions of an already documented pattern.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-03-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 14: Cooperation Collapse in the Harmony Game: Revisiting Scodel and Minas Through Evolutionary Game Theory</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/14">doi: 10.3390/g17020014</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Shade T. Shutters
		</p>
	<p>Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they documented a striking pattern: subjects frequently chose options that reduced an opponent&amp;amp;rsquo;s payoff by more than their own, even when mutual cooperation was both individually and collectively optimal. These results&amp;amp;mdash;especially the behavior observed in their so-called Game H4, a Harmony Game in which cooperation strictly dominated defection&amp;amp;mdash;anticipate a central insight of evolutionary game theory: what matters for adaptation is relative payoff, not absolute gain. This essay reinterprets the Scodel&amp;amp;ndash;Minas experiments through a Darwinian lens, arguing that they provide an early empirical challenge to Nash-equilibrium reasoning and to models that evaluate strategies solely in terms of absolute utility. By reconstructing the H4 payoff structure and embedding it within a simple evolutionary framework, I show how small levels of &amp;amp;ldquo;competitive&amp;amp;rdquo; behavior can destabilize cooperative equilibria that appear self-evident under standard assumptions. I then revisit three later &amp;amp;ldquo;puzzles&amp;amp;rdquo; in the evolution of cooperation&amp;amp;mdash;altruistic punishment, the fragility of &amp;amp;ldquo;win&amp;amp;ndash;win&amp;amp;rdquo; treaties, and rejections in ultimatum bargaining&amp;amp;mdash;to ask how differently they might have been framed had the Scodel&amp;amp;ndash;Minas findings been part of the canonical experimental literature. Rather than treating these phenomena as surprising anomalies, a historically informed, relative-payoff perspective suggests that they could have been recognized much earlier as natural expressions of an already documented pattern.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Cooperation Collapse in the Harmony Game: Revisiting Scodel and Minas Through Evolutionary Game Theory</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Shade T. Shutters</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020014</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-03-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-03-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Essay</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>14</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020014</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/14</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/13">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 13: How to Sell Debt (But Not Money)</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/13</link>
	<description>Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we consider the incentive for participation by relatively uninformed bidders in the presence of more informed bidders under these formats. We characterize the equilibrium under a discriminatory auction and show that discriminatory pricing inhibits uninformed participation. In contrast, the equilibria we construct under a uniform pricing rule show that profitable uninformed participation can occur. The usefulness of widening participation in Treasury auctions makes the latter format a natural choice in these auctions, providing an explanation for the switch to the uniform-price format in US Treasury auctions. We also apply our results to repo auctions and show that a uniform-price format can reduce the ability of a central bank to steer interest rates. This sheds light on the reason for the switch away from the uniform-price format by several central banks in conducting repo auctions. We also consider the question of information aggregation and show that uniform-price auctions might fail to do so. The results also offer an explanation for the fact that the ECB, as well as several other central banks, prefer to allocate liquidity through a fixed-rate tender rather than either uniform-price or discriminatory auctions.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-03-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 13: How to Sell Debt (But Not Money)</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/13">doi: 10.3390/g17020013</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Arup Daripa
		</p>
	<p>Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we consider the incentive for participation by relatively uninformed bidders in the presence of more informed bidders under these formats. We characterize the equilibrium under a discriminatory auction and show that discriminatory pricing inhibits uninformed participation. In contrast, the equilibria we construct under a uniform pricing rule show that profitable uninformed participation can occur. The usefulness of widening participation in Treasury auctions makes the latter format a natural choice in these auctions, providing an explanation for the switch to the uniform-price format in US Treasury auctions. We also apply our results to repo auctions and show that a uniform-price format can reduce the ability of a central bank to steer interest rates. This sheds light on the reason for the switch away from the uniform-price format by several central banks in conducting repo auctions. We also consider the question of information aggregation and show that uniform-price auctions might fail to do so. The results also offer an explanation for the fact that the ECB, as well as several other central banks, prefer to allocate liquidity through a fixed-rate tender rather than either uniform-price or discriminatory auctions.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>How to Sell Debt (But Not Money)</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Arup Daripa</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17020013</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-03-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-03-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>2</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>13</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17020013</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/2/13</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/12">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 12: Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents: Theory and Experiment</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/12</link>
	<description>In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because the agent might be able to induce the outcome by revealing its other preference. On the basis of such an understanding, this paper considers an implementation problem with the bounded rationality of agents. The bounded rationality presented in this paper means that the agent might choose its best response which is different from its dominant strategy. To describe such behavior, this paper introduces a new notion of equilibrium, called (n&amp;amp;minus;k)-dominant strategy Nash equilibrium at which at most k&amp;amp;isin;{0,1,&amp;amp;hellip;,n} boundedly rational agents might choose their best responses which are different from their dominant strategies, and at least (n&amp;amp;minus;k) rational agents choose their dominant strategies. In addition, to show what a socially optimal outcome is collectively chosen under the existence of boundedly rational agents, this paper introduces a new notion of implementation, called k-secure implementation, which is a double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and (n&amp;amp;minus;k)-dominant strategy Nash equilibria. In specific environments with k&amp;amp;le;(n+1)/2, this paper shows that majority rule satisfies k-secure implementability, but not secure implementability which is equivalent to n-secure implementability. In addition, this paper shows that majority rule realized the socially optimal outcome in the environments in laboratory experiments.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-02-14</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 12: Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents: Theory and Experiment</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/12">doi: 10.3390/g17010012</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Katsuhiko Nishizaki
		</p>
	<p>In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because the agent might be able to induce the outcome by revealing its other preference. On the basis of such an understanding, this paper considers an implementation problem with the bounded rationality of agents. The bounded rationality presented in this paper means that the agent might choose its best response which is different from its dominant strategy. To describe such behavior, this paper introduces a new notion of equilibrium, called (n&amp;amp;minus;k)-dominant strategy Nash equilibrium at which at most k&amp;amp;isin;{0,1,&amp;amp;hellip;,n} boundedly rational agents might choose their best responses which are different from their dominant strategies, and at least (n&amp;amp;minus;k) rational agents choose their dominant strategies. In addition, to show what a socially optimal outcome is collectively chosen under the existence of boundedly rational agents, this paper introduces a new notion of implementation, called k-secure implementation, which is a double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and (n&amp;amp;minus;k)-dominant strategy Nash equilibria. In specific environments with k&amp;amp;le;(n+1)/2, this paper shows that majority rule satisfies k-secure implementability, but not secure implementability which is equivalent to n-secure implementability. In addition, this paper shows that majority rule realized the socially optimal outcome in the environments in laboratory experiments.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents: Theory and Experiment</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Katsuhiko Nishizaki</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010012</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-02-14</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-02-14</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>12</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010012</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/12</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/11">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 11: A Structural Measure of Bargaining Fragility in Multi-Domain Agreements</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/11</link>
	<description>Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of agreement-level quantities characterizing dependency architecture: strain &amp;amp;tau; (the number of operative obligations requiring tracking), curvature &amp;amp;kappa; (the density and strength of interdependencies among elements), compressibility &amp;amp;sigma; (the extent to which complexity can be reduced through modularization without altering functional meaning), and the stability quotient &amp;amp;Gamma; = &amp;amp;kappa;/&amp;amp;tau; (average interdependence burden per element). We use the inequality &amp;amp;Gamma; &amp;amp;gt; &amp;amp;sigma; as a classification rule; agreements with &amp;amp;Gamma; &amp;amp;gt; &amp;amp;sigma; are classified as structurally fragile and, in the data, exhibit higher sensitivity to perturbations. Across 42 documented agreements, the diagnostic correctly classifies nearly all observed outcomes, with only a single false positive and no false negatives. The framework operates as a pre-equilibrium screen that complements (rather than replaces) Nash and bargaining equilibrium analyses by identifying agreement architectures that are structurally brittle under small shocks.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-02-11</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 11: A Structural Measure of Bargaining Fragility in Multi-Domain Agreements</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/11">doi: 10.3390/g17010011</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Robert Castro
		</p>
	<p>Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of agreement-level quantities characterizing dependency architecture: strain &amp;amp;tau; (the number of operative obligations requiring tracking), curvature &amp;amp;kappa; (the density and strength of interdependencies among elements), compressibility &amp;amp;sigma; (the extent to which complexity can be reduced through modularization without altering functional meaning), and the stability quotient &amp;amp;Gamma; = &amp;amp;kappa;/&amp;amp;tau; (average interdependence burden per element). We use the inequality &amp;amp;Gamma; &amp;amp;gt; &amp;amp;sigma; as a classification rule; agreements with &amp;amp;Gamma; &amp;amp;gt; &amp;amp;sigma; are classified as structurally fragile and, in the data, exhibit higher sensitivity to perturbations. Across 42 documented agreements, the diagnostic correctly classifies nearly all observed outcomes, with only a single false positive and no false negatives. The framework operates as a pre-equilibrium screen that complements (rather than replaces) Nash and bargaining equilibrium analyses by identifying agreement architectures that are structurally brittle under small shocks.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Structural Measure of Bargaining Fragility in Multi-Domain Agreements</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Robert Castro</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010011</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-02-11</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-02-11</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>11</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010011</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/11</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/10">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 10: Equal Chances or Fewer Victims? Moral Judgments in Autonomous Vehicle Dilemmas</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/10</link>
	<description>We examine the moral dilemma of how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should be programmed to act in unavoidable crash scenarios involving trade-offs between saving one life and saving many. We report results from three experimental studies that investigate individuals&amp;amp;rsquo; preferences over alternative AV decision rules in stylized crash scenarios. Across designs, we find robust support for a probabilistic decision rule that assigns passengers and pedestrians equal ex ante chances of survival (a 50:50 rule). This preference persists across different framings and remains salient even when additional probabilistic options are introduced.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-02-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 10: Equal Chances or Fewer Victims? Moral Judgments in Autonomous Vehicle Dilemmas</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/10">doi: 10.3390/g17010010</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Alexander Matros
		Eren Bilen
		Leonid Matros
		</p>
	<p>We examine the moral dilemma of how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should be programmed to act in unavoidable crash scenarios involving trade-offs between saving one life and saving many. We report results from three experimental studies that investigate individuals&amp;amp;rsquo; preferences over alternative AV decision rules in stylized crash scenarios. Across designs, we find robust support for a probabilistic decision rule that assigns passengers and pedestrians equal ex ante chances of survival (a 50:50 rule). This preference persists across different framings and remains salient even when additional probabilistic options are introduced.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Equal Chances or Fewer Victims? Moral Judgments in Autonomous Vehicle Dilemmas</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Alexander Matros</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Eren Bilen</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Leonid Matros</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010010</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-02-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-02-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>10</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010010</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/10</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/9">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 9: Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/9</link>
	<description>There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-02-03</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 9: Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/9">doi: 10.3390/g17010009</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Sam Ganzfried
		</p>
	<p>There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Sam Ganzfried</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010009</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-02-03</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-02-03</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>9</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010009</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/9</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/8">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 8: Exclusionary Contracts and Incentives to Innovate</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/8</link>
	<description>This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study how exclusionary contracts affect firms&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to invest in innovation. Several symmetric sellers compete to supply an identical product to a set of buyers, and each seller can invest in R&amp;amp;amp;D to develop a higher-quality version of the product. Prior to choosing their R&amp;amp;amp;D investments, sellers may offer exclusionary contracts to buyers. In equilibrium, all buyers sign an exclusionary contract with the same seller, which eliminates rival sellers&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to invest in R&amp;amp;amp;D and concentrates innovative effort in a single firm. Banning exclusionary contracts increases the aggregate probability of innovation and the joint surplus of buyers and sellers only when the R&amp;amp;amp;D technology exhibits sufficiently strong diseconomies of scale.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-02-03</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 8: Exclusionary Contracts and Incentives to Innovate</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/8">doi: 10.3390/g17010008</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Simen Aardal Ulsaker
		</p>
	<p>This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study how exclusionary contracts affect firms&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to invest in innovation. Several symmetric sellers compete to supply an identical product to a set of buyers, and each seller can invest in R&amp;amp;amp;D to develop a higher-quality version of the product. Prior to choosing their R&amp;amp;amp;D investments, sellers may offer exclusionary contracts to buyers. In equilibrium, all buyers sign an exclusionary contract with the same seller, which eliminates rival sellers&amp;amp;rsquo; incentives to invest in R&amp;amp;amp;D and concentrates innovative effort in a single firm. Banning exclusionary contracts increases the aggregate probability of innovation and the joint surplus of buyers and sellers only when the R&amp;amp;amp;D technology exhibits sufficiently strong diseconomies of scale.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Exclusionary Contracts and Incentives to Innovate</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Simen Aardal Ulsaker</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010008</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-02-03</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-02-03</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>8</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010008</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/8</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/7">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 7: Communication and Standoff</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/7</link>
	<description>This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players&amp;amp;rsquo; types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose their types, resulting in the war of attrition having duration zero. However, if type constitutes unverifiable information, the results are less sanguine. Pre-play cheap-talk communication has no effect on the play of the subsequent war of attrition. Mediated cheap-talk communication is no better: No institution that relies on players&amp;amp;rsquo; cheap-talk reports can systematically allocate the prize to the player who values it more highly at a lower resource cost than is entailed in equilibrium play of the war of attrition. Costly signaling in the form of burning money can effectively supplant the war of attrition as a means of allocating the prize, but it requires the same expected equilibrium resource expenditures, with the same expected distribution across types, as does the war of attrition. Thus, in spite of players&amp;amp;rsquo; unanimous preference for a system in which types are made known, and in spite of their disclosing type in equilibrium when type is verifiable, they nonetheless expend resources to credibly communicate their types when type is not verifiable, and the resources expended are, on average, equivalent to those expended in a war of attrition.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-02-02</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 7: Communication and Standoff</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/7">doi: 10.3390/g17010007</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Catherine Hafer
		</p>
	<p>This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players&amp;amp;rsquo; types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose their types, resulting in the war of attrition having duration zero. However, if type constitutes unverifiable information, the results are less sanguine. Pre-play cheap-talk communication has no effect on the play of the subsequent war of attrition. Mediated cheap-talk communication is no better: No institution that relies on players&amp;amp;rsquo; cheap-talk reports can systematically allocate the prize to the player who values it more highly at a lower resource cost than is entailed in equilibrium play of the war of attrition. Costly signaling in the form of burning money can effectively supplant the war of attrition as a means of allocating the prize, but it requires the same expected equilibrium resource expenditures, with the same expected distribution across types, as does the war of attrition. Thus, in spite of players&amp;amp;rsquo; unanimous preference for a system in which types are made known, and in spite of their disclosing type in equilibrium when type is verifiable, they nonetheless expend resources to credibly communicate their types when type is not verifiable, and the resources expended are, on average, equivalent to those expended in a war of attrition.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Communication and Standoff</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Catherine Hafer</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010007</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-02-02</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-02-02</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>7</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010007</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/7</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/6">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 6: Monetary Policy Committees, Independence, and Influence</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/6</link>
	<description>We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and shows how institutional features&amp;amp;mdash;such as committee size&amp;amp;mdash;shape the extent of external influence. When political pressure pushes for expansive and inflationary policy, larger committees can enhance de facto independence by diluting this influence. We also show that when anti-inflationary pressures dominate, an appropriate choice of committee size can replicate the preference shift towards more conservativeness familiar from delegation frameworks, even when it is not feasible to appoint a conservative central banker in a systematic way.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-01-16</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 6: Monetary Policy Committees, Independence, and Influence</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/6">doi: 10.3390/g17010006</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Esteban Colla-De-Robertis
		</p>
	<p>We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and shows how institutional features&amp;amp;mdash;such as committee size&amp;amp;mdash;shape the extent of external influence. When political pressure pushes for expansive and inflationary policy, larger committees can enhance de facto independence by diluting this influence. We also show that when anti-inflationary pressures dominate, an appropriate choice of committee size can replicate the preference shift towards more conservativeness familiar from delegation frameworks, even when it is not feasible to appoint a conservative central banker in a systematic way.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Monetary Policy Committees, Independence, and Influence</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Esteban Colla-De-Robertis</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010006</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-01-16</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-01-16</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>6</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010006</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/6</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/5">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 5: On Collusion Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/5</link>
	<description>We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods. Since our model exhibits a one-to-one relationship between the elasticity of substitution and demand price elasticity, we demonstrate that a larger elasticity decreases the sustainability of collusion. Intuitively, a more elastic demand function causes the increase in deviation profits to compensate for the increase in collusive profits, making collusion less easily sustained. This result holds regardless of whether firms compete in quantities or prices.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-01-14</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 5: On Collusion Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/5">doi: 10.3390/g17010005</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Marc Escrihuela-Villar
		</p>
	<p>We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods. Since our model exhibits a one-to-one relationship between the elasticity of substitution and demand price elasticity, we demonstrate that a larger elasticity decreases the sustainability of collusion. Intuitively, a more elastic demand function causes the increase in deviation profits to compensate for the increase in collusive profits, making collusion less easily sustained. This result holds regardless of whether firms compete in quantities or prices.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>On Collusion Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Marc Escrihuela-Villar</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010005</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-01-14</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-01-14</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>5</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010005</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/5</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/4">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 4: Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/4</link>
	<description>We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX0&amp;amp;mdash;i.e., envy-freeness up to any item, where EFX restricts attention to positively valued items and EFX0 allows removing zero-valued items as well&amp;amp;mdash;can conflict with Pareto-optimality (PO), maximin (MM), or maximum Nash welfare (MNW). Normatively, we argue that envy-freeness (even as EFX or EFX0) is not a panacea for allocating indivisible items and should be weighed against efficiency and welfare criteria.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-01-14</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 4: Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/4">doi: 10.3390/g17010004</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Steven J. Brams
		D. Marc Kilgour
		Christian Klamler
		</p>
	<p>We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX0&amp;amp;mdash;i.e., envy-freeness up to any item, where EFX restricts attention to positively valued items and EFX0 allows removing zero-valued items as well&amp;amp;mdash;can conflict with Pareto-optimality (PO), maximin (MM), or maximum Nash welfare (MNW). Normatively, we argue that envy-freeness (even as EFX or EFX0) is not a panacea for allocating indivisible items and should be weighed against efficiency and welfare criteria.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Steven J. Brams</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>D. Marc Kilgour</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Christian Klamler</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010004</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-01-14</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-01-14</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>4</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010004</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/4</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/3">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 3: Randomized Algorithms and Neural Networks for Communication-Free Multiagent Singleton Set Cover</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/3</link>
	<description>This paper considers how a system designer can program a team of autonomous agents to coordinate with one another such that each agent selects (or covers) an individual resource with the goal that all agents collectively cover the maximum number of resources. Specifically, we study how agents can formulate strategies without information about other agents&amp;amp;rsquo; actions so that system-level performance remains robust in the presence of communication failures. First, we use an algorithmic approach to study the scenario in which all agents lose the ability to communicate with one another, have a symmetric set of resources to choose from, and select actions independently according to a probability distribution over the resources. We show that the distribution that maximizes the expected system-level objective under this approach can be computed by solving a convex optimization problem, and we introduce a novel polynomial-time heuristic based on subset selection. Further, both of the methods are guaranteed to be within 1&amp;amp;minus;1/e of the system&amp;amp;rsquo;s optimal in expectation. Second, we use a learning-based approach to study how a system designer can employ neural networks to approximate optimal agent strategies in the presence of communication failures. The neural network, trained on system-level optimal outcomes obtained through brute-force enumeration, generates utility functions that enable agents to make decisions in a distributed manner. Empirical results indicate the neural network often outperforms greedy and randomized baseline algorithms. Collectively, these findings provide a broad study of optimal agent behavior and its impact on system-level performance when the information available to agents is extremely limited.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-01-12</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 3: Randomized Algorithms and Neural Networks for Communication-Free Multiagent Singleton Set Cover</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/3">doi: 10.3390/g17010003</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Guanchu He
		Colton Hill
		Joshua H. Seaton
		Philip N. Brown
		</p>
	<p>This paper considers how a system designer can program a team of autonomous agents to coordinate with one another such that each agent selects (or covers) an individual resource with the goal that all agents collectively cover the maximum number of resources. Specifically, we study how agents can formulate strategies without information about other agents&amp;amp;rsquo; actions so that system-level performance remains robust in the presence of communication failures. First, we use an algorithmic approach to study the scenario in which all agents lose the ability to communicate with one another, have a symmetric set of resources to choose from, and select actions independently according to a probability distribution over the resources. We show that the distribution that maximizes the expected system-level objective under this approach can be computed by solving a convex optimization problem, and we introduce a novel polynomial-time heuristic based on subset selection. Further, both of the methods are guaranteed to be within 1&amp;amp;minus;1/e of the system&amp;amp;rsquo;s optimal in expectation. Second, we use a learning-based approach to study how a system designer can employ neural networks to approximate optimal agent strategies in the presence of communication failures. The neural network, trained on system-level optimal outcomes obtained through brute-force enumeration, generates utility functions that enable agents to make decisions in a distributed manner. Empirical results indicate the neural network often outperforms greedy and randomized baseline algorithms. Collectively, these findings provide a broad study of optimal agent behavior and its impact on system-level performance when the information available to agents is extremely limited.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Randomized Algorithms and Neural Networks for Communication-Free Multiagent Singleton Set Cover</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Guanchu He</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Colton Hill</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Joshua H. Seaton</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Philip N. Brown</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010003</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-01-12</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-01-12</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>3</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010003</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/3</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/2">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 2: All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/2</link>
	<description>In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-01-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 2: All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/2">doi: 10.3390/g17010002</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Benjamin Kang
		James Unwin
		</p>
	<p>In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Benjamin Kang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>James Unwin</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010002</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-01-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-01-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>2</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010002</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/2</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/1">

	<title>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 1: Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/1</link>
	<description>This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics&amp;amp;mdash;linear other-regarding preferences and inequity aversion&amp;amp;mdash;and examine the predictions of each with a laboratory experiment. Our experimental results roundly reject the majority of these explanations: in treatments with endowment inequality, high endowment individuals invest more in the common pool resource than low endowment individuals. We discuss these results in the context of the literature on psychological entitlement and positional preferences.</description>
	<pubDate>2026-01-04</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 17, Pages 1: Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/1">doi: 10.3390/g17010001</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Garrett Milam
		Andrew Monaco
		</p>
	<p>This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics&amp;amp;mdash;linear other-regarding preferences and inequity aversion&amp;amp;mdash;and examine the predictions of each with a laboratory experiment. Our experimental results roundly reject the majority of these explanations: in treatments with endowment inequality, high endowment individuals invest more in the common pool resource than low endowment individuals. We discuss these results in the context of the literature on psychological entitlement and positional preferences.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Garrett Milam</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Andrew Monaco</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g17010001</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2026-01-04</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2026-01-04</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>1</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>1</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g17010001</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/17/1/1</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/66">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 66: A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Benefits</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/66</link>
	<description>This paper introduces a novel framework for designing fair and sustainable unemployment benefits, grounded in cooperative game theory and real-time fiscal policy. The labor market is modeled as a coalitional game, where a random subset of participants is employed, generating stochastic economic output. To ensure fairness, we adopt equal employment opportunity as a normative benchmark and propose a dichotomous valuation rule that assigns value to both employed and unemployed participants. Within a continuous-time, balanced budget framework, we derive a closed-form payroll tax rate that is fair, debt-free, and asymptotically risk-free. This tax rule is robust across alternative objectives and promotes employment, productivity, and equality of outcome. The framework naturally extends to other domains involving random bipartitions and shared payoffs, such as voting rights, health insurance, road tolling, and feature selection in machine learning. Our approach offers a transparent, theoretically grounded policy tool for reducing poverty and economic inequality while maintaining fiscal discipline.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-12-10</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 66: A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Benefits</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/66">doi: 10.3390/g16060066</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Xingwei Hu
		</p>
	<p>This paper introduces a novel framework for designing fair and sustainable unemployment benefits, grounded in cooperative game theory and real-time fiscal policy. The labor market is modeled as a coalitional game, where a random subset of participants is employed, generating stochastic economic output. To ensure fairness, we adopt equal employment opportunity as a normative benchmark and propose a dichotomous valuation rule that assigns value to both employed and unemployed participants. Within a continuous-time, balanced budget framework, we derive a closed-form payroll tax rate that is fair, debt-free, and asymptotically risk-free. This tax rule is robust across alternative objectives and promotes employment, productivity, and equality of outcome. The framework naturally extends to other domains involving random bipartitions and shared payoffs, such as voting rights, health insurance, road tolling, and feature selection in machine learning. Our approach offers a transparent, theoretically grounded policy tool for reducing poverty and economic inequality while maintaining fiscal discipline.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Benefits</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Xingwei Hu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060066</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-12-10</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-12-10</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>66</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060066</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/66</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/65">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 65: The Effect of Foreign Influence on Conflict and Social Identity in Ethnically Diverse Societies</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/65</link>
	<description>This paper develops a formal model to analyze how foreign interventions&amp;amp;mdash;via resource transfers towards mobilization, technological upgrades of the mobilization technology, and various forms of conditional aid&amp;amp;mdash;reshape identity choices and conflict dynamics in divided societies. After a foreign intervention occurred, individuals simultaneously decided how many resources to allocate to conflict and whether to identify as ethnic or national. The utility derived from identity decreases with the perceived social distance from the chosen group and increases with the group&amp;amp;rsquo;s status. Foreign interventions can modify identity choices by affecting perceived social distance or group status. Our results reveal that inclusive aid and material support for mobilization are likely to induce national identification. Conversely, exclusive or ethnically targeted aid and technological upgrades of mobilization technology are likely to result in ethnic identification. We show that for all types of interventions analyzed, conflict mobilization is lower and the intervened nation&amp;amp;rsquo;s material payoff is higher when individuals identify nationally than ethnically.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-12-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 65: The Effect of Foreign Influence on Conflict and Social Identity in Ethnically Diverse Societies</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/65">doi: 10.3390/g16060065</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Esther Hauk
		</p>
	<p>This paper develops a formal model to analyze how foreign interventions&amp;amp;mdash;via resource transfers towards mobilization, technological upgrades of the mobilization technology, and various forms of conditional aid&amp;amp;mdash;reshape identity choices and conflict dynamics in divided societies. After a foreign intervention occurred, individuals simultaneously decided how many resources to allocate to conflict and whether to identify as ethnic or national. The utility derived from identity decreases with the perceived social distance from the chosen group and increases with the group&amp;amp;rsquo;s status. Foreign interventions can modify identity choices by affecting perceived social distance or group status. Our results reveal that inclusive aid and material support for mobilization are likely to induce national identification. Conversely, exclusive or ethnically targeted aid and technological upgrades of mobilization technology are likely to result in ethnic identification. We show that for all types of interventions analyzed, conflict mobilization is lower and the intervened nation&amp;amp;rsquo;s material payoff is higher when individuals identify nationally than ethnically.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Effect of Foreign Influence on Conflict and Social Identity in Ethnically Diverse Societies</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Esther Hauk</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060065</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-12-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-12-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>65</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060065</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/65</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/64">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 64: Decisions in the Basketball Endgame: A Downside of the Three-Point Revolution</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/64</link>
	<description>Von Neumann&amp;amp;rsquo;s minimax theorem defines optimal strategic unpredictability in zero-sum games. Empirical evidence from professional sports has been interpreted as positive behavioral evidence for minimax. In this article, we analyze the strategic optimality of offensive plays in the basketball endgame when a team has a final possession and trails by no more than a single basket. This final moment of the game most closely approximates the simultaneous-move conditions of a game where minimax theory applies. Using comprehensive NBA data from 2010 to 2025, we test for equality of success rates across shooter types (star vs. non-stars) and shot selection (two-point vs. three-point). Our analysis reveals systematic violations of minimax play that have intensified with basketball&amp;amp;rsquo;s shift to three-pointers and higher expected points. In the final decisive moment of the game, we find that teams systematically overuse three-point shots even though the two-point attempt yields higher field goal percentages. In addition, teams over-rely on star players for the final shot; non-star two-point shots have been the top-performing endgame option in 2022&amp;amp;ndash;2025.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-12-08</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 64: Decisions in the Basketball Endgame: A Downside of the Three-Point Revolution</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/64">doi: 10.3390/g16060064</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Luka Secilmis
		Teo Secilmis
		Simon Jantschgi
		Heinrich H. Nax
		</p>
	<p>Von Neumann&amp;amp;rsquo;s minimax theorem defines optimal strategic unpredictability in zero-sum games. Empirical evidence from professional sports has been interpreted as positive behavioral evidence for minimax. In this article, we analyze the strategic optimality of offensive plays in the basketball endgame when a team has a final possession and trails by no more than a single basket. This final moment of the game most closely approximates the simultaneous-move conditions of a game where minimax theory applies. Using comprehensive NBA data from 2010 to 2025, we test for equality of success rates across shooter types (star vs. non-stars) and shot selection (two-point vs. three-point). Our analysis reveals systematic violations of minimax play that have intensified with basketball&amp;amp;rsquo;s shift to three-pointers and higher expected points. In the final decisive moment of the game, we find that teams systematically overuse three-point shots even though the two-point attempt yields higher field goal percentages. In addition, teams over-rely on star players for the final shot; non-star two-point shots have been the top-performing endgame option in 2022&amp;amp;ndash;2025.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Decisions in the Basketball Endgame: A Downside of the Three-Point Revolution</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Luka Secilmis</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Teo Secilmis</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Simon Jantschgi</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Heinrich H. Nax</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060064</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-12-08</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-12-08</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>64</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060064</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/64</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/63">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 63: Moral Emotions and Beliefs Influence Charitable Giving</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/63</link>
	<description>This paper studies the influence of moral emotions and beliefs on understanding charitable giving. While specific moral emotions such as empathy, guilt, and shame have been associated with prosocial behavior, how they impact giving behavior may depend on beliefs about the giving of others. Using a laboratory experiment, individuals participated in a dictator game with charity and completed measures of beliefs, empathy, guilt, and shame. Results show that while individual variation in empathy, guilt, and shame is important in explaining charitable giving, these effects depend crucially on individual beliefs.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-12-05</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 63: Moral Emotions and Beliefs Influence Charitable Giving</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/63">doi: 10.3390/g16060063</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Garret Ridinger
		Anne Carpenter
		</p>
	<p>This paper studies the influence of moral emotions and beliefs on understanding charitable giving. While specific moral emotions such as empathy, guilt, and shame have been associated with prosocial behavior, how they impact giving behavior may depend on beliefs about the giving of others. Using a laboratory experiment, individuals participated in a dictator game with charity and completed measures of beliefs, empathy, guilt, and shame. Results show that while individual variation in empathy, guilt, and shame is important in explaining charitable giving, these effects depend crucially on individual beliefs.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Moral Emotions and Beliefs Influence Charitable Giving</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Garret Ridinger</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Anne Carpenter</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060063</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-12-05</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-12-05</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>63</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060063</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/63</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/62">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 62: Behavioural Signatures of Wise Negotiators: An Experimental Approach Using an Investment Game</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/62</link>
	<description>Wisdom in negotiation is increasingly vital in managing conflicts, yet its behavioural expression remains underexplored. This study explores the behavioural signatures of individuals nominated as wise negotiators within an organisational context. There were 48 participants recruited as wise negotiators from a larger pool of 313 participants. There were three manipulations used: archetypes (personality), reciprocity style, and emotionality, resulting in a 4X3X2 design (24 conditions). Participants were also asked to fill out various wisdom related questionnaires. Each participant had to go through 24 conditions separately before playing an investment game each time. For the analysis purpose, three-way repeated ANOVA and three-way repeated ANCOVA were used. The results revealed that there was a difference in how wise negotiators negotiate differently with different archetypes (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.01), reciprocity (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.01) and emotional situations (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.01). Additionally, there were also interaction effects of archetypes, reciprocity and emotional situations (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.05). Notably, when wisdom variables were statistically controlled, these differences became nonsignificant. A supplementary 2 &amp;amp;times; 2 design explored gender interactions, showing that outcomes differed by opponents&amp;amp;rsquo; gender but not by the gender of the wise negotiator. This finding highlights the role of wisdom traits in strategic negotiation and has implications for training and selection in a high-stakes negotiation context.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-12-01</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 62: Behavioural Signatures of Wise Negotiators: An Experimental Approach Using an Investment Game</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/62">doi: 10.3390/g16060062</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Prarthana Saikia
		Ankita Sharma
		</p>
	<p>Wisdom in negotiation is increasingly vital in managing conflicts, yet its behavioural expression remains underexplored. This study explores the behavioural signatures of individuals nominated as wise negotiators within an organisational context. There were 48 participants recruited as wise negotiators from a larger pool of 313 participants. There were three manipulations used: archetypes (personality), reciprocity style, and emotionality, resulting in a 4X3X2 design (24 conditions). Participants were also asked to fill out various wisdom related questionnaires. Each participant had to go through 24 conditions separately before playing an investment game each time. For the analysis purpose, three-way repeated ANOVA and three-way repeated ANCOVA were used. The results revealed that there was a difference in how wise negotiators negotiate differently with different archetypes (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.01), reciprocity (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.01) and emotional situations (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.01). Additionally, there were also interaction effects of archetypes, reciprocity and emotional situations (p &amp;amp;lt; 0.05). Notably, when wisdom variables were statistically controlled, these differences became nonsignificant. A supplementary 2 &amp;amp;times; 2 design explored gender interactions, showing that outcomes differed by opponents&amp;amp;rsquo; gender but not by the gender of the wise negotiator. This finding highlights the role of wisdom traits in strategic negotiation and has implications for training and selection in a high-stakes negotiation context.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Behavioural Signatures of Wise Negotiators: An Experimental Approach Using an Investment Game</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Prarthana Saikia</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Ankita Sharma</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060062</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-12-01</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>62</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060062</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/62</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/61">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 61: On SEIR Epidemic Dynamics with Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Strategies: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/61</link>
	<description>We investigate a susceptible&amp;amp;ndash;exposed&amp;amp;ndash;infected&amp;amp;ndash;recovered (SEIR) epidemic model that distinguishes between two subpopulations: individuals favoring vaccination (pro-vaccination), represented by the compartments (SP,EP,IP,RP), and those opposing vaccination (anti-vaccination), described by (SA,EA,IA,RA). The two systems are interconnected through flows between the susceptible classes, capturing the possibility of individuals switching their vaccination strategy, as well as through transitions involving recovered individuals. This framework captures the behavioral interplay during an epidemic, where individuals may reconsider their strategies depending on infection prevalence and the perceived costs and benefits of vaccination versus infection. In the model, immunity may be acquired either through vaccination or after being infected, while waning immunity adds further complexity to individual decision-making. To study these dynamics, we embed the epidemiological system into an evolutionary game framework, where strategy adoption depends on infection levels and associated payoffs. Our analysis shows that, at Nash equilibrium, both pro- and anti-vaccination groups exhibit similar behavior. Numerical simulations further indicate that greater vaccination coverage mitigates the social dilemma, whereas higher rates of waning immunity intensify it.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-11-19</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 61: On SEIR Epidemic Dynamics with Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Strategies: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/61">doi: 10.3390/g16060061</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Karam Allali
		</p>
	<p>We investigate a susceptible&amp;amp;ndash;exposed&amp;amp;ndash;infected&amp;amp;ndash;recovered (SEIR) epidemic model that distinguishes between two subpopulations: individuals favoring vaccination (pro-vaccination), represented by the compartments (SP,EP,IP,RP), and those opposing vaccination (anti-vaccination), described by (SA,EA,IA,RA). The two systems are interconnected through flows between the susceptible classes, capturing the possibility of individuals switching their vaccination strategy, as well as through transitions involving recovered individuals. This framework captures the behavioral interplay during an epidemic, where individuals may reconsider their strategies depending on infection prevalence and the perceived costs and benefits of vaccination versus infection. In the model, immunity may be acquired either through vaccination or after being infected, while waning immunity adds further complexity to individual decision-making. To study these dynamics, we embed the epidemiological system into an evolutionary game framework, where strategy adoption depends on infection levels and associated payoffs. Our analysis shows that, at Nash equilibrium, both pro- and anti-vaccination groups exhibit similar behavior. Numerical simulations further indicate that greater vaccination coverage mitigates the social dilemma, whereas higher rates of waning immunity intensify it.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>On SEIR Epidemic Dynamics with Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Strategies: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Karam Allali</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060061</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-11-19</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-11-19</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>61</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060061</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/61</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/60">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 60: Minimax Under Pressure: The Case of Tennis</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/60</link>
	<description>A series of articles has tested von Neumann’s minimax theory against behavioral evidence based on field data from professional sports. The evidence has been viewed and collectively cited as positive evidence that elite athletes in their familiar sports contexts mix well and behave in line with minimax. In this paper, based on open state-of-the-art tennis data and analytics, we shall uncover new and significant evidence against minimax at the very top of the game, where previously, such results had not been obtained. The kinds of behavioral deviations from minimax that we find become apparent, because we enrich the test strategy to take into account whether or not players face ‘pressure’ situations like break points and other decisive points. Our paper highlights that the prior literature’s failure to reject minimax does not constitute positive behavioral evidence, as some of that literature argued, because it is not robust to data aggregations and separations that are psychologically natural given the relevant real-world context. In this case, this means separating serves into the serve types that players actually consider and separating situations by pressure levels, which leads to clear and sound rejection of minimax.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-11-18</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 60: Minimax Under Pressure: The Case of Tennis</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/60">doi: 10.3390/g16060060</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Ben Depoorter
		Simon Jantschgi
		Ivan Lendl
		Miha Mlakar
		Heinrich Nax
		</p>
	<p>A series of articles has tested von Neumann’s minimax theory against behavioral evidence based on field data from professional sports. The evidence has been viewed and collectively cited as positive evidence that elite athletes in their familiar sports contexts mix well and behave in line with minimax. In this paper, based on open state-of-the-art tennis data and analytics, we shall uncover new and significant evidence against minimax at the very top of the game, where previously, such results had not been obtained. The kinds of behavioral deviations from minimax that we find become apparent, because we enrich the test strategy to take into account whether or not players face ‘pressure’ situations like break points and other decisive points. Our paper highlights that the prior literature’s failure to reject minimax does not constitute positive behavioral evidence, as some of that literature argued, because it is not robust to data aggregations and separations that are psychologically natural given the relevant real-world context. In this case, this means separating serves into the serve types that players actually consider and separating situations by pressure levels, which leads to clear and sound rejection of minimax.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Minimax Under Pressure: The Case of Tennis</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Ben Depoorter</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Simon Jantschgi</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Ivan Lendl</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Miha Mlakar</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Heinrich Nax</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060060</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-11-18</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-11-18</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>60</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060060</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/60</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/59">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 59: Linear Programming for Computing Equilibria Under Truncation Selection and Designing Defensive Strategies Against Malicious Opponents</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/59</link>
	<description>Linear programming and polyhedral representation conversion methods have been widely applied to game theory to compute equilibria. Here, we introduce new applications of these methods to two game-theoretic scenarios in which players aim to secure sufficiently large payoffs rather than maximum payoffs. The first scenario concerns truncation selection, a variant of the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory where players with fitnesses above a threshold survive and reproduce while the remainder are culled. We use linear programming to find the sets of equilibria of this dynamical system and show how they change as the threshold varies. The second scenario considers opponents who are not fully rational but display partial malice: they require a minimum guaranteed payoff before acting to minimize their opponent&amp;amp;rsquo;s payoff. For such cases, we show how generalized maximin procedures can be computed with linear programming to yield improved defensive strategies against such players beyond the classical maximin approach. For both scenarios, we provide detailed computational procedures and illustrate the results with numerical examples.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-11-12</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 59: Linear Programming for Computing Equilibria Under Truncation Selection and Designing Defensive Strategies Against Malicious Opponents</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/59">doi: 10.3390/g16060059</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Zhuoer Zhang
		Bryce Morsky
		</p>
	<p>Linear programming and polyhedral representation conversion methods have been widely applied to game theory to compute equilibria. Here, we introduce new applications of these methods to two game-theoretic scenarios in which players aim to secure sufficiently large payoffs rather than maximum payoffs. The first scenario concerns truncation selection, a variant of the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory where players with fitnesses above a threshold survive and reproduce while the remainder are culled. We use linear programming to find the sets of equilibria of this dynamical system and show how they change as the threshold varies. The second scenario considers opponents who are not fully rational but display partial malice: they require a minimum guaranteed payoff before acting to minimize their opponent&amp;amp;rsquo;s payoff. For such cases, we show how generalized maximin procedures can be computed with linear programming to yield improved defensive strategies against such players beyond the classical maximin approach. For both scenarios, we provide detailed computational procedures and illustrate the results with numerical examples.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Linear Programming for Computing Equilibria Under Truncation Selection and Designing Defensive Strategies Against Malicious Opponents</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Zhuoer Zhang</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Bryce Morsky</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060059</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-11-12</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-11-12</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>59</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060059</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/59</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/58">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 58: Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments&amp;mdash;Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/58</link>
	<description>We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player&amp;amp;rsquo;s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-11-05</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 58: Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments&amp;mdash;Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/58">doi: 10.3390/g16060058</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Jobst Heitzig
		</p>
	<p>We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player&amp;amp;rsquo;s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments&amp;amp;mdash;Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Jobst Heitzig</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060058</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-11-05</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-11-05</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>58</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060058</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/58</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/57">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 57: The Bateson Game: A Model of Strategic Ambiguity, Frame Uncertainty, and Pathological Learning</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/57</link>
	<description>This paper introduces the Bateson Game, a signaling game in which ambiguity over the governing rules of interaction (interpretive frames), rather than asymmetry of information about player types, drives strategic outcomes. We formalize the communication paradox of the &amp;amp;ldquo;double bind&amp;amp;rdquo; by defining a class of games where a Receiver acts under uncertainty about the operative frame, while the Sender possesses private information about the true frame, benefits from manipulation, and penalizes attempts at meta-communication (clarification). We prove that the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s core axioms preclude the existence of a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. More significantly, we show that under boundedly rational learning dynamics, the Receiver&amp;amp;rsquo;s beliefs can become locked into one of two pathological states, depending on the structure of the Sender&amp;amp;rsquo;s incentives. If the Sender&amp;amp;rsquo;s incentives are cyclical, the system enters a persistent oscillatory state (an &amp;amp;ldquo;ambiguity trap&amp;amp;rdquo;). If the Sender&amp;amp;rsquo;s incentives align with reinforcing a specific belief or if the Sender has a dominant strategy, the system settles into a stable equilibrium (a &amp;amp;ldquo;certainty trap&amp;amp;rdquo;), characterized by stable beliefs dictated by the Sender. We present a computational analysis contrasting these outcomes, demonstrating empirically how different parametrizations lead to either trap. The Bateson Game provides a novel game-theoretic foundation for analyzing phenomena such as deceptive AI alignment and institutional gaslighting, demonstrating how ambiguity can be weaponized to create durable, exploitative strategic environments.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-11-03</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 57: The Bateson Game: A Model of Strategic Ambiguity, Frame Uncertainty, and Pathological Learning</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/57">doi: 10.3390/g16060057</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Kevin Fathi
		</p>
	<p>This paper introduces the Bateson Game, a signaling game in which ambiguity over the governing rules of interaction (interpretive frames), rather than asymmetry of information about player types, drives strategic outcomes. We formalize the communication paradox of the &amp;amp;ldquo;double bind&amp;amp;rdquo; by defining a class of games where a Receiver acts under uncertainty about the operative frame, while the Sender possesses private information about the true frame, benefits from manipulation, and penalizes attempts at meta-communication (clarification). We prove that the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s core axioms preclude the existence of a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. More significantly, we show that under boundedly rational learning dynamics, the Receiver&amp;amp;rsquo;s beliefs can become locked into one of two pathological states, depending on the structure of the Sender&amp;amp;rsquo;s incentives. If the Sender&amp;amp;rsquo;s incentives are cyclical, the system enters a persistent oscillatory state (an &amp;amp;ldquo;ambiguity trap&amp;amp;rdquo;). If the Sender&amp;amp;rsquo;s incentives align with reinforcing a specific belief or if the Sender has a dominant strategy, the system settles into a stable equilibrium (a &amp;amp;ldquo;certainty trap&amp;amp;rdquo;), characterized by stable beliefs dictated by the Sender. We present a computational analysis contrasting these outcomes, demonstrating empirically how different parametrizations lead to either trap. The Bateson Game provides a novel game-theoretic foundation for analyzing phenomena such as deceptive AI alignment and institutional gaslighting, demonstrating how ambiguity can be weaponized to create durable, exploitative strategic environments.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Bateson Game: A Model of Strategic Ambiguity, Frame Uncertainty, and Pathological Learning</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Kevin Fathi</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060057</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-11-03</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-11-03</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>57</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060057</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/57</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/56">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 56: Integrating Strategic Properties with Social Perspectives: A Bipartite Classification of Two-by-Two Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/56</link>
	<description>Classifying games according to their strategic properties provides meaningful insights into the motivations driving the interacting parties, suggests possible future trajectories, and in some cases also points to potential interventions aiming to influence the interactions&amp;amp;rsquo; outcomes. Here, we present a new classification that merges two perspectives: (i) a revised version of Rapoport and Guyer&amp;amp;rsquo;s taxonomy, which extends beyond the original 78 games they describe by classifying all two-by-two games according to fundamental strategic properties, and (ii) a novel classification grounded in the theory of subjective expected relative similarity, which addresses not only the games&amp;amp;rsquo; payoffs but also the players&amp;amp;rsquo; strategic perceptions of their opponents. While Rapoport and Guyer&amp;amp;rsquo;s original taxonomy classifies only strictly-ordinal games, the revised classification addresses all two-by-two games. It comprises eleven categories that are further grouped into five super-categories that focus on the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s expected outcome and its strategic stability. The second, similarity-based, classification comprises four main categories, specifying whether players&amp;amp;rsquo; perceptions of their opponents have the potential to influence strategic decision-making. The merged classification comprises 14 game types, offering a holistic account of the strategic interaction, the players&amp;amp;rsquo; underlying motivations, and the expected outcome. It combines the fixed strategic properties with the variable social aspects of the interaction. Moreover, the novel classification points to the potential of social interventions that may influence the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s outcome by altering strategic similarity perceptions. Therefore, the present work is relevant for both theoretical and experimental research, providing insights into actual choices expected inside and outside of the laboratory.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-10-22</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 56: Integrating Strategic Properties with Social Perspectives: A Bipartite Classification of Two-by-Two Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/56">doi: 10.3390/g16060056</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Shacked Avrashi
		Lior Givon
		Ilan Fischer
		</p>
	<p>Classifying games according to their strategic properties provides meaningful insights into the motivations driving the interacting parties, suggests possible future trajectories, and in some cases also points to potential interventions aiming to influence the interactions&amp;amp;rsquo; outcomes. Here, we present a new classification that merges two perspectives: (i) a revised version of Rapoport and Guyer&amp;amp;rsquo;s taxonomy, which extends beyond the original 78 games they describe by classifying all two-by-two games according to fundamental strategic properties, and (ii) a novel classification grounded in the theory of subjective expected relative similarity, which addresses not only the games&amp;amp;rsquo; payoffs but also the players&amp;amp;rsquo; strategic perceptions of their opponents. While Rapoport and Guyer&amp;amp;rsquo;s original taxonomy classifies only strictly-ordinal games, the revised classification addresses all two-by-two games. It comprises eleven categories that are further grouped into five super-categories that focus on the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s expected outcome and its strategic stability. The second, similarity-based, classification comprises four main categories, specifying whether players&amp;amp;rsquo; perceptions of their opponents have the potential to influence strategic decision-making. The merged classification comprises 14 game types, offering a holistic account of the strategic interaction, the players&amp;amp;rsquo; underlying motivations, and the expected outcome. It combines the fixed strategic properties with the variable social aspects of the interaction. Moreover, the novel classification points to the potential of social interventions that may influence the game&amp;amp;rsquo;s outcome by altering strategic similarity perceptions. Therefore, the present work is relevant for both theoretical and experimental research, providing insights into actual choices expected inside and outside of the laboratory.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Integrating Strategic Properties with Social Perspectives: A Bipartite Classification of Two-by-Two Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Shacked Avrashi</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Lior Givon</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Ilan Fischer</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16060056</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-10-22</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-10-22</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>6</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>56</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16060056</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/56</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/55">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 55: The Role of Brand Spillover on Firm&amp;rsquo;s Sourcing and Contract Decisions</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/55</link>
	<description>When a technology provider (entrant) enters an emerging end market, he may outsource critical components from a competing conventional manufacturer (incumbent) or insource critical components. Under the outsourcing strategy, brand reputation spills over from the incumbent to the entrant&amp;amp;mdash;a phenomenon termed brand spillover. This paper investigates the sourcing strategy (insourcing or outsourcing) and contract choice (wholesale price contract or revenue share contract) in markets subject to brand spillover. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one entrant with a new technology and one incumbent who sells the traditional product in the end market and the critical component to the entrant. We find that the entrant adopts the insourcing strategy only if his optimal quantity, including original market power and brand spillover, is intermediate. Otherwise, the outsourcing strategy with wholesale price contract is selected when his optimal quantity is low, while revenue-sharing contracts dominate at high quantity. Interestingly, when brand spillover intensity exceeds a threshold, both parties benefit from a higher level of brand spillover under the wholesale price contract.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-10-16</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 55: The Role of Brand Spillover on Firm&amp;rsquo;s Sourcing and Contract Decisions</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/55">doi: 10.3390/g16050055</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Fei Jing
		Junjie Dong
		</p>
	<p>When a technology provider (entrant) enters an emerging end market, he may outsource critical components from a competing conventional manufacturer (incumbent) or insource critical components. Under the outsourcing strategy, brand reputation spills over from the incumbent to the entrant&amp;amp;mdash;a phenomenon termed brand spillover. This paper investigates the sourcing strategy (insourcing or outsourcing) and contract choice (wholesale price contract or revenue share contract) in markets subject to brand spillover. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one entrant with a new technology and one incumbent who sells the traditional product in the end market and the critical component to the entrant. We find that the entrant adopts the insourcing strategy only if his optimal quantity, including original market power and brand spillover, is intermediate. Otherwise, the outsourcing strategy with wholesale price contract is selected when his optimal quantity is low, while revenue-sharing contracts dominate at high quantity. Interestingly, when brand spillover intensity exceeds a threshold, both parties benefit from a higher level of brand spillover under the wholesale price contract.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Role of Brand Spillover on Firm&amp;amp;rsquo;s Sourcing and Contract Decisions</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Fei Jing</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Junjie Dong</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050055</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-10-16</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-10-16</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>55</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050055</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/55</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/54">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 54: Classifying Limited-Move Stability Cycles in 2 &amp;times; 2 Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/54</link>
	<description>The 2&amp;amp;times;2 game is the simplest non-trivial model of strategic interaction: there are two players, each has two strategies, and each has a strict preference ranking over the four possible outcomes. For models of play that depend only on the ranking of the outcomes, the catalog of 2&amp;amp;times;2 games permits many useful comparisons and contrasts. By interpreting a 2&amp;amp;times;2 game as a graph model, we obtain new data on the properties of limited-move (Lh) stability. Specifically, for each 2&amp;amp;times;2 strict ordinal game, we determine the Lh-stable outcomes; show how stability depends on the horizon, h; and find the lengths of cycles and the numbers of moves until cycling begins. We then compare our observations with other classifications of these games and with the values of the conflict and harmony indices.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-10-11</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 54: Classifying Limited-Move Stability Cycles in 2 &amp;times; 2 Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/54">doi: 10.3390/g16050054</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Leandro Chaves Rêgo
		France Evellyn Gomes de Oliveira
		Giannini Italino Alves Vieira
		D. Marc Kilgour
		</p>
	<p>The 2&amp;amp;times;2 game is the simplest non-trivial model of strategic interaction: there are two players, each has two strategies, and each has a strict preference ranking over the four possible outcomes. For models of play that depend only on the ranking of the outcomes, the catalog of 2&amp;amp;times;2 games permits many useful comparisons and contrasts. By interpreting a 2&amp;amp;times;2 game as a graph model, we obtain new data on the properties of limited-move (Lh) stability. Specifically, for each 2&amp;amp;times;2 strict ordinal game, we determine the Lh-stable outcomes; show how stability depends on the horizon, h; and find the lengths of cycles and the numbers of moves until cycling begins. We then compare our observations with other classifications of these games and with the values of the conflict and harmony indices.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Classifying Limited-Move Stability Cycles in 2 &amp;amp;times; 2 Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Leandro Chaves Rêgo</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>France Evellyn Gomes de Oliveira</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Giannini Italino Alves Vieira</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>D. Marc Kilgour</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050054</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-10-11</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-10-11</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>54</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050054</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/54</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/53">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 53: Competition and Coordination of Regional Fresh Supply Chain Under Government Regulation</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/53</link>
	<description>Fresh agricultural products have significant seasonality and perishability, and their cross-regional sales often face differences in market demand, price, and sales volume. In the context of government quality regulation, competition among retailers in different regions drives supply chain members to improve product quality, expand sales, and reduce losses. However, conflicts of interest under decentralized decision-making may lead to overall inefficiency. This article constructs a supply chain model consisting of a single Manufacturer and two regional Retailers to study the quality competition and coordination mechanism of cross-regional fresh food supply chains under government supervision. By comparing centralized and decentralized decision-making, it is found that although quality improvement in decentralized mode helps enhance competitiveness and sales performance, it is difficult to effectively increase profits and may even lead to a decline in profits. Therefore, this article proposes a cost-sharing contract to achieve supply chain coordination. Research has shown that this contract can effectively improve the overall profit of the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement; under high market demand and strict regulatory penalties, the total profit of the supply chain increases, but the dominant Retailer benefits more, which can easily trigger the &amp;amp;ldquo;Matthew effect&amp;amp;rdquo;. The research results reveal the comprehensive impact of quality investment, contract coordination, market demand fluctuations, and regulatory intensity on supply chain performance, providing theoretical basis and management insights for improving the collaborative efficiency and policy design of cross-regional fresh food supply chains.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-10-10</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 53: Competition and Coordination of Regional Fresh Supply Chain Under Government Regulation</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/53">doi: 10.3390/g16050053</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Chao Zhao
		Yongmei Chi
		Nini Gao
		Jixiang Song
		</p>
	<p>Fresh agricultural products have significant seasonality and perishability, and their cross-regional sales often face differences in market demand, price, and sales volume. In the context of government quality regulation, competition among retailers in different regions drives supply chain members to improve product quality, expand sales, and reduce losses. However, conflicts of interest under decentralized decision-making may lead to overall inefficiency. This article constructs a supply chain model consisting of a single Manufacturer and two regional Retailers to study the quality competition and coordination mechanism of cross-regional fresh food supply chains under government supervision. By comparing centralized and decentralized decision-making, it is found that although quality improvement in decentralized mode helps enhance competitiveness and sales performance, it is difficult to effectively increase profits and may even lead to a decline in profits. Therefore, this article proposes a cost-sharing contract to achieve supply chain coordination. Research has shown that this contract can effectively improve the overall profit of the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement; under high market demand and strict regulatory penalties, the total profit of the supply chain increases, but the dominant Retailer benefits more, which can easily trigger the &amp;amp;ldquo;Matthew effect&amp;amp;rdquo;. The research results reveal the comprehensive impact of quality investment, contract coordination, market demand fluctuations, and regulatory intensity on supply chain performance, providing theoretical basis and management insights for improving the collaborative efficiency and policy design of cross-regional fresh food supply chains.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Competition and Coordination of Regional Fresh Supply Chain Under Government Regulation</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Chao Zhao</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Yongmei Chi</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Nini Gao</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jixiang Song</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050053</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-10-10</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-10-10</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>53</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050053</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/53</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/52">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 52: Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Model with Uncertainties</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/52</link>
	<description>This paper delves into a multi-player non-renewable resource extraction differential game model, where the duration of the game is a random variable with a composite distribution function. We first explore the conditions under which the cooperative solution also constitutes a Nash equilibrium, thereby extending the theoretical framework from a fixed duration to the more complex and realistic setting of random duration. Assuming that players are unaware of the switching moment of the distribution function, we derive optimal estimates in both time-dependent and state-dependent cases. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of strategic decision-making in resource extraction under uncertainty and have implications for various fields where random durations and cooperative strategies are relevant.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-10-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 52: Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Model with Uncertainties</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/52">doi: 10.3390/g16050052</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Peichen Ye
		Anna Tur
		Yilun Wu
		</p>
	<p>This paper delves into a multi-player non-renewable resource extraction differential game model, where the duration of the game is a random variable with a composite distribution function. We first explore the conditions under which the cooperative solution also constitutes a Nash equilibrium, thereby extending the theoretical framework from a fixed duration to the more complex and realistic setting of random duration. Assuming that players are unaware of the switching moment of the distribution function, we derive optimal estimates in both time-dependent and state-dependent cases. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of strategic decision-making in resource extraction under uncertainty and have implications for various fields where random durations and cooperative strategies are relevant.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Model with Uncertainties</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Peichen Ye</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Anna Tur</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Yilun Wu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050052</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-10-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-10-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>52</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050052</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/52</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/51">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 51: Efficient Solutions to Multidimensional Claims Problem</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/51</link>
	<description>In this paper, we study the multidimensional claims problem and introduce the eating algorithm to this problem. It is shown that a solution is efficient if and only if it is the outcome of the eating algorithm with a profile of specific eating functions. Moreover, we adapt three classical solutions, i.e., the constrained equal awards rule, constrained equal losses rule, and proportional rule, to the current setting and show that they are special cases of the eating algorithm with specific eating functions.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-10-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 51: Efficient Solutions to Multidimensional Claims Problem</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/51">doi: 10.3390/g16050051</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Sijia Xu
		Peng Liu
		</p>
	<p>In this paper, we study the multidimensional claims problem and introduce the eating algorithm to this problem. It is shown that a solution is efficient if and only if it is the outcome of the eating algorithm with a profile of specific eating functions. Moreover, we adapt three classical solutions, i.e., the constrained equal awards rule, constrained equal losses rule, and proportional rule, to the current setting and show that they are special cases of the eating algorithm with specific eating functions.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Efficient Solutions to Multidimensional Claims Problem</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Sijia Xu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Peng Liu</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050051</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-10-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-10-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>51</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050051</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/51</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/50">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 50: The &amp;ldquo;Value Principle&amp;rdquo; in Management Practices, Organizational Design, and Industrial Organization</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/50</link>
	<description>The value principle in organizational economics states that the net market value of the goods that a firm sells is a key determinant of its organizational design. We survey and extend some recent developments in the theoretical literature at the nexus of organizational and industrial economics, focusing on this precept as the unifying theme. Under perfect competition, we study how market price influences the use of scarce professional management and the degree of organizational heterogeneity in an industry. In a more general setting, we show how changes in demand influence not only the use of professional management, but also the size and the market power of firms. And we show how prices can affect the internal control structure of firms, sometimes in highly distorted ways. We discuss applications to comparative industrial organization and to technological diffusion.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-09-12</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 50: The &amp;ldquo;Value Principle&amp;rdquo; in Management Practices, Organizational Design, and Industrial Organization</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/50">doi: 10.3390/g16050050</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Patrick Legros
		Andrew F. Newman
		</p>
	<p>The value principle in organizational economics states that the net market value of the goods that a firm sells is a key determinant of its organizational design. We survey and extend some recent developments in the theoretical literature at the nexus of organizational and industrial economics, focusing on this precept as the unifying theme. Under perfect competition, we study how market price influences the use of scarce professional management and the degree of organizational heterogeneity in an industry. In a more general setting, we show how changes in demand influence not only the use of professional management, but also the size and the market power of firms. And we show how prices can affect the internal control structure of firms, sometimes in highly distorted ways. We discuss applications to comparative industrial organization and to technological diffusion.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The &amp;amp;ldquo;Value Principle&amp;amp;rdquo; in Management Practices, Organizational Design, and Industrial Organization</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Patrick Legros</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Andrew F. Newman</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050050</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-09-12</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-09-12</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>50</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050050</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/50</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/49">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 49: Monopoly, Multi-Product Quality, Consumer Heterogeneity, and Market Segmentation</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/49</link>
	<description>This paper introduces a novel ratio-based framework for analyzing how consumer heterogeneity translates into product differentiation in vertically structured monopoly markets. We consider a monopolist facing a continuum of consumers and a strictly convex production cost function and identify conditions under which the heterogeneity of preferences, measured by the length of the consumer type interval, maps into a corresponding range of offered qualities. The analysis shows that this mapping depends on the curvature of the marginal cost function: under linear costs, the relationship is proportional; under convex costs, heterogeneity expands faster than segmentation; and under concave costs, the reverse occurs. These findings offer a new lens for understanding endogenous market granularity in monopoly settings and have potential applicability in markets with vertically differentiated goods. We also show that under partial market coverage, this proportionality breaks down - even in the linear case - revealing a critical asymmetry in equilibrium structure.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-09-10</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 49: Monopoly, Multi-Product Quality, Consumer Heterogeneity, and Market Segmentation</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/49">doi: 10.3390/g16050049</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Amit Gayer
		</p>
	<p>This paper introduces a novel ratio-based framework for analyzing how consumer heterogeneity translates into product differentiation in vertically structured monopoly markets. We consider a monopolist facing a continuum of consumers and a strictly convex production cost function and identify conditions under which the heterogeneity of preferences, measured by the length of the consumer type interval, maps into a corresponding range of offered qualities. The analysis shows that this mapping depends on the curvature of the marginal cost function: under linear costs, the relationship is proportional; under convex costs, heterogeneity expands faster than segmentation; and under concave costs, the reverse occurs. These findings offer a new lens for understanding endogenous market granularity in monopoly settings and have potential applicability in markets with vertically differentiated goods. We also show that under partial market coverage, this proportionality breaks down - even in the linear case - revealing a critical asymmetry in equilibrium structure.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Monopoly, Multi-Product Quality, Consumer Heterogeneity, and Market Segmentation</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Amit Gayer</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050049</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-09-10</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-09-10</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>49</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050049</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/49</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/48">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 48: The Agentic Perspective in Experimental Economics</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/48</link>
	<description>Mainstream experimental economics is characterized by its focus on theory testing and &amp;amp;ldquo;treatment effects&amp;amp;rdquo; on aggregate outcomes. The &amp;amp;ldquo;agentic&amp;amp;rdquo; alternative is concerned with the econometric specification of individual behavior. In this essay, first, a literature review of agentic experimental economics is provided, and a stylized workflow is proposed to produce and validate econometric models of individual behavior based on experimental data: (i) create a baseline (&amp;amp;ldquo;optimal&amp;amp;rdquo;) behavioral benchmark (by analytical means or reinforcement learning) for the considered multi-agent game, (ii) conduct experiments with human subjects, (iii) use the experimental results to characterize the structure of the deviations from the baseline behavior, and (iv) re-run the experiment with artificial agents calibrated in the previous step, and compare the outcomes with those of the human experiment. Two papers have been selected to illustrate the successful use of the proposed workflow. Finally, the relations between agent-based and experimental economics are discussed after deep learning has &amp;amp;ldquo;tamed&amp;amp;rdquo; the curse of dimensionality.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-09-08</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 48: The Agentic Perspective in Experimental Economics</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/48">doi: 10.3390/g16050048</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Arturo Macías
		</p>
	<p>Mainstream experimental economics is characterized by its focus on theory testing and &amp;amp;ldquo;treatment effects&amp;amp;rdquo; on aggregate outcomes. The &amp;amp;ldquo;agentic&amp;amp;rdquo; alternative is concerned with the econometric specification of individual behavior. In this essay, first, a literature review of agentic experimental economics is provided, and a stylized workflow is proposed to produce and validate econometric models of individual behavior based on experimental data: (i) create a baseline (&amp;amp;ldquo;optimal&amp;amp;rdquo;) behavioral benchmark (by analytical means or reinforcement learning) for the considered multi-agent game, (ii) conduct experiments with human subjects, (iii) use the experimental results to characterize the structure of the deviations from the baseline behavior, and (iv) re-run the experiment with artificial agents calibrated in the previous step, and compare the outcomes with those of the human experiment. Two papers have been selected to illustrate the successful use of the proposed workflow. Finally, the relations between agent-based and experimental economics are discussed after deep learning has &amp;amp;ldquo;tamed&amp;amp;rdquo; the curse of dimensionality.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Agentic Perspective in Experimental Economics</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Arturo Macías</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050048</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-09-08</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-09-08</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Opinion</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>48</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050048</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/48</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/47">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 47: Asymptotic Thresholds for (a:b) Minimum-Degree Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/47</link>
	<description>We investigate the (a:b) Maker&amp;amp;ndash;Breaker subgraph game played on the edge set of the complete graph Kn, where n,a,b&amp;amp;isin;N, and Maker&amp;amp;rsquo;s objective is to construct a member of a prescribed family of graphs H, while Breaker aims to prevent this. In our study, Breaker moves first, and H is taken to be either the family of connected spanning subgraphs or the family of spanning subgraphs with minimum-degree at least k=k(n). For the (a:b) minimum-degree-k game, we determine the asymptotically optimal threshold bias across a wide range of values for a. For the (a:b) connectivity game, we resolve an open problem posed by Hefetz et al. (2012) by identifying the exact leading term in the asymptotic behavior of the threshold bias when a=clnn.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-09-08</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 47: Asymptotic Thresholds for (a:b) Minimum-Degree Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/47">doi: 10.3390/g16050047</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Adnane Fouadi
		Mourad El Ouali
		Anand Srivastav
		</p>
	<p>We investigate the (a:b) Maker&amp;amp;ndash;Breaker subgraph game played on the edge set of the complete graph Kn, where n,a,b&amp;amp;isin;N, and Maker&amp;amp;rsquo;s objective is to construct a member of a prescribed family of graphs H, while Breaker aims to prevent this. In our study, Breaker moves first, and H is taken to be either the family of connected spanning subgraphs or the family of spanning subgraphs with minimum-degree at least k=k(n). For the (a:b) minimum-degree-k game, we determine the asymptotically optimal threshold bias across a wide range of values for a. For the (a:b) connectivity game, we resolve an open problem posed by Hefetz et al. (2012) by identifying the exact leading term in the asymptotic behavior of the threshold bias when a=clnn.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Asymptotic Thresholds for (a:b) Minimum-Degree Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Adnane Fouadi</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Mourad El Ouali</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Anand Srivastav</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050047</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-09-08</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-09-08</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>47</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050047</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/47</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/46">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 46: Dividend Representations for Two Influence Assessments</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/46</link>
	<description>This paper establishes dividend-based representations for two influence assessments. First, we define a system of min-dividends derived from the minimal-influence evaluation via a unique linear decomposition using unanimity-type spanning models. Building on this, we further construct a pair of internal and external min-dividends satisfying Completeness and Balancedness conditions, through which we express the stable min-value as the net difference of internal gains and external losses. We then demonstrate that the minimal self-stable value can be represented as accumulated average min-dividends across all coalitions they have participated in. Furthermore, the proposed expression also is adopted to analyze the stability of the minimal self-stable value. These results extend the classical notion of dividends into a minimal-influence-based framework with potential applications in fair resource allocation and responsibility apportionment.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-09-04</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 46: Dividend Representations for Two Influence Assessments</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/46">doi: 10.3390/g16050046</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Yu-Hsien Liao
		</p>
	<p>This paper establishes dividend-based representations for two influence assessments. First, we define a system of min-dividends derived from the minimal-influence evaluation via a unique linear decomposition using unanimity-type spanning models. Building on this, we further construct a pair of internal and external min-dividends satisfying Completeness and Balancedness conditions, through which we express the stable min-value as the net difference of internal gains and external losses. We then demonstrate that the minimal self-stable value can be represented as accumulated average min-dividends across all coalitions they have participated in. Furthermore, the proposed expression also is adopted to analyze the stability of the minimal self-stable value. These results extend the classical notion of dividends into a minimal-influence-based framework with potential applications in fair resource allocation and responsibility apportionment.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Dividend Representations for Two Influence Assessments</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Yu-Hsien Liao</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050046</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-09-04</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-09-04</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>46</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050046</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/46</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/45">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 45: Optimal Vaccination Strategies to Reduce Endemic Levels of Meningitis in Africa</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/45</link>
	<description>Meningococcal meningitis is a deadly acute bacterial infection caused by the Neisseria meningitidis bacterium that affects the membrane covering the brain and spinal cord. The World Health Organization launched the &amp;amp;ldquo;Defeating bacterial meningitis by 2030&amp;amp;rdquo; initiative in 2018, which relies on recent discoveries of cheap and effective vaccines. Here, we consider one important factor&amp;amp;mdash;human behavior&amp;amp;mdash;which is often neglected by immunization campaigns. We constructed a game-theoretic model of meningitis in the meningitis belt, where individuals make selfish rational decisions whether to vaccinate based on the assumed costs and the vaccination decisions of the entire population. We identified conditions when individuals should vaccinate, and we found the optimal (equilibrium) population vaccination rate. We conclude that voluntary compliance significantly reduces the endemic levels of meningitis if the cost of vaccination relative to the cost of the disease is sufficiently low, but it does not eliminate the disease. We also performed uncertainty and sensitivity analysis on our model.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-09-01</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 45: Optimal Vaccination Strategies to Reduce Endemic Levels of Meningitis in Africa</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/45">doi: 10.3390/g16050045</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Alfredo Martinez
		Jonathan Machado
		Eric Sanchez
		Igor V. Erovenko
		</p>
	<p>Meningococcal meningitis is a deadly acute bacterial infection caused by the Neisseria meningitidis bacterium that affects the membrane covering the brain and spinal cord. The World Health Organization launched the &amp;amp;ldquo;Defeating bacterial meningitis by 2030&amp;amp;rdquo; initiative in 2018, which relies on recent discoveries of cheap and effective vaccines. Here, we consider one important factor&amp;amp;mdash;human behavior&amp;amp;mdash;which is often neglected by immunization campaigns. We constructed a game-theoretic model of meningitis in the meningitis belt, where individuals make selfish rational decisions whether to vaccinate based on the assumed costs and the vaccination decisions of the entire population. We identified conditions when individuals should vaccinate, and we found the optimal (equilibrium) population vaccination rate. We conclude that voluntary compliance significantly reduces the endemic levels of meningitis if the cost of vaccination relative to the cost of the disease is sufficiently low, but it does not eliminate the disease. We also performed uncertainty and sensitivity analysis on our model.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Optimal Vaccination Strategies to Reduce Endemic Levels of Meningitis in Africa</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Alfredo Martinez</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jonathan Machado</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Eric Sanchez</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Igor V. Erovenko</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050045</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-09-01</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>45</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050045</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/45</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/44">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 44: Test Me If You Can&amp;mdash;Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/44</link>
	<description>Certifiers such as Stiftung Warentest (Germany), Which? (UK), and Consumer Reports (US) reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by providing credible information about product quality. However, due to their limited testing capacities, they face a set selection problem and test only a subset of all available product models. We show theoretically that, under any current mechanism to select product models for testing, buyers always end up buying suboptimal product models, unless all product models which would be sold under complete information (or all but the overall cheapest one) happen to be tested. Instead, we propose a novel mechanism based on voluntary disclosure, but with the same testing capacity, which always yields the maximum possible consumer surplus and thus weakly dominates any current mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm in a controlled laboratory experiment that our mechanism significantly increases consumer surplus.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-08-29</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 44: Test Me If You Can&amp;mdash;Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/44">doi: 10.3390/g16050044</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Ulrike Vollstädt
		Patrick Imcke
		Franziska Brendel
		Christiane Ehses-Friedrich
		</p>
	<p>Certifiers such as Stiftung Warentest (Germany), Which? (UK), and Consumer Reports (US) reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by providing credible information about product quality. However, due to their limited testing capacities, they face a set selection problem and test only a subset of all available product models. We show theoretically that, under any current mechanism to select product models for testing, buyers always end up buying suboptimal product models, unless all product models which would be sold under complete information (or all but the overall cheapest one) happen to be tested. Instead, we propose a novel mechanism based on voluntary disclosure, but with the same testing capacity, which always yields the maximum possible consumer surplus and thus weakly dominates any current mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm in a controlled laboratory experiment that our mechanism significantly increases consumer surplus.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Test Me If You Can&amp;amp;mdash;Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Ulrike Vollstädt</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Patrick Imcke</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Franziska Brendel</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Christiane Ehses-Friedrich</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050044</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-08-29</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-08-29</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>44</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050044</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/44</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/43">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 43: The Power of Passivity in the Hirshleifer Contest Under Small Noise</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/43</link>
	<description>Hirshleifer&amp;amp;rsquo;s difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity (bidding zero effort) may stand as an effective choice in conflict even when the contest is highly deterministic (i.e., with small noise). For that purpose, we establish two propositions on the contest with n&amp;amp;ge;2 risk-neutral contestants under small noise. The first proposition states that every contestant bids arbitrarily close to zero (if not bidding zero with positive probability at all) under sufficiently small noise. The second proposition, more strikingly, states that every contestant either bids arbitrarily close to the second-highest valuation (among all the contestants&amp;amp;rsquo; valuations), or simply remains passive with certainty under any sufficiently small noise. We further show that the first proposition holds for the contest between risk-averse individuals endowed with constant absolute risk aversion as well, and illustrate by an example how quickly polarization in bidding among contestants, as is predicted by the propositions, may emerge as the noise of the contest abates. These results help pave the way toward a complete characterization of the difference-form contest.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-08-29</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 43: The Power of Passivity in the Hirshleifer Contest Under Small Noise</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/43">doi: 10.3390/g16050043</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Guang-Zhen Sun
		</p>
	<p>Hirshleifer&amp;amp;rsquo;s difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity (bidding zero effort) may stand as an effective choice in conflict even when the contest is highly deterministic (i.e., with small noise). For that purpose, we establish two propositions on the contest with n&amp;amp;ge;2 risk-neutral contestants under small noise. The first proposition states that every contestant bids arbitrarily close to zero (if not bidding zero with positive probability at all) under sufficiently small noise. The second proposition, more strikingly, states that every contestant either bids arbitrarily close to the second-highest valuation (among all the contestants&amp;amp;rsquo; valuations), or simply remains passive with certainty under any sufficiently small noise. We further show that the first proposition holds for the contest between risk-averse individuals endowed with constant absolute risk aversion as well, and illustrate by an example how quickly polarization in bidding among contestants, as is predicted by the propositions, may emerge as the noise of the contest abates. These results help pave the way toward a complete characterization of the difference-form contest.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>The Power of Passivity in the Hirshleifer Contest Under Small Noise</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Guang-Zhen Sun</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050043</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-08-29</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-08-29</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>43</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050043</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/43</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/42">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 42: A Theoretical Analysis of Cooperation Incentives for Non-Mutually Dependent Sellers</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/42</link>
	<description>This paper examines stochastic cooperation in markets with two sellers who exhibit one-sided dependency. The independent seller&amp;amp;rsquo;s pricing influences the dependent seller&amp;amp;rsquo;s demand, but not vice versa. We study the one-dimensional hybrid game class whose parameter is the exogenously given probability of cooperation. In each game of this class, both sellers simultaneously choose prices that determine their endogenous threats, i.e., conflict profits. The sellers are aware of the cooperation probability but cannot condition prices on whether or not there is cooperation. We characterize the equilibrium prices and the sellers&amp;amp;rsquo; expected profits. Our main result shows that the independent seller earns higher expected profits when cooperation is more likely. In contrast, the dependent seller earns lower expected profits when the likelihood of cooperation is below a threshold that we characterize explicitly, and higher profits are earned thereafter. These findings suggest that, within our framework, antitrust concerns may be mitigated. Since dependent sellers can incur losses from cooperation, collusion attempts become less viable in markets with one-sided dependency.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-08-27</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 42: A Theoretical Analysis of Cooperation Incentives for Non-Mutually Dependent Sellers</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/42">doi: 10.3390/g16050042</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Lorenzo Ferrari
		Werner Güth
		Vittorio Larocca
		Luca Panaccione
		</p>
	<p>This paper examines stochastic cooperation in markets with two sellers who exhibit one-sided dependency. The independent seller&amp;amp;rsquo;s pricing influences the dependent seller&amp;amp;rsquo;s demand, but not vice versa. We study the one-dimensional hybrid game class whose parameter is the exogenously given probability of cooperation. In each game of this class, both sellers simultaneously choose prices that determine their endogenous threats, i.e., conflict profits. The sellers are aware of the cooperation probability but cannot condition prices on whether or not there is cooperation. We characterize the equilibrium prices and the sellers&amp;amp;rsquo; expected profits. Our main result shows that the independent seller earns higher expected profits when cooperation is more likely. In contrast, the dependent seller earns lower expected profits when the likelihood of cooperation is below a threshold that we characterize explicitly, and higher profits are earned thereafter. These findings suggest that, within our framework, antitrust concerns may be mitigated. Since dependent sellers can incur losses from cooperation, collusion attempts become less viable in markets with one-sided dependency.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>A Theoretical Analysis of Cooperation Incentives for Non-Mutually Dependent Sellers</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Lorenzo Ferrari</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Werner Güth</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Vittorio Larocca</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Luca Panaccione</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050042</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-08-27</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-08-27</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>42</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050042</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/42</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/41">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 41: Power Indices with Threats in Precoalitions</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/41</link>
	<description>We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for measuring the leverage of players to threaten their peers through departing the precoalition. We replace the Public Good index in that model by five other efficient power indices, i.e., the Shapley&amp;amp;ndash;Shubik index, the Deegan&amp;amp;ndash;Packel index, the Johnston index and two indices based on null player free winning coalitions. Axiomatizations of the novel power indices with threat partitions are presented. We also propose a slight modification to the existing framework for threat power indices which guarantees that null players are always assigned zero power. Numerical results for all power indices combined with different threat partitions are presented and discussed.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-08-25</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 41: Power Indices with Threats in Precoalitions</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/41">doi: 10.3390/g16050041</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Jochen Staudacher
		</p>
	<p>We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for measuring the leverage of players to threaten their peers through departing the precoalition. We replace the Public Good index in that model by five other efficient power indices, i.e., the Shapley&amp;amp;ndash;Shubik index, the Deegan&amp;amp;ndash;Packel index, the Johnston index and two indices based on null player free winning coalitions. Axiomatizations of the novel power indices with threat partitions are presented. We also propose a slight modification to the existing framework for threat power indices which guarantees that null players are always assigned zero power. Numerical results for all power indices combined with different threat partitions are presented and discussed.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Power Indices with Threats in Precoalitions</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Jochen Staudacher</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16050041</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-08-25</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-08-25</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>5</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>41</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16050041</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/5/41</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/40">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 40: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Strategies in Product Warranty Pricing: A Hierarchical Game Approach</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/40</link>
	<description>This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing strategies, while interacting non-cooperatively with the consumer. In this framework, the manufacturer sets the product&amp;amp;rsquo;s sale price, including the base warranty, while the agent determines the price of extended maintenance services. The key contribution is the application of the Shapley value to equitably distribute the coalition&amp;amp;rsquo;s profits based on each member&amp;amp;rsquo;s contribution&amp;amp;mdash;a novel approach in the warranty pricing literature. We detail the characteristic functions that define the coalition&amp;amp;rsquo;s structure and present computer simulations to estimate the expected costs associated with maintenance services. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is applied to report how changes in parameters influence equilibrium strategies and players&amp;amp;rsquo; payoffs. The results provide strategic insights into how manufacturers and agents can coordinate to optimize pricing, capture consumer surplus, and improve decision-making in warranty service markets.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-08-13</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 40: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Strategies in Product Warranty Pricing: A Hierarchical Game Approach</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/40">doi: 10.3390/g16040040</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Henrique Santos
		Thyago Nepomuceno
		</p>
	<p>This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing strategies, while interacting non-cooperatively with the consumer. In this framework, the manufacturer sets the product&amp;amp;rsquo;s sale price, including the base warranty, while the agent determines the price of extended maintenance services. The key contribution is the application of the Shapley value to equitably distribute the coalition&amp;amp;rsquo;s profits based on each member&amp;amp;rsquo;s contribution&amp;amp;mdash;a novel approach in the warranty pricing literature. We detail the characteristic functions that define the coalition&amp;amp;rsquo;s structure and present computer simulations to estimate the expected costs associated with maintenance services. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is applied to report how changes in parameters influence equilibrium strategies and players&amp;amp;rsquo; payoffs. The results provide strategic insights into how manufacturers and agents can coordinate to optimize pricing, capture consumer surplus, and improve decision-making in warranty service markets.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Strategies in Product Warranty Pricing: A Hierarchical Game Approach</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Henrique Santos</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Thyago Nepomuceno</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040040</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-08-13</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-08-13</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>40</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040040</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/40</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/39">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 39: Non-Cooperative Representations of Cooperative Games</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/39</link>
	<description>Non-cooperative games in normal form are specified by a player set, sets of player strategies, and payoff functions. Cooperative games, meanwhile, are specified by a player set and a worth function that maps coalitions of players to payoffs they can feasibly achieve. Although these games study distinct aspects of social behavior, this paper proposes a novel attempt at relating the two models. In particular, cooperative games may be represented by a non-cooperative game in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When these coalitions play against one another, the equilibrium payoffs for each coalition coincide with what is predicted by the worth function. This paper proves sufficient conditions under which cooperative games can be represented by non-cooperative games. This paper finds that all strictly superadditive partition function form (PFF) games can be represented under Nash equilibrium (NE) and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form (CFF) games can be represented under NE; and that all weakly superadditive PFF games can be represented under trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE).</description>
	<pubDate>2025-08-08</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 39: Non-Cooperative Representations of Cooperative Games</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/39">doi: 10.3390/g16040039</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Justin Chan
		</p>
	<p>Non-cooperative games in normal form are specified by a player set, sets of player strategies, and payoff functions. Cooperative games, meanwhile, are specified by a player set and a worth function that maps coalitions of players to payoffs they can feasibly achieve. Although these games study distinct aspects of social behavior, this paper proposes a novel attempt at relating the two models. In particular, cooperative games may be represented by a non-cooperative game in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When these coalitions play against one another, the equilibrium payoffs for each coalition coincide with what is predicted by the worth function. This paper proves sufficient conditions under which cooperative games can be represented by non-cooperative games. This paper finds that all strictly superadditive partition function form (PFF) games can be represented under Nash equilibrium (NE) and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form (CFF) games can be represented under NE; and that all weakly superadditive PFF games can be represented under trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE).</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Non-Cooperative Representations of Cooperative Games</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Justin Chan</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040039</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-08-08</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-08-08</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>39</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040039</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/39</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/38">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 38: Responsibility Hoarding by Overconfident Managers</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/38</link>
	<description>Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that involves the overestimation of one&amp;amp;rsquo;s own capabilities. We introduce a model in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to reduce their own effort by delegating the critical task to the agent more often than in an efficient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager engages in responsibility hoarding, i.e., is likely to delegate a critical task less often to the agent than a rational manager. In fact, a manager with a sufficiently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases the total welfare by refusing to delegate critical tasks and by exerting more effort than a rational manager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which the responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-07-26</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 38: Responsibility Hoarding by Overconfident Managers</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/38">doi: 10.3390/g16040038</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Petra Nieken
		Abdolkarim Sadrieh
		Nannan Zhou
		</p>
	<p>Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that involves the overestimation of one&amp;amp;rsquo;s own capabilities. We introduce a model in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to reduce their own effort by delegating the critical task to the agent more often than in an efficient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager engages in responsibility hoarding, i.e., is likely to delegate a critical task less often to the agent than a rational manager. In fact, a manager with a sufficiently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases the total welfare by refusing to delegate critical tasks and by exerting more effort than a rational manager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which the responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Responsibility Hoarding by Overconfident Managers</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Petra Nieken</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Abdolkarim Sadrieh</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Nannan Zhou</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040038</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-07-26</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-07-26</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>38</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040038</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/38</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/37">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 37: Pure Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Bayesian Games with Multidimensional Vector Types and Linear Payoffs</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/37</link>
	<description>In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those with a continuous type space. More specifically, we are interested in the existence of pure Bayesian Nash equilibriums for such games and efficient algorithms to find them. For continuous priors, we suggest a methodology to perform Nash equilibrium searches in simple cases. For discrete priors, we present algorithms that can handle two-action and two-player games efficiently. We introduce the core concept of threshold strategy and, under some mild conditions, we show that these games have at least one pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our results with several examples like the double-game prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s dilemma (DGPD), the game of chicken, and the sustainable adoption decision problem (SADP).</description>
	<pubDate>2025-07-14</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 37: Pure Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Bayesian Games with Multidimensional Vector Types and Linear Payoffs</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/37">doi: 10.3390/g16040037</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Sébastien Huot
		Abbas Edalat
		</p>
	<p>In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those with a continuous type space. More specifically, we are interested in the existence of pure Bayesian Nash equilibriums for such games and efficient algorithms to find them. For continuous priors, we suggest a methodology to perform Nash equilibrium searches in simple cases. For discrete priors, we present algorithms that can handle two-action and two-player games efficiently. We introduce the core concept of threshold strategy and, under some mild conditions, we show that these games have at least one pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our results with several examples like the double-game prisoner&amp;amp;rsquo;s dilemma (DGPD), the game of chicken, and the sustainable adoption decision problem (SADP).</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Pure Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Bayesian Games with Multidimensional Vector Types and Linear Payoffs</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Sébastien Huot</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Abbas Edalat</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040037</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-07-14</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-07-14</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>37</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040037</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/37</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/36">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 36: &amp;ldquo;Anything Goes&amp;rdquo; in an Ultimatum Game?</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/36</link>
	<description>I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the &amp;amp;ldquo;surprising&amp;amp;rdquo; results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game. I present an evolutionary analysis of different games having the same set of allowable Proposer offers and functions that determine Proposer and Recipient payoffs. For Unrestricted Ultimatum Games, where Recipients may choose from among any of the logically possible pure strategies, populations tend to evolve most often to Nash equilibria where Proposers make the lowest allowable offer. However, for Threshold Reduced Ultimatum Games, where Recipients must choose from among minimum acceptable offer strategies, and for Range Reduced Ultimatum Games, where Recipients must choose from among pure strategies that spurn offers that are &amp;amp;ldquo;too high&amp;amp;rdquo; as well as &amp;amp;ldquo;too low&amp;amp;rdquo;, populations tend to evolve most often to Nash equilibria where Proposers offer substantially more than the lowest possible offer, a result that is consistent with existing Ultimatum Game experimental results. Finally, I argue that, practically speaking, actual Proposers and Recipients will likely regard some reduction of the Unrestricted Ultimatum Game as their game because, for them, the strategies of this reduction are salient.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-07-09</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 36: &amp;ldquo;Anything Goes&amp;rdquo; in an Ultimatum Game?</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/36">doi: 10.3390/g16040036</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Peter Paul Vanderschraaf
		</p>
	<p>I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the &amp;amp;ldquo;surprising&amp;amp;rdquo; results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game. I present an evolutionary analysis of different games having the same set of allowable Proposer offers and functions that determine Proposer and Recipient payoffs. For Unrestricted Ultimatum Games, where Recipients may choose from among any of the logically possible pure strategies, populations tend to evolve most often to Nash equilibria where Proposers make the lowest allowable offer. However, for Threshold Reduced Ultimatum Games, where Recipients must choose from among minimum acceptable offer strategies, and for Range Reduced Ultimatum Games, where Recipients must choose from among pure strategies that spurn offers that are &amp;amp;ldquo;too high&amp;amp;rdquo; as well as &amp;amp;ldquo;too low&amp;amp;rdquo;, populations tend to evolve most often to Nash equilibria where Proposers offer substantially more than the lowest possible offer, a result that is consistent with existing Ultimatum Game experimental results. Finally, I argue that, practically speaking, actual Proposers and Recipients will likely regard some reduction of the Unrestricted Ultimatum Game as their game because, for them, the strategies of this reduction are salient.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>&amp;amp;ldquo;Anything Goes&amp;amp;rdquo; in an Ultimatum Game?</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Peter Paul Vanderschraaf</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040036</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-07-09</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-07-09</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>36</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040036</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/36</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/35">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 35: Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/35</link>
	<description>We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By using the notion of equilibrium binding agreements, we show that (1) when there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is both stable and welfare-maximizing; (2) fragmented patents are stable in the presence of infinitely many asymmetric equilibria; and (3) when considering only a single specific asymmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is welfare-maximizing if it is stable, while fragmented patents can be both stable and welfare-maximizing under certain conditions. We also discuss an alternative version of synergism and an alternative bargaining protocol for patent pool formation.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-07-08</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 35: Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/35">doi: 10.3390/g16040035</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Hao Liu
		Xuewen Qian
		Chen Qu
		Jingyi Shen
		</p>
	<p>We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By using the notion of equilibrium binding agreements, we show that (1) when there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is both stable and welfare-maximizing; (2) fragmented patents are stable in the presence of infinitely many asymmetric equilibria; and (3) when considering only a single specific asymmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is welfare-maximizing if it is stable, while fragmented patents can be both stable and welfare-maximizing under certain conditions. We also discuss an alternative version of synergism and an alternative bargaining protocol for patent pool formation.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Hao Liu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Xuewen Qian</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Chen Qu</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jingyi Shen</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040035</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-07-08</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-07-08</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>35</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040035</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/35</prism:url>

	<cc:license rdf:resource="CC BY 4.0"/>
</item>
        <item rdf:about="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/34">

	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 34: Hierarchies and Promotions in Political Institutions: Accountability and Selection</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/34</link>
	<description>Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two aspects of political performance: accountability and selection. While larger tournaments discourage effort, they improve selection. We also discuss the optimal design of tournaments as a function of the principal&amp;amp;rsquo;s objectives and the features of the environment. We find that tournaments of size two (such as two-candidate elections) are generally suboptimal. Our analysis also highlights that increased desirability of promotion always increases effort but can reduce the optimal tournament size under certain conditions. We also present a range of other comparative statics.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-07-04</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 34: Hierarchies and Promotions in Political Institutions: Accountability and Selection</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/34">doi: 10.3390/g16040034</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		B. Pablo Montagnes
		Stephane Wolton
		Junyan Jiang
		</p>
	<p>Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two aspects of political performance: accountability and selection. While larger tournaments discourage effort, they improve selection. We also discuss the optimal design of tournaments as a function of the principal&amp;amp;rsquo;s objectives and the features of the environment. We find that tournaments of size two (such as two-candidate elections) are generally suboptimal. Our analysis also highlights that increased desirability of promotion always increases effort but can reduce the optimal tournament size under certain conditions. We also present a range of other comparative statics.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Hierarchies and Promotions in Political Institutions: Accountability and Selection</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>B. Pablo Montagnes</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Stephane Wolton</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Junyan Jiang</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040034</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-07-04</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-07-04</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>34</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040034</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/34</prism:url>

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	<title>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 33: Nonmarket Valuation by Contests Under Two American Rules: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</title>
	<link>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/33</link>
	<description>Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules&amp;amp;mdash;the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract&amp;amp;mdash;we develop a strategic game-theoretic model in which a citizens group engages a delegate through a contingent fee compensation contract, while a polluter engages a delegate through an hourly fee compensation contract. If the citizens group prevails, the polluter is obligated to contribute a portion of the contingent fee. Solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium, two results emerge. First, the 4x-rule can be maintained through the adjustment of the asymmetric reimbursement system. Second, the asymmetric reimbursement system can serve both as a supplementary method to measure nonmarket valuation and to reduce the rent dissipation resulting from environmental conflicts under general circumstances.</description>
	<pubDate>2025-06-30</pubDate>

	<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p><b>Games, Vol. 16, Pages 33: Nonmarket Valuation by Contests Under Two American Rules: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</b></p>
	<p>Games <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/33">doi: 10.3390/g16040033</a></p>
	<p>Authors:
		Sung-Hoon Park
		Jason F. Shogren
		</p>
	<p>Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules&amp;amp;mdash;the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract&amp;amp;mdash;we develop a strategic game-theoretic model in which a citizens group engages a delegate through a contingent fee compensation contract, while a polluter engages a delegate through an hourly fee compensation contract. If the citizens group prevails, the polluter is obligated to contribute a portion of the contingent fee. Solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium, two results emerge. First, the 4x-rule can be maintained through the adjustment of the asymmetric reimbursement system. Second, the asymmetric reimbursement system can serve both as a supplementary method to measure nonmarket valuation and to reduce the rent dissipation resulting from environmental conflicts under general circumstances.</p>
	]]></content:encoded>

	<dc:title>Nonmarket Valuation by Contests Under Two American Rules: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</dc:title>
			<dc:creator>Sung-Hoon Park</dc:creator>
			<dc:creator>Jason F. Shogren</dc:creator>
		<dc:identifier>doi: 10.3390/g16040033</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source>Games</dc:source>
	<dc:date>2025-06-30</dc:date>

	<prism:publicationName>Games</prism:publicationName>
	<prism:publicationDate>2025-06-30</prism:publicationDate>
	<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
	<prism:number>4</prism:number>
	<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
	<prism:startingPage>33</prism:startingPage>
		<prism:doi>10.3390/g16040033</prism:doi>
	<prism:url>https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/4/33</prism:url>

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