Journal Description
Philosophies
Philosophies
is an international, peer-reviewed, open access journal promoting re-integration of diverse forms of philosophical reflection and scientific research on fundamental issues in science, technology and culture, published bimonthly online by MDPI. The International Society for Information Studies (IS4SI) is affiliated with Philosophies and their members receive a discount on the article processing charge.
- Open Access— free for readers, with article processing charges (APC) paid by authors or their institutions.
- High Visibility: indexed within Scopus, ESCI (Web of Science), PhilPapers, and other databases.
- Journal Rank: JCR - Q2 (History and Philosophy of Science) / CiteScore - Q1 (Philosophy)
- Rapid Publication: manuscripts are peer-reviewed and a first decision is provided to authors approximately 32.5 days after submission; acceptance to publication is undertaken in 8.1 days (median values for papers published in this journal in the first half of 2024).
- Recognition of Reviewers: reviewers who provide timely, thorough peer-review reports receive vouchers entitling them to a discount on the APC of their next publication in any MDPI journal, in appreciation of the work done.
Impact Factor:
0.6 (2023)
Latest Articles
Hegel’s Keplerian Revolution in Philosophy
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 111; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040111 - 24 Jul 2024
Abstract
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In this paper, I approach Hegel’s philosophy under the banner of a “Keplerian Revolution”, the implicit reference being, of course, to Kant’s supposed Copernican philosophical revolution. Kepler had been an early supporter of the Copernican paradigm in astronomy, but went well beyond his
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In this paper, I approach Hegel’s philosophy under the banner of a “Keplerian Revolution”, the implicit reference being, of course, to Kant’s supposed Copernican philosophical revolution. Kepler had been an early supporter of the Copernican paradigm in astronomy, but went well beyond his predecessor, and so is invoked here in an attempt to capture some of the important ways in which Hegel attempted to go beyond the philosophy of Kant. To make these issues more determinate, however, Hegel’s Keplerian orientation will not be presented in its contrast to Kant’s “Copernicanism” as such, but as contrasted with that of another early follower of Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and this Brunian orientation will be used to characterize Kant’s philosophy as seen from Hegel’s rival Keplerian point of view. Interpreting Hegel as a philosophical Keplerian will require that we broach those worrisome aspects of Kepler’s astronomy, namely his support for Plato’s cosmology and the tradition of the “music of the spheres”, but this will be shown to have connections to Hegel’s own approach to logic. This in turn will help shed light on the meaning of Hegel’s form of idealism and, in particular, on its usually unacknowledged Platonic dimensions.
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Open AccessArticle
Regrounding the Unworldly: Carnap’s Politically Engaged Logical Pluralism
by
Noah Friedman-Biglin
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 110; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040110 - 23 Jul 2024
Abstract
Recent discussions of logical pluralism trace its origins to Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance; indeed, the principle is seen as one of Carnap’s lasting philosophical contributions. In this paper, I will argue that Carnap’s reasons for adopting this principle are not purely logical,
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Recent discussions of logical pluralism trace its origins to Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance; indeed, the principle is seen as one of Carnap’s lasting philosophical contributions. In this paper, I will argue that Carnap’s reasons for adopting this principle are not purely logical, but are rather founded in the Vienna Circle’s manifesto—a programmatic document that brings the Circle’s philosophical work together with a program of social change. Building on work by Uebel, Romizi, and others, I argue that we must understand the principle in light of Carnap’s role in writing the manifesto, and thus as integrated into the larger philosophical and political goals of the Circle. This history illuminates the often-ignored relationship between Carnap’s logical pluralism and his political views. Finally, I turn to the political situation of the post-World War 2 period in the United States. During this time, the Circle’s emigres in the USA transitioned their work from active efforts to reform society to the technical work that we recognize as the foundation of American analytic philosophy today. In this final section, I argue that the reasons that Carnap distanced himself from the political foundations of his view were due in large part to McCarthy-era persecution of left-wing academics.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History)
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Beaming Bodies: A Neo-Lockean Account of Material Persistence
by
Richard Mark Hanley
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 109; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040109 - 17 Jul 2024
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that human bodies do not and cannot persist through beaming: scanning and destruction of the body, followed by transmission of the scan information and replication of the body in another location. I argue that given the minimal time travel assumption
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Conventional wisdom holds that human bodies do not and cannot persist through beaming: scanning and destruction of the body, followed by transmission of the scan information and replication of the body in another location. I argue that given the minimal time travel assumption that information can be sent into the past, it is logically possible for (duplicates of) human bodies to exist in object loops. If so, then conventional wisdom is wrong, and bodies can persist through beaming. The lesson generalizes to all composite material objects that can persist through intrinsic change.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
Open AccessArticle
G. H. von Wright on Logical Empiricism
by
Ilkka Niiniluoto
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 108; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040108 - 16 Jul 2024
Abstract
Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) started his studies in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1934. His teacher, Professor Eino Kaila (1890–1958), was an associate of the Vienna Circle who had changed the course of Finnish philosophy with his own version
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Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) started his studies in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1934. His teacher, Professor Eino Kaila (1890–1958), was an associate of the Vienna Circle who had changed the course of Finnish philosophy with his own version of logical empiricism. Under Kaila’s supervision, von Wright wrote his early studies on probability and defended his doctoral thesis The Logical Problem of Induction in 1941. Von Wright met Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and 1947 and eventually became his successor there in 1948–1951. Later, von Wright characterized these two philosophers as his “father figures”: “Kaila had turned me into a logical positivist or empiricist. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, thoroughly eradicated this personality of mine.” This article studies von Wright’s changing relation to logical empiricism. The main sources include his correspondence with Kaila in 1937–1958 and his books Den logiska empirismen (in Swedish in 1943; in Finnish in 1945) and Logik, filosofi och språk (in Swedish in 1957, in Finnish in 1958). In his “Intellectual Autobiography” (1989), von Wright described the former book as “a farewell to the philosophy of my student years”. Wittgenstein’s influence can be seen in von Wright’s denial of the unity of science and his cool cultural pessimism as expressed in his critical essays. But it is also evident that logic and exact thinking continued to be central tools and ingredients of his subsequent and highly appreciated work as an analytic philosopher.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History)
Open AccessArticle
Should We Vote in Non-Deterministic Elections?
by
Bob M. Jacobs and Jobst Heitzig
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 107; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040107 - 16 Jul 2024
Abstract
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This article investigates reasons to participate in non-deterministic elections, where the outcomes incorporate elements of chance beyond mere tie-breaking. The background context situates this inquiry within democratic theory, specifically non-deterministic voting systems, which promise to re-evaluate fairness and power distribution among voting blocs.
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This article investigates reasons to participate in non-deterministic elections, where the outcomes incorporate elements of chance beyond mere tie-breaking. The background context situates this inquiry within democratic theory, specifically non-deterministic voting systems, which promise to re-evaluate fairness and power distribution among voting blocs. This study aims to explore the normative implications of such electoral systems and their impact on our moral duty to vote. We analyze instrumental reasons for voting, including prudential and act-consequentialist arguments, alongside non-instrumental reasons, assessing their validity in the context of non-deterministic systems. The results indicate that non-deterministic elections could strengthen the case for voting based on prudential and act-consequentialist grounds due to their proportional nature and the increased influence of each vote. We conclude that, while non-deterministic elections strengthen our duty to vote overall, they do not strengthen it for all the arguments in the literature. This paper contributes to the discourse on electoral systems by critically evaluating the moral obligation to vote in non-deterministic elections.
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![](https://pub.mdpi-res.com/philosophies/philosophies-09-00107/article_deploy/html/images/philosophies-09-00107-g001-550.jpg?1721140490)
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Open AccessArticle
The Humanity of Faith: Kierkegaard’s Secularization of Christianity
by
René Rosfort
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 106; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040106 - 16 Jul 2024
Abstract
The nature and practice of Christianity is a major, if not the primary, topic in Kierkegaard’s authorship. What it means to live a Christian life is a persistent topic in many of his major works, and yet, he spends most of his authorship
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The nature and practice of Christianity is a major, if not the primary, topic in Kierkegaard’s authorship. What it means to live a Christian life is a persistent topic in many of his major works, and yet, he spends most of his authorship criticizing traditional ways of practicing Christianity. While his critique of institutionalized Christianity and merciless unmasking of the hypocrisy of self-proclaimed Christians is rather clear, namely that they are not actually Christian, it is more difficult to get a clear idea of Kierkegaard’s alternative. What is a true and sincere Christian life for Kierkegaard? The argument of this article is that Kierkegaard’s famous existential approach to Christianity amounts to a secularization of Christianity and as such can be seen as a critical development of and not a rejection of the Enlightenment critique of religion. The article uses Kant as an advocate of the Enlightenment critique of religion that Kierkegaard inherits and develops critically, and after having examined Kierkegaard’s existential dialectics, an outline of Kant’s transcendental approach is, presented against which Kierkegaard’s existential alternative is examined in more detail. Kierkegaard’s existential approach is radical with its insistence on “that single individual” and on the existential challenges of human freedom that Kant banned from his analysis of both morality and faith. While Kant presents us with the transcendental possibility of faith, Kierkegaard is concerned with the existential reality of faith. It is argued that Kierkegaard’s existential analysis of faith helps us to find the connection between radical individual choice and the rational morality that is not always evident in Enlightenment—and especially Kantian—accounts of morality.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard’s Religious Thought in Relation to Current Religious Discourse)
Open AccessArticle
Fragments and Lies
by
Eugenie Brinkema
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 105; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040105 - 11 Jul 2024
Abstract
This article considers the formal and critical consequences of organizing an aesthetic corpus around the philosophical concept of the fragment via a reading of Aryan Kaganof’s “Ten Monologues from the Lives of the Serial Killers” (1994). This experimental video sets spoken accounts from
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This article considers the formal and critical consequences of organizing an aesthetic corpus around the philosophical concept of the fragment via a reading of Aryan Kaganof’s “Ten Monologues from the Lives of the Serial Killers” (1994). This experimental video sets spoken accounts from the perspective of the likes of Ted Bundy and Charles Manson alongside grainy, ambiguous imagery. Instead of thematic meditations on violence, the monologues circle around quasi-nostalgic reflections on the past and the nature of identity. The film frustrates any language of formal analysis that would rely on accounting for what is present in the film, instead proposing a sympathy with poststructuralism’s efforts at displacing the metaphysics of appearance. Violence is not what resides ready-made within the work, nor is it reducible to the realm of the visible or the audible, but is an unstable process bound up with the act of reading itself. The fragment as a formal problem holds out the abstract, general notion of a break in ways that compel a rethinking of violence as something impersonal, rhythmic, and grammatical.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cinema and Philosophy: Exploring the Intersections of Time, Identity, Ethics and Aesthetics)
Open AccessArticle
Achilles’ To-Do List
by
Zack Garrett
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 104; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040104 - 11 Jul 2024
Abstract
Much of the debate about the mathematical refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes surrounds the logical possibility of completing supertasks—tasks made up of an infinite number of subtasks. Max Black and J.F. Thomson attempt to show that supertasks entail logical contradictions, but their arguments come
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Much of the debate about the mathematical refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes surrounds the logical possibility of completing supertasks—tasks made up of an infinite number of subtasks. Max Black and J.F. Thomson attempt to show that supertasks entail logical contradictions, but their arguments come up short. In this paper, I take a different approach to the mathematical refutations. I argue that even if supertasks are possible, we do not have a non-question-begging reason to think that Achilles’ supertask is possible. The justification for the possibility of Achilles’ supertask lies in the possibility of him completing other supertasks of the same kind, and the justification for the possibility of him completing these other supertasks lies in the possibility of him completing yet more supertasks ad infinitum.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Zeno’s Paradoxes Today)
Open AccessArticle
The Necessity of the Death of God in Nietzsche and Heidegger
by
Duane Armitage
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 103; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040103 - 11 Jul 2024
Abstract
This paper explores the philosophical perspectives of Nietzsche and Heidegger, tracing their analyses of the death of God and its aftermath. My aim is to clarify the diagnosis of this nihilism and its underlying causes, as well as evaluate the proposed remedies put
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This paper explores the philosophical perspectives of Nietzsche and Heidegger, tracing their analyses of the death of God and its aftermath. My aim is to clarify the diagnosis of this nihilism and its underlying causes, as well as evaluate the proposed remedies put forth by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Ultimately, I argue that the seemingly ambiguous consequences of the death of God are not only hopeful, but necessary, if human beings are to rise above and transmute a meaningless, resentment-laced existence, however, not by jettisoning Judeo-Christianity and its values, but rather by reinterpreting them.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Creative Death of God)
Open AccessArticle
On Splits, Big and Little: Towards an Intensive Model of Media and Mediation
by
Eric S. Jenkins
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 102; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040102 - 10 Jul 2024
Abstract
This essay forwards an intensive model of mediation contrasted with the extensive model implicit in much of media theory, which conceives of communication media as an extension of human faculties. An intensive model, instead, conceives of mediation as a phenomenological process of splitting
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This essay forwards an intensive model of mediation contrasted with the extensive model implicit in much of media theory, which conceives of communication media as an extension of human faculties. An intensive model, instead, conceives of mediation as a phenomenological process of splitting or folding affective capacities. An extensive model results in a dualistic, essentialist theory of communication media and unresolvable normative debates about the connecting or disconnecting consequences of media. An intensive model avoids these limitations by diagramming various modes of mediation and illustrating how their consequences stem from alterations to intensive properties, thereby helping constitute subjects and media objects alike rather than presuming a media bridge between pre-existing subjects and objects. The essay employs a number of examples to illustrate the extensive model, including telephone conversations, cinema, animation, and social media. The essay concludes with the division of families over QAnon conspiracies to illustrate the analytic gain from an intensive model.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy and Communication Technology)
Open AccessEditorial
The Ontology of Artifacts in the Long Middle Ages: An Introduction
by
Henrik Lagerlund, Sylvain Roudaut and Erik Åkerlund
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 101; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040101 - 9 Jul 2024
Abstract
What is an artifact [...]
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Art vs Nature: The Ontology of Artifacts in the Long Middle Ages)
Open AccessArticle
Proclus on ἕνωσις: Knowing the One by the One in the Soul
by
Van Tu
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 100; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040100 - 8 Jul 2024
Abstract
At Plato’s insistence to become as godlike as one can, the Neoplatonists seek their salvation in union with the first principle they call the One, identifying this union as the highest end of philosophy. As with all aspirations, the transition from theoretical ideal
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At Plato’s insistence to become as godlike as one can, the Neoplatonists seek their salvation in union with the first principle they call the One, identifying this union as the highest end of philosophy. As with all aspirations, the transition from theoretical ideal to practical implementation remains a perennial problem: how is it possible for a person, as a mere mortal, to leave the person’s confined ontological station to unite with the divine, transcendent first principle? This paper is an attempt to reconstruct Proclus’ highly distinctive answer to this question of enormous importance through a close examination of his development of the late Neoplatonic notion of the One in the soul (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἓν).
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ancient and Medieval Theories of Soul)
Open AccessArticle
The Absurdity of Rational Choice: Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and the Aesthetic Dimension of Newcomb Problems
by
Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 99; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040099 - 6 Jul 2024
Abstract
Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some
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Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some intuitive pull, and so appear to aid in answering the question of what it is rational to do, we argue that their respective positions are not compelling. Newcomb problems are structured such that whichever way one chooses, one might be led by one’s preferred decision theory to miss out on some riches (riches which others obtain whilst employing their preferred decision theory). According to the novel aesthetic diagnosis we shall offer of the Newcomb dialectic, missing out in this way does not render one irrational but, rather, subject to being seen as absurd. This is a different kind of cost but not one that undermines one’s rationality.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
Open AccessArticle
Personal Time and Transmigration Time Travel
by
Cei Maslen
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 98; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040098 - 5 Jul 2024
Abstract
Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not
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Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not considered by Lewis: transmigration or mental time travel fiction. To this end, Lewis’s definition of personal time needs refining, and this is the primary focus of my paper. I discuss some alternative refinements of Lewis’s definition: a Solely Mental definition and a Causal definition. I end by also applying these definitions to cases of reverse aging.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
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Quantum Mechanics, Fields, Black Holes, and Ontological Plurality
by
Gustavo E. Romero
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 97; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040097 - 4 Jul 2024
Abstract
The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields,
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The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy and Quantum Mechanics)
Open AccessCommentary
Moral Responsibility and Time Travel in an Indeterministic World
by
Joshua Spencer
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 96; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040096 - 4 Jul 2024
Abstract
I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she
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I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
Open AccessArticle
Epistemic Injustices in Disaster Theory and Management
by
Alicia García Álvarez
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 95; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040095 - 29 Jun 2024
Abstract
The present paper argues that the standardised treatment of disaster research and practice perpetuates the production of systematic epistemic injustices against victims of disasters. On the one hand, disaster victims are often prevented from contributing with their opinions and knowledge to the processes
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The present paper argues that the standardised treatment of disaster research and practice perpetuates the production of systematic epistemic injustices against victims of disasters. On the one hand, disaster victims are often prevented from contributing with their opinions and knowledge to the processes of disaster mitigation and disaster conceptualisation. On the other hand, disaster victims tend to lack the hermeneutical resources to make sense of their experiences intelligibly, due to the existence of significant hermeneutical gaps in the hegemonic terminology on the matter. I argue that both forms of epistemic injustice, the testimonial and the hermeneutical, are sustained by an epistemic privilege between the Global North and the Global South in matters of disasters. The second group comprises what I categorise generally as ‘disaster victims’. I identify two forms of structural prejudice that operate against disaster victims: one is the ‘non-expert’ prejudice, and the other is the colonial prejudice. Finally, because of the intercultural nature of disaster environments, I discuss the field of ‘multicultural competencies’ as a useful form of unveiling and counteracting the epistemic injustices contained in both disaster theory and practice.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Emergencies, Disasters and Catastrophes: Perspectives from Ethics and Political Philosophy)
Open AccessArticle
The Gap of Presence: Challenges in Describing Perceptual Phenomena
by
André Dias de Andrade
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 94; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040094 - 29 Jun 2024
Abstract
This paper reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project in terms of a phenomenology of sensible transcendence. According to this framework, (i) any given data are correlative to a subjective apprehension, (ii) but they cannot be fully captured by this same experience. Therefore, subjective apprehension must
[...] Read more.
This paper reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project in terms of a phenomenology of sensible transcendence. According to this framework, (i) any given data are correlative to a subjective apprehension, (ii) but they cannot be fully captured by this same experience. Therefore, subjective apprehension must remain open to a type of absence or radical indeterminacy. This notion of transcendence must be grounded in bodily experience, and the challenge is to develop a notion of logos that can account for its sensible donation. We describe that the critical apparatus mobilized to achieve this goal, primarily through the notions of “field of presence” and “presentation”, restores a logic of consciousness in these analyses that focus on the body.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Merleau-Ponty and Rereading the Phenomenology of Perception)
Open AccessArticle
Is God Sustainable?
by
Eugene Halton
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 93; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040093 - 26 Jun 2024
Abstract
This essay approaches the “God is dead” theme by offering a new philosophical history addressing what would make belief in divinity, in God, sustainable and unsustainable. I claim that the death of nature and the death of God in the modern era are
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This essay approaches the “God is dead” theme by offering a new philosophical history addressing what would make belief in divinity, in God, sustainable and unsustainable. I claim that the death of nature and the death of God in the modern era are manifestations of a progressive distancing from a religious philosophy of the Earth that guided human development until the beginnings of civilization. I outline within the space limitations here a new way of looking at the rise of civilization and the modern era by re-evaluating large-scale epochal beliefs and assumptions of progress within a context of sustainable ends and what I have termed sustainable wisdom. From an original evolved outlook I call animate mind, rooted in a religious philosophy of the living Earth, succeeding contractions of anthropocentric mind and machine-centric mind have regressively disconnected from the community of life. This trajectory courses the disconnect from the livingness of things as defining cosmos, to that of machine-centric mind in the modern era, a devolutionary elevation of the feelingless machine, of deadness, of what Erich Fromm described as cultural necrophilia. I propose rebalancing these later contractions of anthropocentric and machine-centric mind with that deeper reality of animate mind, forged as the human evolutionary legacy still present in the human body-mind today. The renewed legacy of animate mind provides a key to what a sustainable God might mean.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Creative Death of God)
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Open AccessArticle
Doing for Circular Time What Shoemaker Did for Time without Change: How One Could Have Evidence That Time Is Circular Rather than Linear and Infinitely Repeating
by
Cody Gilmore and Brian Kierland
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040092 - 25 Jun 2024
Abstract
There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of
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There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of infinitely many 12,000-year epochs, each two of which are exactly alike with respect to all intrinsic, purely qualitative properties. Could one ever have empirical evidence that one inhabits a world of the first kind rather than a world of the second kind? We argue for the affirmative answer, contra Quine, Newton-Smith, and Bergström. Our argument for that conclusion differs from an argument for the same conclusion due to Weir. Weir’s argument is probabilistic and explicitly requires having evidence against determinism. Our argument is a direct appeal to the simplicity of laws, and it involves no probabilistic component. It is modeled on Shoemaker’s argument that one could have evidence of time without change.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
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