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Beyond the Future: Protentional Friction and Suspended Sense in the Lived Time of Illness -
Why Do You Ask Why?: A Critical Phenomenology of Disability and the Burden of Justification -
Asymmetries of Temporal Ontology and Temporal Attitudes -
“As If I Could Read the Darkness”: Some Stakes of Reading in Philosophical Investigations -
Operationalizing Pluralist AI Governance: An Axiology–MCDA Framework
Journal Description
Philosophies
Philosophies
is an international, peer-reviewed, open access journal promoting re-integration of diverse forms of philosophical reflection and scientific research on fundamental issues in science, technology and culture, published bimonthly online by MDPI. The International Society for the Study of Information (IS4SI) is affiliated with Philosophies and their members receive a discount on the article processing charge.
- Open Access— free for readers, with article processing charges (APC) paid by authors or their institutions.
- High Visibility: indexed within Scopus, ESCI (Web of Science), PhilPapers, and other databases.
- Journal Rank: JCR - Q2 (History and Philosophy of Science) / CiteScore - Q1 (Philosophy)
- Rapid Publication: manuscripts are peer-reviewed and a first decision is provided to authors approximately 37.4 days after submission; acceptance to publication is undertaken in 6.6 days (median values for papers published in this journal in the first half of 2026).
- Recognition of Reviewers: reviewers who provide timely, thorough peer-review reports receive vouchers entitling them to a discount on the APC of their next publication in any MDPI journal, in appreciation of the work done.
Impact Factor:
0.7 (2025)
Latest Articles
Rousseau, Educational Happiness, and Institutional Mediation: Reinterpreting Émile for Contemporary Vietnamese School Reform
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 138; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040138 - 6 Aug 2026
Abstract
This article reinterprets Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile as a philosophical resource for clarifying the normative meaning and institutional limits of educational happiness in contemporary Vietnamese school reform. It responds to a central tension: Émile constructs an individualized and partly anti-institutional pedagogical experiment, whereas UNESCO-inspired
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This article reinterprets Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile as a philosophical resource for clarifying the normative meaning and institutional limits of educational happiness in contemporary Vietnamese school reform. It responds to a central tension: Émile constructs an individualized and partly anti-institutional pedagogical experiment, whereas UNESCO-inspired Happy School initiatives operate through mass schooling, policy, professional roles, assessment, and public accountability. Methodologically, the study combines conceptual reconstruction, close textual interpretation, contextual comparison, and critical institutional translation. It reconstructs amour de soi, amour-propre, perfectibility, pity, negative education, and moral freedom, and distinguishes Rousseau’s broader philosophy from the specific pedagogical construction of Émile. The article argues that Rousseau should not be treated as a policy architect or directly scalable school theorist. Rather, his work supplies diagnostic criteria for examining how schools organize comparison, authority, developmental timing, experience, and dependence on external recognition. Institutional mediation is therefore introduced as the authors’ reconstructive category for translating selected Rousseauian concerns into contemporary practices while preserving the limits of that translation. Applied to Vietnam, this approach connects UNESCO’s people–process–place framework with assessment, teacher authority, family–school relations, curriculum experience, and psychological safety. Educational happiness is thus presented not as compulsory positivity or affective comfort, but as a qualified normative ideal supported by institutions that protect dignity and enlarge learners’ capacities for judgment, responsibility, and relational freedom.
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(This article belongs to the Section Virtues)
Open AccessArticle
Ethics of Responsibility in the Contemporary World
by
Samal Adylkhanova, Assem Sagatova, Nursultan Sarsenbekov, Aiman Gappassova, Ali Rafet Ozkan and Halil Gunay
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 137; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040137 - 5 Aug 2026
Abstract
This study examines the role of the ethics of responsibility at individual, societal, and institutional levels and explores its potential to address the ethical challenges of the contemporary world. This ethical framework requires individuals and institutions to consider not only their own interests
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This study examines the role of the ethics of responsibility at individual, societal, and institutional levels and explores its potential to address the ethical challenges of the contemporary world. This ethical framework requires individuals and institutions to consider not only their own interests but also the long-term societal and environmental consequences of their decisions. The study explores how this approach provides guidance in the contexts of technological innovations, environmental crises, and globalization. Technological developments are presented as a domain that both expands the scope of ethics of responsibility and introduces new ethical challenges. It is emphasized that artificial intelligence (AI) systems may give rise to issues such as bias, data privacy violations, and the spread of misinformation through digital platforms. In this context, the necessity of designing “fair AI” and ensuring that digital platforms operate in alignment with ethical principles is emphasized. From the perspective of environmental sustainability, it is stated that while individual efforts, such as recycling and energy conservation, are important, institutions must focus on large-scale initiatives, such as carbon-neutral targets and circular economy models. The article also addresses the criticisms and challenges associated with implementing this framework. The subjective nature of ethical principles and the conflict between diverse cultural values make the universal adoption of this approach difficult. Additionally, the prioritization of individual interests within the capitalist system and the inadequacy of global cooperation are seen as major obstacles to the practical application of ethics of responsibility. This situation underscores the importance of both individual awareness and institutional policies. In conclusion, this framework is presented as an important guide capable of addressing the complex issues of the contemporary world. It is argued that the broader application of this approach is essential in areas such as technological advancements, environmental crises, and global inequalities. Fulfilling the ethical responsibilities of individuals, institutions, and the international community is critical for creating a more equitable and sustainable world.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Clinical Ethics and Philosophy)
Open AccessArticle
Evolutionary Progress and Cultural Value: An Analysis of the Divergence Between Ernan McMullin and Michael Ruse
by
Xinyu Zou and Jianhui Li
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 136; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040136 - 4 Aug 2026
Abstract
The relationship between science and values is a classic and important issue in the philosophy of science. Ernan McMullin, a philosopher of science, believes that as science matures, the pursuit of epistemic values leads to the gradual exclusion of non-epistemic values. Michael Ruse,
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The relationship between science and values is a classic and important issue in the philosophy of science. Ernan McMullin, a philosopher of science, believes that as science matures, the pursuit of epistemic values leads to the gradual exclusion of non-epistemic values. Michael Ruse, a philosopher of biology, emphasizes the uniqueness of this issue in evolutionary biology: the expulsion of progressivist cultural values actually stems from the influence of another cultural value, rather than purely from the pursuit of epistemic values. Therefore, the concept of evolutionary progress cannot completely escape the entanglement of cultural values. Even today, biologists still use other concepts to discuss a metaphor sympathetic to progressivist cultural values. By sorting out the discussions on evolutionary progress among evolutionists in different periods, this paper aims to show that Ruse’s view that “the concept of evolutionary progress is necessarily bound to cultural values” is wrong. Although Ruse correctly points out the uniqueness of this topic in evolutionary biology, his argument hinges on Thomas Huxley’s distinction between professional science and popular science. Huxley confined evolutionary progress to the latter—an area with looser academic norms—which complicates the process of expelling cultural values. More importantly, this paper argues that Ruse’s central mistake is his failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different kinds of value: the cultural values imported by human beings into the concept of evolutionary progress, and the survival values that arise from the functional performance of organisms themselves. The former can, in principle, be excluded from mature scientific discourse; the latter cannot, because they are constitutive of what evolutionary progress describes. By conflating these two categories, Ruse wrongly concludes that even today, the concept of evolutionary progress still cannot be separated from the influence of cultural values.
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Open AccessArticle
The Critique of Modernity in René Guénon and ʿAbdal-Raḥmān Ṭāhā: A Comparative Study
by
Boumediene Hamzi
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 135; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040135 - 3 Aug 2026
Abstract
This article undertakes a systematic comparative study of the critiques of modernity advanced by René Guénon (1886–1951) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ṭāhā (b. 1944). Both thinkers arrive at convergent diagnoses of modernity’s spiritual and ethical failures from fundamentally distinct intellectual starting points—Guénon from the
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This article undertakes a systematic comparative study of the critiques of modernity advanced by René Guénon (1886–1951) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ṭāhā (b. 1944). Both thinkers arrive at convergent diagnoses of modernity’s spiritual and ethical failures from fundamentally distinct intellectual starting points—Guénon from the universal perennialist metaphysics of primordial Tradition, Ṭāhā from Islamic philosophy of language, logic, and ethics. Drawing on Guénon’s The Crisis of the Modern World and The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times alongside Ṭāhā’s Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha (The Spirit of Modernity), Al-ʿAmal al-Dīnī wa-Tajdīd al-ʿAql (Religious Practice and the Renewal of Reason), and Rūḥ al-Dīn (The Spirit of Religion), and supported by secondary scholarship including Wael Hallaq’s Reforming Modernity (2019) and the edited volume Islamic Ethics and the Trusteeship Paradigm (2020), the article argues that the philosophical significance of their encounter lies not merely in their convergences—both condemn the reduction of human life to quantitative and instrumental horizons—but in the productive tension between Guénon’s initiatory-metaphysical model of restoration and Ṭāhā’s trusteeship-based ethic of engagement. Where Guénon describes Western civilization as a civilization of “moralism”—a shifting, interest-driven ethical veneer concealing the absence of genuine transcendent principles—Ṭāhā constructs an affirmative alternative through his concept of i’timāniyya (trusteeship), which grounds reason, speech, and knowledge in an ethics of responsibility toward God, others, and creation. The article further argues that these two thinkers together illuminate a double rupture at the heart of modernity: the loss of metaphysical orientation (the vertical rupture) and the collapse of ethical trusteeship (the horizontal rupture).
Full article
Open AccessReview
Topos Theory and Mereology
by
JT Paasch
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 134; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040134 - 1 Aug 2026
Abstract
A common idea is that logical truth values are fixed independently of the objects to which logic is applied. Topos theory reveals a different possibility. In a topos, the available truth values and logical operations depend upon the structure of its objects’ subobjects
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A common idea is that logical truth values are fixed independently of the objects to which logic is applied. Topos theory reveals a different possibility. In a topos, the available truth values and logical operations depend upon the structure of its objects’ subobjects (generalized parts). In fact, the familiar first-order semantics of sets appears as one instance of this more general phenomenon: it is a logic arising from a particular algebra of parts (namely, the algebra of subsets). This paper provides a detailed exposition of this idea for philosophers without prior training in category theory. Using sets and directed multigraphs as running examples, it explains how a topos’s internal logic—including its truth values—depends upon the structure of its subobjects.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mereology in Metaphysics, Science and Logic)
Open AccessSystematic Review
The Heuristics of Fear in Hans Jonas: Connecting the Status of Nature and the Nature of the Digital Artefact in the Context of Artificial Intelligence as an Extension of Modern Technology—A Systematic Review
by
Rafael Alejandro Betancourt Durango, Diego Alejandro Correa Correa, Eduar Antonio Rodríguez Flores and Conrado Giraldo Zuluaga
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 133; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040133 - 27 Jul 2026
Abstract
Can Hans Jonas’s heuristics of fear still ground a philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI), or does the digital artefact require its reformulation? Building on the empirical turn in the philosophy of technology and on a postphenomenological reading of human–technology relations, this article combines
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Can Hans Jonas’s heuristics of fear still ground a philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI), or does the digital artefact require its reformulation? Building on the empirical turn in the philosophy of technology and on a postphenomenological reading of human–technology relations, this article combines conceptual reconstruction with a PRISMA 2020-compliant bibliometric review (Scopus + Web of Science, 2010–2026; n = 2372 articles and reviews). The bibliometric map reveals an extreme productivity concentration, a stable journal core, and six thematic clusters that organise the field. Rather than treating these patterns as proof of a normative thesis, the article uses them to locate a lexical re-weighting of the field after 2021, in which applied AI-ethics and governance vocabularies expand faster than explicitly philosophical vocabularies. A targeted Jonasian sub-corpus (n = 124) indicates that Jonas remains conceptually relevant but circulates mainly in a smaller, database-visible niche of continental and environmental ethics. We argue that the heuristics of fear remains philosophically fertile provided that it is reconstructed as a threshold question of moral admissibility and expanded through phenomenological resources—lifeworld, embodiment, technological mediation—and through the cosmotechnical plurality emphasised by Yuk Hui. The convergence of bibliometric mapping and philosophical analysis suggests that robust AI governance requires not only procedural principles but also renewed attention to digital mediation, distributed agency, and the protection of the lifeworld under algorithmic uncertainty.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Phenomenological Philosophy of Science and Technology)
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Correction: Morrill, G. A Formal Synopsis of Lambek-Montague Grammar. Philosophies 2026, 11, 1
by
Glyn Morrill
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 132; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040132 - 27 Jul 2026
Abstract
Text Correction [...]
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Logical Linguistic Legacy of Montague Grammar)
Open AccessEditorial
Editorial for the Special Issue “Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy”
by
Florian Vermeiren
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 131; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040131 - 23 Jul 2026
Abstract
Philosophers come in many different shapes [...]
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)
Open AccessArticle
Reinterpreting Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root: Causality, Immanence, and the Limits of Metaphysical Explanation
by
Jan Kerkmann
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 130; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040130 - 22 Jul 2026
Abstract
Background: Arthur Schopenhauer’s On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in its revised 1847 edition) has been variously interpreted as an epistemological prelude to his metaphysics of will, as a continuation of Kantian transcendental philosophy, or as an early
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Background: Arthur Schopenhauer’s On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in its revised 1847 edition) has been variously interpreted as an epistemological prelude to his metaphysics of will, as a continuation of Kantian transcendental philosophy, or as an early expression of Schopenhauer’s broader soteriological concerns. These readings often differ in emphasis but converge in treating the text primarily as subordinate to Schopenhauer’s later system or early intellectual development. Methods: This article offers a systematic textual reconstruction of the 1847 edition within the Kantian tradition of transcendental critique. It proceeds through close reading and conceptual analysis of Schopenhauer’s articulation of the principle of sufficient reason, situating individual argumentative steps within both Kantian and post-Kantian debates. The aim is not to deny the relevance of systematic or developmental readings, but to clarify the internal philosophical function of the text’s argumentative structure. Results: The analysis shows that Schopenhauer’s account of the principle of sufficient reason consistently operates as a critical and immanent framework for structuring possible explanation rather than as a metaphysical grounding principle. Across its four domains, the principle is differentiated into irreducible forms governing distinct types of object-relation, thereby constraining illegitimate transitions between epistemic justification and ontological explanation. This reading highlights (i) the internal differentiation of explanatory forms, (ii) the restriction of causal claims to intra-phenomenal relations, and (iii) the systematic limitation of metaphysical grounding strategies. Conclusions: On this reading, the Fourfold Root does not function primarily as a foundational doctrine for Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will, but as a critical investigation into the limits of metaphysical explanation within experience. It thereby reconfigures metaphysical inquiry as a reflective clarification of the conditions under which explanation is possible, rather than as a doctrine of ultimate ontological grounds.
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Open AccessArticle
The Unity of Heaven and Humanity and Beautiful China: Contemporary Transformation of Traditional Chinese Ecological Aesthetics Wisdom
by
Yunlei Ban
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 129; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040129 - 22 Jul 2026
Abstract
The traditional Chinese ecological aesthetics takes ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ [天人合一] as its philosophical core and constructs a cosmological landscape of coexistence and prosperity between humans and nature. Given the challenges of the global ecological crisis, this research draws on the
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The traditional Chinese ecological aesthetics takes ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ [天人合一] as its philosophical core and constructs a cosmological landscape of coexistence and prosperity between humans and nature. Given the challenges of the global ecological crisis, this research draws on the ecological aesthetic wisdom of ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ to systematically explore its theoretical support and practical value for building a Beautiful China. By employing a mixed-method approach that integrates textual analysis, policy review, and multi-case comparative study, this research finds that in the process of building a Beautiful China, the traditional ecological aesthetic wisdom of ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ has achieved creative transformation and innovative development through the spatial creation of ‘Poetic Dwelling’, the green economy characterized by ‘Suitable for Employment’ and the ecological empowerment for the principle of ‘Suitable for Nurturing Life and Tourism’. This has paved a distinctive path for green development that integrates cultural subjectivity, ecological principles, and modern governance technologies. The discussion further emphasizes that intelligent ecological governance, leveraging technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data, provides a key technological pathway for the contemporary transformation of ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ philosophy. This study provides a unique ecological and cultural foundation for building a Beautiful China and for global ecological protection.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)
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Open AccessEssay
More-than-Human Ethics: A Complex Issue
by
Maria Laura Giacobello
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 128; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040128 - 22 Jul 2026
Abstract
This article explores the ecological crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon that engages humanity at an existential and therefore philosophical level. Starting from the recognition of the authentic human condition, as that of a being deeply rooted in an ecosystem whose balance sustains its
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This article explores the ecological crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon that engages humanity at an existential and therefore philosophical level. Starting from the recognition of the authentic human condition, as that of a being deeply rooted in an ecosystem whose balance sustains its well-being, it argues for moving beyond the anthropocentric fallacy that has driven humankind to pursue its dream of Promethean domination. Rather, the complex nature of the human being, at once biological and cultural, carries a message of universal solidarity. In ignoring this message, humanity has betrayed its true identity: that of a steward of life understood in its universal dimension. As a conscious part of nature, humanity is entrusted with caring for it, adopting a more-than-human ethics grounded in respect and love for the relationships that connect all things within the web of life. This calls for revisiting the anthropological question through a systemic lens, opening onto an alternative epistemological and ontological perspective, one that allows us to rethink humanity’s relationship with the entire ecosphere and imagine a different way of co-dwelling on Earth.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)
Open AccessArticle
The Five-Year Horizon: Quantum Computing and the Philosophy of Technical Becoming
by
Christophe Jurczak
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 127; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040127 - 20 Jul 2026
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Certain physics-based technologies (quantum computing, fusion energy, advanced materials, brain–computer interfaces) have remained “five years away” for decades. This paper argues that this perpetual horizon is not a forecasting failure but the temporal signature of Perpetual Five-Year Technologies (PFYTs): technologies of atoms, not
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Certain physics-based technologies (quantum computing, fusion energy, advanced materials, brain–computer interfaces) have remained “five years away” for decades. This paper argues that this perpetual horizon is not a forecasting failure but the temporal signature of Perpetual Five-Year Technologies (PFYTs): technologies of atoms, not bits, whose technical object and enabling ecosystem must co-develop. Drawing on philosophy of technology and sociology of scientific practice, and grounded in quantitative analysis of cross-platform performance data and high-impact research across hardware architectures, the paper shows that PFYT temporality is endogenous, produced by concretization dynamics and recursive constraint discovery rather than by market failures or insufficient funding. Quantum computing provides the paradigmatic case. Treating the quantum processor as a technical individual in active individuation explains why multiple computing paradigms persist and why each breakthrough resets rather than collapses the horizon. The convergence of machine learning and quantum hardware into pipelines for drug and materials discovery shows how Physical AI reshapes PFYT dynamics, compressing some cycles while introducing new forms of co-individuation between intelligence and matter. The framework generates diagnostics for physics-based frontiers where technical objects and milieus co-produce developmental time.
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Open AccessArticle
Simulation as Inquiry: Reframing Methodological Knowledge Through Boundary Mapping
by
Sifiso Vilakati
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 126; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040126 - 20 Jul 2026
Abstract
Methodological statistics has developed under the pervasive belief that the value of a simulation study lies in its ability to demonstrate the superiority of a proposed method. This belief has distorted the epistemic role of simulation research by encouraging selective reporting, narrow design
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Methodological statistics has developed under the pervasive belief that the value of a simulation study lies in its ability to demonstrate the superiority of a proposed method. This belief has distorted the epistemic role of simulation research by encouraging selective reporting, narrow design spaces and the suppression of results that fail to show improvement. Drawing on philosophical accounts and on meta scientific critiques by several studies, this paper argues that non-superiority is not a failure but an essential source of methodological knowledge. It marks the boundaries at which a method performs adequately, where it begins to degrade and where it breaks. Using empirical patterns evident in contemporary methodological literature and drawing on the widely cited case in which machine learning methods often failed to outperform logistic regression in clinical prediction, this paper demonstrates how non-superiority clarifies expectations and guides methodological refinement. The paper proposes a structural remedy that pairs the Registered Reports model with principled simulation design following the ADEMP framework. This alignment protects the visibility of non-superiority and restores the integrity of simulation research. Boundary mapping is therefore not a modest contribution but a scientific and ethical imperative for methodological transparency and applied reliability.
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Open AccessArticle
The Standpoint Threshold: Architectural Conditions for Processing from Somewhere
by
Daniel H. Lange
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 125; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040125 - 20 Jul 2026
Abstract
The philosophy of artificial intelligence often begins one question too late. Discussions move directly to whether a system could be conscious, whether there is something it is like to be the system, or whether it possesses genuine subjectivity, without first asking a more
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The philosophy of artificial intelligence often begins one question too late. Discussions move directly to whether a system could be conscious, whether there is something it is like to be the system, or whether it possesses genuine subjectivity, without first asking a more basic structural question: what would have to be true of a system’s internal organization before those questions gain a determinate basis in its architecture? This paper addresses that prior question. It defends a threshold account built on three jointly necessary conditions: persistent internal context, differentiated internal possibility, and closed-loop operativity. Together, these conditions mark the point at which a system’s processing can plausibly be said to unfold from an internal standpoint, rather than merely as a chain of locally linked transitions. Such organization may also have functional significance independent of consciousness by supporting temporal coherence, cross-role coordination, and reduced dependence on episodic reconstruction or external scaffolding. The account explains why simple feedback controllers are clear non-cases, why standard transformer inference remains at most a bounded near-case, and why world-model architectures are more serious candidates for assessment, while making no claim that such systems are conscious. The aim is not to provide a test for artificial consciousness, but to clarify when consciousness-oriented inquiry into intelligent systems has a determinate architectural target.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Consciousness in the Age of Intelligent Systems: Philosophical Frameworks, Neural Theories, and Generative AI)
Open AccessArticle
Environmental Esthetics and Other Non-Anthropocentric Representations of Nature
by
Sandra Baquedano
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 124; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040124 - 18 Jul 2026
Abstract
This article addresses environmental esthetics in dialog with other non-anthropocentric representations of nature, starting with the Ancient Western philosophy of art as a human expression of nature (φύσις, physis). In the context of this more primary understanding, the consolidation of an anthropocentric
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This article addresses environmental esthetics in dialog with other non-anthropocentric representations of nature, starting with the Ancient Western philosophy of art as a human expression of nature (φύσις, physis). In the context of this more primary understanding, the consolidation of an anthropocentric representation of nature based on homo mensura is examined, in which the human being emerges as the measure of all things. This interpretation of nature fosters its progressive reification, which coincides with the emergence of esthetics as a modern philosophical discipline, often articulated around the partial and isolated appreciation of the object. It is argued that environmental esthetics emphasizes an immersive and relational experience with the environment, facilitating a certain release from anthropocentric mental habits, and that the notion of hyperobjects also helps to confront them by laying bare phenomena that exceed the human scale. In line with this expansion of space–time coordinates, which challenge perceptive categories in themselves, an ecosuicidological esthetic is presented, one capable of cultivating a renewed, non-anthropocentric sensitivity. The article resorts to Amerindian knowledges for the concept’s potential deployment and discusses artistic expressions that reconfigure the experience of representing nature, transforming perception and inspiring new forms of reciprocity.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)
Open AccessArticle
Biocultural Ethics for Human–River–Biosphere Co-Inhabitation
by
Ricardo Rozzi
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 123; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040123 - 17 Jul 2026
Abstract
The reunification of scientific, artistic, and philosophical knowledge empowers us to rethink our relationship with nature in light of a biocultural ethic grounded in co-inhabitation among humans and other-than-human beings in shared habitats. To this end, the biocultural ethic is built upon the
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The reunification of scientific, artistic, and philosophical knowledge empowers us to rethink our relationship with nature in light of a biocultural ethic grounded in co-inhabitation among humans and other-than-human beings in shared habitats. To this end, the biocultural ethic is built upon the 3H model, which values the vital links among co-inhabitants and their life habits in shared habitats. The model integrates the biophysical, cultural, and sociopolitical dimensions characteristic of environmental complexity. In this essay, the 3H model is applied to rivers, examined from biological, philosophical, poetic, and legal perspectives. The result is not only to highlight that rivers are more than merely exploitable resources, but also to show that their “voice” raises a normative (ethical and legal) appeal that, among other aspects, has inspired the new Latin American constitutionalism. This ontological, epistemological, and ethical turn seeks to foster a transition from destruction and homogenization toward a bioculture that values biological and cultural diversity through renewed forms of co-inhabitation with rivers and the biosphere.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)
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Open AccessArticle
The Safety Versus Sensitivity Debate Revisited
by
Duncan Pritchard
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 122; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040122 - 17 Jul 2026
Abstract
It is widely accepted that there is a modal condition on knowledge. There are two main candidates in the literature: safety and sensitivity. My goal in this paper is to revisit this debate in the context of anti-risk epistemology. This approach
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It is widely accepted that there is a modal condition on knowledge. There are two main candidates in the literature: safety and sensitivity. My goal in this paper is to revisit this debate in the context of anti-risk epistemology. This approach is meant to offer an independent way of determining the modal condition on knowledge (i.e., as opposed to simply pitching modal conditions against one another and seeing which one accommodates the wider range of cases). Interestingly, while anti-risk epistemology favors safety over traditional formulations of sensitivity, it also leads to a very specific way of formulating the safety condition on knowledge. Given that sensitivity might also be reformulated along anti-risk lines, a natural question to ask is where this leaves the debate between safety and sensitivity. I will be suggesting that the most plausible anti-risk formulation of sensitivity is equivalent to the corresponding formulation of safety. If that is right, then ultimately the moral to draw from anti-risk epistemology is not that it favors safety over sensitivity but that it leads to a formulation of the anti-risk condition on knowledge whereby this distinction collapses.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Knowledge and Conditionals—Reliability, Probability, Counterfactuals, and Relevance)
Open AccessArticle
Semantic Displacement and AI-Mediated Agency: Conversational Systems and the Externalization of Meaning
by
Edu William
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 121; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040121 - 15 Jul 2026
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This article develops a conceptual account of semantic displacement in conversational AI. The central question concerns how agency is affected when systems do more than automate information retrieval and begin to supply the descriptions, classifications and normative cues through which users understand what
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This article develops a conceptual account of semantic displacement in conversational AI. The central question concerns how agency is affected when systems do more than automate information retrieval and begin to supply the descriptions, classifications and normative cues through which users understand what they are doing. Drawing on philosophy of action, philosophy of language, hermeneutics, philosophy of technology and critical accounts of algorithmic mediation, this article reconstructs the relation between meaning and action as a condition of agency. Its methodological approach is conceptual and diagnostic, oriented toward clarifying a problem that becomes visible when established theories are brought together in relation to contemporary conversational systems. The article interprets these systems as operational semantic infrastructures that organize context-sensitive linguistic uptake within practical environments such as health, work, education, administration and everyday self-management. It then introduces semantic displacement as the condition in which action-relevant meanings become increasingly organized, prioritized and consolidated outside the agent’s own participatory interpretation. The argument contributes a vocabulary for distinguishing agency-enhancing semantic support from forms of semantic substitution that weaken interpretive participation. It concludes by proposing semantic sovereignty and interpretive contestability as normative ideals for human agency in AI-mediated environments. The argument specifies action as intentional conduct understood under socially available descriptions and cognition as situated interpretive sense-making rather than purely internal computation. It also clarifies three conditions under which semantic support becomes displacement: opaque semantic generation, practical stabilization and reduced interpretive contestability.
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Open AccessArticle
Enacting Ontological Pluralism: Informational Dynamics and Embodied Cognition in Śaiva-Śākta Phenomenology
by
Diego Gonzalez-Rodriguez
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 120; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040120 - 14 Jul 2026
Abstract
Contemporary cognitive science is predominantly grounded in physicalist assumptions that locate cognition and consciousness in neural and computational processes. While these approaches have yielded significant empirical advances, they often struggle to account for the qualitative and first-person structure of experience. This paper proposes
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Contemporary cognitive science is predominantly grounded in physicalist assumptions that locate cognition and consciousness in neural and computational processes. While these approaches have yielded significant empirical advances, they often struggle to account for the qualitative and first-person structure of experience. This paper proposes an ethno-phenomenological perspective by engaging non-Western epistemic practices through the lens of embodied cognition and ontological pluralism. Rather than treating non-Western phenomenology as external to scientific inquiry, we analyze how it can inform cognitive dynamism and ontological enactment through sophisticated epistemic practices. Particularly, we analyze how by actively manipulating cognitive and informational structures, Śaiva-Śākta phenomenology may dynamically affect embodied subjectivity. From this perspective, certain methods like visualization and ritual enactment can be understood as systematic interventions that modulate attentional, mnemonic, and perceptual processes, thereby reconfiguring the experiential architecture of the self and world. We further examine how processes such as constructive imagination function as mechanisms of cognitive reorganization, enabling practitioners to inhabit multiple ontological configurations of subject–object relations. Drawing on predictive processing and enactive cognitive science, the paper argues that Śaiva-Śākta sādhanā may operationalize a form of embodied epistemology in which ontology is not merely represented but enacted. This supports a model of ontological pluralism in which divergent experiential worlds correspond to stabilized modes of cognition rather than competing metaphysical hypotheses. Within this framework, sādhanā is considered a methodological method for investigating consciousness beyond reductionist neurophysiological accounts, offering structured access to non-ordinary modes of experience. Conclusively, the paper proposes that certain non-Western traditions may provide not only philosophical insights but also alternative phenomenological pathways for exploring the informational dynamics of embodied cognition, thereby expanding the methodological and ontological horizons of cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
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Consummatum Est: On the Faustian Laboratory, the Hubris of AI’s Architects, and the Humanity They Forgot to Ask
by
Alison L. Kahn
Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 119; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040119 - 13 Jul 2026
Abstract
The development of artificial intelligence has proceeded within a disciplinary culture whose positivist epistemological foundations generate a constitutive blind spot: the systematic exclusion of tacit, embodied, relational and contextually situated knowledge from what counts as knowledge at all. This article argues that this
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The development of artificial intelligence has proceeded within a disciplinary culture whose positivist epistemological foundations generate a constitutive blind spot: the systematic exclusion of tacit, embodied, relational and contextually situated knowledge from what counts as knowledge at all. This article argues that this exclusion is not a technical limitation, but a structural condition of AI systems as currently built, with serious consequences for individuals, institutions and the social order. The method is interdisciplinary and critically synthetic, integrating the anthropology of science and technology, the philosophy of language and the literary-philosophical tradition of techno-critique. Three original contributions are advanced. First, the Faustian framework is reformulated as a collective rather than individual pact: the AI contract implicates a civilisation. Second, the prevalent reductionist critique is refined: the error is not quantification of incommensurable goods but the enforcement of total orderings upon value landscapes that admit only partial orderings. Third, the stochastic parrot objection is reconciled with the Faustian analysis through the concept of institutional amplification: AI’s danger resides not in its intelligence but in the authority conferred upon its incomprehension. The article concludes that Mephistopheles, not Faustus, is the more precise figure for AI itself, and asks whether the defunding of humanities disciplines, those best placed to navigate the moral challenges AI presents, constitutes the most consequential characteristic deletion of all.
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