Philosophies

This paper proposes the Unified Observation Layer Theory (UOLT), a structural framework for understanding observation not as an act of cognition, measurement, or subjectivity, but as a layered condition through which the world becomes visible. Contemporary theories across physics, philosophy, and cognitive science often treat observation as a primary explanatory principle, implicitly assuming that what is observed constitutes the world itself. Such approaches repeatedly encounter paradoxes concerning objectivity, incompleteness, and the limits of visibility. UOLT argues that these paradoxes do not arise from epistemic failure or insufficient data, but from a structural confusion between distinct layers of observation. UOLT introduces a three-layer model consisting of an Invisible Layer, a Projection Layer, and a Visible Layer. The Invisible Layer refers to structural conditions that do not appear directly within a given observational configuration, yet are presupposed by the coherence of what becomes established within it. The Projection Layer specifies the conditions under which certain structural relations become stably manifest, including selection, emphasis, and exclusion. The Visible Layer corresponds to the domain in which objects, quantities, causality, language, and time are articulated as established. By separating these layers, UOLT explains why observation can never access the totality of the world, why visibility does not imply completeness, and why similar structural paradoxes emerge across otherwise distinct domains. Importantly, UOLT does not compete with or replace existing physical or philosophical theories. Instead, it repositions them as descriptions operating within the Visible Layer, without reducing the Invisible Layer to hidden variables or metaphysical entities. Unified Observation Layer Theory offers a non-temporal, non-reductive account of observation that clarifies the structural conditions under which reality appears coherent despite being only partially visible. In doing so, it provides a framework for reconsidering objectivity, visibility, and world formation without privileging observation as an ultimate ground. This paper does not aim to propose a unified theory, but to clarify the structural conditions under which observation becomes possible.

This paper argues that al-Ghazali’s (1058–1111) distinction between taqlid (uncritical acceptance of authority) and ijtihad (independent reasoning) can offer a normative response to the contemporary challenge of fake news, thereby connecting a medieval epistemic framework to a pressing twenty-first-century problem. This study treats fake news as both an epistemic and an ethical challenge. Epistemically, fake news undermines the aim of belief, which is the aspiration toward truth, by introducing and sustaining falsehoods within the testimonial networks on which individuals depend for knowledge. Ethically, it constitutes a form of deception that manipulates audiences, corrodes intellectual virtues such as honesty, and disintegrates the trust between individuals and public institutions that is essential for collective life. Methodologically, this paper adopts an analytical–critical approach. It examines recent philosophical literature on the epistemology of misinformation, reconstructs al-Ghazali’s taqlid–ijtihad framework from his original texts, and then adapts it to the conditions of digital information environments. The resulting model distinguishes between digital ijtihad, the responsible and competent verification of online information, and justified digital taqlid, the legitimate reliance on credible digital authorities when independent verification is impractical. The findings suggest that this adapted framework not only enriches contemporary epistemic theory but also offers practical normative guidance for cultivating responsible belief formation, including in educational contexts where teaching itself functions as a structured form of testimonial exchange.

In this contribution, I explore the idea that reality is best understood as fundamentally dynamic and interdependent, i.e., processual, bringing together resources from process thought, phenomenology and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. I furthermore explore how this view shapes the ways we speak about, investigate, and understand the natural world. What is novel in my approach is that I bring a phenomenological reading of process in dialogue with Buddhist thought. My paper unfolds in two stages: first, I map key points of convergence between phenomenologically clarified process philosophy and Madhyamaka; second, I consider the broader epistemological and practical consequences of viewing reality as impermanent and dependently arising by looking at Whitehead’s and Nāgārjuna’s views in dialogue. Engaging with Buddhist philosophy alongside phenomenological process thought enables a deeper investigation into the ethical, and lived dimensions of metaphysical inquiry, which are dimensions often sidelined both in Western metaphysics and in some versions of phenomenology, because metaphysical and phenomenological analysis can remain stuck on the conceptual level, detached from both lived experience and practice. By contrast, Buddhist traditions explicitly link philosophical reflection with lived experience and embodied practice throughout. For this reason, sustained dialogue with Buddhist views and practices can expand Western methodology as such and can enrich process-based phenomenological approaches in particular by showing ways to reconnect speculative metaphysics, observation, and the concrete in practical ways.