The Development in Heidegger’s Thinking of Truth: From the 1930 Drafts of on the Essence of Truth to the Published 1943/49 Version

Abstract

This paper traces the development in Heidegger’s thinking of truth from the early drafts of “On the Essence of Truth” (1930) to the published essay of 1943/49. It argues that the shift from the early thinking of truth, which understands truth as disclosure in terms of horizonal projection, to the later conception, which understands truth as disclosure granted by the open-region (die Gegnet), marks a deepening that entails significant development in Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. This paper follows the development of the relation between comportment, letting-be, disclosure, and concealment in early drafts, and shows how the later published version rethinks these in light of a more primordial openness that had remained unthought in the early drafts.

1. Introduction

Heidegger’s general method of inquiry combines two elements: phenomenology and destruction. Phenomenology, for Heidegger, involves allowing everyday “experience” to reveal its own structures without forcing “experience” into a preconceived theoretical framework. Destruction involves taking up concepts and understandings handed down by the philosophical tradition in order to probe into their concealed presuppositions and, in doing so, to open up paths of thought that have remained unexplored and unthought. This is not a merely negative or a purely historical undertaking, but an attempt to think what has already been thought from out of its origin and, in doing so, to recover relationship to phenomena that may have been obscured. Heidegger applies the same method of inquiry to the exploration of the question of truth. However, the inquiry changes and develops over the course of his thinking, and the precise nature and implications of these changes are not often clear. This paper aims to probe into this development by comparing the 1930 drafts of “On the Essence of Truth,” available in Gesamtausgabe Volume 80.1 [1], with the more well-known 1943/49 published version, in order to gain insight into the development of Heidegger’s thinking on truth, which subsequently offers insight into the broader development of his thinking as a whole. My contention is that these texts reveal subtle but significant developments that lead to significant changes in how the relationship between the human being, beings, and being is understood.

Heidegger’s inquiry into truth always unfolds in three major steps: (1) the inquiry into the traditional understanding of truth; (2) the inquiry into the conditions that make the traditional understanding possible; and (3) the inquiry into the ground of those conditions of possibility. Heidegger frames this as an inquiry into the essence of truth. Section 2 presents an outline of Heidegger’s general approach to the question of truth by examining his account in Being and Time [2]. Section 3 surveys the similarities and differences between the various drafts of “On the Essence of Truth” available to the public. Section 4 offers a detailed analysis of his account of truth in the early drafts (1930). Lastly, Section 5 offers a detailed analysis of the developments from the early drafts to the final published version in 1943/49.

2. Outline of Heidegger’s Approach to the Question of Truth

Truth in Being and Time

(1) Heidegger inquires into the question of truth in §44 of Being and Time. The analysis begins with the inherited understanding of truth, which he calls the “traditional conception of truth” [2] (p. 256). “Traditional” is not used in a pejorative sense but simply describes the understanding that has been handed down by the European philosophical tradition. There are two key elements in what has been handed down: (a) truth understood as a property of judgements, and (b) the conception of truth as agreement or correspondence (Übereinstimmung) between a judgement and that which a judgement is about [3] (p. 256). For example, it is said of the judgement “the picture on the wall is hanging askew” that it is true if, in fact, the picture is hanging askew. The truth of the judgement is established in so far as it corresponds with the actual state of affairs.

This traditional conception is based on what Daniel Dahlstrom has aptly called the “logical prejudice” in his book Heidegger’s Concept of Truth. The prejudice consists of the assumption that truth is exclusively a property of judgements, assertions, or propositions, and that it consists of a logical relationship between a subject’s representation with an entity external to the subject [4] (pp. xvi–xvii). Here, judgement is usually taken to reside in the inner sphere of the subject that must somehow hook onto or correspond to a present-at-hand object outside the sphere of subjectivity. As Heidegger puts it, “On the one hand, a subject with life experiences, and on the other, an object toward which we must make something like an excursion” [5] (p. 218). What remains covered over in this traditional understanding is that the correspondence between a judgement and the entity it refers to is made possible only if the entity referred to is first “discovered” or “uncovered” (Entdecktheit). This leads to the first layer of what remains unthought in the traditional understanding of truth.

(2) The judgement “the picture on the wall is hanging askew” brings the picture into focus “just as it is in itself” [2] (p. 261), as askew. Judging has the nature of “being towards the thing itself that is” [2] (p. 260), allowing the entity judged to become salient. Heidegger names this “bringing into focus,” or discovery achieved through the directed nature of judgement, “uncoveredness.” Judging, therefore, at first, does not indicate some inner representation that must somehow hook onto the actual present-at-hand entity “out there,” but expresses the nature of being-directed-toward the entity judged—the actual picture on the wall—pointing it out, uncovering it. It is only because the picture has first been uncovered as it is in itself—as askew—that a judgement about it can be true or false. Uncovering thus shows itself to be the condition that first makes the truth or falsity of any judgement possible.

What is uncovered, however, is not uncovered as a mere brute fact, but as an entity within a meaningful context. The picture can be uncovered as a decoration piece, as an object of investigation, or as crooked. In each case, it is uncovered in light of a forward-looking projection (Entwurf) of aims and goals that we strive toward. For example, as decoration, the picture is projected to beautify the room; as an object of investigation, the picture is projected to be studied; and as crooked, it is projected as something to be corrected or noticed. However, such projections are not free-floating, but based on what is already given, the “past” we did not choose. Heidegger calls this thrownness (Geworfenheit)—the inherited background understanding, cultural norms, and prior expectations that make such projections intelligible—understanding that pictures are meant to hang straight, to decorate, to present something beautiful. Thrown-projection, entailed in the as-structure, implies that the uncovering of an entity is always within a context of significance—within a world which Heidegger names “disclosedness” (Erschlossenheit). This leads us to the second layer of what remains unthought.

(3) Disclosure does not indicate a mere mental operation enacted by a present-at-hand entity called the human being. Rather, “Dasein is its disclosedness” [2] (p. 171). This is implied in the claim that Dasein, the human being, is a being-in-the-world;1 not as subjectivity “in” the world like in a container looking out, but as itself the site of disclosedness, already outside itself, already amidst entities, involved with them, oriented by purposes, guided by moods, and engaged in practices. Thus, the “in-the-world” describes a structural feature of Dasein’s being. Dasein is itself the disclosure of significance, and Dasein’s disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) is what grounds any uncoveredness (Entdecktheit) of this or that entity [2] (p. 263). Heidegger will later identify this disclosedness, in light of which beings are uncovered, as letting-be or freedom.

With these three steps, Heidegger grounds the traditional understanding of truth, handed down, in its essence. For Heidegger, truth, in its primary sense, is not the correctness of judgements but the disclosedness of Dasein. In Heidegger’s words, “only with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained” [2] (p. 263); because Dasein is disclosed, entities can be uncovered as what they are, and because entities are uncovered as what they are, the judgements about them can be true or false. With this, Heidegger has not rejected the traditional understanding but has shown how it rests on deeper, concealed presuppositions. Thus, in probing into these presuppositions, we have “not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordially” [2] (p. 262).

3. From Being and Time to on the Essence of Truth

3.1. Early Drafts of on the Essence of Truth

Heidegger continues his engagement with the question of truth throughout his life. Certain subtle differences begin to emerge from the 1930s onward in comparison to earlier writings. Whether these developments signify some significant change has been a matter of debate—a debate that goes hand in hand with the question whether Heidegger’s later thought as a whole represents some significant development.

One of Heidegger’s most well-known writings on truth is his 1943/49 essay “On the Essence of Truth” [3]. The recently published Gesamtausgabe Volume 80.1 includes four early drafts of this essay [1]. Three of these drafts included in the volume are from a series of four lecture presentations Heidegger gave in 1930. The first lecture was given in Karlsruhe on July 14th (first draft), the second lecture in Bremen on October 8th (second draft), and the third and fourth in Marburg and Freiburg, respectively, on December 5th and 11th (third draft). The volume also includes an additional draft composed around Pentecost in 1940 (fourth draft). Altogether, there are six versions of the essay available to the public now: four drafts in Gesamtausgabe Volume 80.1 and the two published versions most readers are familiar with from 1943 and again in 1949, which includes a concluding note not present in the 1943 edition. While much of the third draft from lectures given in 1930 is the same as the version eventually published in 1943, there are some notable additions, changes, and omissions. These changes offer direct clues into the development of Heidegger’s thinking of truth, offering insight into whether the differences among the early versions and the eventually published version imply a significant reorientation. Before examining these developments, let us first survey the similarities and differences between different drafts of the essay available.

3.2. The Four Drafts in Gesamtausgabe Volume 80.1

The first draft [1] (pp. 329–344), delivered in Karlsruhe (July 1930), already lays out the basic three-step structure that was present in Being and Time and that all the subsequent drafts adhere to. Again, the three-step structure is (1) the inquiry into the traditional understanding of truth; (2) the inquiry into the inner possibility of the traditional understanding; and (3) the inquiry into the ground of the inner possibility [1] (p. 330). The first draft follows this basic structure but with a looser and less developed exposition in comparison to the later drafts. It moves quickly from an inquiry into the traditional understanding of truth to a claim, implied but not developed in Being and Time, about truth’s grounding in freedom.

A notable difference between the first and subsequent drafts is the explicit exposition of knowing (Erkennen) as a basic mode of comportment [1] (pp. 331–332). This explicit exposition is omitted from all subsequent drafts, although the role of knowing is maintained implicitly through the concept of projection (Entwurf) 2. Heidegger’s exposition of knowing begins with the identification of traditional understanding of truth with correspondence, specifically, the correspondence between a true statement and the thing to which the statement refers. He argues that, according to the traditional understanding, making a true statement implies knowing (erkannt) beings as the beings they are. Knowing, however, is not a detached cognitive act, but a basic comportment that uncovers beings. Here, uncovering achieved by knowing is distinguished from uncovering achieved by mere familiarity (bekannt). Knowing involves uncovering or apprehending a being as it truly is; mere familiarity entails a superficial recognition, without knowing if the being is uncovered as it truly is or if it is misunderstood (verkannt), despite being familiar. Uncovering achieved by knowing, for Heidegger, consists of four elements: exhibiting (Aufweisen), laying-out (Auseinanderlegen), determining (Bestimmen), and grounding (Begründen). For example, a traffic light is not first perceived as an object present-at-hand onto which meaning is projected afterwards. Rather, it immediately stands out as significant—it is exhibited as relevant. Exhibiting simultaneously entails laying-out within a network of practical relations (road, cars, traffic rules), which simultaneously entails determining the thing perceived as a signalling device. This, in turn, implies grounding in a shared world of civic meaning. These four elements are not sequential steps, but elements that co-constitute uncovering achieved by knowing-comportment.

Perhaps the most striking difference between the first and subsequent drafts is in the politically charged language present in the first draft. Heidegger uses terms such as rootedness (Bodenständigkeit), homeland (Heimat), and national character (Volkstum), along with the emphasis on the preservation of tradition and custom [1] (pp. 337–340). At first glance, this seems to align Heidegger with National Socialist ideology. Heidegger describes “rootedness” as a necessary openness to binding, particularly to tradition and custom. The perversion of truth into untruth is identified with being “uprooted” or cut off from allowing oneself to be bound. Additionally, Heidegger speaks of a reciprocal relationship between people and homeland, where each protects and sustains the other. This closely mirrors the nationalist understanding of an organic unity between people (Volk) and land (Boden). However, on a closer reading, Heidegger’s account is not necessarily an endorsement of National Socialist ideology. Heidegger understands these concepts in a broader ontological framework. He claims that truthfulness consists of a decision (Sichentschließen) to remain open to what binds and discloses—to let beings emerge as they are. This decision is not political in nature but ontological; it implies being open to, and readiness to, preserve the meaningfulness of beings as they show themselves. Rootedness, in this sense, is not primarily about ethnic identity or political ideology, but about the basic structure of disclosedness. Nonetheless, even if the nationalist reading is not necessarily entailed in Heidegger’s framework, the language easily lends itself to one—especially given Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism in the first half of the 1930s.

The second draft [1] (pp. 345–377), delivered in Bremen (October 1930), is changed in many respects from the first draft. It maintains the same three-step structure but offers a more developed and thorough exposition. The explicit discussion of knowing and the politically charged language of the first draft are omitted. The politically charged language is replaced with a more ontologically abstract language. For example, Heidegger no longer speaks of the perversion of truth as uprootedness from custom and tradition, but instead describes it in terms of errancy. Additionally, being in truth is not spoken of in terms of rootedness but in terms of being attuned to “mystery.”

This draft is the first to include several ideas that remain in the final 1943/49 version. These include discussions of true and false gold; the five-mark coin example to illustrate how correspondence between statement and thing is accomplished; the discussion of freedom as the letting-be of beings; and the understanding of concealment as mystery and errancy. All these appear for the first time in the second draft. A distinctive feature of this draft is the discussion of fundamental attunement (Grundstimmung) in Section II.c [1] (pp. 375–377). Heidegger argues that unconcealment of beings is never neutral but always attuned—in other words, disclosure is always mooded. Even the supposedly “objective” attitudes are attuned. The attitude of science, for example, seems “objective” and emotionless, yet this very indifference is a mood [1] (p. 376), an attunement of openness that allows beings to show up as “objects.”

The third draft [1] (pp. 379–405), delivered in Marburg and Freiburg (December 1930), differs only slightly from the second draft. Several longer paragraphs are trimmed down for clarity and precision, and the section on attunement (II.c) is omitted altogether. The third draft offers the most fully developed version from the series of lectures presented in 1930 and most closely mirrors the draft eventually published in 1943/49. Subsequently, this draft offers the most polished and complete account of Heidegger’s early understanding of truth prior to the later developments present in the 1943/49 version. The differences between the third and the eventually published version in 1943 are discussed in Section 3.3.

The fourth draft [1] (pp. 407–428), composed during Pentecost in 1940, is almost identical to the 1943/49 published version. The only differences are different paragraphing and absence of chapter divisions.

3.3. Third Draft to the 1943/49 Published Version

Much of the 1943/49 published version of the essay (which will from now on be referred to as Truth Essay) mirrors the third 1930 draft (which will from now on be referred to as Truth Address) with the following exceptions. In Section one of the Truth Essay, “The Usual Concept of Truth,” Heidegger names the traditional understanding of truth “correctness” (Richtigkeit), followed by the addition of historical commentary describing the conception of correctness in medieval Christian thought, and its later transformation into an understanding that substituted the theological notion of creation for worldly reason. Despite various historical developments, all such variations retain the “obvious” and unquestioned assumption of truth as correctness at the basis of their understanding [3] (pp. 118–119). The key addition, in my view, appears in Section two, “The Inner Possibility of Accordance,” where Heidegger introduces the concept of the open-region. This addition provides a crucial clue to the key development in Heidegger’s thinking from the early account of truth in the Truth Address to the “post-Kehre” account in the Truth Essay. The introduction of the open-region implies a shift in how comportment, unconcealment, concealment, and role of letting-be are thought. Specifically, in the Truth Address, concealment is taken to be on an equal footing as the unconcealment. Heidegger claims that concealment of beings-as-a-whole is “as old as letting-be itself, which in disclosing also already withholds” [1] (p. 396). In the Truth Essay, however, Heidegger claims that concealment of beings-as-a-whole “is older than letting-be itself, which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself towards concealing” [3] (pp. 130). In contrast to Truth Address, in the Truth Essay, concealment is claimed to be older than unconcealment and thus, in a sense, grounds unconcealment [3] 3. This development is a direct consequence of the introduction of the open-region. The aim of the remainder of the paper is to analyze the significance and implications of the rewriting of Section 1b of the Truth Address with a special attention given to the open-region.

4. Truth Address

4.1. Judgement and Intending

In Section 1b of the Truth Address (1930, third draft), Heidegger asks how correspondence between a true statement and the entity the statement refers to is possible. He explores this by offering a simple example of a true statement about a five-mark coin—“this coin is round” [1] (p. 384). How does this true judgement about a coin correspond to the actual coin, establishing the truth (or falsity) of a statement?

Heidegger argues that “the statement comes to connection with the five-mark coin in that it intends [meint] the coin” [1] (p. 384). A judgement is always a judgement about something, that which the judgement is about is the thing intended in the judgement. “Aboutness” here signifies the directedness towards the thing, and this “directedness” is what Heidegger means by intending—what in Being and Time Heidegger described as “Being towards the thing itself that is”. It is by means of the intending nature of the judgement, “the coin is round,” that our attention is directed to the coin in the real world, bringing it to view—uncovering it. If the coin that is uncovered shows itself to be round, the truth of the judgement is confirmed, if it does not, its falsity is confirmed. Here, the correspondence between judgement and thing does not imply the picture theory of truth—i.e., a mental image or a model of the coin that ought to somehow correspond to the coin present-at-hand. Rather, correspondence between judgement and thing occurs because judgements are inherently directed towards actual entities in the world—bringing us into connection with and uncovering the entity referred to. Thus, it is through the intending nature of judgement, that uncovers the thing intended, that the correspondence or non-correspondence of a judgement and entity is made possible.

4.2. Comportment, Projecting, Binding, and Letting-Be

The claim that judgement uncovers implies that judgement is a form of engagement with the entity judged. Heidegger calls this engagement comportment (Verhalten). This implies that intending is not grounded in “statement as statement, but [in] statement as comportment” [1] (p. 385). Thus, it is “being-towards” achieved by comportment that uncovers the thing intended. Heidegger says, “The self-engagement of comportment is an opening for what it relates to (and thus at the same time an openness to the comportment too). We therefore say: every comportment reveals” [1] (p. 385). The key implication of grounding intentionality in comportment is the following: comportment need not be reflective or conscious; in fact, in our daily life, it is usually pre-reflective and practical. This means that “not every comportment is a revelation in the sense of a cognitive determination. What, for example, comportment of labour produces, becomes specifically revealed only in performing of the labor itself” [1] (p. 385). Statement-making, thus, is just one kind of comportment among others.

Furthermore, uncovering achieved by comportment is constituted by two elements which Heidegger names binding and projection [1] (pp. 387–387).

Binding: Comportment does not freely decide how an entity shows up; rather, comportment is given measure by, for example, a hammer “just as it is in itself.” If a hammer shows itself to be too heavy, the heaviness gives measure to comportment, determining how comportment can and cannot engage with the hammer.

Projecting: However, in order for the property “too heavy” to give measure and bind comportment, the hammer must be revealed as a hammer that is too heavy. The as-structure implies that the hammer is not a mere brute fact but appears within a projection of a horizon.

Heidegger names projection and binding that uncovers letting-be-of-beings [1] (p. 391). Projection and binding are not distinct, but two elements that belong-together in letting a being be what and how it is. This belonging-together can be clarified through the following analogy. Imagine arriving at a small clearing while walking through a dense forest. The clearing does not create the path or the trees but allows them to come forth “just as they are in themselves,” with their own contours, giving measure to comportment in the way they can be used, viewed, or judged. In a similar sense, projection opens up a horizon within which beings are uncovered “just as they are in themselves,” binding our comportment. In a comportment of use, to build a house, for example, the hammer is uncovered as a tool (projection) to help accomplish, or to get in the way, of a goal. The accomplishment or non-accomplishment is dictated by the hammer (binding) as it is in itself. If it is too heavy, it will get in the way of the goal, if it is not too heavy it will aid in the accomplishment of the goal. In a comportment of scientific investigation, by contrast, the hammer is uncovered in a distinct manner—as a present-at-hand object for investigation. Here, the hammer gives measure to comportment by showing itself in a different way, as having determinate properties—specific weight, material composition, position in space, etc.

4.3. For-the-Sake-of-Which and Horizon

Each distinct kind of comportment assumes a distinct projection of a horizon within which beings are uncovered as what they are. In a comportment of use, a horizon of possible practical relations with entities is disclosed, where entities are uncovered as equipment. In a comportment of scientific investigation, a horizon of a distinct set of possible relations with entities is disclosed, where entities are uncovered as objectively present. All horizons are ultimately determined by what Heidegger names the for-the-sake-of-which (Umwillen). For-the-sake-of-which is not mentioned directly in the Truth Address but is implied in the claim that “comportment must first disclose beings as beings” [1] (p. 391). Comportment implies practical involvement, such practical involvement implies that the openness of a horizon is determined by our concerns, projects, and goals. The hammer is uncovered, for example, within a horizon of use in order to build a ceiling, which itself belongs to the larger context of building a house, to live in, to provide shelter, or to earn a wage. These projects refer back to Dasein’s concern with its own being, to become a better builder, a good employee. The for-the-sake-of-which names Dasein’s engagement with specific projects that ultimately refer to the pursuit of possibilities of Dasein’s own being. It is in this sense all uncovering achieved by comportment is attuned by the for-the-sake-of-which that determines the horizon within which beings are uncovered.

So, the claim that “comportment must first disclose beings as beings” implies that the uncovering of beings occurs in light of the for-the-sake-of-which. This leads to the following understanding of the relationship between the human being and beings in the Truth Address.

Letting-be dares something first and last. It dares neither this nor that—but dares to rise up within beings, out of beings, against them as such. This rising up against beings does not aim at their removal or depreciation. The uprising is not rebellion, but: the self-raising against beings as such holds itself back precisely in order, in the restraint of such holding-back, to let beings be—be what? The beings that they are and how they are [1] (p. 392).

“Uprising” here signifies letting beings disclose themselves as beings. It is Dasein who bears the expectation that beings should be and must be. This is implied in the claim that “Dasein is its disclosedness,” meaning that Dasein is the condition for letting beings be. This demand to let be is, however, not a rebellion or an attack on beings but is marked by a self-restraint since comportment must let the beings reveal themselves as they are in themselves, thereby binding our comportment. Ultimately, for the Heidegger of the Truth Address, all disclosure and all uncovering of beings is bound to and dependent on our comportment with beings—the purposes and concerns that define human existence. Thus, beings can only be disclosed in light of these purposes, only we, as Dasein, can let beings be.

4.4. Possibility in Early Heidegger

The understanding of disclosure outlined above assumes a very specific account of possibility (Möglichkeit). In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the encountering of entities as ready-to-hand within the horizon of practical projects as freeing them for their “own possibilities. That which is ready-to-hand is discovered as such in its serviceability, usability, detrimentality” [2] (p. 184) Within the horizon of practical projects, entities are discovered as useful, usable, available, or, as unavailable or un-useable. We do not first have a neutral, present-at-hand object on which possibilities of use are later projected; rather, possibility is the a priori condition that determines the very being of the thing as ready-to-hand. When something is uncovered as present-at-hand, the object is discovered in light of a different set of possibilities that the entity itself is appropriate-for (dunamis)—as having a specific material composition, as measurable, occupying a specific location in space, having a specific weight. In both cases, the being of the entity is not simply “given” as a static brute fact on which possibilities are projected afterwards but is always already appropriate-for possibilities that are brought to the fore in light of a specific projected horizon.

This modal status of entities is described only in passing in Being and Time. Heidegger’s main concern is the clarification of the being of Dasein as a being-possible. This horizon, which brings out certain possibilities from the entities encountered, is structured by the larger projects which are all ultimately for-the-sake-of Dasein’s own being. A pencil shows up as usable in order to write, but writing itself belongs to broader projects such as teaching or communication, all of which ultimately refer back to Dasein’s concern with its own being, the possibility of being a student or a professor for example. Here, entities are disclosed only in light of Dasein’s own projects—projects that determine the possibilities of its own being. The choice of becoming one kind of person or another, a hero or a traitor, a professor or a corporate worker. Dasein here is not understood as “some-thing” present-at-hand that “contains” possibilities; rather, the very being of Dasein is a being-possible. In Heidegger’s words, “Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility” [2] (p. 183). Dasein is possibility from the ground up.

4.5. Conclusions

This section has examined Truth Address’s inquiry into how the correctness of judgements is possible. Heidegger shows that judging is a kind of practical engagement with entities that uncovers them. This engagement—which Heidegger names comportment (Verhalten)—is constituted by binding and projecting, which together uncover beings within a disclosure of particular horizons shaped by our concerns, goals, and possibilities. In this sense, entities are uncovered in light of Dasein’s own possibilities. Heidegger’s analysis here is, for the most part, continuous with his analysis in Being and Time. The main difference is the understanding of disclosedness in terms of freedom. Truth as disclosedness takes place through freedom, which Heidegger understands as the act of letting beings be.

However, this early account leaves a crucial question unasked: what makes the horizon of disclosure possible at all? If all uncovering is grounded in the disclosedness of Dasein as being-possible, is Dasein’s disclosedness self-grounding, or is it granted by something other? Heidegger will come to argue that the uncovering of entities stands within a more primordial granting of openness that precedes the openness of a horizon, that is, it precedes the disclosedness of Dasein. In the later Truth Essay he names this prior openness the open-region, as an openness that precedes and enables every horizonal openness.

5. Truth Essay

5.1. From Meinen to Vor-Stellen

In the published version of “On the Essence of Truth” [3], Heidegger significantly rewrites parts of Section 1b of the Truth Address (1930, third draft) [1]. Two key developments that stand out are (1) the replacement of the term meinen (intending) with vor-stellen (presenting or setting-before) and (2) the introduction of a new, key concept—the open-region.

Returning to the same example of the five-mark coin, Heidegger now writes, “the statement regarding the coin relates ‘itself’ to this thing in that it presents [vor-stellt] it” [3] (p. 121). As with meinen, vor-stellen maintains the phenomenon of directedness towards a thing—the statement is still about the coin and still uncovers it. However, vor-stellen describes a more specific dynamic of uncovering. While meinen emphasized a general intending implied in all comportment—general, meaningful relation to things—vor-stellen describes a specific kind of intending called presenting, or more literally, a “setting-before.”

Heidegger describes this dynamic of uncovering in the following way: “what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness [Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding” [3] (p. 121). Here, setting-before involves the presenting of an entity that relates itself to the presenter and at the same time stands opposed as a self-standing entity. Heidegger names the “domain” in which this dynamic occurs an “open field of opposedness.” This can be thought of as a “domain of relatedness” in which the presenter and the presented are set into oppositional relation. It is important to note that the presenter and the presented are not pre-existing entities that are subsequently brought into relation. Rather, it is within this relation of uncovering that the presenter comes to be a presenter as that which opposes and the presented comes to be the presented as that which stands opposed—both emerge or are let-be as such within an “open field of opposedness.” Nothing essentially new seems to be added here that was not already implicit in the Truth Address. Heidegger is bringing out what was implied in the 1930 Truth Address [1]. “Domain of relatedness” is another way of describing, and expanding upon, an opening up of a horizon or disclosure within which beings are uncovered. However, it is noticeable that Heidegger no longer frames disclosure in terms of practical relation to things at all—ready-to-hand relation as underlying present-at-hand relation. Instead, Heidegger now discusses beings solely in terms of how they come to presence or are set-before. This is because, Heidegger, during this period, wants to think how entities themselves become present in a more original sense. He argues that stellen (positioning, standing, putting) need not be reduced to vor-stellen. Rather, stellen contains in itself a more original sense of coming to presence, one that does not fall into thinking of entities as mere objects present-at-hand or equipment subjugated to use [6] 4.

5.2. Horizon and the Open-Region

However, having established the dynamic of “setting-before,” Heidegger deepens his analysis by introducing the key notion of the open-region [7,8] 5. He writes

This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open-region, the openness of which is not first created by the presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. The relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the accomplishment of that bearing [Verhaltins] that originarily and always comes to prevail as a comportment [Verhalten]. But all comportment is distinguished by the fact that, standing in the open-region, it adheres to something opened up as such [3] (p. 121)

This passage hints at a subtle but decisive shift from the Truth Address and, subsequently, Heidegger’s early thought as a whole. In the Truth Address, comportment was said to uncover entities. This is still the case in the sense that “presentative statement,” a kind of comportment, is described as establishing a relationship with the entity. Crucially, however, comportment is now spoken of as first “adhering” to something already opened-up as such. So, comportment does indeed establish the relationship between a presentative statement and entity, but now this relationship is first made possible by a more originary openness, which Heidegger names the open-region (die Gegnet) [9] 6. Heidegger explicitly states that this originary openness is “not created by the presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness.”

To clarify, in the Truth Address, the statement “the coin is round” uncovers the coin through a comportment directed toward it. Comportment here is understood as the condition for establishing a “domain of relatedness” with the coin that discloses the coin as a coin. In this earlier account, entities are uncovered in light of a horizon determined in advance by our concerns, projects, and goals. In the Truth Essay, the domain of relatedness or horizon established by a comportment is not self-grounding but is made possible by something more originary—namely, the open-region. The change in Heidegger’s phrasing is key here. It is no longer claimed that “every comportment reveals” or that “comportment must first disclose beings as beings,” but rather comportment now “enters into” and “takes over” the open-region as a “domain of relatedness.” That is to say, the relationship comportment establishes with entities operates within, and is made possible by, a more originary openness named the open-region.

Due to this development, the willful and decisionist tone in the Truth Address, that letting-be “dares to rise up within beings, out of beings, against them as such… to let beings be” is replaced with a more receptive and participatory tone. To let-be now means to “engage oneself with the open-region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself” [3] (p. 125). Entities belong to an openness that appropriates us prior to any willful purposive projection. That is to say, entities are not dependent on our comportment to be the beings that they are but are the beings that they are through their belonging to the primary openness—the open-region—and are only brought into relation with us through comportment.

5.3. Open-Region and Possibility

An insight can be gained into the open-region by examining the development of Heidegger’s account of possibility, specifically through the examination of his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” [10]. In Being and Time, possibility is understood through Dasein’s for-the-sake-of-which. Entities are uncovered in light of horizons projected by human concerns, goals, and projects. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger rethinks possibility through the notion of reliability (Verlässlichkeit), which indicates a more primordial mode of disclosure that precedes purposive projection. The famous example of the peasant woman’s shoes hints at this development. The shoes are not first encountered as equipment for walking or farming; their being is not exhausted by the human purposes. Rather, prior to purposive use, their reliability silently holds open a world, which implies an opening of possibilities within which such projects are possible at all. Heidegger writes, “The equipmental being of the equipment consists indeed in its usefulness. But this usefulness itself rests in the abundance of an essential Being of the equipment. We call it reliability” [10] (p. 160).

Here, the shoes have something of their own, a reliability that comportment adheres to “prior” to any purposive projection, any for-the-sake-of-which. “Prior to” here is ontological, not sequential—it does not refer to something that happens sequentially before comportment with this or that being, but ontologically before, as a prior condition that permeates all comportment. So, humans never exist apart from their concerns or projects, but prior to, or behind, these comportments—whether using, making, observing—there is already a silent opening of a world. The peasant’s worn shoes hint at and belong to a world that is not imposed by human will but emerges though their reliability. Heidegger describes this in the following way: from the dark interior of the worn shoes resounds the toil of labour, the dampness of the soil, the certainty of hunger and bread, the nearness of birth and death [10] (p. 159). These possibilities are not described in terms of projections of the peasant woman’s inner aims, but possibilities granted through the reliability of the shoes themselves. That is to say, the shoes do not wait to be taken up by human purposes to be disclosed, but themselves already silently bear a world. World, thus, is no longer understood as referential totality of equipment structured by human concerns, but is held open though the reliability of beings, within which human goals and projects can arise [11] 7.

This developed notion of the world is implied in the notion of the open-region. The open-region, because it is open per se, opens up possibilities that are not wholly determined by possibilities bound to inner human drives and aims—human will—but by possibilities that appropriate the human prior to any specific purposes and goals we may have [12] (pp. 121–122). Thus, disclosure is no longer grounded exclusively in the projection of human purposes. Rather, comportment “adheres” to what is already opened up within the open-region. Possibility, accordingly, is no longer reducible to Dasein’s self-projection but is now understood as a granting or bestowal that precedes human projects.

5.4. Open-Region and Concealment

In Country Path Conversations Heidegger describes the open-region as a gathering expanse in which entities come forth and to which they return [9] (p. 73). This “expanse” is not a spatial container, but the clearing—a dynamic space of presencing. This clearing is both an expanse (die Weite) and an abiding-while (die Weile) [9] (p. 74); a domain in which entities linger and abide prior to them being delimited by our situated perspective, horizon of our specific aims and goals. Here, entities are disclosed not yet as objects-for-subjects, or as equipment for use, but as “things for themselves.” [9] 8

This abiding and lingering of entities “for themselves” implies a rather elusive mode of presencing. When an entity becomes explicitly set-before us, it presents itself only in a specific outward aspect, in light of a specific horizon. In this moment of setting-before, the open-region conceals itself as a horizon [9] (p. 78). Here, the open-region is not grasped as the open-region and entities are not disclosed as things that belong to it. To genuinely allow the open-region to remain the open-region and disclose entities as things that belong to it, entities must not be determined by “our vantage points and representations, but must instead hint at a world from out of which they are what they are” [13] (pp. 130–131). This “hinting” implies a necessary withdrawal because world is that which forever remains non-objective, non-explicit, in the background. This “withholding” is not a deficiency but is a condition for genuine disclosure that uncovers things as emerging from the world to which they belong. Thus, withdrawal is not a disappearance, but a withdrawal from, and resistance to, explicit bringing-forth into a situated perspective—a horizon. The open-region is “older” than all horizons of representational thought and perception—we can think of it as a silent, sheltering dimension in which entities become things and the world comes into play. To dwell within this openness is to adhere to and become attuned to the hint of what withdraws—to the silence that makes all showing possible.

This development in Heidegger’s understanding of world from horizonal openness, referential totality of equipment, to the gathering expanse of the open-region is intimately tied to a development in Heidegger’s understanding of concealment. In Truth Address, Heidegger claims that concealment of beings-as-a-whole is “as old as the letting-be itself, which in disclosing also already withholds.” Every uncovering of a being assumes a backdrop of a wider whole, a specific context, that Heidegger calls beings-as-a-whole, or world. Beings-as-a-whole here is understood as a horizon, a background context, that lets beings appear in a certain way—bringing specific possibilities the entity is appropriate-for forth while concealing others 9. For example, the backdrop of the horizon of carpentry lets the hammer be uncovered as ready-to-hand while simultaneously concealing the world of carpentry (beings-as-a-whole) [14,15,16] 10. It is in this sense concealment of beings-as-a-whole is as old as letting-be—Heidegger names this uncovering of a being against the backdrop of a horizon unconcealment in the Truth Address [1] (p. 391).

In the Truth Essay, however, Heidegger claims that concealment of beings-as-a-whole “is older than letting-be itself, which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself towards concealing.” At this stage of his thinking, unconcealment is no longer identified with uncovering of a being against the backdrop of a horizon, but with the more originary openness of the open-region itself [3] (p. 125). As a result, beings-as-a-whole is no longer understood as a concealed horizon in light of which beings are uncovered, but as the silent, gathering expanse at work in the background prior to any horizonal projection [9] (p. 97n57). Accordingly, letting-be is no longer understood as the act of uncovering achieved by comportment through such a horizonal projection, but rather as comportment adhering to, or releasing itself to, this prior openness. That comportment relates itself to a prior openness by “adhering to,” or “releasing itself to,” implies that the concealment of beings-as-a-whole is older than letting-be. This prior openness can be understood as self-concealing-revealing in the sense that it quietly discloses itself in the background—prior to all horizonal projection. Due to the fact that disclosure occurs in the background, in silence, Heidegger claims that unconcealment belongs to concealment. In his words, “Concealment deprives alētheia of disclosure yet does not render it sterēsis (privation); rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to alētheia as its own” [3] (p. 130). Heidegger fittingly refers to this silent-gathering, or concealed-openness, as a light that “remains invariably a dark light” [13] (pp. 88 and 102).

5.5. Gestell and Concealment

To obtain a clearer sense of what Heidegger means by concealed-openness, let us consider how, specifically, the openness of the open-region implies a disclosure of a world. Any projection of a horizon (i.e., horizon of carpentry) assumes that human being has been “enregioned” [7] (p. 92) and beings have been “bethinged” [9] (p. 91) beforehand by the open-region. This implies that a horizon is not self-grounding but is grounded in a deeper openness to which both human beings and beings already belong. This, for Heidegger, means that human beings and beings are appropriated by historical worlds—[9] 11 i.e., the Greek world of phusis and logos, the Christian world of divine creation, the modern technological world of Gestell (enframing or positionality). This disclosure of a world, however, always remains withdrawn since disclosing arises from an originary openness that, by its nature, remains in the background.

To help further clarify the concealed nature of disclosure, let us consider unconcealment in the modern age, which Heidegger names Gestell. Gestell is a mode of disclosure that uncovers beings as standing-reserve (Bestand)—as resources made available, optimized, ordered, and controlled. Yet, this disclosure occurs without disclosing itself as such. Gestell, thus, conceals that it is a mode of disclosure. This concealment, however, is not a nefarious or deceptive act—Gestell does not hide itself to mislead. Rather, as has been argued, withdrawal belongs to the very essence of unconcealment. Perception and thinking, are naturally drawn toward what is unconcealed, what is readily available and present, rather than toward the silent event of unconcealing that first “enregions” us, makes entities present. That is to say, the event of unconcealment withdraws not as a flaw but as a structural condition. In this sense, any act of disclosure naturally tends to forget its own origin.

For Heidegger, the danger of Gestell specifically lies not in its technological character but to the extent it has forgotten its origin. This is because, in forgetting its origin, it universalizes itself as the only possible way beings can be disclosed, driving “out every other possibility of revealing” [17] (p. 332), flattening disclosure into a single framework of what is readily and merely available for optimization, control, and efficiency. In contrast, being attuned to the concealed nature of openness makes possible the awareness of disclosure and, subsequently, of the contours of Gestell—an awareness that Gestell is not exhaustive but is a mode of disclosure. Heidegger points to this possibility through a more original understanding of stellen (setting, standing, presencing), one that pays heed to an older sense of producing and presenting (Her-und Dar-stellen)—to bring forth and present in the poetic sense of poiesis [17] (p. 326). Unlike Gestell, this poetic revealing maintains a thoughtful relation to concealment. Both Gestell and poetic revealing are modes of unconcealment, but only poetic revealing preserves its belonging to concealment.

5.6. Dark Light and Thing

To grasp more concretely what it means to preserve a thoughtful relation to concealment, and the manner in which beings might be uncovered in such thoughtful relation, it will be helpful to consider a passage from Jun’ichirō Tanizaki’s book, In Praise of Shadows. In this book, Tanizaki describes the traditional Japanese sensibility that values shadows, ambiguity, and subtlety, in contrast to his generalized view of Western striving for illumination, clarity, and unambiguity. In the following passage, he describes the contrast between Western preference for ceramic tableware and the traditional Japanese preference for lacquerware:

Ceramics are by no means inadequate as tableware, but they lack the shadows, the depth of lacquerware… Remove the lid from a ceramic bowl, and there lies the soup, every nuance of its substance and colour revealed. With lacquerware there is a beauty in the moment between removing the lid and lifting the bowl to the mouth when one gazes at the still, silent liquid in the dark depths of the bowl, its colour hardly differing from that of the bowl itself. What lies within the darkness one cannot distinguish… What a world of difference there is between this moment and the moment when the soup is served Western style, in a pale, shallow bowl. A moment of mystery, it might be called, a moment of trance [18] (p. 25)

Tanizaki’s description is not merely a comparison of aesthetic preferences but describes a distinct way of encountering entities—an encounter that does not strive to bring everything into full presence, available, controllable, but rather allows for what is hidden to appear in its hiddenness. This enables an experience of presence that is not fully exposed, but hints at the “darkness” to which it belongs. The beauty of the lacquer bowl lies in this ambiguity, in its shroudedness. Tanizaki’s description reveals the truth of the thing—truth not as representational correspondence, but a disclosive event in which the thing that is uncovered in its essence, as a thing that hints at its belonging to the open-region. The lacquerware soup bowl is what is present, but what is hinted at in this shrouded seeing is the traditional Japanese world from out of which the bowl comes to be what it is. The world shines forth through, and withdraws into, the thing itself. This is the elusiveness of presencing in the open-region: not fixity to what is merely disclosed, but a presence that simultaneously hints at the dimension of presencing, disclosing, worlding.

The lacquerware bowl, then, is no longer an object merely present, or simply a means to an end disclosed in the horizon of use—like the ceramic bowl that is just there for-the-sake-of consumption of nutrients—but is a site where the world gathers and is revealed in the thing. A thing, thus, is not exhausted by being present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) or being ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), but it hints at the concealed depth from which it shines forth, not as an object for knowledge, or a tool for use, but as something that speaks the world from which it emerges. The nature of the world is to gather, this gathering is the gathering of the Fourfold (das Geviert): Earth and Sky, Mortals and Divinities. These are not elements in some cosmology or features of some metaphysical theory, but interweaving dimensions by means of which things become meaningful and the world comes to presence.

6. Conclusions

This paper has traced the development of Heidegger’s thinking of truth from Being and Time [2] through the 1930 drafts of “On the Essence of Truth” [1] to the published version of 1943/49 [3]. The 1930 Truth Address’s argument implies and retains the basic structure of Being and Time: all truth is grounded in Dasein’s disclosedness, Dasein’s being-possible. Uncovering of beings occurs through comportment; comporting entails horizonal projection; horizons entail projective disclosedness within which beings are uncovered. In this early framework, unconcealment is inseparable from the for-the-sake-of-which: entities come to presence in light of human concerns and practical possibilities.

The 1943/49 Truth Essay deepens this framework by grounding Dasein’s disclosedness in a more primordial openness that the earlier account left unthought. In reworking Section 1b of the Truth Address, Heidegger introduces the concept of the open-region (die Gegnet). An originary openness is not determined by Dasein’s disclosedness; rather, it is that which the human being always already “enters into” and which is “taken over” as a domain of relatedness. Disclosure, here, no longer arises solely from human goals and purposes but from a prior granting that first opens the space for human beings to pursue their projects.

The shift becomes clearer when viewed through the development of Heidegger’s account of possibility. In Being and Time, possibility is understood as Dasein’s ownmost structure: entities show up according to the possibilities that matter to Dasein’s own being. However, already by the time of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger introduces the notion of reliability of beings which, has been argued in this paper, entails a silent opening of world, of possibilities, prior to any purposive projection. This insight leads to the notion of the open-region: a dynamic site of presencing that grants possibilities being disclosed through human projection. These developments show not a rupture but a significant deepening of Heidegger’s early thinking—a thinking through of what had remained unthought in his early writings.