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Philosophies, Volume 11, Issue 1 (February 2026) – 22 articles

Cover Story (view full-size image): In contrast with the common opinion, which tends to emphasise divergences between Wittgenstein and Turing, this article focuses primarily on possible resonances between them. The notion of game provides an ideal lens for examining similarities and differences in their views on mechanical procedures, mathematical understanding, and thinking activity. The Austrian philosopher and the British mathematician met in Cambridge in 1939. Several passages from their dynamic exchanges during Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics help frame their mutual perspectives. While certain remarks by Turing appear instrumental in allowing Wittgenstein to revise his early work, Turing’s later reflections on “computing machinery and intelligence” demonstrate the significance of his dialogue with Wittgenstein. View this paper
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24 pages, 337 KB  
Article
Deleuze’s Spinozist Gambler: Lessons on Games of Chance
by Ilgin Aksoy and Corry Shores
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010022 - 20 Feb 2026
Viewed by 257
Abstract
At the end of Deleuze’s lectures on Spinoza of 1980–1981, he asks his students to “imagine a Spinozist gambler.” Yet he ends the course offering few clues about how to picture this figure. Here we provide an interpretation of the Spinozist gambler based [...] Read more.
At the end of Deleuze’s lectures on Spinoza of 1980–1981, he asks his students to “imagine a Spinozist gambler.” Yet he ends the course offering few clues about how to picture this figure. Here we provide an interpretation of the Spinozist gambler based on both its Spinozist conceptual context and its place in Deleuze’s broader philosophy of gambling play. Accordingly, we examine Spinozist gambling in terms of Deleuze’s account of Spinoza’s three types of knowledge, and we compare the Spinozist gambler to Deleuze’s more prominent figure of the Nietzschean dice-thrower. We thereby offer a tripartite characterization of the Spinozist gambler following its place in Spinoza’s epistemology, which we further refine by examining Deleuze’s comments on indeterminism in Spinoza and Nietzsche. We argue that, according to Deleuze, the Spinozist gambler controls chance through rational organization, whereas the Nietzschean gambler affirms and embraces chance itself. And by means of this analysis, we advance our knowledge of both Deleuze’s Spinozism and his philosophy of play. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)
10 pages, 206 KB  
Article
The Quest of the Absolute: Spinoza and Sartre
by Roland Breeur
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010021 - 19 Feb 2026
Viewed by 237
Abstract
In 1948 Sartre wrote an essay about the absolute space in Alberto Giacometti’s sculptures. This notion of absolute space is also used by Gilles Deleuze, inspired by the art critic and philosopher Henri Maldiney, in his approach of the notion of essence in [...] Read more.
In 1948 Sartre wrote an essay about the absolute space in Alberto Giacometti’s sculptures. This notion of absolute space is also used by Gilles Deleuze, inspired by the art critic and philosopher Henri Maldiney, in his approach of the notion of essence in Spinoza. In the first part of this article, I explain what this absolute space is about, and how it helps us to better understand Spinoza’s theory of the relation between essences and existence of modi in their relationship with—and dependency of—the substance. In a second part, I explain Sartre’s notion of absolute space in order to illustrate his inversion of the relation of essence and existence, and what this inversion means on a metaphysical level. I conclude with the suggestion that Sartre’s early philosophy and his notion of absolute consciousness and freedom can be interpreted as a kind of Spinozism, stripped of its essences. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)
9 pages, 1234 KB  
Article
What Artificial Intelligence May Be Missing—And Why It Is Unlikely to Attain It Under Current Paradigms
by Pavel Straňák
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010020 - 10 Feb 2026
Viewed by 712
Abstract
Contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) achieves remarkable results in data processing, text generation, and the simulation of human cognition. However, it appears to lack key characteristics typically associated with living systems—consciousness, autonomous motivation, and genuine understanding of the world. This article critically examines the [...] Read more.
Contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) achieves remarkable results in data processing, text generation, and the simulation of human cognition. However, it appears to lack key characteristics typically associated with living systems—consciousness, autonomous motivation, and genuine understanding of the world. This article critically examines the possible ontological divide between simulated intelligence and lived experience, using the metaphor of the motorcycle and the horse to illustrate how technological progress may obscure deeper principles of life and mind. Drawing on philosophical concepts such as abduction, tacit knowledge, phenomenal consciousness, and autopoiesis, the paper argues that current approaches to developing Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) may overlook organizational principles whose role in biological systems remains only partially understood. Methodologically, it employs a comparative ontological analysis grounded in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, systems theory, and theoretical biology, supported by contemporary literature on consciousness and biological autonomy. The article calls for a new paradigm that integrates these perspectives—one that asks not only “how to build smarter machines,” but also “what intelligence, life, and consciousness may fundamentally be,” acknowledging that their relation to computability remains an open question. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Consciousness in the Age of Intelligent Systems: Philosophical Frameworks, Neural Theories, and Generative AI)
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24 pages, 995 KB  
Article
Reflections, Reflection, Refraction
by Simona Trifu
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010019 - 10 Feb 2026
Viewed by 267
Abstract
This article explores Mihail Aslan’s volume of poetry Late Geometries, Rejected through the prism of an in-depth psychoanalytic reading. The text highlights how the poetic work constitutes an expression of deep psychic processes, centered around the concepts of early trauma, narcissistic deficit, and [...] Read more.
This article explores Mihail Aslan’s volume of poetry Late Geometries, Rejected through the prism of an in-depth psychoanalytic reading. The text highlights how the poetic work constitutes an expression of deep psychic processes, centered around the concepts of early trauma, narcissistic deficit, and failure of the primordial environment. Through theories by authors such as Winnicott, Anzieu, Green, and Kristeva, the article reveals how Aslan’s creation functions as a transitional space, in which a complex dialectic takes place between Eros and Thanatos, between the constitution of the self and its waste. Writing thus becomes an act of psychic survival, a way to metabolize the traumatic experience and to reconstruct an inner geometry, albeit “late” and “rejected”. Full article
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69 pages, 2797 KB  
Article
Redefining Reality: An Islamic Metaphysical Critique of AI’s Data-Centric Worldview
by Boumediene Hamzi
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010018 - 6 Feb 2026
Viewed by 790
Abstract
This essay explores the metaphysical and philosophical implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) through the intersecting insights of René Guénon (ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Yaḥiā), Martin Heidegger, and Ibn al-ʿArabī. It argues that modern AI systems, particularly in their statistical and data-centric [...] Read more.
This essay explores the metaphysical and philosophical implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) through the intersecting insights of René Guénon (ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Yaḥiā), Martin Heidegger, and Ibn al-ʿArabī. It argues that modern AI systems, particularly in their statistical and data-centric forms, are not merely instrumental tools but expressions of a deeper metaphysical worldview-one rooted in quantification, abstraction, and utility. Guénon’s critique of the “reign of quantity” and Heidegger’s notion of Enframing (Gestell) converge in diagnosing the loss of qualitative and sacred dimensions in modern life. While Heidegger’s phenomenology provides a powerful immanent critique of technological reductionism from within the Western philosophical tradition, Guénon’s metaphysical traditionalism articulates a diagnosis of modernity that resonates with Islamic metaphysics, especially as articulated by Ibn al-ʿArabī. The essay includes Heidegger in the argument as a representative of a critique of modern technology issuing from the Western tradition itself, and by emphasizing his shared concerns with Guénon, whose metaphysics resonates with Ibn al-ʿArabī’s metaphysics. Through a comparative metaphysical framework, this paper proposes an Islamic response to AI that avoids both technophilia and technophobia, insisting instead on a spiritually grounded ethic of technology that preserves human’s dignity and mission. Methodologically, the essay restores a prior order often inverted in contemporary AI ethics: ontology (what AI is) grounds epistemology (what it can know), and only then can ethical evaluation be coherent. Full article
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16 pages, 198 KB  
Essay
Trading Places: Adam Smith’s Moral Commerce
by Paul Keen
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010017 - 5 Feb 2026
Viewed by 586
Abstract
If modern readers sometimes find Adam Smith’s laissez-faire market vision in Wealth of Nations difficult to reconcile with his emphasis on sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which Smith published in 1759 while serving as Chair of Moral Philosophy at the [...] Read more.
If modern readers sometimes find Adam Smith’s laissez-faire market vision in Wealth of Nations difficult to reconcile with his emphasis on sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which Smith published in 1759 while serving as Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, the fault may be ours. For many of Smith’s eighteenth-century contemporaries, the connections between the two books would have been obvious: they were distinct but converging aspects of an Enlightenment project to lay the ethical foundations of an urban middle-class discourse of polite sociability that reflected Britain’s status as a modern transactional society. This focus on the moral dimensions of eighteenth-century Britain’s experience of commercial modernity becomes especially clear when we read Smith in the philosophical context out of which his ideas emerged, including writers such as Joseph Addison, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume. Closer attention to these earlier writers, especially Steele and Addison’s Spectator, offers a powerful reminder of the philosophical complexity of this project and a timely rejoinder to current efforts to sever economic policies from ethical imperatives in the name of an often brutal protectionism today. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Adam Smith's Philosophy and Modern Moral Economics)
21 pages, 313 KB  
Article
What Goals? Which Point? Whose Purpose? A Critical Engagement with Sport Internalism
by Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010016 - 4 Feb 2026
Viewed by 459
Abstract
In this article, I critique the dominance of internalism in sport philosophy and outline an alternative theoretical framework that integrates internal and external elements while striving to transcend the dichotomous language used to conceptualize sport. The analysis begins by claiming that internalism conflates [...] Read more.
In this article, I critique the dominance of internalism in sport philosophy and outline an alternative theoretical framework that integrates internal and external elements while striving to transcend the dichotomous language used to conceptualize sport. The analysis begins by claiming that internalism conflates three fundamental teleological aspects of sport: goals, point, and purposes. I argue that this conflation limits internalism’s ability to explain the complexity of sporting practices. By carefully distinguishing these elements, I illustrate their distinct roles in shaping sport and explore how they interact. I conclude by proposing that the alternative pluralist framework briefly sketched here enables a more comprehensive understanding of sport. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Sport and Physical Culture)
23 pages, 3898 KB  
Article
Light, Ontology, and Analogy: A Non-Concordist Reading of Qur’an 24:35 in Dialogue with Philosophy and Physics
by Adil Guler
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010015 - 31 Jan 2026
Viewed by 553
Abstract
This article develops a structural–analogical framework to investigate conceptual resonances between Qur’an 24:35—the Verse of Light—and contemporary relational models in physics, while maintaining firm epistemic boundaries between theology, philosophy, and empirical science. The Qur’anic metaphors of niche, glass, tree, oil, and layered light [...] Read more.
This article develops a structural–analogical framework to investigate conceptual resonances between Qur’an 24:35—the Verse of Light—and contemporary relational models in physics, while maintaining firm epistemic boundaries between theology, philosophy, and empirical science. The Qur’anic metaphors of niche, glass, tree, oil, and layered light depict a graded ontology of manifestation in which being unfolds through ordered relations grounded in a transcendent divine command (amr). By contrast, modern physics—as represented by quantum field theory, loop quantum gravity, and cosmological models—operates entirely within immanent causality, conceiving spacetime and matter as relational, dynamic, and structurally emergent. Despite their distinct registers, both discourses converge structurally around a shared grammar of potentiality, relation, and manifestation. Drawing on classical Islamic metaphysics—especially al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt al-Anwār—alongside contemporary relational ontologies in physics (Smolin, Rovelli, Markopoulou), the article argues that “real time” functions as an ontological choice that conditions intelligibility, agency, and novelty. The Qur’anic notion of nūr is interpreted not as physical luminosity but as the metaphysical ground of determinability, while the quantum vacuum is treated as a field of latent potential—without suggesting empirical equivalence. Rather than concordism, the comparison highlights a structural resonance (used here as a heuristic notion indicating pattern-level affinity rather than equivalence, correspondence, or empirical verification): both traditions affirm that reality is neither static nor substance-based, but arises through dynamic relational processes grounded—whether transcendently or immanently—in principled order. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ontological Perspectives in the Philosophy of Physics)
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68 pages, 976 KB  
Article
The Frame Survival Model of Conscious Continuity: A Theoretical Framework for Subjective Experience in a Branching Universe
by Alexander George Kurtz
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010014 - 29 Jan 2026
Viewed by 745
Abstract
The persistence of ordered experience in a quantum-branching universe raises fundamental questions about how continuity is maintained across multiple possible outcomes. The Frame Survival Model (FSM) is a theoretical framework grounded in quantum decoherence, and is applicable to any system—biological or artificial—capable of [...] Read more.
The persistence of ordered experience in a quantum-branching universe raises fundamental questions about how continuity is maintained across multiple possible outcomes. The Frame Survival Model (FSM) is a theoretical framework grounded in quantum decoherence, and is applicable to any system—biological or artificial—capable of sustaining integrated, survival-compatible states. FSM models reality as a sequence of discrete “Hyperframes”—complete matter–energy configurations defined by quantum decoherence events. At each transition, a system either proceeds along a survival-compatible path or terminates its trajectory within that branch. When applied to consciousness, FSM formalizes subjective continuity as “threading” through a network of compatible Hyperframes, yielding an observer-relative path through the multiverse. The same formalism extends to other coherent, path-dependent processes, making FSM relevant to physics, information science, and the life sciences. By providing operational definitions for survival filtering, informational coherence, and frame-to-frame stability, FSM unifies continuity across domains and re-contextualizes longstanding paradoxes—including subjective death, quantum immortality, and identity persistence—without invoking new physics. It further suggests experimentally approachable implications, such as modulation of perceived time by changes in decoherence rates, positioning FSM as both a general continuity principle and a testable framework for applied fields such as cognitive neuroscience. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Consciousness in the Age of Intelligent Systems: Philosophical Frameworks, Neural Theories, and Generative AI)
14 pages, 198 KB  
Communication
Between Poetry and Philosophy
by Charles Altieri
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010013 - 28 Jan 2026
Viewed by 318
Abstract
Poetry is not philosophy, nor was it meant to be, except on rare, glorious occasions. And only Wittgenstein seems willing to claim that philosophy should be written as poetry. Yet it is difficult to imagine poetry not wanting to impinge on the cultural [...] Read more.
Poetry is not philosophy, nor was it meant to be, except on rare, glorious occasions. And only Wittgenstein seems willing to claim that philosophy should be written as poetry. Yet it is difficult to imagine poetry not wanting to impinge on the cultural roles played by at least some philosophy. And some philosophers, like Hegel and Heidegger, want to influence the course of poetic practice. So it seems useful to inquire into the various ways these two disciplines can overlap or complicate one another’s modes of inquiry, even if one has no hope of securing abstract definitions for either practice. Those with the appropriate philosophical background, for example, could articulate tensions within a culture’s intellectual life as a means of specifying how an author develops emotionally resonant concrete experiences grappling with this environment. One example might be examining how the need to address Humean skepticism helped shape the development of Romantic ways of making constructive imagination inseparable from attentive states of perceptive involvement in the world. Another example might focus on efforts by contemporary poetry to correlate the work performed by ordinary language philosophy with Heideggerean ideals of building and dwelling potentially applicable to the frameworks provided by philosophical grammar. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Contexts for Reading Poetry)
35 pages, 1504 KB  
Article
Scientific Artificial Intelligence: From a Procedural Toolkit to Cognitive Coauthorship
by Adilbek K. Bisenbaev
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010012 - 27 Jan 2026
Viewed by 430
Abstract
This article proposes a redefinition of scientific authorship under conditions of algorithmic mediation. We shift the discussion from the ontological dichotomy of “tool versus author” to an operationalizable epistemology of contribution. Building on the philosophical triad of instrumentality—intervention, representation, and hermeneutics—we argue that [...] Read more.
This article proposes a redefinition of scientific authorship under conditions of algorithmic mediation. We shift the discussion from the ontological dichotomy of “tool versus author” to an operationalizable epistemology of contribution. Building on the philosophical triad of instrumentality—intervention, representation, and hermeneutics—we argue that contemporary AI systems (notably large language models, LLMs) exceed the role of a merely “mute” accelerator of procedures. They now participate in the generation of explanatory structures, the reframing of research problems, and the semantic reconfiguration of the knowledge corpus. In response, we formulate the AI-AUTHorship framework, which remains compatible with an anthropocentric legal order while recognizing and measuring AI’s cognitive participation. We introduce TraceAuth, a protocol for tracing cognitive chains of reasoning, and AIEIS (AI epistemic impact score), a metric that stratifies contributions along the axes of procedural (P), semantic (S), and generative (G) participation. The threshold between “support” and “creation” is refined through a battery of operational tests (alteration of the problem space; causal/counterfactual load; independent reproducibility without AI; interpretability and traceability). We describe authorship as distributed epistemic authorship (DEA): a network of people, artifacts, algorithms, and institutions in which AI functions as a nonsubjective node whose contribution is nonetheless auditable. The framework closes the gap between the de facto involvement of AI and de jure norms by institutionalizing a regime of “recognized participation,” wherein transparency, interpretability, and reproducibility of cognitive trajectories become conditions for acknowledging contribution, whereas human responsibility remains nonnegotiable. Full article
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3 pages, 159 KB  
Editorial
Love Is a Philosopher
by Joseph Rivera
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010011 - 22 Jan 2026
Viewed by 216
Abstract
Love’s Movement, Love’s Gift [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophies of Love)
18 pages, 265 KB  
Article
Wittgenstein, Turing, and the Intelligence of Games
by Rossella Lupacchini
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010010 - 16 Jan 2026
Viewed by 537
Abstract
One of Wittgenstein’s most quoted passages from his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology concerns Turing’s “machines” and says verbatim: “These machines are humans who calculate. And one might express what he [Turing] says also in the form of games.” This passage [...] Read more.
One of Wittgenstein’s most quoted passages from his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology concerns Turing’s “machines” and says verbatim: “These machines are humans who calculate. And one might express what he [Turing] says also in the form of games.” This passage not only captures the kernel of Turing’s conceptual argument for the adequacy of his definition of “computability”, as presented in his article On Computable Numbers (1936), but also helps clarify Turing’s idea of “mechanical intelligence.” Indeed, the notion of game provides an ideal means to focus on similarities and differences between Turing and Wittgenstein’s views of mechanical procedures, mathematical understanding, and thinking activity. The live encounter between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alan Turing took place in Cambridge in 1939, when Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics were regularly attended by Turing. Interestingly, during the conversations between the two, Turing seems to play the role of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, to allow the present Wittgenstein to reassess what he deplores as mistaken or misleading in his early work. As for Turing himself, his reflection on thinking machines from the late 1940s demonstrates the significance of his dialogue with Wittgenstein. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intelligent Inquiry into Intelligence)
18 pages, 272 KB  
Article
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Development, Human Nature and Commerce
by Mark Rathbone
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010009 - 13 Jan 2026
Viewed by 606
Abstract
Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776) offer a distinctive perspective on moral development that avoids succumbing to the limitations of capitalism and utilitarianism by supporting both moral agency and the importance of enabling structures and [...] Read more.
Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776) offer a distinctive perspective on moral development that avoids succumbing to the limitations of capitalism and utilitarianism by supporting both moral agency and the importance of enabling structures and systems in commerce. Corruption of moral sentiments cannot be averted by enforcing only mechanical structures and systems of compliance with governance rules, regulations, and disciplinary processes to control employees. Compliance then follows a means-to-an-end logic for maximising profit, which becomes a barrier for autonomous moral development or is even incapable of moral decision-making, as suggested by Hannah Arendt. Smith’s originality lies in grounding this analysis with an affirmative view of human nature and liberty, which enables him to move beyond purely legalistic or moralistic approaches to understand and counter moral failure. Smith offers a distinctive perspective on moral development in commerce, integrating human cognition, moral philosophy, and enabling structural and systemic design that avoids the displacement of responsibility noted by Albert Bandura. For Smith, the corruption of moral sentiments is distorted by the natural need for praise from others at all costs, as opposed to praiseworthy conduct. His remedy is a two-fold process of moral education in which the impartial spectator extends the natural desire for praise to prioritise honour and integrity in behaviour that is praiseworthy. However, moral education also requires a structural social space that is not prescriptive or legalistic to enhance the freedom to develop morally by exercising the choice to strive towards ethical behaviour. In this manner, self-interest enables moral development through natural means that prioritise honourable conduct and perpetuates sympathetic sentiment in which the well-being of others is considered. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Adam Smith's Philosophy and Modern Moral Economics)
16 pages, 952 KB  
Article
Entropy and Moral Order: Qur’ānic Reflections on Irreversibility, Agency, and Divine Justice in Dialog with Science and Theology
by Adil Guler
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010008 - 13 Jan 2026
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 835
Abstract
This article reconceptualizes entropy not as a metaphysical substance but as a structural constraint that shapes the formation, energetic cost, and durability of records. It links the coarse-grained—and typically irreversible—flow of time to questions of moral responsibility and divine justice. Drawing on the [...] Read more.
This article reconceptualizes entropy not as a metaphysical substance but as a structural constraint that shapes the formation, energetic cost, and durability of records. It links the coarse-grained—and typically irreversible—flow of time to questions of moral responsibility and divine justice. Drawing on the second law of thermodynamics, information theory, and contemporary cosmology, it advances an analogical and operational framework in which actions are accountable in an analogical sense insofar as they leave energetically costly traces that resist erasure. Within a Qur’ānic metaphysical horizon, concepts such as kitāb (Book), ṣaḥīfa (Record), and tawba (Repentance) function as structural counterparts to informational inscription and revision, without reducing theological meaning to physical process. In contrast to Kantian ethics, which grounds moral law in rational autonomy, the Qurʾān situates responsibility within the irreversible structure of time. Understood in this way, entropy is not a threat to coherence but a condition for accountability. By placing the Qurʾānic vision in dialog with modern science and theology, the article contributes to broader discussions on justice, agency, and the metaphysics of time within the science–religion discourse. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ontological Perspectives in the Philosophy of Physics)
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60 pages, 1123 KB  
Article
Meditation Transcending Signs: Seven Concepts for a Buddhist Psychosemiotics
by Federico Divino
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010007 - 12 Jan 2026
Viewed by 532
Abstract
This paper aims to provide an in-depth and detailed overview of the relationship between language and cognition in Pāli Buddhist texts. These reflections will touch on several fundamental themes, such as the role of signs in structuring cognitive processes and semiosis as a [...] Read more.
This paper aims to provide an in-depth and detailed overview of the relationship between language and cognition in Pāli Buddhist texts. These reflections will touch on several fundamental themes, such as the role of signs in structuring cognitive processes and semiosis as a force linked to the proliferation of concepts and percepts, whose organization underlies the constitution of a shared and partly subjective “world”. The paper will engage with linguistics, semiotics, and biosemiotics in order to acquire a vocabulary capable of better understanding the Buddhist reflections on these issues, and, where possible, it will also offer a genealogical inquiry that explains why the theme of language takes on the pivotal role it holds in Pāli Buddhism. Full article
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18 pages, 324 KB  
Review
Can AI Think Like Us? Kriegel’s Hybrid Model
by Graziosa Luppi
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 6; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010006 - 6 Jan 2026
Viewed by 969
Abstract
This review provides a systematic critique of the debate between two paradigms in the philosophy of mind—the Naturalist–Externalist Research Program (NERP) and the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP)—with particular focus on Uriah Kriegel’s reconciliation project. Following Kriegel’s view, attention is given to rational [...] Read more.
This review provides a systematic critique of the debate between two paradigms in the philosophy of mind—the Naturalist–Externalist Research Program (NERP) and the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP)—with particular focus on Uriah Kriegel’s reconciliation project. Following Kriegel’s view, attention is given to rational agents’ awareness of their mental states—a key issue since most current artificial intelligence systems aim to model rational thinking and action. Naturalist accounts derive mental content from brain activity and environmental interaction, emphasizing a constitutive dependence of the former on the latter. In contrast, phenomenological theories assert that the object of mental states is an internal semblance presented to the subject. Within this framework, I maintain that Kriegel attempts to naturalize mental content within the framework of a Same Order theory, but this limits his ability to demonstrate that intentionality is grounded in consciousness in the sense of the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. Compounding this issue, the idea that the mind arises from manipulating representations has been challenged by dynamical approaches to cognitive science, yet advanced representational models persist, often simulating phenomenological qualities through forms of internal data organization. Methodologically, the approach is primarily comparative and reconstructive, focusing on the structural tensions and theoretical commitments that distinguish NERP and PIRP. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Consciousness in the Age of Intelligent Systems: Philosophical Frameworks, Neural Theories, and Generative AI)
15 pages, 229 KB  
Article
The Ontology of Wonder: Why Plato Lets Thales Fall
by Marcel Dubovec
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010005 - 2 Jan 2026
Viewed by 633
Abstract
This paper reinterprets Plato’s anecdote of Thales’ fall into the well in the Theaetetus. In contrast to readings that view this episode as a merely comic critique of the impractical intellectual, this study situates it within the broader context of Plato’s philosophical [...] Read more.
This paper reinterprets Plato’s anecdote of Thales’ fall into the well in the Theaetetus. In contrast to readings that view this episode as a merely comic critique of the impractical intellectual, this study situates it within the broader context of Plato’s philosophical reorientation of wonder from cosmology to ontology. Drawing on Hans Blumenberg’s intellectual–historical approach and contrasting it with Aristotle’s epistemological conception of thaumazein in the Metaphysics, this paper combines conceptual analysis with close textual readings of the Theaetetus, Symposium, and Phaedrus under a unitarian assumption of continuity. This comparative inquiry reveals that Plato transforms wonder from a state of aporia or perplexity into an ecstatic participation in the realm of Forms, thereby redefining the philosophical act itself. This study argues that Plato “lets Thales fall” precisely to withdraw wonder from cosmological observation, embodied in the figure of Thales, and to reclaim it as the ontological foundation of philosophical contemplation. Full article
15 pages, 296 KB  
Article
From Pyrrho to Sextus Empiricus: The Philosophical Roots of Postmodern Political Theory in Ancient Greek Skepticism
by Ziya Kıvanç Kıraç, Fırat Kargıoğlu and Oğuzhan Göktolga
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010004 - 30 Dec 2025
Viewed by 522
Abstract
In this article, the philosophical (critical) continuity between ancient Greek skepticism (Pyrrhonism) and postmodern political theory is pointed out. This continuity (philosophical reincarnation) is demonstrated by referring to Sextus Empiricus’ writings on Pyrrhonism, as well as two different approaches that are considered to [...] Read more.
In this article, the philosophical (critical) continuity between ancient Greek skepticism (Pyrrhonism) and postmodern political theory is pointed out. This continuity (philosophical reincarnation) is demonstrated by referring to Sextus Empiricus’ writings on Pyrrhonism, as well as two different approaches that are considered to reflect postmodern political theory in its most salient features, such as anti-fundamentalism: Chantal Mouffe’s “project of radical democracy” and the “art of doubt” in Ulrich Beck’s “reflexive” modernity. The content of the identified continuity is basically the following: Just as the Pyrrhonian philosopher aspires to achieve serenity of spirit by suspending judgment through doubt (“epoche” and “ataraksia”) [epəkē –αταραξία], the postmodern theorist aims to end organized political violence by doubting all modern truth allegations. In other words, the individual hope of the Pyrrhonian philosopher is reproduced in the postmodern mind as a socio-political ideal. In Michel Foucault’s terms, the “regime of truth” or the “politics of truth” is an option that often leads to the “terror of truth”. The politics of doubt, on the other hand, is a peaceful, tolerant alternative. According to the postmodern theorist, skepticism is a highly strategic element of a pluralist (libertarian) democratic order. The intellectual way to make modern democracy even more democratic is, first and foremost, through a skepticism that makes absolutely no concessions to truth allegations. In this respect, the most uncompromising skeptic in the history of philosophy is the Pyrrhonian philosopher. Pyrrhonism is the summit of anti-dogmatism. This means that the postmodern theorist is not so much a postmodern agent. In other words, postmodern political theory is the theory of an innovation that is already obsolete. Full article
17 pages, 289 KB  
Article
Amor Mundi: Why It Is So Difficult to Love the World
by Lilian Suzanne Alweiss
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010003 - 26 Dec 2025
Viewed by 673
Abstract
This paper examines what Hannah Arendt means when she urges us to “love the world as it is” considering that we live in a world that is marred by injustice and violence. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part, demonstrates [...] Read more.
This paper examines what Hannah Arendt means when she urges us to “love the world as it is” considering that we live in a world that is marred by injustice and violence. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part, demonstrates how Arendt’s concept of amor mundi is deeply influenced by her reading of St. Augustine. The second part, in turn addresses the challenge of loving the world as it is, given Arendt’s agreement with Augustine that we live in a desert. It argues that Arendt departs from Augustine on two fronts, first she rejects notions of original sin and forgiveness in favour of reconciliation, and second, she rejects the idea of divine grace claiming that our only hope for a new humanity lies in loving the world as it is. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophies of Love)
16 pages, 278 KB  
Article
Through a Heideggerian Lens: Fear, Comportment, and the Poetics of Nihilism in Naipaul’s Tell Me Who to Kill
by Suhail Ahmad
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010002 - 24 Dec 2025
Viewed by 626
Abstract
This article re-interprets V. S. Naipaul’s “Tell Me Who to Kill” from In a Free State (1971) through a Heideggerian lens, focusing on the ‘groundlessness’ of existence and the dialectics of ‘danger’ that structure the unnamed narrator’s life within colonial ‘modernity’. Using Hiedegger’s [...] Read more.
This article re-interprets V. S. Naipaul’s “Tell Me Who to Kill” from In a Free State (1971) through a Heideggerian lens, focusing on the ‘groundlessness’ of existence and the dialectics of ‘danger’ that structure the unnamed narrator’s life within colonial ‘modernity’. Using Hiedegger’s phenomenology as a rhetorical hermeneutic, it traces how ordinary existential structures—fear, anxiety, boredom, curiosity, idle talk, and ambiguity—surface in the narrator’s and other characters’ comportments and speech. In Heidegger’s sense, these moods do not simply describe psychological states but reveal the conditions of Dasein’s being-in-the-world and the ontological disclosures of a being unhomed by empire. By situating Heidegger’s concepts of Dasein, thrownness, and fallenness within Naipaul’s world of migration, labour, and racial precarity, the paper reveals how metaphysical homelessness becomes historically tangible. The narrator’s obsessive drive for success, his failed fraternal duty, and his descent into estrangement dramatize a colonial subjectivity torn between aspiration and abjection. In reframing Heidegger through the postcolonial experience, the article both deprovincializes European existentialism and reclaims phenomenology as a site for interrogating the psychic economies of empire. Ultimately, the novella becomes a poetics of nihilism—where the search for authenticity collapses under the weight of displacement. Full article
16 pages, 268 KB  
Article
A Formal Synopsis of Lambek-Montague Grammar
by Glyn Morrilll
Philosophies 2026, 11(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010001 - 22 Dec 2025
Viewed by 402
Abstract
In the context of formal grammar we sketch a review of the smooth integration of the logical semantics of Montague with the logical syntax of Lambek: Lambek-Montague grammar. This highlights a pristine compositional architecture of categorial grammar founded on methodology of computational logic. [...] Read more.
In the context of formal grammar we sketch a review of the smooth integration of the logical semantics of Montague with the logical syntax of Lambek: Lambek-Montague grammar. This highlights a pristine compositional architecture of categorial grammar founded on methodology of computational logic. The main finding is that this approach lends itself to a further technical refinement of represention of grammar as Girard proof nets; we conclude by mentioning this prospect. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Logical Linguistic Legacy of Montague Grammar)
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