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  • 0.7
    Impact Factor
  • 1.7
    CiteScore
  • 38 days
    Submission to First Decision
  • 7 days
    Acceptance to Publication

Philosophies

Philosophies is an international, peer-reviewed, open access journal promoting re-integration of diverse forms of philosophical reflection and scientific research on fundamental issues in science, technology and culture, published bimonthly online by MDPI. The International Society for the Study of Information (IS4SI) is affiliated with Philosophies and their members receive a discount on the article processing charge. 
  • Open Access— free for readers, with article processing charges (APC) paid by authors or their institutions.
  • High Visibility: indexed within Scopus, ESCI (Web of Science), PhilPapers, and other databases.
  • Journal Rank: JCR - Q2 (History and Philosophy of Science) / CiteScore - Q1 (Philosophy).
  • Rapid Publication: manuscripts are peer-reviewed and a first decision is provided to authors approximately 37.4 days after submission; acceptance to publication is undertaken in 6.6 days (median values for papers published in this journal in the first half of 2026).
  • Recognition of Reviewers: Reviewers whose reports are timely and of high quality receive an APC discount voucher for a future publication in an MDPI journal. Become a reviewer.

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All Articles (1,122)

  • Article
  • Open Access

Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly functions as an epistemic infrastructure that shapes how knowledge is accessed, produced, interpreted, validated, and circulated. In African contexts, critiques of AI have appropriately emphasized language bias, cultural inclusion, and the underrepresentation of African languages and knowledge traditions. While these concerns remain significant, this paper argues that representational and language-centered approaches are insufficient because expanding linguistic or cultural coverage does not necessarily transform how knowledge is interpreted, validated, or accorded authority within AI-mediated environments. Drawing on Ubuntu’s relational ethical foundations and African epistemological traditions, this paper proposes Mbuntu as an African relational epistemic framework for technologically mediated knowing. Mbuntu extends Ubuntu’s relational orientation from relational humanity toward relational knowing under technological mediation and is organized around four interrelated principles: relational intelligence, communal knowledge validation, moral accountability, and context sensitivity. Together, these principles provide conceptual heuristics for examining how computational representations acquire credibility and epistemic authority, while distinguishing the apparent accuracy of AI-mediated knowledge from the justification for treating it as authoritative within particular social and cultural contexts. This paper develops the implications of this distinction for education, AI design and evaluation, and governance, including questions of epistemic sovereignty. Rather than prescribing a universal technical model, Mbuntu provides a diagnostic and normative framework for moving beyond epistemic inclusion toward epistemic reorientation, in which the conditions through which AI mediates, validates, and authorizes knowledge themselves become objects of critical scrutiny.

Philosophies

20 November 2026

Mbuntu Framework for AI-Mediated Knowledge.
  • Article
  • Open Access

Two debates in the philosophy of mathematics have stalled: whether computer-assisted proofs that no one can survey are proofs in the traditional sense, and whether probabilistic proofs are epistemically inferior to deductive ones. I argue that both rest on an unexamined assumption, proof-level predication: that surveyability, transferability, reliability and explanatory power are properties of a proof taken as a whole. Against it, I defend the Locus Thesis. These properties belong primarily to the components of a warrant architecture (a specification linking the intended claim to an object-level statement, a justificatory object, a checking procedure, a trusted base, an error profile, an allocation of epistemic functions, a set of independent replication routes, and a selection profile), and they hold of the whole only through explicit composition rules. Read through modal epistemology, the thesis is a principled response to the generality problem for mathematical reliabilism in computational mathematics: under conditions that can be stated precisely, the method that confers warrant is the acceptance procedure, and the process that generated the proof is screened off. Several connected consequences follow. A Randomness Location Principle, derived from sensitivity and safety, splits the probabilistic-proof debate: randomness bears on warrant only where it sits in acceptance. Surveyability is reconstructed as layered auditability, and the novelty of AI mathematics is located precisely: when generation is cheap, doubt migrates to specification and selection. OpenAI’s release of 722 machine-produced manuscripts on 6 October 2026, some formally verified and some not, is analyzed through a notion of release-level warrant, with an interventionist audit procedure, and the public controversy it provoked is shown to divide along the components of the architecture. Explanation is shown to be a separate function that warrant does not supply, and eight objections are answered.

Philosophies

17 November 2026

  • Article
  • Open Access

While Kierkegaard’s assessment of uncertainty as playing a positive role in human existence is notably posited in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), the present article turns to another of his texts, The Sickness unto Death (1849), to demonstrate how his understanding of the tight connection between selfhood and despair also reflects an endorsement of this state. Uncertainty, according to the reading I suggest, can be evaluated as a positive aspect of human existence because it plays a crucial role in uncovering the conditions for living a meaningful life, or, rather, in Kierkegaardian terminology, the conditions for achieving the state of being healed from despair.

Philosophies

17 November 2026

  • Article
  • Open Access

This article examines Alain Badiou’s mathematical ontology, but its purpose is no longer merely expository. It asks a more demanding question: in what sense can the formal structures of set theory carry an ontological argument, and where do they function only as philosophical decisions that cannot themselves be derived from mathematics? We argue that Badiou’s mathematical ontology should be understood as an axiomatic strategy of ontology. Its specificity does not consist in importing isolated mathematical propositions into philosophy, but in organizing the formal distinctions among membership, inclusion, power set, infinity, choice, forcing, and genericity into a chain of arguments concerning the conditions under which being can be presented. Two connected claims follow. First, the charge of ontological “backtracking” (as in Livingston) need not be treated simply as a defect produced by the intrusion of mathematical formalism into ontology. Rather, it raises the question of how formal consequences may prompt a reconsideration of the ontological decisions that initially authorize their interpretation. Although the revisability of axiomatic commitments is not unique to Badiou, its significance in his philosophy derives from the distinctive status he assigns to mathematics as the discourse of being. Second, what is distinctively Badiouian is not multiplicity as such, but a determinate theory of multiplicity as presentable through membership, inclusion, and the excess of structure over itself. This reading strengthens the internal coherence of Badiou’s project while also delimiting its philosophical reach: formalization can establish the possibility of a rigorous discourse on being, but mathematical form alone cannot prove that pure multiplicity is Being itself.

Philosophies

16 November 2026

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Philosophies - ISSN 2409-9287