Threatening Happiness: “No One Can Compel Me to Be Happy Their Way”

Abstract

Starting from classical philosophical suggestions about the status of happiness recipes that suggest the optimal ways to reach it, I will soon illustrate the fundamental Kantian suggestion: “No one can coerce me to be happy in his way”, that is, an individual has the right to choose their own kind of happiness “provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone”. I will conclude that happiness (and even its very possibility) is constrained in a relational interplay in a collective of human beings. Thanks to the events that took place during the notorious “enclosures”, which violently expropriated peasants by destroying their homes and cottages during the so-called primitive accumulation of capitalism, I will provide a very clear example of the relational nature of happiness and even its potential to be jeopardized. The idea of a “moral bubble” will be proposed as an explanation for why some people fail to recognize the harm they create when they jeopardize the happiness of other humans. A study of the current predatory neoliberal capitalism’s peculiar propensity to make the majority of people unhappy will be the focus of the last section. The article interdisciplinarily aims at bridging philosophy, economics, sociology, and political theory, enriching the philosophical analysis with historical and contemporary contexts, and also providing the following critical engagement: the analysis of how dominant narratives and economic frameworks serve to mask violence, thus challenging readers at least to reconsider accepted truths about progress and prosperity.

1. Philosophy and Its Recipes for Happiness

The main aim of this paper is to situate happiness not merely as an individual pursuit but as fundamentally relational and vulnerable to collective structures, historical forces, and moral blindness. First of all, we have to discuss the consolidated philosophical tradition of providing recipes for happiness. A lot of sophisticated suggestions about the status of happiness have been provided throughout the history of philosophy: in general, they consist of recipes that suggest the optimal ways to reach happiness, and at the same time, they also offer a related explanation of its own nature as follows:

1.

Happiness can be reached through knowledge and virtue, as suggested by Plato and Aristotle.

2.

Happiness can be reached through asceticism, ἄσϰησις, for example, for the Cynics.

3.

Alas! Happiness is always momentary, as contended by the Cyrenaics.

4.

Happiness coincides with Ataraxia, ἀταραξία, freedom from fear, absence of bodily pains, ascetic lifestyle, beautiful friendships, and avoidance of politics, as contended by Epicurus.

5.

The practice of virtue and of moderating passions is enough to achieve happiness, following the various precepts of the Stoics.

6.

Love of God is the correct way that leads to happiness, Saints Augustine and Thomas suggest.

7.

Happiness is simply a subjective state of mind that differs from person to person, is the warning provided by De Montaigne.

8.

In a more complicated manner, Bentham says that the right course of action leading to happiness is that which causes the highest amount of utility as aggregate pleasure (happiness) minus any suffering (pain) of each individual affected by the action.

9.

Schopenhauer, in turn, explains happiness in terms of a desire being fulfilled.

10.

Instead, Nietzsche desired a culture that set higher and more difficult goals than “simple happiness”. He introduced the almost dystopian figure of the “last man” as a kind of thought experiment against utilitarians and happiness seekers.

11.

Marcuse, in his critique of consumerism, suggests that the current system is one that claims to be democratic, but is authoritarian in character, as only a few individuals dictate perceptions of freedom by allowing the purchase of only certain happiness choices. It also suggests that the notion that “happiness can be bought” is psychologically harmful.

In this article, I am not particularly interested in providing one more recipe for reaching happiness. I leave this task to other intellectuals and philosophers (mainly because I do not like to assert an additional point of view that is perhaps useful but that unfortunately can too easily conflict with others) and to the mass media and social networks, the latter being very prodigal in drawing broad views around a desideratum so common in human beings. I prefer to underline a philosophical perspective on the relational character of human happiness and the unquestionable truth that signals that the actual or potential happiness of some people can be favored or prevented by other human beings and vice versa.1 I must emphasize that here the relational or intersubjective nature of happiness does not suggest that, in order to be happy, one must obviously take the happiness of others as seriously as one’s own, but more simply that individuals cannot be happy when obstacles are imposed on them, more or less consciously—see the moral bubbles that I will explain later—by another or others, with the result of compromising the fundamental conditions of their happiness. This does not mean that analyses related to the production of recipes for happiness do not contain important observations concerning the relational and intersubjective nature of happiness, as in the examples just mentioned.

In a way, in a recent book, Ott [1], distancing himself from a mere illustration of a new recipe for achieving happiness, adopts instead a broader perspective. The book emphasizes the relational nature of happiness (so it is not considered as a mere subjective sensation), arguing that it should be accepted as a valid and useful criterion for both individual and governmental decision-making. Happiness is defined as the persistent subjective appreciation of life as a whole. Ott contends that happiness is a quantifiable and comparable phenomenon2 that may guide societal advancement rather than only being a subjective sensation. He highlights how important good governance is to promoting pleasure, claiming that technical quality (such as the rule of law and efficient administration) frequently has a greater influence on citizens’ well-being than democratic quality. According to his research, societal conditions like financial security and less inequality, as well as sound governance and economic stability, are important factors that influence national happiness levels. In order to improve the effectiveness of conversations and policies, Ott also supports clearing up conceptual ambiguity surrounding happiness. According to his theory, using happiness as a benchmark might help people become more resilient and critical while also helping governments better recognize and handle socioeconomic problems. His concept essentially proposes happiness as a supplementary objective in addition to conventional economic measurements, bridging the gap between subjective well-being and objective societal elements. I have to further note that happiness, as an interrelational and, therefore, communal reality, necessarily passes through the existence of a political authority that orders many of the things that are involved in our lives, but far from all. I will come back to the interrelational aspect of happiness later when proposing my own perspective.

In sum, I illustrated Ott’s analysis because it already advances the idea that I later propose to develop: that of emphasizing the relational nature of happiness. I argue that it should be accepted as a valid and useful criterion for both individual and governmental decision-making. I also have to note that this allows me to address what I have not yet achieved, which is to define happiness. Following Ott, I can state that happiness is defined as the persistent subjective appreciation of life. It is assumed that it is a “positive, favorable appreciation” as well as subjective and persistent. Nevertheless, happiness does not necessarily have to be “appreciated”, noticed, or conscious. It is possible to be happy without asking ourselves if we are happy. (I would say that finding out that I do not know if I am happy or not is a good way to find out that I am indeed happy. Unhappiness is felt explicitly, we can say.)3

The reader who is interested in studies about specific issues regarding happiness can refer to various rich empirical, sociological, and psychological research that can easily be found in the books, handbooks, and journals of the best academic international publishers. The following are some examples: how corruption can affect happiness [2], the relation between extraversion and daily happiness [3], the fact that valuing happiness to an extreme degree has a potential downside in Western but not in East Asian countries [4], happiness in individuals with developmental disabilities [5], social policy factors that determine national degree of happiness [6], kindness as a correlate of happiness in general (kinder companies have happier employees) [7], marital happiness in a Middle Eastern context [8], mindfulness and happiness [9], the act that happiness of workers has a positive impact on their productivity [10], the role of happiness in fostering social bonds [11], gratitude vs. yoga intervention to increase happiness among women [12].4

The useful contrast between the subjective and objective conceptions of happiness must be kept in mind. Subjectively, happiness is defined as a person’s own experience of contentment and well-being. A definition can be found in a dictionary, for example, “a state of mind that takes pleasure in the possession of a good”, if it is noticed that this complacency may be unconscious, in the sense that one does not usually ask oneself whether one is happy (especially when one is happy). I do not think this way and believe that happiness presupposes the explicit awareness of being happy. It differs from person to person and is influenced by their experiences, emotions, and perceptions. It could be satisfaction or inner peace for some, and joy from relationships, accomplishments, or sensory pleasures for others. While contemporary psychology frequently associates it with emotional experiences like joy or life satisfaction, philosophers like Aristotle linked it to eudaimonia, a flourishing life of virtue and purpose. It is intrinsically personal and varies according to one’s ideals, culture, and mood. Conversely, the objective definition of happiness is determined by quantifiable, outside factors that enhance well-being regardless of one’s own emotions. Health, money, education, social ties, and the availability of necessities (such as food and shelter) are all included in this. Happiness is defined by utilitarians (like Jeremy Bentham) as maximizing pleasure and reducing misery, and it is frequently measured in societal measures like life expectancy or GDP (gross domestic product). Regardless of whether someone is happy or not, objective happiness can be measured using data, such as a nation’s Human Development Index or a person’s physical health. In conclusion, objective pleasure is external and observable (e.g., “They have a stable income and health”), whereas subjective happiness is internal and felt (e.g., “I feel fulfilled”). Both may coincide or deviate; for example, a person may be content despite having material wealth, or vice versa.

Furthermore, like in the case of Bentham’s emphasis on increasing delight, modern happiness frequently feels subjective and connected to individual fulfillment or pleasure. According to Montaigne, it is a subjective state of mind that is based on personal experience. Some contemporary philosophers contest simply subjective viewpoints by arguing that happiness must be linked to reality rather than just feelings. Prior to the modern era, achieving moral or spiritual goals—such as leading a moral life—was more important than merely pursuing emotions. It was frequently viewed as a consequence rather than an active goal. Modern perspectives, such as those included in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which focused on psychological or social situations, elevated happiness to a primary life objective. Pre-modern happiness was tied to moral goodness, like eudaimonia, emphasizing lasting spiritual states. It relied on objective standards, such as virtue or divine union.

Furthermore, modern happiness often feels subjective, tied to personal satisfaction or pleasure, and focuses on maximizing joy. Montaigne saw it as a personal state of mind, all about individual experience. However, some modern thinkers argue that happiness needs to connect to reality, not just feelings, challenging purely subjective views. Pre-modern happiness was more about moral or spiritual achievement, like living virtuously, not just chasing feelings. It was often seen as a byproduct, not a direct pursuit. The shift to modern views made happiness a central life goal, like in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, focusing on psychological or social states. Pre-modern happiness is tied to moral goodness, like eudaimonia, emphasizing lasting spiritual states. It relied on objective standards, such as virtue or divine union. To conclude, from the perspective of this article, I have to say that I am not interested in a definition of happiness. I do not have a definition of happiness in a trivial, naturalistic way, so to speak; the only thing I could personally say is that happiness is always perceived as such.

As I anticipated, in this article, I am also not particularly interested in providing one more recipe for reaching happiness, and I am not concerned with empirically based results about some local aspects of human happiness, such as the ones I just described. As I said, my aim is to underline from a philosophical perspective the fundamental relational character of human happiness and the unquestionable truth that signals that the happiness of some human beings can be favored or prevented by other human beings and vice versa. To go ahead with this program, I will take advantage of some Kantian considerations regarding “how to protect the free pursuit of happiness”. 5

2. Kant: How to Protect the Free Pursuit of Happiness

“No one can coerce me to be happy in his way”, Kant immediately says; extremely useful intellectual assistance comes to me from him, who very clearly states in a precious text entitled “On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice” of 1793, the following words:

No one can coerce me to be happy in his way (as he thinks of the welfare of other human beings); instead, each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him, provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a possible universal law (i.e., does not infringe upon this right of another) [17] (p. 291).

This conviction of Kant also introduces a very skeptical point of view regarding the suggestions for becoming happy that I outlined in the previous section. It is useless to coerce people to be happy; not only that, but an individual also has the right to choose his own kind of happiness, “provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone”.6

3. The States of Happiness Are Conflicting: Happiness and Violence

Let us further elaborate on the Kantian contention that emerges from the sentence referring to a hypothetical individual “[…] provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone”. A macroscopic example of this relational character of happiness and, I would say, also of the “possibility of jeopardizing all kinds of happiness” of other human beings is provided by Marx. He describes some aspects of what is unanimously considered by historians as the root of the so-called primitive accumulation of capitalism that led to the explosion of capitalism in the 19th century: the so-called “enclosures” violently expropriated peasants, razing their cottages and dwellings.

Chapter 26 of the first book of Capital enumerated and richly illustrated at least 20 horrible, violent aspects of the so-called “enclosures” [19], one being the following: “Clearance of estates”, that is, the removal of human beings from them. The example of Elizabeth Leveson-Gower, Duchess of Sutherland (see Figure 1): “Clearing of estates”, i.e., the sweeping of human beings off of them. The example of the Duchess of Sutherland “As an example of the method used in the nineteenth century, the ‘clearings’ made by the Duchess of Sutherland will suffice here. This person, who had been well instructed in economics, resolved, when she succeeded to the headship of the clan, to undertake a radical economic cure and to turn the whole county of Sutherland, the population of which had already been reduced to 15,000 by similar processes, into a sheep-walk. Between 1814 and 1820 these 15,000 inhabitants, about 3000 families were systematically hunted and rooted out. All their villages were destroyed and burnt, and all their fields turned into pasturage. British soldiers enforced this mass of evictions and came to blows with the inhabitants. One old woman was burnt to death in the flames of the hut she refused to leave. It was in this manner that this fine lady appropriated 794,000 acres of land that had belonged to the clan from time immemorial” [20] (p. 891).

As an example of the relational character of happiness, we can say that the Duchess not only inhibited happiness and any chances of happiness to many peasants that “were systematically hunted and rooted out”, but also to the old woman, burnt and killed, and so eternally removed from any possibility of happiness.

4. The Happy Duchess, Her “Moral Bubble”, and the Unhappy Peasants

4.1. The Happy Duchess …

Lady Sutherland faced some peasant revolts that were a blow to her and her advisers, who were, in the words of historian Eric Richards, “genuinely astonished by this response to plans they considered wise and benevolent. They believed the common people were ungrateful and foolish” [21] (p. 134).

This aspect does not have to be interpreted as an example of hypocritical, horrible wickedness. Simply, Lady Sutherland was convinced of the beneficial nature of her interventions, which were directed toward economic growth (she was also an expert in the economic knowledge available at that time). In this case, we are in the presence of what has been called a “moral bubble” (Magnani [22,23,24]) based on edifying economic narratives that are characterized by the rational force of the “objectivity”, which delineates a situation that can be described by the stereotypical motto “this is what happened and no alternative behaviors were possible”. The introduction and elaboration of “moral bubbles” provide a nuanced framework for understanding not only systemic violence but also individual complicity and blindness.

4.2. … and Her Moral Bubble

The significant paper “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments” [25], written by Justin Kruger and David Dunning and published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology in 1999, provided an example of the so-called Dunning-Kruger effect. In the context of the naturalization of morality, I emphasized the importance of paying attention to something similar, known as the “moral bubble effect”, which has to do with people’s inadequate (or extremely insecure) awareness of their violent actions (in the present case of their jeopardizing happiness of other human beings): humans frequently commit violent acts without realizing the consequent potential or actual harm, so ignoring the hurt they have caused. It is crucial to note that maintaining the stability of moral frameworks depends on this human cognitive quirk. The practice of accepting and making violence invisible is founded on a frequent psychological phenomenon called “embubblement”. Human behavior is imprisoned by what have been dubbed moral bubbles (Magnani [22,23]), which regularly conceal violence: this is also connected to the fact that many violent behaviors are generally regarded as though they were something else in our culture.7

As previously mentioned, we encounter this type of moral bubble in the context of the Duchess’ action within the framework of capitalistic primitive accumulation: edifying economic narratives, which are infused with the power and inevitability of the events’ objectivity, are the most effective means of fostering moral bubbles and hiding actual or potential violent outcomes that impact all types of actual (and even potential) happiness of those involved.

Such widespread concealed violence, when highlighted, for example, the one—in the case of enclosures—against the peasants (that Marx so eloquently describes), is implicitly excused or justified: this leads to the heart of our conviction that it is instead important to stress the power of adopted moral frameworks (in the Duchess’ case the good morality of economic knowledge) to conceal and at the same time (potentially) provoke various kinds of violence. It is in this way that we can more easily see that violence is not so exceptional, beyond the common repetitive stereotypes, such as, for example, in the case of its facile and simplistic psychiatrization. When such widespread covert violence is brought to light, such as the one against the peasants in the case of enclosures (which Marx so eloquently describes), it is implicitly justified or excused and rendered invisible. This leads us to believe that it is more important to emphasize the importance of adopted moral frameworks (in the Duchess’ case, the good morality of economic production) to conceal and, at the same time (potentially), provoke various kinds of violence. By performing this, we may more readily recognize that violence is not all that unique, as seen by the prevalent and recurring stereotypes, such as the easy and straightforward psychiatrization of it.

The term “epistemic bubble” was first used by Woods, who stated that a “cognitive agent is in an epistemic bubble with respect to proposition a if he is in a k-state with respect to a and the distinction between his knowing that a and his experiencing himself as knowing it is phenomenally inapparent to him in the there and now” [26] (p. 162). In summary, from a first-person point of view, we are likely to be unable to distinguish between a real correction and an apparent one, and we know less than we think we do. It is necessary to recognize the error from a third-person perspective.

Similarly, the process of moral embubblement is also self-sustaining because, according to some research in the fields of logic, informal logic, and rhetoric, fallacies—which are common in everyday situations and are prone to errors of various kinds, even hidden ones—have what René Thom referred to as “military intelligence” [27] within the framework of the catastrophe theory. According to this viewpoint, moral bubbles are an excellent psychological mechanism that enables people to legitimize and dissimulate violence and the damage inflicted on others at the same time. The protection of our moral beliefs on an individual basis, as well as the moral frameworks that operate in our collectives, is a derived result.

In conclusion, we may appreciate that under moral bubbles, even if we are readily aware of the likelihood of actual violent results, this possibility is not activated and disappears from awareness. Because they are deeply ingrained in us and we follow them without question, actions that stem from strong moral convictions and rules are always endowed with a strong cognitive value. Potentially generated violence vanishes because its cognitive value is terribly secondary and/or completely justified, allowing it to be ignored and the ensuing ignorance to be justified. Marx states unequivocally in Chapter 26, “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation” of the first volume of Capital, which we have quoted above, that the economic narratives are highly characterized by the exploitation of common moral bubbles that people typically construct to hide the potential related violence. The entire chapter is devoted to disintegrating moral bubbles in order to expose the violence that has been committed (and kept hidden). The enclosure of agricultural land dates back to the 12th century: this case certainly explains the very long persistence of this specific human capacity of considerably affecting the actual (or potential) happiness of other human beings (against Kant’s warning about the need to avoid the infringement “upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone”). A long persistence of a behavior that characterizes the relational and intersubjective character of happiness.

The reader does not have to misunderstand me. My critique of Lady Sutherland’s decisions, performed by a noble woman who acts at the “prehistory” of capitalism, and my examinations of the bad effects of our neoliberal era should not be understood as a destructive attack on the capitalist economic system; Marx and Engels themselves observe the wonderful achievements of capitalism in the first chapter of the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848) [28].

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?

We have to recognize that capitalism is “our” economic system, with which we live, and we can also prosper, of course avoiding those apologies of the obvious positive effects of capitalism (and also of neoliberal capitalism), also regarding the rich generation of various possibilities of happiness (and the reduction in extreme poverty, for example), that are often simply “candid”, and ways of secreting the really bad outcomes, just considering them as unintended consequences of intentional behavior, for example, wars, certainly caused by the so-called overaccumulation typical of our global capitalism [29]. Given the fact that economists who work very hard in considering and inventing ways to improve the bad effects of capitalism constantly fail, I think every philosophical criticism is not only welcome but also a kind of duty of philosophy to modestly counter the dominant planetary current chorus of uncritical praisers of neoliberal capitalism.

Lastly, it is important to remember that moral bubbles can serve protective functions by protecting stable ethical frameworks, particularly during uncertain or crisis situations. For instance, a close-knit community with common beliefs (such as a religious or cultural group) may depend on moral bubbles—and thus on the concealment of the possibility of effective related violence—to preserve traditions or collective identity while remaining cohesive and resilient in the face of outside pressures (recognizing the potential of perpetrated violence tends to jeopardize the related moral frameworks that generated it). Within the group, this can promote mutual support and trust. In this perspective, they also serve to strengthen the community. Common moral principles can foster a feeling of community, promote collaboration, and fortify social ties. A moral bubble, for example, could bring people together in a grassroots movement around a cause, such as environmental justice, allowing for collective action even at the cost of marginalizing opposing viewpoints. In conclusion, moral bubbles can strengthen and safeguard collectives by encouraging unity and a common goal.

5. Happiness Is Always Threatened. Is It Possible to Make People and Their Individuals Truly Happy?

From the perspective of the analysis I have provided in the previous sections, we can conclude that both happiness and the possibility of happiness itself are always threatened, given the fact that we underlined the relational interplay between the truth of the Kantian motto “No One Can Coerce Me To Be Happy in His Way” and the fact that there are a lot of obstacles human beings can oppose to an individual’s “specific” aspiration for happiness.

I said above that the wonderful philosophical tradition full of recipes and suggestions about the ways humans can follow to reach happiness is, according to Kant, useless. We do not have to coerce people to be happy; not only does an individual have the right to choose their own kind of happiness, “provided he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone”: recipes for happiness clash against this philosophical awareness. In this light certainly it is necessary to remember the great negativity of those social-historical monsters that arose punctually whenever someone—a social class, a political force, a party, an individual, a church or some other religious or social sect—grabbed power and claimed to realize its own specific and metaphysical model of society, capable of making a people and its individuals truly happy. By the way, I am also inclined to think that “coerced happiness” (e.g., public health policies) is never justified. Notwithstanding this warning, I ask the reader to follow me in the considerations below that, while certainly not recipes for achieving happiness, nevertheless illustrate serious obstacles to its attainment.

A special example of the influx of collectivity in the individuals’ search for happiness is magnificently represented by our current neoliberal era. We have to stress that the mechanism of enclosures I have described above can be traced back not only to violently expropriating common lands in which the peasants flourished but also, in the case of the “new enclosures”, to a historical and general tendency of capitalistic accumulation, and not only of the primitive one. The violent aspects of primitive accumulation, and so of primitive enclosures, are the main characters of every phase of the recent capitalist globalization, marked by continuous and unprecedented assault (as smart social, political, and economic mechanisms for producing enclosures) on the commons, perpetrated by certain supranational financial institutions and global economic governance bodies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, COVID-19 lockdown, and, currently also by the paradoxical economic effects of the interplay between the green era and the Ukraine war and the global food and energy crisis. It is more than clear that the effects of the actions of these neoliberal capitalistic elites day after day jeopardize the specific happiness and the aspiration of happiness of singular human beings all over the planet.8

Furthermore, the fact that often objects and external entities are more valuable than human beings is a reason for distress and unhappiness. In my book Morality in a Technological World: Knowledge as Duty [30] I explored the ethical challenges posed by rapid technological advancements and argued for a rethinking of morality in light of these changes: I contend that modern technology has outpaced our traditional moral frameworks, leaving us ill-equipped to address the complex ethical dilemmas it creates—issues like human cloning, ecological transformations, diminishing digital privacy, and the integration of humans with machines. The core argument of the book is that knowledge itself must be seen as a moral obligation, and I introduced the idea of “knowledge as duty”, suggesting that understanding the implications of technology is essential for making ethical decisions in today’s world.

In the book, I also introduce the provocative and unconventional idea of “respecting people as things” as part of a broader effort to rethink ethics in a technology-driven era. This concept emerges from my observation that traditional moral frameworks, which often emphasize the unique dignity of humans as distinct from objects, struggle to address the realities of a world where technology blurs the lines between people and “things”—think of cyborgs, artificial intelligence, or even humans reduced to data points in digital systems. I contend that we have to reframe how we perceive value and dignity in a technological context and suggest that by recognizing the “thing-like” qualities of people, their integration with technological systems, or their objectification in certain contexts—we can develop a more inclusive and pragmatic ethical stance. Given the excess in our era of the cognitive and moral value attributed to “things” and the consequent effect of oppression by these “things” on human beings, I contend that we have to “respect people as things”, re-attributing moral worth already belonging to “things” back to humans, thus emphasizing the view that morality is distributed across both human agents and the technological environment. What I call “moral mediators” play a role in shaping ethical outcomes, and humans themselves are increasingly intertwined with these “things”. This idea challenges conventional ethics by flipping the script: instead of insisting on an absolute separation between persons and objects, I proposed that acknowledging their overlap can foster a deeper, more adaptable form of respect and favor new degrees of happiness.

6. Conclusions

Starting with traditional philosophical ideas regarding the state of happiness and recipes that outline the best methods to reach it, I have illustrated the core Kantian idea that “no one can force me to be happy”, meaning that each person has the freedom to choose their own form of happiness as long as they do not violate the freedom of others to pursue a similar goal that may coexist with everyone’s freedom. I derived the conclusion that, in a collective of human beings, happiness—and even its possibility—is constrained by relational interactions. I have illustrated a very clear example of the relational nature of happiness and of the potential to jeopardize it, thanks to the events that occurred in the context of the infamous “enclosures”, which violently expropriated peasants by demolishing their homes and cottages during the so-called primitive accumulation of capitalism. The concept of “moral bubble” has been described to explain why some people are oblivious to the harm they cause when they put other people’s happiness at risk. A final few words were devoted to an analysis of the current predatory neoliberal capitalism’s unique tendency to make the majority of people unhappy.