From Pyrrho to Sextus Empiricus: The Philosophical Roots of Postmodern Political Theory in Ancient Greek Skepticism

Abstract

In this article, the philosophical (critical) continuity between ancient Greek skepticism (Pyrrhonism) and postmodern political theory is pointed out. This continuity (philosophical reincarnation) is demonstrated by referring to Sextus Empiricus’ writings on Pyrrhonism, as well as two different approaches that are considered to reflect postmodern political theory in its most salient features, such as anti-fundamentalism: Chantal Mouffe’s “project of radical democracy” and the “art of doubt” in Ulrich Beck’s “reflexive” modernity. The content of the identified continuity is basically the following: Just as the Pyrrhonian philosopher aspires to achieve serenity of spirit by suspending judgment through doubt (“epoche” and “ataraksia”) [epəkē –αταραξία], the postmodern theorist aims to end organized political violence by doubting all modern truth allegations. In other words, the individual hope of the Pyrrhonian philosopher is reproduced in the postmodern mind as a socio-political ideal. In Michel Foucault’s terms, the “regime of truth” or the “politics of truth” is an option that often leads to the “terror of truth”. The politics of doubt, on the other hand, is a peaceful, tolerant alternative. According to the postmodern theorist, skepticism is a highly strategic element of a pluralist (libertarian) democratic order. The intellectual way to make modern democracy even more democratic is, first and foremost, through a skepticism that makes absolutely no concessions to truth allegations. In this respect, the most uncompromising skeptic in the history of philosophy is the Pyrrhonian philosopher. Pyrrhonism is the summit of anti-dogmatism. This means that the postmodern theorist is not so much a postmodern agent. In other words, postmodern political theory is the theory of an innovation that is already obsolete.

1. Introduction

“Modernity, in whatever age it appears cannot exist without a shattering of belief”

[1] (p. 77).

As is known, postmodern political theory has varied content and differing definitions in both academic and non-academic contexts. In other words, there are currently many significant attempts to interpret and define postmodern political theory. The aim of this article is not to present these attempts with a panoramic (general or external) view, but to relate postmodern political theory to ancient Greek skepticism by taking one of these attempts as a criterion. The verb ‘to relate’ here means ‘to show a kind of repetition, renewal, or updating’: to explicitly and strategically exemplify a philosophical repetition with the example of the “Pyrrhonian philosopher” Sextus Empiricus [2] (p. 6). Pyrrhonism is a ready-to-use anti-dogmatic school for postmodern political theory. The radical (fundamental) skepticism that postmodern political theory eagerly resorts to is systematically present in the mind of the Pyrrhonian philosopher, who indefinitely postpones final decisions. In this respect, the postmodern theorist is a faithful descendant of the Pyrrhonian philosopher: “kindred souls greeting each other from afar” [3] (p. 71). Stuart Sim, in his short and instructive essay entitled Postmodernism and Philosophy, points to this kinship as follows:

“One of the best ways of describing postmodernism as a philosophical movement would be as a form of scepticism—scepticism about authority, received wisdom, cultural and political norms and so on—and that places it in a long running tradition in Western thought that stretches back to classical Greek philosophy. Scepticism is a primarily negative form of philosophy, which sets out to undermine other philosophical theories claiming to be in possession of ultimate truth, or of criteria for determining what counts as ultimate truth (…) postmodern philosophy is to be defined as an updated version of scepticism, more concerned with destabilizing other theories and their pretensions to truth than with setting up a positive theory of its own; although of course to be sceptical of the theoretical claims of others is to have a programme of one’s own, if only by default”

[4] (pp. 3, 12).

At this point, it is noteworthy how Pauline Marie Rosenau classifies the wing of postmodern theorists who say that “claims to truth are a form of terrorism” in her classification study in Post-Modernism and Social Sciences: “Skeptics” [5] (pp. 23, 24)1. Sim’s proposed philosophical content can be exemplified with many cornerstones. For example, Immanuel Kant, one of the most famous architects of modern philosophy, criticizes skeptics by likening them to “a group of nomads who despise all established structures” [6] (pp. 100, 101)2, while for postmodern theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, nomadism is a “socio-political” “ideal” [4] (p. 15). In Deleuze’s words, the desired thing is “to make thought a nomadic power” [7] (p. 260). Is there no skepticism in modern philosophy or in the Enlightenment movement represented by Kant? Of course there is. Skepticism, especially in the form of ‘method’, is an indispensable, complementary part of the Age of Reason3. However, modern theorists resort to skepticism “to escape doubt and achieve certainty” [8] (p. 166). What he seeks is certain knowledge: a ‘truth itself’, a “solid and motionless point”. For example, René Descartes, one of the founding figures of modern theory, adopts skepticism while seeking to reach and inhabit a point that even the most advanced skepticism cannot touch [9] (pp. 36–38). The ultimate point that a modern theorist can reach as a machine of doubt is the beginning of a dogmatic worldview. Modern reason is a reason that doubts everything relentlessly yet remains unquestioning of itself. There is no truly “Pyrrhonian crisis” [10] (pp. 583–585) among the building blocks of its state of mind. The modern theorist, who wants to replace the old (traditional) “regime of truth” or the “politics of truth” [11] (p. 13) with his own, departs from the path of the Pyrrhonian philosopher while seeking a “new source of knowledge that avoids skeptical criticism” [10] (pp. 588–590). For example, Bertrand Russell, one of the modern masters of skepticism, strongly doubts Christian morality but does not doubt the idea that humanity can morally progress under the guidance of reason and science as much as necessary. According to John Gray, Russell spent much of his life as a skeptic and claimed to be happy living with doubt. However, he harbored broad hopes that a skeptical view of social transformation could hardly justify. He found flaws in religion, which he approached with skeptical hesitation. However, it did not occur to him to apply the same skepticism to his noble hopes for improving the world. Despite the changes in the attitudes he adopted throughout his life, he never gave up his belief that human life could be transformed through the use of reason. He was never able to resolve the conflict between skepticism and faith [12] (pp. 42–44).

Since the modern theorist does not doubt his own reason, doubting him requires another subject: the postmodern theorist. Perhaps the most important task of postmodern reason is precisely this: As Richard Rorty, who does not hesitate to describe himself as a “postmodernist,” puts it, “doubting the masters of doubt.” [13] (p. 585). According to Jean-François Lyotard4, one of the superstars of postmodern political theory, the word ‘postmodern’ has a psychological rather than a chronological content. The prefix ‘postmodern’ corresponds to a “mental” position rather than a specific period of time: postmodern theory is a theory of a “state of mind” rather than a “period” [14] (pp. 177, 178)5. What is the distinguishing characteristic of this mental state? Lyotard’s answer to this question in his text “Answer to the Question: What is Postmodernism?” is a kind of skepticism:

“Well, then, what is postmodern? (…) It is undoubtedly a part of the modem. All that has been received, if only yesterday must be suspected (…) Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant. (…) Postmodernism would have to be according to the paradox of ‘future (post) time’s past (modo)”

[1] (pp. 79–81).

Lyotard answers the same question in his report The Postmodern Condition as follows: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.” [1] (p. xxiv).

“Disbelief” in The Postmodern Condition is also closely related to ‘skepticism’. Not believing is doubting. ‘Meta-narrative’, or otherwise ‘grand narrative’, is briefly defined in the glossary at the end of Glenn Ward’s book Postmodernism. According to him, Lyotard views meta-narratives as dangerously authoritarian, and we observe that in postmodernity we are skeptical of them” [15] (p. 172).

Furthermore, Sim also clarifies the term ‘grand narrative’ in his Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought with a similar presentation:

“Jean-François Lyotard defines theories that claim to provide universal explanations and benefit from the authority they give themselves as grand narratives. (…) According to Lyotard, we have now seen the inside of grand narratives and realized that their claims to authority are false and indefensible”

[4] (p. 3).

For example, philosophical systems like Platonism, institutional religions like Catholicism, psychological analysis methods like Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, or political ideologies like Marxism are all meta-narratives. In Lyotard’s view, postmodern political reason is the reason that declares the collapse or, in other words, the discarding of all these meta-narratives. In his essay Return to Postmodernity, he uses the following shocking examples to discuss the political reason in question:

“Everyone agrees on the collapse of ideologies. The alternative of a classless society has disappeared, and it is not so simple to accept this. Many people from my generation have died because of this. Another example: the promises of liberal capitalism. What we will see, we will see. If we follow the paths it has drawn, all of humanity would reach the wealth that is the sine qua non of liberation. Today we can see how this program has failed. The distance between us and the Third World countries has not decreased, but it continues to increase. Liberal capitalism is the creator of all poverty on earth. Today, two-thirds of humanity are not in a position to sit down together and make decisions on issues concerning the whole world, intellectually and materially. Here are two striking examples of the collapse of ideologies”

[16] (p. 21)6.

In short, Lyotard does not take the idea of “moral progress”, which Russell attaches great importance to, seriously at all. Sociologist Robert Nisbet, in his comprehensive book A History of the Idea of Progress, equates this theoretical transformation with skepticism as follows:

“The skepticism regarding Western progress that was once confined to a very small number of intellectuals in the nineteenth century has grown and spread to not merely the large of majority of intellectuals in this final quarter of the century, but to many millions of other people in the West”

[17] (p. 317).

As seen in the sources cited so far, postmodern political theory is the natural consequence of a philosophical migration. It is a kind of philosophical reincarnation: the wandering soul in question is the skeptical soul of the Pyrrhonian philosopher. In the next section of the study, we will take a closer look at the Principles of Pyrrhonism through Sextus Empiricus.

2. From Pyrrho to Sextus Empiricus: “Epoché” and “Ataraxia” in Ancient Greek Skepticism

“Skepticism was certainly not a modern invention”

[18] (p. 58).

“The Sceptics, then, were constantly engaged in overthrowing the dogmas of all schools, but enunciated none themselves”

[19] (p. 487).

First and foremost, to eliminate potential ambiguities, it is necessary to outline the following limiting notes in a structured manner:

• Sextus Empiricus, who is “one of the carriers of Pyrrhonian thought”, has three books in his work Principles of Pyrrhonism. However, in this article, in order not to be bogged down in philosophical detail, only the first one will be referred to. The first book is a kind of “general treatise (generalis tractatio)” or, in other words, “Summary of Skepticism” on skepticism [2] (p. 149). “We can reveal the specific character of Skepticism in the general treatise; thus, we can reveal what this philosophy encompasses, what its principles and justifications are, what its means of judgment should be, its goal, what hinders rational reasoning, how we should understand the skeptical views of the Skeptics, and what distinguishes Skepticism from other philosophies.” [2] (pp. 3–5).
• Also, this article will not touch upon the biographies of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. Because the information about the lives of both philosophers is both extremely limited and irrelevant to the main subject of this article.
• ‘Doubting’ is an integral part of ancient Greek philosophy and even of the entire history of philosophy. Thus, ‘doubting’ is not a quality specific to the Pyrrhonian philosopher. So, when the topic of ancient Greek skepticism is raised, why is Pyrrhonism the first school of philosophy that comes to mind? Because Pyrrhonism is the most mature, uncompromising, and comprehensive version of ancient Greek skepticism. For example, Plato, the founder of the famous Academy, sometimes adopts a skeptical attitude in his philosophy. However, according to Sextus Empiricus, we cannot call Plato a ‘skeptic’ just because of this characteristic:

“… And if Plato does really utter some statements in a sceptical way when he is, as they say, “exercising,” that will not make him a Sceptic…”

[2] (p. 137).7.

The distinctive feature of Pyrrhonism is that it transforms skepticism into a way of life:

“… Pyrrho is called Pyrrhonian because he articulated himself more systematically and explicitly to Skepticism than anyone before him”

[2] (pp. 5, 6).

What is the fundamental idea of Pyrrhonism? This question can be answered by drawing on Sextus Empiricus’ writings as follows: anti-dogmatism. In the view of the Pyrrhonian philosopher, all claims to truth throughout history are empty. Everything is doubtful. Because none of us can grasp what anything really is. We are deprived of this kind of knowledge.

“… though things appear to be such and such, they are not such in reality but only appear such. (…) For what we wish to ascertain is not whether things appear to be such and such, but whether they are so in their essence”

[19] (pp. 491, 503).

Thus, every inquiry into the “knowledge of truth” [20] (p. 17) and every judgment based on appearances leads to mental confusion: a state of turmoil. Because if the way something appears to us does not indicate what it truly is—as Pyrrhonism holds—we cannot regard any appearance as superior to others. All appearances are equally potent in terms of ‘closeness to truth.’ We cannot prefer one over the other by declaring it ‘certain knowledge’ or ‘final judgment.’ In short, we cannot make a judgment. Approval becomes impossible.

“the main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize”

[2] (p. 9)8.

At this point, the Pyrrhonian philosopher’s advice is to achieve “ataraxia” [αταραξία] (a state of tranquility or peace of mind) through “epoché” [epəkē] (the suspension of judgment) [2] (pp. 6–8). His primary aim is not to solve the problem of ‘preference,’ but rather to achieve peace of mind by acknowledging that this problem cannot be solved.

“According to Sextus Empiricus, universal doubt must result in mental health, and it does (…). The ancient Pyrrhonists, as their great historian and analyst Richard H. Popkin argues, ‘gained only ataraxia (αταραξία), mental peace, and equanimity’”

[18] (p. 59).

At this point, a brief detour can be made to mention another school from Ancient Greece: the Skepticism of the New Academy. The ‘New Academy’ is the name given to Plato’s Academy when it came under the control of the Skeptics [21] (p. 1593). The philosopher of the New Academy, not following in the footsteps of Pyrrhon, considers himself entitled to prefer one appearance over another.

For example, when a rope is lying coiled up in a dark room, to one who enters hurriedly it presents the simply “probable” appearance of being a serpent; but to the man who has looked carefully round and has investigated the conditions—such as its immobility and its color and each of its other peculiarities—it appears as a rope, in accordance with an impression that is probable and tested [2] (p. 141).

The philosopher of the New Academy, by not choosing the ‘epoché’ option, prefers the second appearance over the first. Because in his view, a “reasonable and controlled” appearance is superior to a “merely reasonable” one.

“Contrary to the concept of ‘suspension of judgment’ (epoché) in Pyrrhonism, the Skeptics of the Academy give a weak, yet some approval to the possible. Therefore, the Pyrrhonists have accused them of being dogmatic and cowardly in rejecting the possibility of knowledge”

[21] (p. 1593).

Before closing the parenthesis, a note in the form of an association: The difference in approach between Pyrrhonism and the New Academy can also be considered alongside the distinction between ‘Skeptics and Affirmers’ in postmodern theory. This is because, according to the Skeptics, all narratives that involve value judgment are equally powerful in terms of validity, whereas Affirmers might regard one narrative as more valid compared to others [5] (p. 21).

The Pyrrhonian philosopher uses many different arguments against dogmatism. Sextus Empiricus exemplifies these proofs in ten points and explains them as follows:

2.1. Differences in the Animal Kingdom

“… dogs, fish, lions, humans, and grasshoppers do not see things in the same size and shape; rather, the eye sees the appearance according to the condition under which vision occurs. The same reasoning applies to the other senses. How can it be said that touch will have the same effect on shelled, boneless, spiny, furry, or scaly animals? Can animals with very narrow auditory channels hear sounds the same way as animals with wide auditory channels? Or animals with furry ears compared to those with bare ears? (…) The sense of smell also varies according to the diversity in animals. (…) The sense of taste organs are similar as well. While some animals have rough and dry tongues, others have very moist ones (…) …if the appearance of objects varies for animals according to their diversity, and if it is not possible to make a preference among them, then we must suspend our judgment concerning external objects”

[2] (pp. 17, 20).

2.2. Differences Among Humans

Humans are composed of two different things: body and soul, and we differ from each other in both. For example, our physical appearance and personal traits are different. (…) If the same things affect humans in different ways depending on the differences among them, suspension of judgment also manifests in this way, because, while we can describe how something appears by referring to the differences in each person, we cannot reveal how it is in its own nature in each individual. (…) The Platonist would say “according to Plato,” the Epicurean would say “according to Epicurus,” and others would similarly suggest we follow their own path, thus leading us back to suspending judgment with their endless disagreements. Furthermore, those who argue that we should adopt the majority’s opinion are making a childish suggestion, since no one can visit all of humanity and determine what the majority has adopted. (…) Thus, suspension of judgment inevitably comes into play due to the differences among humans [2] (pp. 36–38).

At this point, a brief note of a second “association” can be made. Paul Feyerabend, one of the spokespeople for postmodern political theory in the scientific world, validates Sextus Empiricus’s claim of “endless disagreements” with the following examples in a critical passage from his book Against Method. According to Feyereband, scientists, artists, religious reformers, and philosophers have, until now, created a heap of views and approaches completely lacking order. There are Kantian, Hegelian, and Heideggerian followers; Kuhnians, Popperians, and Wittgensteinians; followers of Foucault, Derrida, and Ricoeur; New Aristotelians, New Thomists… Most of these philosophies began as attempts to end the war between different schools. They were unsuccessful. Before long, these attempts themselves became schools and joined the war” [22] (pp. 8, 9).

Thus, both Sextus Empiricus and Feyerabend would agree with Rorty:

“philosophy is not a discipline which confronts permanent issues …which centers on one topic rather than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation”

[23] (p. 276).

2.3. Sensory Organs

It is clear that the senses contradict each other. For example, there are hollows and protrusions visible in pictures, but when touched, nothing is there. Honey tastes sweet on your tongue but looks tasteless to your eyes; therefore, it is impossible to say whether honey is truly sweet or tasteless. The same applies to fragrant oils: they please the sense of smell but disturb the sense of taste [2] (pp. 55, 56).

Sextus Empiricus offers another notable example while clarifying the third argument: “the apple, for example, seems smooth, odorous, sweet and yellow. But it is non-evident whether it really possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but one quality but appears varied owing to the varying structure of the sense-organs; or whether, again, it has more qualities than are apparent, some of which elude our perception?” According to Sextus Empiricus, we cannot answer such questions [2] (p. 57). Furthermore, we are subjects who can only perceive the world of objects through five senses. Perhaps there are other objects (appearances, qualities) that we could perceive through other senses. Could this not be the case? According to the Pyrrhonian philosopher, of course, it could be. According to Empiricus, a person born with the senses of touch, taste, and smell but lacking the senses of sight and hearing would think that things possess only those qualities that can be grasped rather than perceived [2] (pp. 58, 59). Therefore, it is not possible for us to make judgments.

2.4. Situations (Conditions)

“The phenomena also change depending on whether one is hungry or full, for the same food is sweet to the hungry and tasteless to the full. It also changes depending on whether one is drunk or sober, for what is reprehensible to us when we are sober is not so when we are drunk. It also varies according to its previous state, for the same wine is sour to one who has eaten dates or figs, and sweet to one who has eaten nuts and chickpeas. (…) …although it is easy to say what character objects appear to each person, it is not easy to say what their true character is, since there is no room for agreement. (…) In this way [in the proof], then, there is also a deferral of assent concerning external objects”

[2] (pp. 46–49).

2.5. Locations, Distances and Places

“The same ship appears small and stationary from a distance and large and moving up close. The same tower appears circular from a distance and angular up close. These are differences according to distances. Depending on the location, for example, a lamp light appears dim in daylight and bright in the dark. The same shovel appears bent in water, but straight out of water. (…) Depending on positions, for example, the same picture appears flat when it is laid out, but deep and protruding when it is placed in a corner. (…) Since, then, when every visible thing is observed in a place, at a distance, and in a position, there is a great difference in the appearance of each of them, as we have said, through these means one inevitably arrives at the postponement of confirmation”

[2] (pp. 48–52).

2.6. Mixtures

“… No existing object is exactly as it seems; rather, it appears to us mixed with something else. Therefore, we can only describe the combination of the thing that can be observed as mixed with the object, but not what the object is like in its pure form. It is clear to me that no external object appears just as it is; instead, it always appears differently when mixed with something else. For example, the color of our skin looks different in hot weather and different in cold weather. We cannot say what its true color is; instead, we can only describe how it appears when observed in those conditions. (…) According to this reasoning, we cannot come to a decision about the nature of external objects, and we are forced to suspend judgment”

[2] (pp. 50–54).

2.7. Quantity and Quality

“Grains of sand, when scattered, appear hard, but when all gathered together in a heap, they appear soft. (…) When we drink wine in moderation, it strengthens us; but if we drink excessively, it leaves us weakened. The same applies to food; its effects vary depending on the amount consumed. For example, food that is eaten in excess often leads to indigestion and diarrhea. (…) We can describe what the grains of sand, the wine, and the food look like and how they appear, but due to the differences in appearance based on their formation, we cannot say what these objects are like in their true nature. (…) It becomes clear that this path also leads us to suspend judgment, as we cannot make a judgment about the pure nature of external objects”

[2] (pp. 52–56).

2.8. Relativity

“We conclude that everything is relative. For example, everything is relative to the judging subject—whether it is an animal, a human, a sense organ, or a particular condition—and to the things observed together with the object, as everything depends on a particular mixture, quantity, and position. (…) Someone who denies the relativity of everything still confirms that everything is relative, but only in the sense that it is relative to us, not in general. (…) Based on this, we must suspend judgment about the nature of objects”

[2] (pp. 58–62).

2.9. Frequency or Rarity

“The sun is more striking than a comet, but because we see the sun more frequently and the comet more rarely, we are influenced by the comet and think of it as a sign of prophecy, whereas we have no such thoughts about the sun. In other words, if we saw the sun rarely rise and set, illuminating and darkening the entire world at once, it too would seem striking. Similarly, earthquakes do not affect those who have experienced them before in the same way they affect those experiencing them for the first time. The sea impresses those who see it for the first time much more! (…) Therefore, the same objects seem impressive and valuable, or insignificant and worthless, depending on whether they are seen frequently or rarely. While we can describe how they appear based on their frequency or rarity, we still cannot say how they truly are. Thus, we must suspend judgment about them based on this path”

[2] (pp. 60–64).

2.10. Myths, Traditions, Customs, Laws, Etc.

“We sometimes present these [myths, traditions, customs, laws, etc.] against each other, or sometimes to refute one another. For example, we can present tradition against tradition: some Ethiopians tattoo their babies, but we do not; Persians consider wearing brightly colored clothes appropriate, but we do not. (…) We can present the law against the law: in Rome, someone who renounces their father’s property is not responsible for his debts, whereas in Rhodes, the person must pay their father’s debts. (…) We might present law against belief in a myth: poets see gods as powers that allow adultery and homosexual behavior, while our law prohibits such things. (…) It becomes clear that through this path, many disputes about objects can be raised, and we cannot say what the objects are like in their true nature. We can only say how they appear according to a specific teaching, law, tradition, or something similar. Thus, we must suspend judgment about external objects based on this path”

[2] (pp. 64–68).

As can be seen, these are multifaceted answers to the question, ‘Why can’t we make a judgment?’

There remains only one important question about Pyrrhonism: How does the Pyrrhonian philosopher live, and by what criteria does he act, doubting everything and constantly suspending judgment? Does not endless hesitation lead to inaction? Sextus Empiricus’ answer to this question is this:

“… we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive? And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature’s guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically”

[2] (p. 17).

In short, Pyrrhonism is not a state of ‘inaction’ in practice (in daily life).

On the other hand, there are those who think that Pyrrhonism means inaction (indecision). For example, Emil M. Cioran believes that inertia and Pyrrhonism are logically identical (one and the same thing):

“Suspension of judgment represents the philosophical counterpart of indecision; it corresponds to the formula used to articulate a will that cannot choose anything except an absence that excludes any measure of value and any coercive criterion. (…) The logical destination [of doubt] is absolute inaction (…). Of all the skeptics, only one Pyrrhon actually came close to this; the others tried more or less successfully”

[24] (pp. 82, 83).

According to Cioran, the Pyrrhonian philosopher, who deserves the title of “the most cultivated of mortals” for having created a perfect “system of hesitations”, appears like a “living corpse” as an “uncompromising”, “orthodox”, “consistent and stubborn skeptic” [24] (pp. 85–87).

The next section of the study can be prefaced with the following question: What is the relationship between the terms ‘epoche’ and ‘ataraxia’ (epəkē –αταραξία), which constitute both the intellectual and vital backbone of Pyrrhonism and postmodern political theory?

3. Postmodern Political Theory: “He Who Bets on Doubt Wins”

“It is the impossible attempt to step outside our skins—the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with something absolute”

[25] (p. xix).

“Doubt shows the way to another modernity”

[8] (p. 259).

The Pyrrhonian philosopher’s proposal of ‘suspending judgment to achieve tranquility of the soul’ (epoché and ataraxia) finds a parallel in the world of the postmodern theorist: by opposing modern truth claims, the goal is to eliminate political violence, or in other words, the forms of modern antagonism (hostility). Anti-dogmatism is anti-antagonism. The skeptic, in Cioran’s terms, is an “anti-fanatic” subject; their primary aim is the “destruction of inviolability” [24] (p. 81). According to the postmodern theorist, the philosophical source of terrorism is modern truth claims. Where doubt ends, terror begins. To eradicate the roots of antagonist politics, one must first refute modern truth claims, or what Cioran calls “false truths” [26] (pp. 4, 5). The “task” that the Pyrrhonian philosopher sets for themselves is precisely this: to “dig into the truth claims [and] tarnish them by exposing their origins” [24] (p. 83). For in their view, accessing “true truth” means realizing that “every truth is empty” [26] (pp. 4, 5). In pursuit of this goal (task), the postmodern theorist, particularly following in the footsteps of Friedrich Nietzsche9, adopts an ‘anti-foundationalist’ stance, attempting to dynamite all grand narrative foundations.

Anti-foundationalists question the validity of discourse10 foundations by asking questions such as, “What guarantees the truth of your foundation (that is, starting point)?’ Postmodernism has drawn heavily on the example set by anti-foundationalist philosophers, perhaps most notably the iconoclastic nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose call for a ‘revaluation of all values’ constitutes something of a battle cry for the movement [4] (p. 3).

Thus, anti-foundationalism is, in a sense, another name for skepticism. One of the most prominent addresses of anti-foundationalism in postmodern political theory is the concept of “radical democratization” (radical democracy) formulated extensively by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy [29] (p. 75). According to Mouffe, the “radical and pluralist democracy project” is “both modern and postmodern” [30] (p. 10). This characterization is directly related to the Enlightenment movement. Like Jürgen Habermas, Laclau and Mouffe evaluate the Enlightenment as an “unfinished project”. The philosophy of the Enlightenment is, on the one hand, too important to be dismissed, yet, on the other hand, it is in crisis to the extent that it can no longer be defended “as it is.” This is the “epistemological” crisis of the “Jacobian” reason. The crisis of the modern theorist who turns his back on skepticism. The crisis of “revolutionary politics” that is purportedly grounded in the knowledge of truth [30] (pp. 10 and 16).

The radical democracy project is modern because it does not completely reject the achievements of the Enlightenment but aims to complete or at least continue it. At the same time, it is postmodern because it approaches the truth claims derived from the Enlightenment—such as ‘reason’ (rationalism) or ‘humanity’ (humanism)—with skepticism. According to Mouffe, democratic political order cannot be maintained with these truth claims, because none of them contain a true universality or necessity. All of them are historical and contingent. In the radical democracy project, there is no such truth claim (foundation). Furthermore, from Mouffe’s perspective, it is not possible to find a foundation in the nature of ‘truth.’ She points to this absence in various ways:

• “There is no threshold of democracy that once reached will guarantee its continued existence” [30] (p. 6).
• “… in fact, there is no point of view external to all tradition from which one can offer a universal judgement.” [30] (p. 15).
• “There is no neutral ground, supposedly uncontaminated by philosophy, from which to speak” [31] (p. 7).

These anti-foundational assertions evoke the anti-dogmatism of Pyrrhonism. If there is no possibility of finding a genuine foundation, how can a democratic political system be sustained? If the “rationalist belief in the existence of a universally rational consensus” is politically flawed (empty, vain belief) [32] (p. 13), how can the “moment of definitive confrontation”, or in other words, the “bloody decisive battle” [33] (p. 59) arising from antagonist politics be avoided? In response to such questions, Mouffe proposes a non-foundational foundation, one that does not represent a “knowledge of truth” in the traditional sense: antagonism. According to Mouffe’s project, the very foundation of democratic politics is antagonism. Antagonism, in its various forms, is the essence of the “political” itself [32] (pp. 13, 14). A politics entirely devoid of antagonism is not democratic but totalitarian (depoliticized). Therefore, Mouffe suggests not eliminating antagonist politics but transforming it. One of the main ideas of the radical democracy project is to transform antagonism, meaning the “struggle between enemies,” into agonism, meaning the “struggle between adversaries” [32] (pp. 16, 17)11: Not an absolute reconciliation, but a “conflictual consensus.” In this way, ongoing struggles will be preserved, and undemocratic violence will be avoided.

• “We will fight against his ideas but we will not question his right to defend them.” [29] (p. 4) ….”Democratic consensus can be envisaged only as a conflictual consensus. Democratic debate is not a deliberation aimed at reaching the one rational solution to be accepted by all, but a confrontation among adversaries. (…) Democratic consensus can be envisaged only as a conflictual consensus. Democratic debate is not a deliberation aimed at reaching the one rational solution to be accepted by all, but a confrontation among adversaries.” [34] (p. 5).

In light of the information presented so far, it can also be stated that Mouffe moves from anti-foundationalism to post-foundationalism. In other words, Mouffe advocates for a “post-foundational understanding”: the foundation “both exists and does not exist” [35] (pp. 346, 347). As Laclau and Mouffe put it, “If society is not totally possible, neither is it totally impossible” [29] (p. 129).

So, what is the political function of postmodern skepticism in the realization of the radical democracy project? The way to transform antagonist politics into agonist politics begins, first and foremost, with self-doubt. Because every agonist is, in a sense, an antagonist who is capable of doubting themselves. An antagonist’s reason can only transform into an agonist reason by doubting its own truth claims. Therefore, in addition to antagonism, another non-foundational foundation of Mouffe’s radical democracy project, in the modern sense, is self-skepticism. The radicalization of democracy is the radicalization of skepticism. From this perspective, radical democracy is a democracy in which Pyrrhonism is reiterated.

The author of the bold statement in the title of this section, Ulrich Beck, also advocates for a postmodern “art of doubt” against modern truth politics, like Mouffe and Laclau, who propose a “tamed antagonism” relationship [36] (pp. 100, 101). According to Beck, only a postmodern “dragon of doubt” can overcome the political conflicts caused by the Enlightenment [8] (p. 173). This dragon is the antidote to the terror of truth and totalitarianism stemming from the Enlightenment, or as Beck puts it, the “list of organized, perfected horrors” [8] (p. 159). In other words, skepticism is one of the philosophical cornerstones of a peaceful democratic struggle environment, or, in Mouffe’s terms, a “conflictual consensus.”

“There are strong connections between pacifism and skepticism. Truth and the military emerge from the same thought box. (…) Doubt allows for conflict, even makes it necessary; but at the same time, it frees opposing positions and the means of fighting from their dogmatic structure. Doubt makes it possible to pacify conflict—reconciling conflict with peace in such a way that the two extremes created by heaven and war become either impossible or distant possibilities. (…) Truth is a presumption that deceives people about themselves and others, a form of arrogance about the beliefs they hold”

[8] (pp. 173–176).

In Beck’s The Reinvention of Politics, the art of doubt is described as the “political program” of a “reflective” process of modernization. This process is the story of a “creative self-destruction”: the transformation of simple (“classical industrial”) modernity, based on the Enlightenment, into another form of modernity through the “reflective doubt,” or more simply, the transition to the “second modernity” [8] (pp. 5, 23). So, what is reflective doubt? How can it be defined? Reflective doubt is the skepticism fostered by a form of modernity that doubts itself or rethinks itself from critical perspectives. Just as the Enlightenment is a “critique of the traditional world,” reflective skepticism, or the “invention of the political”, is the “critique of critique” itself.

“The Invention of the Political: It means a creative, self-creative politics that does not reproduce old enmities, does not renew them, does not turn them into a source of power, but instead attempts to design and create new contents, forms, and coalitions.” [8] (p. 136). In this sense, “reflective modernity” is exactly what Zygmunt Bauman refers to as “postmodernity” [37] (p. 26). “Postmodernity is not necessarily the rejection, discrediting, or termination of modernity. Postmodernity is simply a modernity that looks more deeply, carefully, and sensibly at itself, its condition, and its past actions, does not love what it sees entirely, and feels the need for change—it is neither lacking nor excessive.” [38] (p. 272).

Moreover, Beck’s challenge to all theorists with an almost Pyrrhonian attitude is extremely noteworthy. In his view, a theorist’s avoidance of skepticism is synonymous with deceiving oneself and, naturally, others. Furthermore, attempting to construct a life philosophy entirely free from doubt is, in one word, a futile intellectual endeavor. Therefore, Beck’s reflective skepticism is the “updated Pyrrhonism” that constitutes the political destiny of the postmodern theorist.

“Yes, dear colleagues—for once, please be honest! Can you name a single theory from your area of expertise that is undisputed, universally accepted, and, in addition to being approved, does not have to deal with a mountain of doubts and opposing views—and hide them? As for me, I do not see any theory that possesses this quality; I am always ready to remind us of certain things that a theory (or an empirical study with all its conclusions) must necessarily make us forget in order to be accepted in our field”

[8] (p. 172).

Before moving on to the ‘Conclusions’ section, one can also add an existential observation by Cioran to Beck’s theoretical challenge. For Cioran, too, there is no possibility of escaping doubt. Doubt somehow finds its way into the truth claims we desperately try to protect. This has always been the case. Living (existence) is always doubted:

“Doubt crashes down upon us like a calamity; far from choosing it, we fall into it. And try as we will to wrest ourselves from it, to conjure it away, doubt never loses sight of us, for it is not even true that doubt crashes down upon us doubt was within us, and we were foredoomed to it”

[24] (p. 79).

The two examples provided above (the radical democracy project and the art of doubt) adequately reflect the central idea of this article. Political Pyrrhonism in postmodern theory is clearly evident in both examples. In the ‘Conclusions’ section, this central idea (theoretical link) will be further clarified and detailed with a few reinforcing references.

4. Conclusions

“… great intellects are sceptical. (…) A mind that aspires to great things, and that wills the means thereto, is necessarily sceptical”

[39] (pp. 152, 153).

“Whoever lacks tolerance has fallen victim to their inability to embrace doubt”

[40] (p. 33).

The chronic opposition story of skepticism, stretching from Ancient Greece to the present day, sheds light on the mental position of the postmodern theorist in several ways. In other words, what is the benefit of reinterpreting postmodern political theory through the lens of Pyrrhonism? This question can be answered in the following points:

a.

As Cioran emphasizes in his Fall into Time, skepticism was a school of thought that reached its fullest maturity in Ancient Greece, arguably completing and earning significant respect:

“The treatises by Sextus, published at the beginning of the 3rd century, are a compilation of all ancient doubts, a thorough collection of their oppressive nature. It is the most dizzying—and one must say also the most tedious—thing ever written. Skepticism, at the end of antiquity, never regained the same prestige, neither in the Renaissance despite Montaigne nor in the 18th century despite Hume”

[24] (pp. 47, 48).

Thus, keeping the radical skepticism of postmodern political theory in mind and placing it within its intellectual and conceptual context can make it easier to understand and appreciate its value. The postmodern mind is simultaneously both old and new. The method (skepticism) is old, but the subject on which it is applied (Enlightenment-based modernity) is new. As a form of skepticism (anti-dogmatism, anti-foundationalism), postmodern theory is the theory of a long-outdated novelty: it is more derivative than original, more of a sequel than a precursor. In other words, the postmodern theorist is not quite as “postmodern” as one might think.

“The critique of foundationalism in philosophy wasn’t so much postmodern as a continuation of the Enlightenment’s own critique of the foundational role of God in human affairs”

[41] (p. 127).

b.

The primary target of postmodern theory’s critique is a political reason that is devoid of doubt. In the essay On Stupidity by the prominent Turkish essayist Tahsin Yücel, stupidity (lack of reason) is equated with “the absence of doubt”:

“… a fool proposes everything as an absolute truth and believes in everything as if it were an absolute truth”

[42] (p. 8).

Building on this view, Yücel argues that “almost all” ideologies contain “a certain kind of stupidity”. Yücel’s generalization, which recalls Pyrrhonism, could be considered a “political motto” for postmodern theorists, who question all overarching narratives.

c.

Finally, the most important political promise of the postmodern theorist, who critiques the absence of doubt with great force, is the elimination of organized violence (systematic terror). In their view, the path to lasting peace (security) and tolerance lies primarily in the embrace of skepticism. In a pluralistic (liberal) political system that adopts skepticism, there is room for everyone—and if there is not, it can be created over time. Cioran, in A Short History of Decay, expresses this foundational connection, referencing Pyrrhon, in a literary style:

“Next to the one who holds a truth, his own truth, even the devil seems pale. […] When one insists on not accepting that ideas can replace one another, blood flows… A dagger rises from under the certainty of decisions; fiery eyes are harbingers of murder. […] Next to a Pyrrhon, I feel safer than I would next to an Apostle Paul; for a wit’s wisdom is softer than a saint’s unchained sanctity”

[43] (p. 4).

This three-point response outlines the critical continuity between postmodern political theory and ancient Greek skepticism (especially Pyrrhonism).