Advances in Contest Theory: Strategic Foundations and Mechanism Design

Dear Colleagues,

Contests serve as a central paradigm in economic theory regarding the modelling of strategic interactions over valuable resources, effort-based rewards, or influence. From all-pay auctions and political competition to tournaments in organizations and innovation prizes, contests offer powerful frameworks for analyzing competitive environments where agents expend costly effort to increase their chances of winning. In recent decades, contest theory has provided deep insights into the design and outcomes of such mechanisms under various assumptions related to information, heterogeneity, timing, and institutional constraints.

This Special Issue aims to highlight state-of-the-art theoretical research in contest theory and mechanism design. We welcome papers that develop new models, extend existing frameworks, or explore novel applications within the theoretical domain. The scope of this Special Issue includes, but is not limited to, optimal prize allocation, endogenous entry, asymmetric ability or cost structures, multi-stage contests, contests with incomplete or asymmetric information, stochastic or dynamic environments, and contest design under budget or policy constraints. We also welcome theoretical studies that explore the connections between contests and broader areas in mechanism design, auction theory, or industrial organization.

While this Special Issue focuses on theoretical contributions, we particularly encourage submissions that offer conceptual clarity, tractable modelling approaches, and potential relevance for applied researchers and policymakers. Our aim is to consolidate and showcase recent advances in contest theory, stimulate new lines of inquiry, and support the development of more robust and versatile contest-based mechanisms for both academic and practical purposes.

This Special Issue will serve as a resource for scholars working in economic theory, political economy, organizational economics, and related fields. It will also be of interest to those exploring the strategic foundations of incentive systems in real-world applications.

Dr. Jun Zhang
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

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