Games, Volume 12, Issue 4

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm’s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated t...

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as pl...

Empirical investigation suggests that conflict is path-dependent, i.e., current conflict leads to more conflict in the future. However, there is very little formal theory for why conflict path dependence exists. We propose a mathematical model to exp...

This paper analyses the voting behavior of the parliamentary groups in the Regional Assembly of Madrid to appoint the Bureau, its representative body, in all the legislatures since its inception (1983–2021). To this end, the actual result of th...

In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority voting games (WMVG) up to eight players. We also show different procedures that allow us to obtain some minimum or minimum sum representations of WMVG, f...

This paper deals with one of the possible methodological approaches to an empirical examination of game awareness. Such an outline should enable the gathering of a deeper understanding of individuals’ awareness. The questionnaire is based on a...

Human cooperation, occurring without reciprocation and between unrelated individuals in large populations, represents an evolutionary puzzle. One potential explanation is that cooperative behaviour may be transmitted between individuals via social le...

Hierarchical decision-making processes traditionally modeled as bilevel optimization problems are widespread in modern engineering and social systems. In this work, we deal with a leader with a population of followers in a hierarchical order of play....

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this...

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives—modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by the outside wo...