Philosophies

1 pages, 136 KB

Open AccessCorrection

Correction: Morrill, G. A Formal Synopsis of Lambek-Montague Grammar. Philosophies 2026, 11, 1

by Glyn Morrill

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 132; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040132 - 27 Jul 2026

Abstract

Text Correction [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Logical Linguistic Legacy of Montague Grammar)

3 pages, 139 KB

Open AccessEditorial

Editorial for the Special Issue “Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy”

by Florian Vermeiren

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 131; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040131 - 23 Jul 2026

Abstract

Philosophers come in many different shapes [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)

12 pages, 194 KB

Open AccessArticle

Reinterpreting Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root: Causality, Immanence, and the Limits of Metaphysical Explanation

by Jan Kerkmann

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 130; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040130 - 22 Jul 2026

Abstract

Background: Arthur Schopenhauer’s On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in its revised 1847 edition) has been variously interpreted as an epistemological prelude to his metaphysics of will, as a continuation of Kantian transcendental philosophy, or as an early [...] Read more.

Background: Arthur Schopenhauer’s On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in its revised 1847 edition) has been variously interpreted as an epistemological prelude to his metaphysics of will, as a continuation of Kantian transcendental philosophy, or as an early expression of Schopenhauer’s broader soteriological concerns. These readings often differ in emphasis but converge in treating the text primarily as subordinate to Schopenhauer’s later system or early intellectual development. Methods: This article offers a systematic textual reconstruction of the 1847 edition within the Kantian tradition of transcendental critique. It proceeds through close reading and conceptual analysis of Schopenhauer’s articulation of the principle of sufficient reason, situating individual argumentative steps within both Kantian and post-Kantian debates. The aim is not to deny the relevance of systematic or developmental readings, but to clarify the internal philosophical function of the text’s argumentative structure. Results: The analysis shows that Schopenhauer’s account of the principle of sufficient reason consistently operates as a critical and immanent framework for structuring possible explanation rather than as a metaphysical grounding principle. Across its four domains, the principle is differentiated into irreducible forms governing distinct types of object-relation, thereby constraining illegitimate transitions between epistemic justification and ontological explanation. This reading highlights (i) the internal differentiation of explanatory forms, (ii) the restriction of causal claims to intra-phenomenal relations, and (iii) the systematic limitation of metaphysical grounding strategies. Conclusions: On this reading, the Fourfold Root does not function primarily as a foundational doctrine for Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will, but as a critical investigation into the limits of metaphysical explanation within experience. It thereby reconfigures metaphysical inquiry as a reflective clarification of the conditions under which explanation is possible, rather than as a doctrine of ultimate ontological grounds. Full article

32 pages, 907 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Unity of Heaven and Humanity and Beautiful China: Contemporary Transformation of Traditional Chinese Ecological Aesthetics Wisdom

by Yunlei Ban

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 129; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040129 - 22 Jul 2026

Abstract

The traditional Chinese ecological aesthetics takes ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ [天人合一] as its philosophical core and constructs a cosmological landscape of coexistence and prosperity between humans and nature. Given the challenges of the global ecological crisis, this research draws on the [...] Read more.

The traditional Chinese ecological aesthetics takes ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ [天人合一] as its philosophical core and constructs a cosmological landscape of coexistence and prosperity between humans and nature. Given the challenges of the global ecological crisis, this research draws on the ecological aesthetic wisdom of ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ to systematically explore its theoretical support and practical value for building a Beautiful China. By employing a mixed-method approach that integrates textual analysis, policy review, and multi-case comparative study, this research finds that in the process of building a Beautiful China, the traditional ecological aesthetic wisdom of ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ has achieved creative transformation and innovative development through the spatial creation of ‘Poetic Dwelling’, the green economy characterized by ‘Suitable for Employment’ and the ecological empowerment for the principle of ‘Suitable for Nurturing Life and Tourism’. This has paved a distinctive path for green development that integrates cultural subjectivity, ecological principles, and modern governance technologies. The discussion further emphasizes that intelligent ecological governance, leveraging technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data, provides a key technological pathway for the contemporary transformation of ‘the Unity of Heaven and Humanity’ philosophy. This study provides a unique ecological and cultural foundation for building a Beautiful China and for global ecological protection. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)

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14 pages, 283 KB

Open AccessEssay

More-than-Human Ethics: A Complex Issue

by Maria Laura Giacobello

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 128; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040128 - 22 Jul 2026

Abstract

This article explores the ecological crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon that engages humanity at an existential and therefore philosophical level. Starting from the recognition of the authentic human condition, as that of a being deeply rooted in an ecosystem whose balance sustains its [...] Read more.

This article explores the ecological crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon that engages humanity at an existential and therefore philosophical level. Starting from the recognition of the authentic human condition, as that of a being deeply rooted in an ecosystem whose balance sustains its well-being, it argues for moving beyond the anthropocentric fallacy that has driven humankind to pursue its dream of Promethean domination. Rather, the complex nature of the human being, at once biological and cultural, carries a message of universal solidarity. In ignoring this message, humanity has betrayed its true identity: that of a steward of life understood in its universal dimension. As a conscious part of nature, humanity is entrusted with caring for it, adopting a more-than-human ethics grounded in respect and love for the relationships that connect all things within the web of life. This calls for revisiting the anthropological question through a systemic lens, opening onto an alternative epistemological and ontological perspective, one that allows us to rethink humanity’s relationship with the entire ecosphere and imagine a different way of co-dwelling on Earth. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)

22 pages, 1242 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Five-Year Horizon: Quantum Computing and the Philosophy of Technical Becoming

by Christophe Jurczak

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 127; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040127 - 20 Jul 2026

Abstract

Certain physics-based technologies (quantum computing, fusion energy, advanced materials, brain–computer interfaces) have remained “five years away” for decades. This paper argues that this perpetual horizon is not a forecasting failure but the temporal signature of Perpetual Five-Year Technologies (PFYTs): technologies of atoms, not [...] Read more.

Certain physics-based technologies (quantum computing, fusion energy, advanced materials, brain–computer interfaces) have remained “five years away” for decades. This paper argues that this perpetual horizon is not a forecasting failure but the temporal signature of Perpetual Five-Year Technologies (PFYTs): technologies of atoms, not bits, whose technical object and enabling ecosystem must co-develop. Drawing on philosophy of technology and sociology of scientific practice, and grounded in quantitative analysis of cross-platform performance data and high-impact research across hardware architectures, the paper shows that PFYT temporality is endogenous, produced by concretization dynamics and recursive constraint discovery rather than by market failures or insufficient funding. Quantum computing provides the paradigmatic case. Treating the quantum processor as a technical individual in active individuation explains why multiple computing paradigms persist and why each breakthrough resets rather than collapses the horizon. The convergence of machine learning and quantum hardware into pipelines for drug and materials discovery shows how Physical AI reshapes PFYT dynamics, compressing some cycles while introducing new forms of co-individuation between intelligence and matter. The framework generates diagnostics for physics-based frontiers where technical objects and milieus co-produce developmental time. Full article

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10 pages, 195 KB

Open AccessArticle

Simulation as Inquiry: Reframing Methodological Knowledge Through Boundary Mapping

by Sifiso Vilakati

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 126; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040126 - 20 Jul 2026

Abstract

Methodological statistics has developed under the pervasive belief that the value of a simulation study lies in its ability to demonstrate the superiority of a proposed method. This belief has distorted the epistemic role of simulation research by encouraging selective reporting, narrow design [...] Read more.

Methodological statistics has developed under the pervasive belief that the value of a simulation study lies in its ability to demonstrate the superiority of a proposed method. This belief has distorted the epistemic role of simulation research by encouraging selective reporting, narrow design spaces and the suppression of results that fail to show improvement. Drawing on philosophical accounts and on meta scientific critiques by several studies, this paper argues that non-superiority is not a failure but an essential source of methodological knowledge. It marks the boundaries at which a method performs adequately, where it begins to degrade and where it breaks. Using empirical patterns evident in contemporary methodological literature and drawing on the widely cited case in which machine learning methods often failed to outperform logistic regression in clinical prediction, this paper demonstrates how non-superiority clarifies expectations and guides methodological refinement. The paper proposes a structural remedy that pairs the Registered Reports model with principled simulation design following the ADEMP framework. This alignment protects the visibility of non-superiority and restores the integrity of simulation research. Boundary mapping is therefore not a modest contribution but a scientific and ethical imperative for methodological transparency and applied reliability. Full article

20 pages, 245 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Standpoint Threshold: Architectural Conditions for Processing from Somewhere

by Daniel H. Lange

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 125; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040125 - 20 Jul 2026

Abstract

The philosophy of artificial intelligence often begins one question too late. Discussions move directly to whether a system could be conscious, whether there is something it is like to be the system, or whether it possesses genuine subjectivity, without first asking a more [...] Read more.

The philosophy of artificial intelligence often begins one question too late. Discussions move directly to whether a system could be conscious, whether there is something it is like to be the system, or whether it possesses genuine subjectivity, without first asking a more basic structural question: what would have to be true of a system’s internal organization before those questions gain a determinate basis in its architecture? This paper addresses that prior question. It defends a threshold account built on three jointly necessary conditions: persistent internal context, differentiated internal possibility, and closed-loop operativity. Together, these conditions mark the point at which a system’s processing can plausibly be said to unfold from an internal standpoint, rather than merely as a chain of locally linked transitions. Such organization may also have functional significance independent of consciousness by supporting temporal coherence, cross-role coordination, and reduced dependence on episodic reconstruction or external scaffolding. The account explains why simple feedback controllers are clear non-cases, why standard transformer inference remains at most a bounded near-case, and why world-model architectures are more serious candidates for assessment, while making no claim that such systems are conscious. The aim is not to provide a test for artificial consciousness, but to clarify when consciousness-oriented inquiry into intelligent systems has a determinate architectural target. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Consciousness in the Age of Intelligent Systems: Philosophical Frameworks, Neural Theories, and Generative AI)

19 pages, 281 KB

Open AccessArticle

Environmental Esthetics and Other Non-Anthropocentric Representations of Nature

by Sandra Baquedano

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 124; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040124 - 18 Jul 2026

Abstract

This article addresses environmental esthetics in dialog with other non-anthropocentric representations of nature, starting with the Ancient Western philosophy of art as a human expression of nature (φύσις, physis). In the context of this more primary understanding, the consolidation of an anthropocentric [...] Read more.

This article addresses environmental esthetics in dialog with other non-anthropocentric representations of nature, starting with the Ancient Western philosophy of art as a human expression of nature (φύσις, physis). In the context of this more primary understanding, the consolidation of an anthropocentric representation of nature based on homo mensura is examined, in which the human being emerges as the measure of all things. This interpretation of nature fosters its progressive reification, which coincides with the emergence of esthetics as a modern philosophical discipline, often articulated around the partial and isolated appreciation of the object. It is argued that environmental esthetics emphasizes an immersive and relational experience with the environment, facilitating a certain release from anthropocentric mental habits, and that the notion of hyperobjects also helps to confront them by laying bare phenomena that exceed the human scale. In line with this expansion of space–time coordinates, which challenge perceptive categories in themselves, an ecosuicidological esthetic is presented, one capable of cultivating a renewed, non-anthropocentric sensitivity. The article resorts to Amerindian knowledges for the concept’s potential deployment and discusses artistic expressions that reconfigure the experience of representing nature, transforming perception and inspiring new forms of reciprocity. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)

27 pages, 1443 KB

Open AccessArticle

Biocultural Ethics for Human–River–Biosphere Co-Inhabitation

by Ricardo Rozzi

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 123; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040123 - 17 Jul 2026

Abstract

The reunification of scientific, artistic, and philosophical knowledge empowers us to rethink our relationship with nature in light of a biocultural ethic grounded in co-inhabitation among humans and other-than-human beings in shared habitats. To this end, the biocultural ethic is built upon the [...] Read more.

The reunification of scientific, artistic, and philosophical knowledge empowers us to rethink our relationship with nature in light of a biocultural ethic grounded in co-inhabitation among humans and other-than-human beings in shared habitats. To this end, the biocultural ethic is built upon the 3H model, which values the vital links among co-inhabitants and their life habits in shared habitats. The model integrates the biophysical, cultural, and sociopolitical dimensions characteristic of environmental complexity. In this essay, the 3H model is applied to rivers, examined from biological, philosophical, poetic, and legal perspectives. The result is not only to highlight that rivers are more than merely exploitable resources, but also to show that their “voice” raises a normative (ethical and legal) appeal that, among other aspects, has inspired the new Latin American constitutionalism. This ontological, epistemological, and ethical turn seeks to foster a transition from destruction and homogenization toward a bioculture that values biological and cultural diversity through renewed forms of co-inhabitation with rivers and the biosphere. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)

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14 pages, 236 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Safety Versus Sensitivity Debate Revisited

by Duncan Pritchard

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 122; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040122 - 17 Jul 2026

Abstract

It is widely accepted that there is a modal condition on knowledge. There are two main candidates in the literature: safety and sensitivity. My goal in this paper is to revisit this debate in the context of anti-risk epistemology. This approach [...] Read more.

It is widely accepted that there is a modal condition on knowledge. There are two main candidates in the literature: safety and sensitivity. My goal in this paper is to revisit this debate in the context of anti-risk epistemology. This approach is meant to offer an independent way of determining the modal condition on knowledge (i.e., as opposed to simply pitching modal conditions against one another and seeing which one accommodates the wider range of cases). Interestingly, while anti-risk epistemology favors safety over traditional formulations of sensitivity, it also leads to a very specific way of formulating the safety condition on knowledge. Given that sensitivity might also be reformulated along anti-risk lines, a natural question to ask is where this leaves the debate between safety and sensitivity. I will be suggesting that the most plausible anti-risk formulation of sensitivity is equivalent to the corresponding formulation of safety. If that is right, then ultimately the moral to draw from anti-risk epistemology is not that it favors safety over sensitivity but that it leads to a formulation of the anti-risk condition on knowledge whereby this distinction collapses. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Knowledge and Conditionals—Reliability, Probability, Counterfactuals, and Relevance)

19 pages, 488 KB

Open AccessArticle

Semantic Displacement and AI-Mediated Agency: Conversational Systems and the Externalization of Meaning

by Edu William

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 121; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040121 - 15 Jul 2026

Abstract

This article develops a conceptual account of semantic displacement in conversational AI. The central question concerns how agency is affected when systems do more than automate information retrieval and begin to supply the descriptions, classifications and normative cues through which users understand what [...] Read more.

This article develops a conceptual account of semantic displacement in conversational AI. The central question concerns how agency is affected when systems do more than automate information retrieval and begin to supply the descriptions, classifications and normative cues through which users understand what they are doing. Drawing on philosophy of action, philosophy of language, hermeneutics, philosophy of technology and critical accounts of algorithmic mediation, this article reconstructs the relation between meaning and action as a condition of agency. Its methodological approach is conceptual and diagnostic, oriented toward clarifying a problem that becomes visible when established theories are brought together in relation to contemporary conversational systems. The article interprets these systems as operational semantic infrastructures that organize context-sensitive linguistic uptake within practical environments such as health, work, education, administration and everyday self-management. It then introduces semantic displacement as the condition in which action-relevant meanings become increasingly organized, prioritized and consolidated outside the agent’s own participatory interpretation. The argument contributes a vocabulary for distinguishing agency-enhancing semantic support from forms of semantic substitution that weaken interpretive participation. It concludes by proposing semantic sovereignty and interpretive contestability as normative ideals for human agency in AI-mediated environments. The argument specifies action as intentional conduct understood under socially available descriptions and cognition as situated interpretive sense-making rather than purely internal computation. It also clarifies three conditions under which semantic support becomes displacement: opaque semantic generation, practical stabilization and reduced interpretive contestability. Full article

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12 pages, 250 KB

Open AccessArticle

Enacting Ontological Pluralism: Informational Dynamics and Embodied Cognition in Śaiva-Śākta Phenomenology

by Diego Gonzalez-Rodriguez

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 120; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040120 - 14 Jul 2026

Abstract

Contemporary cognitive science is predominantly grounded in physicalist assumptions that locate cognition and consciousness in neural and computational processes. While these approaches have yielded significant empirical advances, they often struggle to account for the qualitative and first-person structure of experience. This paper proposes [...] Read more.

Contemporary cognitive science is predominantly grounded in physicalist assumptions that locate cognition and consciousness in neural and computational processes. While these approaches have yielded significant empirical advances, they often struggle to account for the qualitative and first-person structure of experience. This paper proposes an ethno-phenomenological perspective by engaging non-Western epistemic practices through the lens of embodied cognition and ontological pluralism. Rather than treating non-Western phenomenology as external to scientific inquiry, we analyze how it can inform cognitive dynamism and ontological enactment through sophisticated epistemic practices. Particularly, we analyze how by actively manipulating cognitive and informational structures, Śaiva-Śākta phenomenology may dynamically affect embodied subjectivity. From this perspective, certain methods like visualization and ritual enactment can be understood as systematic interventions that modulate attentional, mnemonic, and perceptual processes, thereby reconfiguring the experiential architecture of the self and world. We further examine how processes such as constructive imagination function as mechanisms of cognitive reorganization, enabling practitioners to inhabit multiple ontological configurations of subject–object relations. Drawing on predictive processing and enactive cognitive science, the paper argues that Śaiva-Śākta sādhanā may operationalize a form of embodied epistemology in which ontology is not merely represented but enacted. This supports a model of ontological pluralism in which divergent experiential worlds correspond to stabilized modes of cognition rather than competing metaphysical hypotheses. Within this framework, sādhanā is considered a methodological method for investigating consciousness beyond reductionist neurophysiological accounts, offering structured access to non-ordinary modes of experience. Conclusively, the paper proposes that certain non-Western traditions may provide not only philosophical insights but also alternative phenomenological pathways for exploring the informational dynamics of embodied cognition, thereby expanding the methodological and ontological horizons of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Full article

15 pages, 208 KB

Open AccessArticle

Consummatum Est: On the Faustian Laboratory, the Hubris of AI’s Architects, and the Humanity They Forgot to Ask

by Alison L. Kahn

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 119; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040119 - 13 Jul 2026

Abstract

The development of artificial intelligence has proceeded within a disciplinary culture whose positivist epistemological foundations generate a constitutive blind spot: the systematic exclusion of tacit, embodied, relational and contextually situated knowledge from what counts as knowledge at all. This article argues that this [...] Read more.

The development of artificial intelligence has proceeded within a disciplinary culture whose positivist epistemological foundations generate a constitutive blind spot: the systematic exclusion of tacit, embodied, relational and contextually situated knowledge from what counts as knowledge at all. This article argues that this exclusion is not a technical limitation, but a structural condition of AI systems as currently built, with serious consequences for individuals, institutions and the social order. The method is interdisciplinary and critically synthetic, integrating the anthropology of science and technology, the philosophy of language and the literary-philosophical tradition of techno-critique. Three original contributions are advanced. First, the Faustian framework is reformulated as a collective rather than individual pact: the AI contract implicates a civilisation. Second, the prevalent reductionist critique is refined: the error is not quantification of incommensurable goods but the enforcement of total orderings upon value landscapes that admit only partial orderings. Third, the stochastic parrot objection is reconciled with the Faustian analysis through the concept of institutional amplification: AI’s danger resides not in its intelligence but in the authority conferred upon its incomprehension. The article concludes that Mephistopheles, not Faustus, is the more precise figure for AI itself, and asks whether the defunding of humanities disciplines, those best placed to navigate the moral challenges AI presents, constitutes the most consequential characteristic deletion of all. Full article

17 pages, 280 KB

Open AccessArticle

Heidegger’s “On the Basic Disposition of Knowledge”: Curiosity, Thaumazein, Terror, and Withdrawal

by Marcel Dubovec

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 118; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040118 - 13 Jul 2026

Abstract

The focus of this paper is Heidegger’s lecture “On the Basic Disposition of Knowledge” (summer semester 1939), first published in 2020 in GA 80.2 and still largely unexplored in Heidegger scholarship. In this text, Heidegger problematizes the scientific disposition as a lack of [...] Read more.

The focus of this paper is Heidegger’s lecture “On the Basic Disposition of Knowledge” (summer semester 1939), first published in 2020 in GA 80.2 and still largely unexplored in Heidegger scholarship. In this text, Heidegger problematizes the scientific disposition as a lack of mindfulness (Besinnungslosigkeit). This lack of mindfulness is, in turn, characterized as a disturbance and forgetting of the original disposition that, in Plato and Aristotle, is named in Greek thaumazein. In the advanced form of occidental knowledge, shaped by techne, the remembrance of wonder at beings (Erstaunen) is no longer possible. Instead, the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit) becomes accessible only through another disposition: terror (Entsetzen). The paper argues that these distinctions between basic dispositions (curiositas, thaumazein, and terror) can be understood only by focusing on Heidegger’s concept of withdrawal (Entzug). In Heidegger’s words, one must take it seriously that Being withdraws from beings. On this basis, curiosity blocks the experience of withdrawal, thaumazein names the beginning of philosophy but cannot be repeated today, and it is terror that discloses the abandonment of Being. To place this claim in context, the paper offers a short sketch of Heidegger’s critique of curiositas, based on his Augustinian reception in the Natorp report (“Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation”) and in Being and Time (§ 36). It then draws on his account of thaumazein in Basic Questions of Philosophy (GA 45) and finally briefly turns to Contributions to Philosophy, where Heidegger develops the disposition of the other beginning in three stages: shock (Erschrecken), restraint (Verhaltenheit), and diffidence (Scheu). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Interpreting the New Heidegger)

20 pages, 270 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Society of the Like: Hegel, Veblen and the Negative Ontology of Recognition in Cyberspace

by Alejandro Pérez-y-Soto-Domínguez, Héctor Fernando Rueda-Rodríguez and Héctor Alberto Cortez-Valencia

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 117; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040117 - 11 Jul 2026

Abstract

This article advances a philosophical interpretation of contemporary cyberspace through the categories of recognition, negativity and invidious distinction. Existing accounts attribute digital self-exploitation to surveillance, economic coercion or behavioural design; these readings describe mechanisms without identifying the ontological operation they presuppose. The paper [...] Read more.

This article advances a philosophical interpretation of contemporary cyberspace through the categories of recognition, negativity and invidious distinction. Existing accounts attribute digital self-exploitation to surveillance, economic coercion or behavioural design; these readings describe mechanisms without identifying the ontological operation they presuppose. The paper argues that the like is not a reduced form of recognition but its structural contrary, and that the same cancellation operates across the broader architecture of commerce in cyberspace. Drawing on Hegel’s analysis of Anerkennung as a negative operation requiring risk and determinate negation, and on Veblen’s theory of invidious distinction as the preservation of that negativity within commercial society, the article shows that algorithmic cyberspace cancels the three conditions under which recognition is ontologically possible—the risk of non-recognition, determination through scarcity, and the reciprocity of the encounter. What the like offers is pure positivity, and that positivity produces the very exhaustion it claims to soothe. Platform fatigue is therefore structural: the consequence of an institution that monetises recognition demands it cannot satisfy. The paper concludes by situating the diagnosis within the Kantian question of autonomy and the Luddite prehistory of technical resistance to the reorganisation of recognition. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Critical Theory in the Age of Digital Capitalism)

14 pages, 6070 KB

Open AccessArticle

Token Trajectories as Knowledge Representation in Large Language Models

by Rafal Maciag

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 116; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040116 - 9 Jul 2026

Abstract

The subject of this paper is the problem of knowledge revealed by the emergence of advanced natural language processing technology, called large language models (LLMs). It proposes an interpretation of the appearance of this phenomenon as an emergent effect of a complex system, [...] Read more.

The subject of this paper is the problem of knowledge revealed by the emergence of advanced natural language processing technology, called large language models (LLMs). It proposes an interpretation of the appearance of this phenomenon as an emergent effect of a complex system, such as LLMs. The meaning of this interpretation is based on the observation of the computational trajectory of computational units (vectors) which, on the other hand, represent discrete semantic units, tokens. To justify the autonomy and relevance of this interpretation of knowledge, the paper invokes the concept of discursive space, which allows, in particular, for the reliance on language as a container of knowledge and for the generalization of the idea of knowledge to other semantic environments. To describe more general units of knowledge, the strong version of the theory proposes the introduction of the institution of gnosemes, of which discourse is a special case. Gnosemes find application in the case of LLMs. Due to the different ontical contexts of the entities described, the paper proposes a transdisciplinary approach, the axis of which is the field of social sciences. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intelligent Inquiry into Intelligence)

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19 pages, 278 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Epistemological Crisis of Rationality in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Through the Lens of 4E Cognition and Postphenomenology

by Olexii Varypaiev

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 115; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040115 - 8 Jul 2026

Abstract

Everyday work with large language models (LLMs) normalizes a practice in which a generated formulation supports judgment before the user has checked its grounds. This crisis of rationality arises not from a single technical defect in the system, but from a shift in [...] Read more.

Everyday work with large language models (LLMs) normalizes a practice in which a generated formulation supports judgment before the user has checked its grounds. This crisis of rationality arises not from a single technical defect in the system, but from a shift in justificatory practice in which fluent textual coherence is read as evidence of semantic understanding and rational judgment. The method brings conceptual analysis into contact with 4E cognition and a postphenomenological account of technological mediation. Within this framework, LLMs are described neither as autonomous rational subjects nor as neutral instruments, but as multistable moral-epistemic mediators of human rationality. The analysis distinguishes textual competence from world-involved understanding and relates interface mediation to trust and responsibility. On this basis, the article proposes a four-cluster protocol for the attribution of rationality, which introduces an epistemic pause as a route of verification between a generated formulation and its authorial acceptance as a claim. The central risk lies not in whether machine consciousness has been proven, but in the normalization of practices in which ready-made text acquires the status of a ground before the user has reconstructed its sources and accepted responsibility for what is asserted. Full article

16 pages, 281 KB

Open AccessArticle

Genetic Manipulation of Plants: A More-than-Human Ethical Challenge

by Grégori de Souza and Jelson Roberto de Oliveira

Philosophies 2026, 11(4), 114; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11040114 - 8 Jul 2026

Abstract

The central argument of this article is that the genetic manipulation of plants raises profound ethical questions that cannot be adequately addressed within a purely anthropocentric framework. Drawing on Hans Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility, the article argues that modern biotechnology transforms living organisms [...] Read more.

The central argument of this article is that the genetic manipulation of plants raises profound ethical questions that cannot be adequately addressed within a purely anthropocentric framework. Drawing on Hans Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility, the article argues that modern biotechnology transforms living organisms into objects of technological intervention, thereby challenging traditional distinctions between subject and object in the domain of technology. Because plants are living beings that possess their own intrinsic good and play a fundamental role in the biosphere, their genetic manipulation must be evaluated not only in terms of human utility but also in relation to ecological integrity, intergenerational responsibility, and the preservation of life’s evolutionary continuity. The article proposes an approach that remains largely unexplored in the international literature: interpreting plant genetic engineering through the lens of Jonasian ontology of life and the ethics of responsibility, thereby moving the debate beyond the limits of traditional anthropocentrism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility)

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