Environmental Esthetics and Other Non-Anthropocentric Representations of Nature

Abstract

This article addresses environmental esthetics in dialog with other non-anthropocentric representations of nature, starting with the Ancient Western philosophy of art as a human expression of nature (φύσις, physis). In the context of this more primary understanding, the consolidation of an anthropocentric representation of nature based on homo mensura is examined, in which the human being emerges as the measure of all things. This interpretation of nature fosters its progressive reification, which coincides with the emergence of esthetics as a modern philosophical discipline, often articulated around the partial and isolated appreciation of the object. It is argued that environmental esthetics emphasizes an immersive and relational experience with the environment, facilitating a certain release from anthropocentric mental habits, and that the notion of hyperobjects also helps to confront them by laying bare phenomena that exceed the human scale. In line with this expansion of space–time coordinates, which challenge perceptive categories in themselves, an ecosuicidological esthetic is presented, one capable of cultivating a renewed, non-anthropocentric sensitivity. The article resorts to Amerindian knowledges for the concept’s potential deployment and discusses artistic expressions that reconfigure the experience of representing nature, transforming perception and inspiring new forms of reciprocity.

1. Philosophy of Art Among the Ancient Greeks as a Human Expression of φύσις

Ancient Greek philosophy offers various poetic explanations of nature (φύσις, physis), which poetized not only through verse but also through mythology and whose metaphorical representations served as fundamental pillars of philosophy. Many pre-Socratic fragments are veritable philosophical poems about nature. For example, Heraclitus described it as a living fire, “kindled in measures and extinguished in measures” [1] (DK 22 B 30). In general, measure, equality, and proportion were common patterns among the pre-Socratics and their conceptions of nature. Through a harmonious vision between measures and opposites [1] (DK 22 B 88), the justice present in nature was also revealed: “The sun will not overstep measures,” says Heraclitus, “otherwise, the Erinyes, justice’s helpers, will find it out” [1] (DK 22 B 94).

Philosophy of art was substantially linked to nature among the Greeks, in visions where subjects such as truth, justice and beauty were essential. For example, Plato explained that a demiurge had endowed nature with intelligence, wanting everything to be good. This divine artisan created the world from ideas: a rational work of art, the most “beautiful” and the “best” [2] (Timaeus, 30b). From a metaphysical dimension marked by perfection, the essence of beauty was defined and the identification of beauty with the good became commonplace. The entire cosmos was conceived of as a divine living and soul-possessing being [2] (34b–36b) with a spherical shape—the most perfect of all—that revolved around itself [2] (33b–34c) and held the Earth at its center [2] (40b–c), constituting the place of greatest stability and measure. Then, as if it were a work of art modeled on its own being, this was followed by the spheres of the planets, all surrounded by the sphere of stars. As a whole, it moved to the rhythm of musical harmonies and numerical proportions in accordance with time. In this way, Plato returned to the idea of a naturalized cosmos [2] (39d–41d) that was alive, beautiful and harmonious. Its circles followed an orderly movement. Nature was conceived as an artistic creation superior to human art because the universe arose from the model of an intelligible, perfect and unique living being (31a–b). It is true that Timaeus is the expression of a worldview with strong pre-Socratic influences, in which nature was understood as a naturalized cosmos. However, with Plato and the Sophists, nature (φύσις, physis) began to relate more specifically to the nature of a being, the study of whom focused, above all, on the distinctively human. Plato related his philosophy of nature to art (τέχνη/μίμησις) through various philosophical allegories in which the relationship between the natural world, human creation, truth and appearance was central. His philosophy revived the Milesian notion of substance, which for them was manifested as an eternal and constant law of nature amid the multiplicity of changes and contingencies of becoming. This law opened the possibility for human beings to direct their existence toward a higher level of rationality primarily aimed at the good [3] (De Republica, VI, 508b–509b). Platonic metaphysics attributed nature with a degree of imitation regarding the universe of ideas. In other words, sensitive nature was a copy of the suprasensitive order and, in this sense, a realm of shadows [3] (De Republica, VII, 514a–515c). Consequently, imitative art (theater, poetry and painting) could to a certain degree be viewed as twice removed from the truth, a distance that was due to the imitation of objects that were merely copies of ideas, which is why Plato had his qualms about mimetic art [3] (De Republica, X, 595a; 608b). However, he also understood nature as a beneficial law, a rational principle of justice that concerned both human beings and the eternal models that upheld reality. He considered the world order to be intelligent and, though he did not deny the presence of evil, his conception of nature implied a rational appreciation of a moral and, ultimately, religious nature. A common element of his classic allegories was the order that nature could be subjected to according to its relationship with the divine. Nature was intelligible but became degraded in the sensitive world. Art, while it could distance itself from the truth by merely imitating appearances, could also be tremendously valuable if it managed to guide the soul toward the truth. For example, in the Chariot Allegory, reflection shifts to the nature of the soul, essential to understanding poetic art. Plato depicts the soul as a winged chariot pulled by two horses: reason and desire (νοῦς–λόγος/ἐπιθυμία). The experience of natural and artistic beauty could arouse the memory of ideas (ἀνάμνησις). In this sense, he believed that authentic art—if guided by truth—could lift the soul and transcend mere imitation (μίμησις). If it was aimed at the good, art became an esthetic–erotic and formative force [4] (Phaedrus, 260d–270a). For Plato, art that imitated the rational order of the cosmos was superior, not the mere surface of nature.

While Plato saw sensitive nature as an imperfect copy of the world of ideas and viewed mimetic art with caution, Aristotle assigned a positive value to mimesis [5] (Poetica, IV: 1448b). In Poetica, art was not limited to the reproduction of appearances but represented human actions according to principles of need and verisimilitude, and allowed access to universal truths [5] (Poetica, IX: 1451a–1451b). Furthermore, the Aristotelian notion of nature maintained the idea of an internal and teleological order of natural beings, albeit without resorting to a transcendental model like the Platonic one of ideas. In nature as in art, beauty was related to the appropriate order, proportion and magnitude, elements that also appeared in the Greek cosmological conceptions mentioned above.

There was also a parallel to the educational function that Plato attributed to art in the Aristotelian theory of catharsis [5] (Poetica, VI, 1449b), according to which, for example, tragedy contributed to ethical education by purifying emotions like fear and compassion [6] (Politica, VIII: 1341b–1342a). Thus, Aristotle maintained the close relationship between art, nature and human education but assigned greater autonomy to artistic creation than Plato did, insofar as he classified the mimetic arts according to medium, object and mode of imitation. This gave poetry an autonomous technical structure: it was not a mere degraded copy but a practice with internal principles [5] (Poetica, I: 1447a). For his part, Aristotle attributed greater philosophical legitimacy to art than Plato, inasmuch as art arose from a natural human disposition, contributed to ethical and affective education, and possessed a rationality of its own capable of revealing universal structures of action [5] (Poetica, IV, VI & IX); [6] (Politica, VIII); [7] (Fisica, II, 2 & II, 8); [8] (Etica a Nicomaco, VI, 4); [9] (Metafísica, I, 1).

The Anthropocentric Representation of Homo Mensura: Man as the Measure of All Things

Protagoras of Abdera’s statement on homo mensura, that “Man is the measure of all things” [10] (Cratylus, 385d–386a), invites us to reflect on the philosophical sources of anthropocentrism in classical Greek philosophy: “man is ‘the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non–existence of the things that are not’ (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν)” [11] (Theaetetus, 152a). Plato critically discussed this claim, which was key to understanding his own philosophy of art: “Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you—you and I being ‘man’?” [11] (152a). In this sense, providing a universally valid definition was not simple. Thus, for example, it was argued about justice: “For I claim that whatever seems right and honorable to a state is really right and honorable to it, so long as it believes it to be so” [11] (167c).

Unlike Protagoras, Plato held that each person’s opinion was not what, in essence, served as a measure of virtue. The measure has to arise from something objective that is independent of opinion and, strictly speaking, only the idea is a measure or reference for judging the true value of human actions. A critical approach to the hermeneutics of homo mensura helps to better understand Plato’s philosophy of art, according to which beauty is not something that depends on who perceived it, because for them man is not the measure of all things. The true measure is good, truth, and beauty in and of themselves, which exist objectively in the world of ideas. Therefore, something is not beautiful because it seems beautiful to someone, but because it participates in the idea of beauty. In other words, the phrase that “Man is the measure of all things” represents the Sophist relativism that Plato disagreed with. If art imitates sensitive appearances and depends on human perception, it cannot be a criterion of truth or authentic beauty. In this case, art distances the soul from true knowledge. Hence, Plato did not accept that man was the measure of all things. The fact that beauty does not depend on subjective taste in Platonic philosophy of art—for there is beauty in itself and good art must direct the soul toward good—explains why Plato distrusted tragic poetry, regulated art in De Republica, and valued its subordination to moral education [12] (II, 376e–392c; III, 392c–403c); [3] (X, 595a–602b; X, 605c–607a).

Far from a hedonistic and superficial esthetic dilettantism, art for Plato contemplates various philosophical conceptions and angles that were far from merely reflecting issues associated with esthetic luxury. The myth of Prometheus, for example, invites a reflection on the origin of art and technique [13] (Protagoras, 320c–322d). Human beings were born into nature unprotected; Prometheus came to their assistance by giving them fire and technique (arts). In this context, art appeared as a tool for survival in the face of human vulnerability.

In short, Plato’s critique of Protagoras’s statement can be considered cross-cutting to the different visions of art offered in his allegories and dialogs. The very hermeneutics of homo mensura help to better understand the subsequent course that this interpretation of nature took, leading to an instrumental vision of it that hides its being. The verb “to measure” has been closely related to a prevailing economic and utilitarian measure or valuation of nature ever since. Thus, a dynamic aimed at transforming the measurable into an object of exploitation was gradually consolidated, establishing criteria of equivalence and proportion between nature conceived as a resource and the monetary gains obtained from the relations of domination and control over it [14] (pp. 73–74). By contrast, esthetic contemplation and the perceptive realm inherent to it offer a pause in the face of this instrumental mode of reasoning, opening the possibility of accessing an understanding of nature that is not necessarily determined by an anthropocentric approach.

2. The Reification of Nature in Western Modernity and the Emergence of Esthetics as a Philosophical Discipline

The certainty of the medieval universe, based on a revealed truth that is external to the subject, began to undergo intense questioning during modernity. Human beings became aware of their autonomy and of the need to establish the laws and norms that would govern their lives. It is well known that theocentrism became remarkably attenuated during this period, particularly since the Renaissance, relegating the power of external divine or supernatural forces in general to a secondary plane. In parallel, an anthropocentric vision was intensified, whose philosophical roots—as has already been noted—are found in Antiquity.

The shift from a revealed certainty to one substantiated by the subject meant that human beings once again asserted themselves as guarantors of the truth, though this time starting with themselves. This transformation implied an inversion of the power and domination relations typical of the medieval world. Modern thought seemed to have detached itself from the principles that had hitherto been accepted as undisputed foundations of knowledge, strengthening itself through a relationship of imposition and control over nature. This consolidated an era characterized by the central role of subjectivity (there is no object without subject), the predominance of a specific scientific model, and the world’s disenchantment and progressive reification [14] (pp. 105–106).

The way nature was represented changed in the modern era. In the predominant Cartesian paradigm, nature was conceived as a thing, a res extensa, rather than a naturalized cosmos [15] (1641/2003, Medit. II, pp. 20–21); [16] (1644/1983, II, art 4, pp. 40–41; art. 11, p. 44); a machine ready for human use and benefit. Conceptions of the universe as a living cosmos were gradually left behind and those of native peoples who divinized nature were despised [17] (Boyle, 1686/1996, p. 15). The main objective became knowledge of its laws to master and manage it effectively [18] (Bacon, 1620/2003, § 129); [19] (1627/2009, p. 50).

Ratio as calculating rationality [20] (Hobbes, 1651/1946, p. 22), which is typical of modern science, generalized its modus operandi of accounts and measurements to all areas of knowledge. It relegated the selfless contemplation of nature without economic or personal ends, which stood in the way of this relationship, to the background. The ancients’ way of poetizing it was excluded. But modern science did not replace the philosophy of art, nor was its main intention to complement it. On the contrary, it fought against and discarded its conception of nature. It did not imitate or represent it as before but instead operated through calculation.

The birth of esthetics in the 18th century—as aesthetica—can be better understood in the face of the process of reification of nature and the inclusion of the bodily dimension in this reification, conceived in the likeness of a machine [15] (Descartes, 1641/2003, pp. 58–59); [21] (1664/1972, pp. 2–4); [22] (La Mettrie 1747/1996, pp. 28–29); [20] (Hobbes 1651/1946, p. 5). It is no coincidence that its emergence coincided with the Enlightenment, a European cultural and intellectual movement that promoted an exacerbated trust in reason and science to lift humanity out of the shadows of ignorance and enable its progress.

The new modern paradigm [23] (Descartes, 1637/2001, p. 16); [15] (1641/2003, Medit. I, II, VI) gradually distanced philosophy from the ancient representation of nature as a living universe, expressed in artistic manifestations of a philosophical style. In the West, all this seemed to be generally replaced by a conception that came to understand nature as inanimate matter in constant movement, subjected to mechanical and mathematical laws. The foundational poetic force of nature that was the principle and artistic expression of great philosophical inspirations was no longer exalted. Esthetics emerged as a philosophical discipline to partially fill that void.

Alexander Baumgarten coined the term esthetics (aesthetica) in his 1735 work Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, defining it as a science that focuses on sensitive knowledge [24] (Cf. 1735/1954, § 115–117, pp. 77–79). His work addresses esthetic problems with specificity in more systematic issues than his predecessors. Among other things, he detailed various notions associated with multiple artistic phenomena and the essence of beauty, such as genius and artistic disposition, in addition to respective knowledge. The essence of beauty is discussed extensively in his Ästhetik [25] (1750/2007, § 14–28, pp. 21–27; § 32, p. 31). It is true that these subjects had already been discussed in Antiquity and later during the Middle Ages. However, it was Baumgarten’s legacy of definitions and vocabulary that exerted an enormous influence on German philosophers of his time, especially Kant, whose esthetics in turn contributed fundamental elements to the seminal works of several thinkers who followed. However, among the many topics of Kantian esthetics, disinterest is crucially related to environmental and ecological esthetics. Esthetic disinterest characterizes the purely disinterested disposition, activity and state without merely functional ends. There is no satisfaction as such, but instead disinterested gratification, calm complacency. Kant assigned a privileged and exemplary place to esthetic judgments of nature. The notion of disinterest applies to the realm of esthetic appreciation [26] (Kant, 1790/1994, § 5) and illustrates it though nature’s judgments [26] (§ 23).

In contrast, Hegelian esthetics did not concede an esthetic autonomy to nature equivalent to that of art. Though Hegel did not reduce nature to a mere instrument for use, he did subordinate it to the spirit, meaning that natural beauty was considered inferior, immediate and incomplete compared to artistic beauty [27] (Hegel, 1823/2015, pp. 258, 269–271, 280–281). In this sense, to consider his esthetic ecological is problematic in the contemporary sense: while Kantian disinterest allows one to consider a non-utilitarian appreciation of nature, something expressed more strongly in the notion of disinterest in Schopenhauer’s esthetics, Hegelian esthetics re-enrolls nature in an Anthro-spiritual hierarchy in which art holds a higher place as a human product of the spirit [28] (Hegel, 1830/1992, § 556, p. 543; § 558, p. 544; § 560, p. 545).

The Romantic Era was a decisive time for modern reconsideration of nature, as it ceased to be considered a merely exterior, mechanical object available for human dominion. According to Romantic sensitivity, nature emerged as a living, expressive and spiritual totality capable of eliciting esthetic experience, a sense of infinitude and self-awareness. Thus, esthetics was not limited to beholding beauty but became a pathway to a worldview in which nature, subjectivity and the world were profoundly intertwined. Unlike instrumental rationalism, Romanticism asserted the sublime, organic and mysterious aspects of nature. Thus, the esthetic experience of nature allowed one to question the rigid separation between subject and object, culture and the natural world. For this reason, Romanticism can be viewed as a fundamental stage for pondering a less instrumental and more contemplative, symbolic and existential relationship with nature.

In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, art held a privileged place as a form of knowledge that allowed the world to be grasped and reproduced free of the will’s interests and associations [29] (1819/1986, § 34–37). In contrast with the scientific paradigm of the time, art was perceived in clear opposition to science [29] (§ 36, p. 265), as artistic knowledge managed to free itself of the influence of desire or will in the very act of cognition. Though the esthetic experience did not completely suppress the will, it did cease to exercise the dominance over the subject that allowed it to be carried away by that state, an idea also reflected in Mainländer’s esthetics [30] (1876/2021, § 2, pp. 167–168). Both thinkers believed that the artistic perspective temporarily freed the subject from the interests that ordinarily condition knowledge and understanding. Catharsis in the context of these two philosophies should be understood as a certain release or transformation of the will, respectively, not as a self-affirmation of the same as conceived by Nietzsche [31] (1872/2007, pp. 28–30). These and other 19th-century pessimistic philosophers addressed the shadows that the Enlightenment had failed to illuminate in all their grandeur and assigned a central role to esthetics. In this context, the Schopenhauerian worldview should be highlighted, in which the disinterested contemplation of nature offers a certain suspension of the will’s influence, which habitually instrumentalizes and aims knowledge toward merely functional ends. In the esthetic state, nature ceases to be transformed into a mere utilitarian or economic resource; man is no longer the measure to value its use and exploitation. In short, when this esthetic perspective is projected on current environmental problems, it is implicitly at a different level than the extractivist and patriarchal interpretation that encourages the exploitation of resources under a misconception of what human progress and development mean.

3. Environmental Esthetics and the Possible Removal of Certain Anthropocentric Mental Habits

Environmental esthetics studies the philosophical experience of how environments are felt emotionally—for example, the way in which nature is assimilated through rural and urban landscapes or the family environments in which life and everyday activities unfold. One of environmental esthetics’ characteristic features is art’s shift to the environment. Unlike classical esthetics, which encompasses a wide range of esthetic–philosophical topics and usually takes works of art in the classical sense as a reference (poetry, painting, sculpture, music, etc.), environmental esthetics emphasizes the esthetic experience of landscapes, cities, sounds, smells, climates, atmospheres or ecosystems such as forests, deserts, etc. There is an immersive experience, whose contemplation is not the distant one of museums, but rather a bodily experience situated directly within the environment, not opposite or outside it. This esthetic experience of the environment relativizes the exclusionary primacy of sight and the isolated object. It encompasses the person’s inclusion of multisensory perception (sounds, smells, temperatures, textures), temporality (seasonal, climatic or biological changes) and participatory awareness of the subject’s active involvement. In the context of the current ecological crisis, it is more in tune with rethinking the sensitive, perceptive and affective relationship that is established with the natural environment. The way nature is perceived esthetically influences the way it is valued and treated, hence its connection to environmental ethics, the philosophy of nature, animal ethics, ecology, and ecological thought.

The esthetic way of experiencing and appreciating environments may predispose people to a greater sensitivity to question not just anthropocentrism, but also other ecocidal mental habits in the background such as speciesism, theo-narcissism, eco-reifying hermeneutics, and the ecoptimism of sufficient reason [14]. Mental habits have a decisive influence on the way individuals perceive nature and value their environments. Practices and behaviors, as well as acquired physical habits, originate in dispositions that the spirit shapes from very early stages onward. There are mental habits that operate more subtly at the individual level, but whose expression contributes to harming or destroying the human ecosystem and biodiversity on Earth, causing a veiled and indirect ecocide. Anthropocentrism and speciesism are both better-known mental habits, while theo-narcissism, eco-reifying hermeneutics, and ecoptimism of sufficient reason require a brief explanation.

“Theo-narcissism”, based on the belief that man was created in God’s image and likeness, is a mental habit that combines an exalted image of humanity with certain religious interpretations of its place in the cosmos. From this perspective, human beings conceive themselves as the most privileged creatures in creation, the bearers of an exceptional dignity that places them above all other living beings. This mental habit favors the idea that nature primarily exists to serve human ends and that a supposed transcendental mandate legitimizes its transformation or exploitation. By reinforcing the human species’ centrality and superiority, theo-narcissism contributes to consolidating an anthropocentric vision of the world that hinders acknowledgment of the multiple forms of value that exist in the biotic community.

“Eco-reifying hermeneutics” is a mental habit that guides an interpretation of nature based on a logic of objectification and utility. In this interpretive framework, living beings, ecosystems, and natural elements are primarily viewed as resources available to meet human needs. Nature ceases to be a reality endowed with its own value and is conceived as a sum of objects susceptible to exploitation, control and administration. As a mental habit profoundly rooted in Modernity, “eco-reifying hermeneutics” contributes to naturalizing practices of domination of the environment, reinforcing an instrumental relationship that impedes recognition of the autonomy and dignity of non-human entities.

Lastly, “ecoptimism” is a mental habit characterized by an excessive trust in human techno-scientific progress to solve ecological problems. This line of thought is based on the conviction that science, technology and economic growth will find effective solutions to environmental crises without the need for a profound change in lifestyles, productive models or ways of relating to the natural world. As a mental habit, ecoptimism acts as an interpretive filter that attenuates the perception of the gravity of phenomena such as global overheating, the loss of biodiversity or global pollution, fostering an attitude of confidence that can end up delaying urgent transformations.

However, environmental esthetics helps to diminish anthropocentrism by promoting an experience with nature based on participation, care, and acknowledgment of its intrinsic value beyond its utility to human beings. By questioning the idea that human beings are the measure of all things, it also helps to reduce speciesism by inviting them to view other living beings as moral and esthetic subjects, not mere means for human ends. Furthermore, it contributes to weakening theo-narcissism by questioning visions that place human beings in a position of absolute privilege within creation, favoring an attitude of ecological humility that recognizes our interdependence with all forms of life and the systems that make existence on the planet possible. It also challenges eco-reifying hermeneutics, as it fosters an understanding of nature as a community of beings and processes with their own value, instead of conceiving it as a set of resources available for exploitation. Lastly, environmental esthetics allows one to distance oneself from ecoptimism by showing that the ecological crisis cannot be solved with technological progress but instead requires a profound transformation of the way we perceive and relate to the natural world.

Regarding the anthropocentric mental habit, the esthetic experience of the environment is closely related to ethics that problematize it and can contribute to overcoming some of its expressions by opening up to a different way of understanding and experiencing the relationship with nature and the environment. Rather than addressing a new topic, environmental esthetics can move beyond anthropocentrism’s traditional shared ontological and perceptive approach, toward three fundamental guidelines:

1. Weakening the belief that human beings are the exclusive center of the esthetic experience. Esthetics often questions the object–subject dichotomy characteristic of the modern paradigm, in which nature is valued as an object for a subject that submits it to its appreciation of control and appropriation. However, some contemporary exponents of environmental esthetics also problematize the classical duality of a distant and neutral human subject contemplating an esthetic object, whether it is a work or a landscape. For example, Arnold Berleant argues that traditional esthetics privileges distance by separating subject and object, fueling indifference, coldness, uncommitted neutrality and passivity, all of which he alleges to be inappropriate to understanding the real esthetic experience [32] (pp. 1–20). As an alternative, he suggests an immersive, participatory and engaged experience in which human beings are not subjects outside nature, but within it. However, the essence and origins of this critique are not new. Consider the distinction between the pure subject of knowledge (das reine Subjekt des Erkennens) and the pure object of knowledge (das reine Objekt des Erkennens), where the esthetic difference between the two tends to be diluted and less marked, as is the case with the empirical subject and object of knowledge. In the esthetic relationship, the pure subject feels captivated by what is observed, identifying with and merging with what is contemplated [29] (§ 34, p. 260), in that way fostering a state that is freer of the anthropocentrism with which homo mensura measures and calculates his environment. Thus, the radical dichotomy that Berleant rejects was already strongly questioned in the 19th century, which since then has been a valid way to address the esthetic states that link contemplation with participation, or distance with immersion.

2. Openness to a non-instrumental sensitivity toward nature. Kant associated the esthetic experience with selfless, non-functional contemplation, but detached from the environment in certain aspects. Modern esthetics inherited some of these characteristics. Continuing his critique, Berleant rejects the classic model of Kantian esthetics of disinterest [32] (pp. 9–104) and, specifically, the idea of disinterested contemplation, showing how disinterest produces a passive spectator model that impoverishes the esthetic experience. However, Berleant’s rejection of disinterest is not without criticism either. For example, Damla Dönmez argues that the concept of disinterest is essentially misinterpreted, ignoring aspects such as non-instrumentality, impartiality, selflessness, and the acceptance of the otherness of nature, which she views as compatible with an esthetic appreciation that is respectful of the environment. For her, disinterest is not anthropocentric but anthropogenic [33] (p. 149). Other specialists in the esthetics of nature and environmental esthetics maintain elements of disinterest in search of non-instrumental visions of nature, pointing to the need to recognize it not as a human creation that only exists to please and serve human beings. Allen Carlson, for example, proposes the esthetic appreciation of nature—the environmental model [34] (p. 274)—as an alternative to her anthropocentric vision. Thus, Berleant’s critique of this guideline would tend to simplify or caricaturize the notion of disinterestedness from other perspectives, since this concept in Kant, Schopenhauer or in other more contemporary authors does not necessarily imply mere indifference or passivity or, as has been noted, a radical separation between subject and object, but rather the mere suspension of personal, practical, and utilitarian interests.

The problem does not lie in disinterest in and of itself, but in the unecological interpretation of its scope. For example, a non-instrumental esthetic view of nature emerges extensively from the third book of The World as Will and Representation [29]. In this sense, environmental esthetics can foster a contemplation and response to nature that does not measure it from a calculating perspective or seek its control or exploitation, but rather protects it, listens to it, accompanies it and allows itself to be affected by it, removing the human subject from its center as an absolute measure of esthetic experience.

3. The environment as a coagent of the esthetic experience. The environment is not a passive space or a mere resource that is out there. People engage in the esthetic experience through the impression of landscapes, atmospheres, noises, seasonal rhythms, smells, tonalities and the presence of other living beings. It is not just produced by the human mind in isolation or totally separated from the world. The esthetic experience arises from a network of relationships between humans and non-humans. Nature expresses itself as the bearer of its own esthetic agency, without necessarily being subordinate to the measure of homo mensura. The esthetic experience takes place in an environmental sphere in which it is shared with other life forms and, consequently, with other intertwined forms of perception and environments. There are horizons of perception configured by climatic, geographical, cultural, and other conditioning factors. For example, Ronald Hepburn emphasizes these aspects of the esthetic experience of nature that are not or cannot be replaced by the experience that a work of art independent of the environment seeks:

I have been arguing that certain important differences between natural objects and art–objects should not be seen as entailing the aesthetic unimportance of the former, that (on the contrary) several of these differences furnish grounds for distinctive and valuable types of esthetic experience of nature. These are types of experience that art cannot provide to the same extent as nature, and which in some cases it cannot provide at all.

[35] (p. 293)

For Hepburn, the suspension of practical interests and purposes allows nature to manifest itself esthetically. That is, preserving its capacity to reveal nature’s otherness and non-human foundation.

In short, environmental esthetics may be closely related to an ethics whose focus goes beyond human life (animal ethics, environmental ethics, etc.), and especially non-Western worldviews that problematize anthropocentrism. The weakening of the belief that human beings are the exclusive center of esthetic experience, the openness to a non-instrumental sensitivity toward nature, and the assimilation of the environment as a coagent of esthetic experience help to envisage a gradual release from anthropocentric mental habits. This process, in addition to questioning the categorical and rigid subject–object dichotomy characteristic of modernity, relativizes the space–time coordinates where anthropocentrism has been deployed with force. An example of this is the notion of hyperobjects, which will be analyzed below.

4. Hyperobjects and Non-Anthropocentric Esthetics

Environmental esthetics emphasizes how the environment is experienced, how it feels to live in a certain place, its atmosphere and the feelings or emotions it elicits.

The notion of hyperobjects, coined by Timothy Morton [36] (pp. 130–135), refers to things with a massive spatiotemporal presence compared to human beings [37] (p. 1). One may not be aware of them, but they are distributed and spread out on a scale so vast that they exceed direct human experience to measure them in their entirety. In this sense, they challenge traditional human perception. The term is a compound of the Greek prefix hyper, which means “excess”, “above”, “beyond”, and the word “objects”. They are not just “hyper” for people, because they are also massive for other entities and living beings. Nor are they “hyper” because they are infinite entities, but because, according to Morton, they are so vast that they invalidate the traditional notion of “world”, leading to the assimilation of a disturbing intimacy with the non-human. Hyperobjects are “hyper” in relation to other entities that may or may not be the work of human beings. They are not just systems or assemblages of other objects, but exist in and of themselves, according to what Morton calls object-oriented ontology (OOO). OOO is a recent philosophical movement that proposes a particular modality of realism and a non-anthropocentric perspective:

Hyperobjects are not just collections, systems, or assemblages of other objects. They are objects in their own right, objects in a special sense that I shall elucidate as we proceed through this book. The special sense of object derives from object–oriented ontology (OOO), an emerging philosophical movement committed to a unique form of realism and non-anthropocentric thinking”.

[37] (p. 2)

Following object-oriented ontology, it is possible to become aware that one is experiencing “the End of the World”, understood as the end of the idea that nature is something external and separate from oneself. Global warming is a key example of a hyperobject. Morton prefers to refer to global warming instead of climate change to illustrate its traumatic nature and to distance himself from denialist positions [37] (pp. 7–9). There are also other hyperobjects of an environmental and climatic nature, such as the biosphere and specific ecosystems. There are hyperobjects that come from nuclear materials like plutonium and uranium, whose radiation is toxic for life on the planet and whose half-life or effects persist for thousands of years. That is, they last far beyond the human time scale, showing the extensive finiteness of hyperobjects. Morton also mentions the chemicals in pesticides, which are considered toxic hyperobjects that invisibly but constantly penetrate and alter bodies. Hyperobjects also include concrete industrial products that take centuries to break down, such as polystyrene or the plastic bags that can be found all over the planet, polluting and persisting over time. The same is the case with oil, a geophysical substance, whose use has increased its parts per million (PPM) in the atmosphere, illustrating the increase in the greenhouse gases (GHGs) that have ultimately transformed the surface of the Earth. This planet is also a hyperobject, with its geological cycles that exceed human significance. There are other biological or cosmic hyperobjects such as black holes, the solar system and the Milky Way, with structures that contain human beings and whose temporal and spatial scales exceed one’s own understanding due to their immensity. To be sure, the concrete things mentioned are not the only hyperobjects, and more abstract issues such as the prevailing economic system and capitalism, among others, can be included.

Hyperobjects are manifested esthetically. Morton argues that many environments are already traversed by hyperobjects, and though they are not fully visible, their effects are perceptible. In other words, hyperobjects are felt before they are understood. One walks through the city and feels the heavy air; one raises one’s head and sees the gray sky: pollution. On a summer day, in addition to pollution, one feels an unbearable heat: global warming. The streets are full of cables; roads are crowded with vehicles and the noise of engines; the smell from exhaust pipes and factories: the industrial system. All this is an esthetic experience of the environment; it is not just scientific data warning of pollution, reporting a few degrees more or less, or counting the number of vehicles circulating in the city. One does not necessarily think that one is within a climate hyperobject or industrial capitalism, but one still feels something. This bodily experience may be environmental esthetics and, from this perspective, the phenomenon that produces it would be a hyperobject.

In this context, there is no “pure nature” with a distant, clean and idyllic landscape. Morton argues that this was how nature was conceived before, while the city was associated with the human sphere. However, he argues that forests now have plastic, that the “natural” air has chemicals, and that the climate has already been altered.

Morton establishes five interrelated properties to describe the ways hyperobjects are perceived. (1) Viscosity: hyperobjects are viscous insofar as they stick to the entities with which they relate. In the esthetic field, one must consider that there is no objective distance that allows them to be neutrally viewed from the outside; (2) Nonlocality: the hypoerobject’s local expression is not the hyperobject itself. One can see a landscape full of cables, but that knot of cables is only a small fragment of the hyperobject itself, just a thin and black expression of the industrial economic system that constitutes the hyperobject itself; (3) Temporal Undulation: inscribed in deep time, hyperobjects surpass the human scale and turbulently alter the space–time coordinates that human beings are accustomed to; (4) Phasing: because phases unfold in a space of high dimensionality, which prevents their full understanding by human beings, it is only possible to perceive partial manifestations at certain times; and (5) Interobjectivity: the effects that emerge from the relationships between the esthetic properties of multiple objects that coexist in the same space.

Hyperobjects fundamentally relate to non-anthropocentric visions, which, by displacing human beings from the center of reality, facilitate recognition of their coexistence and radical intimacy with the non-human. The vision of hyperobjects does not revolve around the usual anthropocentric axis but rather identifies them as a threat to the latter [37] (p. 21) and considers all entities to be real. The center is shifted here. Human beings no longer enjoy a central or privileged perspective. There is no beyond or fringe from which to observe the universe; one is always inside it and within hyperobjects. Awareness of them entails assimilating an extensive finiteness, since they last thousands of years and can be in greater harmony with ethics that transcend individual human interests and usually only regulate relations among contemporaries. This non-anthropocentric view recognizes that we are composed of non-human entities (like the mitochondria in our cells) and that others—and the other—are part of the physical essence itself. A landfill far from the city may contain mountains of waste, but traces of microplastics are already inside the body itself and are part of it. There is no longer pristine nature, but a place where life and death coexist with toxic substances, radiation, and garbage. Ecological awareness consists of recognizing that this space is coinhabited with the non-human and the lethal.

Hyperobjects are classified as agents of the environmental crisis and can make clear each person’s responsibility for the environmental damage caused and suffered. They can be recognized as agents of slow violence. Ecological damage involves dynamics that have been exercised slowly over years and centuries. For example, global warming acts like a “slow–motion nuclear bomb” [37] (p. 103) whose effects are almost invisible until a major catastrophe occurs: wildfires, devastating floods, the submergence of islands underwater, etc.

Environmental disasters used to be seen as external events, but hyperobjects are viscous, they “stick”, and involve people and agents in destructive dynamics. Involvement in the destructive process is complete. In that sense, Morton points out that there is no “outside” from which to observe the crisis. For example, the mere act of starting their cars makes individuals accomplices to global warming: “When I turn the key in the ignition of my car, I am relating to global warming” [37] (p. 20).

The ecocide caused by hyperobjects created by human beings can reveal a crisis in which time is running out and where neither governments nor world powers have prioritized their study and prevention but instead incite destructive and self-destructive rearmament. There is a radical mismatch between one’s ability to understand the extent of damage (which will last thousands of years, like plutonium radiation) and the ability to act effectively in the present to prevent it. Because one is trapped inside these massive objects, any ethical or political decision feels insufficient.

Environmental esthetics now studies hybrid, mixed, uncomfortable landscapes and how hyperobjects are felt. That esthetic experience of the environment can create awareness, so people can feel an environment as toxic, oppressive, strange or disturbing. This feeling may cause discomfort, solastalgia, and a sense of responsibility and ethical questioning: what are we doing, what can be done, what is my responsibility, and what role does art play in all this?

For example, Chris Jordan’s photography, which Morton highlights in his work, can be interpreted as an invitation to reconsider our perceptive and ethical relationship with the environment. His images often reveal the material consequences of mass consumption and pollution, laying bare what normally remains hidden in everyday life. This perspective engages in close dialog with his work, especially his concept of hyperobjects, entities that exceed immediate human perception due to their vast spatiotemporal scale. Jordan’s photographs contribute to making diffuse realities like climate change, plastic pollution or the global accumulation of waste perceptible, offering concrete representations of phenomena that are usually abstract.

From the perspective of environmental esthetics, these images help to remove an anthropocentric vision of nature by showing how human beings are part of a network of ecological interdependencies whose alteration has planetary consequences. Thus, Jordan’s work not only has artistic value but also possesses a critical and ecological dimension by raising awareness of the processes of environmental deterioration that Morton identifies as central features of the contemporary ecological crisis.

Given that Morton is a thinker deeply rooted in Western tradition, something that is evident in his conception of nature and in the artistic expressions he highlights in his work on Anglophone culture, the next section will take conceptions of nature from non-Western worldviews as a reference, such as those of native American peoples, to show how they help to remove the inherited anthropocentric structures discussed here.

5. Ecocide and Ecosuicide: Contributions from Non-Western Knowledge for an Ecosuicidological Esthetic

Originally, the concept of ecocide referred to war-related practices that deliberately turned the environment into a military objective, transforming it into a direct instrument of destruction. These dynamics aim to cause environmental disasters with the purpose of forcing the definitive displacement, death or mass extermination of both human and non-human populations. Though it is possible to identify pre-industrial practices of ecocide since ancient times, the term emerges specifically in a marked military context in the mid-20th century, and the wars waged by the United States in Southeast Asia. In this scenario, the notion of ecocide was articulated as a denunciation of the environmental devastation and humanitarian catastrophe caused by Operation Ranch Hand and especially the destructive effects of chemical weapons—herbicides and defoliants—mainly on the forests of Vietnam.

The use of nature as a military target not only expresses material and concrete violence, but also reveals a particular way of conceiving, perceiving and valuing the natural world. Reducing the environment to a strategic objective implies an anthropocentric view that strips it of feeling, complexity, and intrinsic value, subjecting it to a perceptive regime that makes it available for annihilation. From an esthetic perspective, ecocide cannot just be understood as an ethical or political problem, but also as the result of a certain form of sensitivity and representation of nature.

Currently, it is particularly necessary to distinguish between the uses of the concept of ecocide strictly limited to its original context of war and those which extend its scope beyond this framework. In other words, nature is turned into a target of destruction that is not necessarily military, but rather slow and systematically violent. This conceptual expansion makes it possible to see processes of devastation that, while not direct, are equally lethal and operate according to forms of perceptive normalization that tend to render their cumulative effects invisible. In this context, one must consider that the paleobiological analysis of fossil records has generally distinguished two types of extinction. Background extinction corresponds to a slow and continuous process in which a species and its ecological niche are maintained for long periods without substantial changes. In contrast, mass extinction is an abrupt rupture. It happens more rapidly, affects a significantly larger number of species, and compromises vast expanses of habitat [38] (pp. 231–232). This latter type of mass extinction began to repeat itself as the first human groups arrived in the different continents, presenting common features such as increased frequency, temporal acceleration, and spatial expansion [39] (pp. 24–25). Unlike background extinction, ecocide can be understood as a contemporary form of mass extinction that unfolds quickly because of multiple anthropogenic causes.

Mass extinctions in previous geological times were associated with extra-human causes, such as the impact of meteorites. What is unique about the current ecocide, conceived as the anthropogenic mass extinction of species, lies not only in its magnitude, but also in the fact that it is caused by a species capable of reflecting on its own acts. However, this capacity has not prevented the persistence of a perceptive pattern that conceives nature as a passive background for human action, reinforcing an anthropocentric vision incapable of a profound assimilation of the inherent value, complexity, and fragility of living systems.

Numerous scientists have noted that the ongoing extinction crisis is comparable to the great extinctions of the remote past, yet the decisive difference is that this would be the only one caused by a species. Wherever human settlements were established, numerous populations of plant and animal species were pushed into depletion and even extinction. The most alarming feature today is that in recent decades the scope of human actions has triggered the greatest scenario of environmental degradation and anthropogenic extermination ever recorded [40] (p. 221).

As irreversible processes, extinctions represent a definitive loss of life forms that impoverishes not only ecosystems, but also the human capacity to understand and inhabit the world. From a non-anthropocentric perspective, this loss can be viewed as a sensitive and perceptive impoverishment, insofar as modes of relationship, coexistence and meanings that exceed the exclusively human are also extinguished.

The complexity of ecocide cannot be conceived in isolation from other self-destructive global dynamics, such as consumerism and human overpopulation, which overburden the Earth’s ability to absorb the waste produced by human activity. These dynamics are sustained by mental and perceptive habits that fragment environmental reality, making it difficult to recognize the links of interdependence between different life systems. In this sense, anthropogenic mass extinction of species can be understood as a form of ecocide, even where a direct destructive intent is lacking.

It must be highlighted that the cumulative effects of ecocide are of such a magnitude that, when considered on a broader time scale, they reveal a lethal potential that goes beyond the destruction of the rest of biodiversity and compromises the very conditions for human survival. In this context, it is worth recalling the notion of ecosuicide, intended to account for the self-destructive nature inherent in these dynamics.

Ecosuicide can be understood as the process through which human beings’ ecocidal actions ultimately compromise the conditions that make their own existence possible. It is a form of cumulative self-destruction that accompanies the devastation of biodiversity, degradation of ecosystems, and alteration of the ecological balances essential for life. From this perspective, the mass elimination of species, destruction of habitats, and deterioration of natural systems not only affect non-human living beings but also increasingly expose humanity to growing risks to its own survival. Thus, ecosuicide refers to the self-referential dimension of ecocide: by destroying the ecological foundations that sustain life on the planet, the human species ends up falling victim to the consequences of its own actions, jeopardizing its current and future continuity [14] (pp. 14–17; 170–173; 182).

Ecosuicide thus highlights a disturbing paradox: it is precisely in the Anthropocene that human life faces the greatest risk of extinction from anthropogenic causes. This means that the era characterized by the impact and dominion of human activities on the planet has unprecedented and potentially self-destructive and lethal consequences.

Differentiating ecosuicide from ecocide allows us to recognize both problems as moments in the same process, distinguished by their intensity and the time scale from which they are analyzed. At a local microscale, destructive practices are often presented as mere acts of exploitation or pollution. From a fragmented and short-term perspective, these damages are not perceived as part of a global self-destructive trend, even when they are massive like those of ecocide. However, broadening the spatiotemporal scale and adopting a more comprehensive perspective makes the ecosuicidal nature of these practices visible. This breadth of gaze requires a profound transformation of the modes of perception inherited from modernity, which have privileged immediacy, utility, and domination. A non-anthropocentric representation of the problem better understands that the latency of ecosuicide does not make it less real, but rather more difficult to perceive within a sensitive regime focused exclusively on the human.

Modes of sensitivity and perception toward Mother Earth are a constituent part of various non-Western worldviews. In India, this originating force is called Prakriti (nature). Some native American peoples believe that existence emanates from a primordial energy that is both the Mother and the substance of everything that exists. This understanding, central to multiple native American cultures, configures not only an ontology but also a certain way of feeling, perceiving and relating to the environment. In this context, the life of the Universe and its expression in Mother Earth also need human correspondence: respect, communication, and protection of its life. “That is why life is in dialog; happiness is knowing how to listen and how to express oneself. To relate with water, the earth, plants, animals and the sun through words, respect, reverence and energetic and spiritual interconnectedness. This is to become conscious with the consciousness of the Universe” [41] (p. 116). In their origin myth, all forms of life come from Mother Earth or Pachamama, the source of creativity, protector of biodiversity and a symbol of the interdependence between all beings [42] (p. 239). In Quechua, pacha refers to the land as fertile soil that enables survival, while mama is the mother, the one that nourishes and sustains, equivalent to a carnal mother because of her ability to make life flourish [43] (p. 214). The philosophy of the Mapuche people follows a similar vein, and their name—mapu (earth) and che (people)—expresses an inseparable identity with the territory: being the “people of the earth” is to recognize oneself as a constituent part of it. Thus, not just living beings, but all expressions of nature on the planet, are understood to be its descendants and the children of Mother Earth or Mother Nature.

Mother Earth or Mother Nature is a protective, active and creative power in all these traditions; the principle and foundation of life. It is a source of life and sensitivity; human beings are part of it, not its owner. The Earth does not belong to human beings; it is human beings who belong to the Earth. Based on non-anthropocentric esthetic representations of nature, these worldviews offer philosophical keys to study and prevent its anthropogenic destruction. By shifting the axis from domination to participation and reciprocity, they transform perceptual habits that reduce the environment to a mere resource.

Environmental esthetics, ecological esthetics, and various non-anthropocentric representations of nature are closely related to ecosuicidology because they contribute to questioning the cultural and perceptive frameworks that favor ecocidal practices.

Ecosuicidology constitutes a survival ethic and a field of philosophical reflection dedicated to the study of ecocidal dynamics and processes aimed at preventing their destructive and self-destructive consequences. Its objects of analysis include those human actions and practices that, by causing ecosystems to deteriorate, ultimately threaten the conditions that make the continuity of life possible, including that of humanity itself. From an eminently preventive perspective, ecosuicidology seeks to identify, examine and attenuate ecocidal mental habits that favor environmental degradation, promoting a clearer understanding of its causes and consequences [14] (p. 182). It also addresses the global loss of biodiversity caused by multiple anthropogenic factors as a philosophical problem with profound ethical implications. In this context, its fundamental task is to detect the cognitive, value-based and cultural frameworks that drive ecocidal behaviors, which take on an ecosuicidal nature by turning against the ecological foundations that sustain life on the planet.

By displacing human beings from the absolute center of value, environmental esthetics facilitates an understanding of nature as a reality endowed with meaning and value of its own, independent of its utility to human interests. Thus, in addition to removing anthropocentrism, it helps to weaken other essentially ecocidal mental habits such as speciesism, theo-narcissism, eco-reifying hermeneutics, and ecoptimism, all of which tend to legitimize various forms of domination and exploitation of the natural world.

From the perspective of ecosuicidology, these changes in sensitivity and perception are of fundamental importance as they allow us to recognize that the destruction of ecosystems and the loss of biodiversity are not just a threat to other species but also to the continuity of human life. Non-anthropocentric representations promote an awareness of the interdependence between human beings and the rest of the biotic community, contributing to the prevention of behaviors whose nature is simultaneously ecocidal and ecosuicidal through the deterioration of the ecological conditions required for existence. In this sense, environmental and ecological esthetics can be understood as cultural and ethical tools capable of promoting forms of coexistence that are more respectful of biodiversity and more compatible with the preservation of the ecological foundations that sustain life on the planet.

This relational interbeing can be understood as the core of an ecosuicidological esthetic that does not position human beings as the center or measure of all things, but as participants in a broader vital fabric that requires a form of sensitivity in tune with its care and protection. The future arises from its art, from objects that are designed from a non-anthropocentric perspective.

Extreme anthropogenic climate scenarios or global armed conflicts can deploy their lethal effects over periods that transcend the lives of those who cause them. These are courses of action that, when intensified under the logic of unlimited growth and the arms race, lead to an accelerated destruction of the very conditions that make life possible.

On the one hand, ecocide can be understood as a crime against biodiversity, in which nature is turned into a sacrifice zone at the service of political, military or economic ends. There are also structures and mental habits that operate more subtly, but whose generalization indirectly causes ecocide. These “partial truths” form a perceptual regime that normalizes environmental deterioration and makes it difficult to recognize its long-term consequences.

An ecosuicidological esthetic supposes a sensitivity based on interdependence, humility and listening, which helps to disable the instrumental dynamics that promote exploitation and environmental devastation. In this sense, it is not just a theory of sensitive experience, but a way to reconfigure the human relationship with the Earth and actively contribute to its preservation.

An ecosuicidological esthetic incorporates a non-anthropocentric transformation in the ways that the Earth is felt, perceived and inhabited. In this sense, it contributes to the progressive dismantling of ecocidal mental habits, to opening the possibility of a broader understanding of the interdependence between human and non-human beings, and to the adoption of a sensitivity capable of recognizing all life forms’ shared vulnerability. Here it is relevant to note the counterpoint that can be established between ecosuicidological esthetics and the idea of the Misanthropocene, coined by Raj Patel [44] and redefined through the transcultural approach of Jean-Yves Heurtebise [45]. In its origin, it plays on the term Anthropocene, which can become a misanthropic narrative toward a humanity that emerges as the destroyer, the species that makes the continuity of life on the planet incompatible. This can provoke disgust toward civilizational violence, repugnance extractivism, despair in the face of devastation and human guilt and complicity in the ecological crisis.

Jean-Yves Heurtebise relabels the Anthropocene as the Misanthropocene to stress that the underlying problem of humanity’s relationship with nature is its struggle with itself in a race for global or regional supremacy, disputing an internal conflict with itself, with its own cultural limits and tendency toward self-destruction [45] (p. 13). Ecosuicidological esthetics transforms this spirit into an esthetic and ethical question: How can one represent nature, ruin, extinction, pollution, animals, waste and damaged landscapes when they can no longer be viewed as simple beautiful, sublime or available objects? In this sense, it relates to the Misanthropocene with an esthetic and ethical response to the danger it poses: the malaise caused by humanity. It assimilates this problem and redirects it toward the critique, clarification and treatment of ecocidal mental habits. Thus, a work of art, image or esthetic experience reveals not only a wounded world, but also the way in which a certain representation of nature expresses its vulnerability and possible destruction. Esthetics becomes preventive when it turns nature’s vulnerability into a sensitive experience of warning and responsibility.

Strictly speaking, the ecosuicidological esthetic does not designate an artistic school with a closed catalog of works. Rather, it can be understood as a critical category derived from ecosuicidology: a way of reading, producing and evaluating works that makes it clear that ecological devastation is not just the destruction of nature, but also a form of human self-destruction.

For this reason, works related to an ecosuicidological esthetic would not be “beautiful” in the classical sense, but rather works that show wounds, waste, extinctions, fires, mining, pollution, speciesism, territorial dispossession, or the ruins of progress. Their esthetic function is not to decorate nature but to make the violence of an anthropocentric representation of nature visible. Denilson Baniwa’s work is an example of this, especially his series Natureza Morta, which turns satellite images of deforested jungle into almost forensic scenes, associating environmental destruction, coloniality and damage to humans and animals.

Works produced based on Amerindian knowledge can be recognized in concrete practices: ritual masks, ceramics, fabrics, body painting, song, dance, ceremonial objects, territorial architecture, contemporary visual art, performance art, videos, installations and painting. For example, the Wauja masks used in Apapaatai healing rituals and the Yudjá ceramics of the Xingu show that works are not just contemplative objects but part of a ritual, bodily, territorial and cosmological network. There is also the case of MAHKU, the Huni Kuin Artists Movement, whose paintings translate traditional songs, myths, ancestral stories and ritual visions of Nixi pae/ayahuasca into images. Its mural Kapewë Pukeni, presented at the 2024 Venice Biennale, tells the alligator bridge myth and converts an Amerindian worldview into a contemporary visual art form.

6. Conclusions

From an ecosuicidological esthetic, the destruction of nature is not only a material phenomenon but also a perceptive configuration, a way of seeing and feeling the Earth that is aware of how it has been turned into an available background, a passive scenario of human action. The term ecosuicide deepens this awareness by warning that the destruction of nature entails not only the annihilation of ecosystems external to homo mensura, but also a profoundly self-destructive dynamic that erodes the very conditions that make shared life possible. From this perspective, violence against nature reveals itself as violence that we ultimately direct against ourselves. The ecosuicidological esthetic allows us to understand that this self-destruction originates in a distorted sensitivity, in an experience of the world reduced to a utility object, where the living loses its symbolic, relational, and sensitive meaning. However, this logic is incompatible with Amerindian knowledges, in which the figure of the children of the Earth, Mother Earth, Mother Nature or Pachamama express a relational ontology that prevents the conception of nature as a merely instrumental object. In many Andean and Amazonian worldviews, human beings are not positioned as agents of superior and external domination, but as yet other living beings within a living web of interdependence. The Earth is not an object, resource or inert matter, but a creating matrix, a living and sacred entity, with which affective bonds of care, gratitude and co-responsibility are forged.

An anthropocentric, violent and merely functional relationship of exploitation with nature would be not only ethically reproachable but also ontologically unthinkable within these cultural matrixes. Since ancient times, these worldviews have embodied esthetic representations of nature in which the sensitive experience is usually determined by recognizing the agency, value, and dignity of non-human otherness.

Ecosuicidology is a philosophical and ethical discipline aimed at identifying and transforming the mental habits that normalize environmental deterioration. It not only studies, explains and describes ecological collapse, but also questions the categories, imaginaries and perceptual dispositions that trigger it. This entails reviewing the way nature is perceived, valued and represented.

In dialog with Amerindian knowledges, this perspective seeks to overcome modern anthropocentrism by means of a new sensitivity that acknowledges the substantial interdependence between different life systems, restoring a form of esthetic experience that is not based on uncompromised distance, partial and isolated reification, or appropriation, but on a renewed sensitivity, an esthetic capable of reformulating the way the environment is experienced, making everyone participate in the sentient and perceptive fabric of existence.

Any representation of nature already implies a way of evaluating art. If nature is represented as an exterior landscape, resource, available object or passive background for human action, then art will be considered for its formal dominion, visual beauty, contemplative distance or capacity for symbolic appropriation. But the esthetic criteria change if nature is conceived as a living network of relations, agency, reciprocity, damage and co-belonging: a work is valuable not just because of its form, but also its capacity to transform perception, deactivate anthropocentrism, and underscore our ecological responsibility.

Thus, ecosuicidological esthetics appreciates art according to its power to reveal ecological self-destruction and our ecocidal mental habits, while Amerindian knowledge allows us to consider art based on relationality, reciprocity, territorial memory and continuity between humans, animals, plants, spirits, rivers and soils. In both cases, esthetics ceases to be just a theory of taste or beautiful art and becomes a critique of sensitivity that asks which world we learn to see, value or destroy through our images of nature.