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18 November 2026

33 Pages

Who Gets to Speak for Reality? Objectivity as Delegated Speaking in Journalism

and
1
Independent Researcher, 178, Hill Top Road, Thornton, Bradford BD13 3QL, UK
2
Département de Communication, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Marie Victorin, 90, Avenue Vincent d’Indy, Outremont, QC H2V 2S9, Canada
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Abstract

This article explores and intervenes in epistemic contests about journalism’s commitment to objectivity by proposing a novel conceptualisation of objectivising knowledge practices. Using data from three focus group discussions in which young people in Slovakia responded to a controversial video report on the 2015 migration crisis, we use a ventriloquial approach to demonstrate how the objectivity of the report was not just evaluated but communicatively organised. Each group enacted what we propose to call a distinct regime of objectivisation, or delegated speaking. Importantly, in all three regimes, objectivity is achieved through subjectivities rather than against them, by decentring authority and perspective. Procedural objectivisation multiplies subjectivities by making several voices speak. Moral objectivisation orients subjectivity toward attachments deemed appropriate to the situation. Visual objectivisation mobilises the viewer’s subjectivity by letting audiences see for themselves and form their own judgment. Disagreements about the truth value of the news are thus not necessarily about whether it is objective in any absolute sense as much as whether its distribution of voices and evidential forces matches expectations of how journalism should make the world speak, what part audiences play in making it speak, and, more broadly, what kind of social role, power and responsibility the epistemic practice of journalism is accorded.

1. Introduction

Objectivity remains one of journalism’s most persistent and contested epistemic norms (Schudson, 2001; Carlson, 2025). According to Carlson, debates in journalism studies about objectivity have become so verbose “that we risk falling back into generalizations instead of pushing forward to investigate nuances closely tied to the particular contexts in which they arise” (Carlson, 2025, p. 363). He therefore suggests focusing on moments when objectivity becomes the object of epistemic contests. Since such contests are dispersed events occurring throughout the interstices of networked societies, almost any ‘outbreak’ can be illuminating, “even if the ramifications of the event are unclear” (Carlson, 2025, p. 373).
Carlson’s research agenda acknowledges recent challenges to journalistic objectivity. These range from Durham’s (1998) attempt to strengthen objectivity by acknowledging and incorporating a reporter’s standpoint to more radical critiques that would abandon objectivity as a professional goal. The latter emphasise the representational harm that can follow when reporters covering subjects such as racial tension (Schmidt, 2024), Indigenous communities (Callison & Young, 2020) or the ‘refugee crisis’ (Jontes, 2022) are asked to eradicate their positions and biases. Having witnessed the debate move from proposals for ‘strong’ (Durham, 1998) or ‘pragmatic’ (Ward, 2010) objectivities to use of the term ‘post-objectivity’ (Callison & Young, 2020), Carlson put forward the concept of epistemic contest to help map these disputes, which are always, in part, struggles over terminology.
His research agenda is oriented towards “intraprofessional competition over the shape of acceptable knowledge” (Carlson, 2025, p. 374, emphasis added). Our argument is that epistemic contests also occur at the point of news consumption, where audiences evaluate what should count as credible journalistic knowledge and whether reports meet expectations of objectivity, balance, and evidential adequacy. Studying any event where objectivity matters—where it becomes a force or a stake in disputes about “what news knowledge is supposed to do” (Carlson, 2025, p. 374)—helps identify “recurring assertions” (Carlson, 2025, p. 373), which could, eventually, help us better understand how objectivity gets done and what it is doing.
In this article, we therefore follow Carlson’s appeal to study objectivity where it becomes a stake in epistemic contests, focusing on how objectivity matters for members of news audiences. More specifically, we ask the following question: how do news audiences communicatively enact and negotiate objectivity when evaluating a contested journalistic report? We start by reviewing the literature on objectivity as a (contested) journalistic norm and its uptake by audiences. Then we develop an alternative theoretical framework, based on the ventriloquial approach to communication (Cooren, 2010, 2012), which, in line with Carlson’s suggestion, treats objectivity as a situated communicative accomplishment. This leads us to propose the notion of objectivisation to conceptualise all the ways journalists and audiences distribute evidential authority through delegated speaking. We use objectivisation in this broad sense, distinct from Ettema and Glasser’s (1998) more specific notion of objectification, which concerns the grounding of moral judgments in established standards.
Empirically, we examine three focus group discussions with journalism students in Slovakia responding to a controversial 2015 video report by Czech photojournalist Jan Šibík. Filmed at a refugee camp on the Serbian–Hungarian border, the report was criticised for suggesting that humanitarian aid was being squandered and subsequently attracted support from people expressing xenophobic views. The case is therefore particularly useful for studying an epistemic contest in which not only the accuracy of a report, but also what journalism should show, explain, and make audiences feel, became contested. Journalism students are analytically useful participants because they occupy a liminal position between news audiences and prospective members of the profession, allowing audience expectations and emerging professional norms to become visible within the same discussions.
Drawing on these discussions, we identify three regimes of objectivisation, which, as we show, roughly correspond to ways of seeing associated with daily reporting, investigative journalism, and documentary film. We then consider what understanding objectivity as delegation implies for epistemic contests about journalism, audience expectations, and media literacy.

2. Literature Review

For as long as objectivity has been a journalistic ‘emblem’ (Schudson, 1978), there has been “a contrapuntal accompaniment” (Schudson, 1990, p. 269) questioning whether the pursuit of objectivity through relatively well-codified procedural routines actually produces good journalism and credible news, whether it just serves journalists as a handy ‘get-out-of-jail’ card (Maras, 2013, p. 194), whether it leads to empirical relativism (Durham, 1998), or, worse still, whether continuing to strive for a ‘view from nowhere’ plays “a functional role […] in supporting the status quo” (Callison & Young, 2020, p. 45). Decades of contrapuntal conceptual games have given journalism and journalism studies an abundance of definitions of objectivity, ranging from those that make it an umbrella concept for sub-concepts like neutrality, factuality, fairness and detachment, each of which is a norm in itself (McQuail, 2013; Ward, 2015), to those that effectively reduce it to subtractive operations like the exclusion of ‘subjective’ judgment, the absence of emotion, the opposition to ‘partisan’ journalism, or the separation of facts from values (Schudson, 2001; Hanitzsch, 2007).
Common criticisms of the objectivity norm range from inoperability to systematic elite bias to the universalisation of a western or American norm (in this regard, Maras (2013) provides an overview of the main objections to journalistic objectivity). However, among the most damning charges is that journalists invoke objectivity to evade responsibility for testing the truth claims they report, under the justification “that the goal of good reporting is to present multiple points of view without comment as equally viable truth claims” (Durham, 1998, p. 124). This charge of alibiism recalls Tuchman’s (1972) idea that, during the twentieth century, objectivity became a ‘strategic ritual’ for journalists. In her famous ethnography of a local US newspaper, she showed how ‘newsmen’ adopted a procedural definition of objectivity. According to them, a story could be considered objective if they could show (to her in the first instance) that they had followed the institutional procedures intended to produce objective reporting, such as using quotations or leading with the ‘material facts’. The ritual was strategic since it provided not only a practical guide but also a strong defence against libel suits, complaints from sources or public criticism.
Subsequent authors (C. Peters, 2011; Ward, 2015) concurred that objectivity functions partly as a rhetorical strategy to protect journalism from critique but argued that it nevertheless provides “a useful shorthand, akin to Weber’s analytical construct of ideal types, that captures the historical development of the modernist ideals of journalism—truth, factuality, balance and reality” (C. Peters, 2011, p. 312). In other words, objectivity is an analytically useful term as long as we remember that it is always an historically situated accomplishment. Even though the manifestations of journalistic objectivity have varied tremendously over time and between places, it should therefore be considered a hybrid epistemological arrangement that plays a vital role in making journalism work and justifying its work (Ward, 2015).
Objectivity works for journalism despite, or perhaps because of, an epistemological fuzziness that conflates normative, practical and discursive/textual dimensions. Accordingly, one of the most widely cited definitions is the following:
The objectivity norm guides journalists to separate facts from values and to report only the facts. Objective reporting is supposed to be cool, rather than emotional, in tone. Objective reporting takes pains to represent fairly each leading side in a political controversy. According to the objectivity norm, the journalist’s job consists of reporting something called ‘news’ without commenting on it, slanting it, or shaping its formulation in any way (Schudson, 2001, p. 150).
While subtractive operations predominate here (“only”, “rather than”, “without”), Schudson’s overall conception purposely makes objectivity “at once a moral ideal, a set of reporting and editing practices, and an observable pattern of news writing” (Schudson, 2001, p. 149). One of its merits is to oblige us to take a perspective “encompassing both the actions of journalists and the expectations of what these actions should be” (Carlson, 2025, p. 366), which means that objectivity might intervene anywhere where news producers or consumers attempt to orient (to) each other’s expectations.
At the same time, Schudson’s (2001) insistence on the ‘cool’ tone of objective reporting raises the question of the place of emotion within journalistic practice. In the canonical style of ‘just the facts’ news reporting, where an author forsakes any interpretive role, objectivity is reconciled with emotionality by outsourcing emotional labour to non-journalists “whose emotions journalists can authoritatively describe without implicating themselves” (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013, p. 130). Emotions are ‘reported’, like any other ‘facts’. But the recent affective turn in journalism studies (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2020) has seen a less defensive case for emotion, according to which reporters are no longer just channelling others’ passion (Loyn, 2003) but can use their own emotions as epistemic affordances—“mental objects or inner environments, available to media professionals as epistemological resources” (Kotišová, 2026, p. 639).
Taken together, these contributions suggest that objectivity must be understood as a set of practices through which different epistemic and affective registers are combined, managed, and made accountable. This only reinforces the difficulty of pinning objectivity down conceptually. Any new attempt to study journalistic objectivity thus runs the risk of appearing only to further muddy the waters. Our approach, echoing Carlson’s suggestions for epistemic contests research, shifts the question away from matters of definition toward issues of where and how objectivity is recognised, challenged, or upheld in practice. In this regard, audience research is particularly valuable for the insight it can provide into the acceptance or rejection of journalistic knowledge claims. It offers a vantage point from which to observe how objectivity is attributed, negotiated, and mobilised by media users themselves. In what follows, we draw on this body of work to examine how such attributions are accomplished in practice, focusing on young people, whose media consumption habits are liable to change most rapidly.
Across different media systems (at least within North America and Western Europe)1, most studies report that young adults still endorse the traditional journalistic value of objectivity (Edgerly, 2017, for the USA; Manninen, 2018, for Finland; Garusi & Splendore, 2023, for Italy; Schneiders, 2024, for Germany; Garusi & Juarez Miro, 2025, for Austria), although there are some which question objectivity’s primacy as a motivation for selecting news sources (Marchi, 2012, for the USA; Swart & Broersma, 2022, for the Netherlands). However, in most audience research, objectivity is treated as a quality that things can have or lack: information is, or is not, objective; journalism is, or is not, objective. The studies just cited explore how people detect the presence or absence of objectivity and how much that affects their decision making around news consumption. Valuable as they are, they mostly ignore how objectivity is produced, that is, how it is made present or absent in a situation.
A few exceptions exist. For example, in explaining one type of news consumption decision, Garusi and Juarez Miro report that some Austrian users who do not trust any particular source to be objective seek out “sources with different standpoints” and trust their own “ability to access the objective and impartial truth” (Garusi & Juarez Miro, 2025, p. 579). This echoes Marchi’s (2012) conclusion that US teens’ newsgathering practices can be considered ‘objective’ even if they reject objectivity as practised for them by journalism. While both studies’ reliance on recollective interviews about general patterns of behaviour did not favour close attention to the ways objectivity is enacted at the point of consumption, these authors hint at the kind of performative and communicative conception of objectivity we will propose in the next section.
Overall, these strands of research suggest that objectivity is less a stable attribute of journalistic texts than a reference point that is variably mobilised across different contexts. While much of the literature has sought to define, defend, critique, or reject the concept, some recent work invites attention to the situations in which objectivity becomes relevant as it is invoked, questioned, or taken for granted in the course of producing or engaging with news. Audience research offers a particularly valuable vantage point in this regard, as it captures the uptake of journalistic norms beyond the newsroom. Yet such research has often approached objectivity as a criterion that audiences apply to news, rather than examining how it is brought into play in concrete evaluative situations. This leaves open the question of how judgments about journalistic quality are formed in practice, and how references to objectivity, alongside other considerations, enter into these assessments.

3. Theoretical Framework: Objectivity as a Ventriloquial Accomplishment

In this article, we propose to approach objectivity as a communicative accomplishment emerging from specific distributions of agency, authority, and evidential force. This does not deny that journalism has historically associated objectivity with ideals such as neutrality, detachment and factuality, but it invites us to examine how these ideals are practically and communicatively achieved, negotiated, and recognised in situated interactions. Objectivity can then be considered an effect produced through the organisation of relations between voices, images, bodies, affects, technologies, institutions, and audiences. In this respect, our approach extends Martine and De Maeyer’s (2019) relational account of journalistic objectivity, in which objectivity gradually emerges through chains of reference that make journalistic claims increasingly capable of resisting objections.
This perspective resonates with recent calls in journalism studies to investigate the concrete situations in which objectivity matters (Carlson, 2020, 2025). If objectivity remains a central term through which journalism’s epistemic claims are articulated and contested, then what deserves analytical attention, in our opinion, is not only whether objectivity is attributed to a report, but how that attribution is accomplished, recognised and contested, and according to whose expectations (Zelizer, 1993). To examine these processes, we mobilise a ventriloquial approach inspired by work in the communicative constitution of organisation (CCO) tradition (Cooren, 2010, 2012). Essentially, a ventriloquial perspective proposes that communication actively participates in the constitution of realities, agencies, and forms of authority. Communicating thus means making beings mutually present through various mediations.
Speakers never speak entirely on their own behalf as they speak through various figures (the name ventriloquists sometimes used to speak about their dummies), while simultaneously being spoken by them (Christensen & Christensen, 2022). The notion of figure takes us beyond a human-centred conception of communication as it may refer to a person, institution, norm, value, procedure, category, body, image, technology, emotion, or even an event capable of making a difference in a situation. When journalists invoke facts, when interviewees speak in the name of public opinion, when visual evidence appears to show reality directly, or when participants orient toward empathy, neutrality or fairness, a ventriloquial analysis thus shows how such figures are made to speak and act within communication (Nathues & van Vuuren, 2022). The possibility to speak through different figures lends some situations a highly eclectic figurative potential.
Ventriloquism therefore refers to the process through which heterogeneous beings are animated, delegated authority, and made consequential within interaction (Cooren et al., 2021). Importantly, this communicative process always exceeds individual intentionality since what is said and shown can later be taken up, reinterpreted, or reframed by others (Cooren et al., 2023). In this regard, Cooren (2010) distinguishes between upstream ventriloquation, i.e., the figures speakers mobilise to support or orient their own discourse, and downstream ventriloquation, i.e., the ways discourse may subsequently be appropriated and made to say things beyond the speaker’s control. This distinction is especially relevant in contexts where journalistic discourse circulates within polarised public arenas and may become attached to ideological projects unforeseen or undesired by journalists themselves.
A ventriloquial perspective thus precludes treating journalistic objectivity as something achieved simply by subtracting the journalist’s subjectivity, whether in the form of values, emotions, opinions, or standpoint, or by imagining that the facts resulting from journalism’s epistemic procedures can somehow become unmediated. If reporters select, frame, narrate, quote, edit, juxtapose, and organise heterogeneous materials in order to make events publicly present, then journalism operates through mediation, that is, through the mobilisation and arrangement of various figures.
The question is not whether mediation occurs, but how it is distributed and rendered accountable, acceptable, authoritative, or trustworthy. A ventriloquial approach consequently invites us to reconceptualise objectivity as a particular regime of delegated speaking. A report appears objective when the authority to qualify reality is sufficiently distributed across figures deemed legitimate or credible within a given epistemic community. This delegation may occur through quotations, eyewitness testimony, visual documentation, bodily co-presence, expert authority, moral valuation, emotional orientation, or combinations thereof. In other words, and this is a key point in our positioning, objectivity is achieved not through the disappearance of subjectivity, but through communicative arrangements that distribute evidential authority beyond any single speaking subject.
This reconceptualisation has two important implications. Firstly, it allows us to avoid treating subjectivity and objectivity as strict opposites (Martine & De Maeyer, 2019). This argument has affinities with Durham’s (1998) notion of strong objectivity, which, drawing on standpoint epistemology, rejects the assumption that situatedness must be eliminated and instead treats acknowledged standpoints as epistemic resources. Our approach differs, however, in the basic operation it foregrounds. Whereas strong objectivity asks how socially situated standpoints can be reflexively incorporated into knowledge production, a ventriloquial approach asks how authority to qualify reality is delegated across heterogeneous figures, only some of which are human standpoints.
Subtraction and incorporation can therefore both be understood as particular forms of delegation: authority may be redistributed by minimising an authorial voice, multiplying standpoints, mobilising documents or images, or allowing audiences themselves to participate in making a situation speak. From this perspective, what matters is not the presence or absence of subjectivity as such, but how subjectivities are organised, distributed, and oriented within a communicative situation. A journalist’s emotional involvement, for example, may be perceived as disqualifying in some contexts but ethically necessary in others (Kotišová, 2026). Likewise, the presence of a marked authorial perspective may imply either ideological distortion or embodied witnessing (Voronova, 2026).
Secondly, it allows us to treat journalism as a communicative organisation of witnessing (Zelizer, 2007). Even the most descriptive reports organise relations between audiences and events by configuring who or what gets to speak, from what position, through what medium, and with what degree of authority. Journalism therefore involves a continual negotiation concerning the legitimate distribution of communicative agency. This is particularly evident in multimodal reporting, where meaning emerges not only through language but through the articulation of images, sounds, spatial arrangements, bodily presence, and affective atmospheres (Bock et al., 2025; Francoeur, 2026). A ventriloquial approach is especially useful here because it helps us analyse how these heterogeneous mediations are arranged so that certain realities, values, or experiences come to speak more forcefully than others.
Images, for example, may function as relatively autonomous agents capable of showing, demonstrating, or bearing witness in their own right (Hariman & Lucaites, 2016; Thomson, 2019), but their evidential force depends on broader communicative arrangements involving expectations about journalism, technological mediation, embodied presence, institutional credibility, moral valuation, emotional orientation, and the political and social relations of power through which certain voices, perspectives, and forms of evidence become more authoritative than others (Callison & Young, 2020). What counts as objective evidence is therefore not only communicatively negotiated but shaped by historically situated relations of epistemic and political authority.
To conceptualise these negotiations, we propose the notion of objectivisation. By objectivisation, we refer to the communicative work through which evidential authority is distributed across a plurality of voices, bodies, images, procedures, values, or other figures, allowing a situation, event, or claim to appear as more than the expression of a single standpoint (Daston & Galison, 2007; Latour, 1999). Understood in this manner, objectivity becomes a gradient effect of delegation. Reports appear more or less objective depending on how successfully they distribute evidential authority.
In this regard, our study builds on Martine and De Maeyer’s (2019) relational account of journalistic objectivity, developed from a CCO perspective. They propose assessing degrees of objectivity through the length and strength of chains of reference connecting journalistic claims to witnesses, observations, recordings, documents, and other forms of evidence, each additional link potentially strengthening a claim’s capacity to withstand objections. From a ventriloquial perspective, we extend this insight by asking how heterogeneous figures are communicatively arranged and delegated different degrees of authority in making reality speak. We also shift attention from the chains of reference displayed in journalistic texts to their uptake by audiences, examining how audiences activate a report’s figurative potential and enact objectivising moves of their own.
This allows us to reinterpret the disagreements we sometimes observe in how various audiences perceive a news report. Rather than viewing participants as more or less capable of detecting subjective bias, we propose to approach them as enacting different regimes of objectivisation, meaning different ways of imagining how journalism should communicatively organise witnessing and distribute authority to constitute a legitimate objectivisation of reality. As explained in Section 4, our three regimes were derived from observation and analysis of how participants in three focus groups evaluated a single news report as news consumers. As we worked on our analytical reconstructions, abductively and iteratively, we also noticed a parallel between the norms implicit in each group discussion and three distinct ways of seeing and interpreting events from a journalist’s perspective (Bjerknes, 2022).
A first regime associates objectivity with procedural decentring. Here, objectivity emerges through the multiplication of voices, adherence to institutional conventions, and the minimisation of authorial presence (Mindich, 1998; Schudson, 2001). Quotations, balance, canonical journalistic questions, and genre conventions function as mechanisms for distributing communicative authority away from reporters as individual subjects. Anything that recentres authority within a single perspective, such as emotional expressiveness or ideological positioning, provokes suspicion. Procedural objectivisation corresponds to the way of seeing associated with daily reporting, where statements by ‘credible sources’ are reported without assessing their truth value, on the assumption that the audience wants to hear not from the journalist but from the sources of news (Ericson, 1998; Ettema & Glasser, 1998, pp. 159–160).
A second regime ties objectivity to moral orientation and affective attachment. Here, participants evaluate reports not only according to epistemic procedures or perceptual immediacy, but according to the values and forms of empathy they enable or suppress (Silverstone, 2007; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). Subjectivity is not necessarily rejected in this regime; it becomes problematic when it appears attached to the ‘wrong’ objects and blocks morally appropriate forms of responsiveness towards others. Objectivity thus becomes linked to the robustness of certain moral attachments and to journalism’s responsibility regarding the affective consequences of its representations. Moral objectivisation resembles an investigative way of seeing, in which accounts of situations evoke moral as well as empirical ‘facts’, so that audience members who share ‘community values’ with news producers will feel an appropriate emotion, such as indignation or empathy (Ettema & Glasser, 1998).
A third regime associates objectivity with responsive presence. In this case, objectivity stems less from procedural balance than from embodied proximity and indexical contact with events. Images, bodily co-presence, and ‘being thereness’ become central operators of credibility. Rather than requiring reporters’ effacement, this regime values reporters’ capacity to place audiences in perceptual contact with situations and allow them to ‘see for themselves.’ Objectivity then depends less on plurivocity than on the delegation of evidential authority to the material and sensory dimensions of witnessing. Objectivisation via responsive presence, or visual-witnessing objectivisation, corresponds to a documentary way of seeing, in which evidence is objectivised by “plac[ing] it referentially outside the domain of the discourse itself” (Nichols, 2016, p. 99), since film, with or without commentary, can communicate with audiences using mimetic narration (Bjerknes, 2022), i.e., by showing rather than telling (Bock, 2016).
These regimes of delegated speaking should not be understood as mutually exclusive, nor should our typology be seen as fixed and finite. They overlap, coexist, and sometimes contradict one another within the same interaction. Participants may shift between them during the same discussion. Nonetheless, we believe that distinguishing them analytically helps illuminate different communicative expectations around journalism and news. This perspective also has implications for how media literacy is conceptualised. Whereas media literacy is often treated as a capacity to detect framing, bias, or manipulation (Livingstone, 2004; Vraga et al., 2015), our approach suggests that media literacy also involves orientations toward witnessing and authority. Audiences do not merely decode messages as they implicitly evaluate how communicative agency has been distributed and decide whether to trust particular arrangements of voices, images, affects, and values.
The focus groups analysed below therefore do not reveal varying levels of critical competence so much as different expectations concerning how journalism should make the world speak, that is, how it should ventriloquise it. What is being contested is not objectivity in some absolute sense, but its communicative organisation.

4. Materials and Methods

The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe intensified epistemic contests around journalism’s commitment to objectivity, as reporters were accused of distorting reality in favour of competing ideological positions (Ojala & Pöyhtäri, 2018). The report examined here became part of such a controversy. Czech photojournalist Jan Šibík was criticised for suggesting that humanitarian aid was being squandered at a refugee camp on the Serbian–Hungarian border in September 20152. He also received support on Facebook from people expressing xenophobic views, which made him uncomfortable (Krajské Listy, 2016), illustrating how journalistic discourse may become vulnerable to downstream ventriloquation and be appropriated in ways its author did not intend (Cooren et al., 2023).
The video was one of several news reports used in focus group discussions examining how young people in Slovakia evaluate news. We selected it for the present analysis because it generated especially divergent reactions accompanied by strong feelings about an issue (migration) that remains divisive in Central Europe. Since the focus groups took place as part of a wider study conducted to develop innovative approaches to the media literacy component of university journalism programmes, participants were 17 journalism students at a university in central Slovakia (14 Slovaks and three international students, six male and 11 female, aged 18–25). Although participants were unaware of the report’s controversial history (in a neighbouring country when they were still children), eight had in fact previously encountered the video in a media literacy course, where it had been presented as an example of a ‘subjective’ report and used to introduce framing. This uneven prior exposure proved analytically useful, allowing us to observe how participants who had received this prior instruction invoked it when evaluating the report, while others approached it without this interpretive frame.
The Slovak context is relevant because objectivity has had particular professional significance in post-communist journalism. After decades in which journalism had served as a ‘transmission belt’ for an official ideological worldview, procedural objectivity became one means of re-establishing professional credibility. Although the contemporary Slovak media system is highly polarised, objectivity continues to function both as a journalistic emblem and as a criterion against which journalists can be accused of activism, imbalance, or procedural failure (Smith, 2017; Chlebcová Hečková & Smith, 2026). We do not assume that this history determines how our participants understand objectivity, but it forms part of the epistemic environment in which their expectations of journalism have developed.
Because focus groups tend to produce negotiated collective positions rather than overt disagreement (Duchesne, 2017), we compared reactions across three groups shown the same report. One group consisted of first-year students and two of fourth-year students. This design enabled us to examine how groups at different stages of induction to the profession collectively oriented to the report and to the journalistic expectations through which they evaluated it. Each focus group lasted approximately two hours. Participants first discussed their news and social media practices and experiences of media literacy education, before being shown several news reports and invited to assess their trustworthiness. The facilitators did not explicitly prompt discussion about objectivity, since we did not want to presume a straightforward alignment between trust and objectivity, bearing in mind research in other Central and East European countries which suggests that, in the context of an increasingly illiberal public sphere, “people’s trust in media is no longer principally guided by established professional journalistic standards and values such as independence, impartiality, or objectivity” (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024, p. 243)3. In our case, however, objectivity was introduced spontaneously by participants in all three discussions as they sought to explain why they trusted or distrusted particular reports.
From the communicational perspective of this article, a facilitator’s contributions inevitably influence what other participants in a focus group say and do not say. Focus groups never (just) reveal pre-existing views; they co-produce position-takings (some more conflictual, some more consensual) interactively, and the facilitator is an interactant. In addition to opening each round with a question, our facilitation strategy essentially involved trying to catch the mood of the discussion and encourage participants to develop whatever thoughts they had begun to enunciate.
The first author transcribed and translated the relevant segment of each discussion4 into English directly from the video recordings (see Appendix B). Both authors repeatedly read and annotated the transcripts, identifying how participants characterised the report, what forms of evidence or authority they invoked, and how these evaluations developed over the course of each discussion. We then selected excerpts that made visible contrasting collective patterns of evaluation. Rather than treating the groups as reaching fixed consensus, we reconstructed the negotiated positions that emerged through interaction.
Our analysis therefore attended both to what participants evaluated and to how their evaluations were justified and taken up by others. We compared which figures were repeatedly granted or denied evidential authority within each discussion, including sources, journalistic procedures, emotions, images, embodied presence, and audiences themselves. We also followed the sequential development of each discussion, since a regime was not inferred from isolated statements but from recurring orientations that participants reinforced, qualified, or contested as the interaction unfolded. The three regimes of objectivisation presented below are therefore analytical reconstructions of contrasting patterns across the discussions rather than a coding scheme. They emerged abductively from iterative comparative analysis, in which we drew on the ventriloquial approach in CCO theory for sensitising concepts (Blumer, 1954) like ventriloquation, delegation and witnessing.
Our participants occupied a productive but ambiguous position. They were invited to respond as news consumers, yet as journalism students they sometimes also evaluated the report as prospective members of the profession. We do not claim that these groups represent either journalism students or news audiences more generally. Rather, their position on an ‘edge’ of the journalistic epistemic community provides a useful site for observing contested expectations about what journalism should do and how objectivity should be accomplished (Ferron et al., 2022).

5. Results: Three Regimes of Objectivisation

Focus group participants did not simply evaluate Šibík’s report as objective or subjective. They also assessed the communicative arrangements through which the report attempted to make the situation speak. In doing so, they oriented to different regimes of objectivisation, that is, different expectations concerning how journalism should distribute evidential authority. One regime came to dominate each discussion, although participants sometimes moved between them. What follows therefore identifies three analytically distinguishable ways in which participants objectivised, or refused to objectivise, Šibík’s report.

5.1. Procedural Decentring: “He Didn’t Make Space for Anyone Else to Speak”

A first regime treats objectivity as the procedural decentring of the reporter’s voice. In this regime, which is commonly associated with daily reporting, a report becomes more objective when authority to qualify reality is redistributed across witnesses, institutional actors, affected persons, experts, and other sources. The central journalistic procedure for this is quotation—a ventriloquial operation whereby the reporter makes others speak, thereby showing that what is being reported does not emanate from the reporter alone. Quoting demonstrates diligent journalistic work, and functions as a metadiscursive marker of trustworthiness as well as a key strategic ritual for producing journalistic objectivity (Tuchman, 1972). Quoting those with different perspectives is a particularly effective decentring procedure.
A fourth-year student oriented to this regime when he explained why he found the video untrustworthy:
Patrik5: One warning signal was that all the time it was only him speaking. He didn’t make space for anyone else to speak. He didn’t ask the refugees about the situation they find themselves in or ask the police for a statement. The very fact that he’s the only one speaking indicates that it isn’t a particularly objective report.
Patrik’s complaint concerns the distribution of speaking positions. Šibík is criticised for being the only one authorised to describe the situation. The refugees and the police are present as visual or narrative objects but are not granted the status of speaking subjects. In ventriloquial terms, they are therefore spoken about rather than made to speak. For Patrik, this failure of delegation prevents the report from appearing objective.
In his next turn, Patrik noted a second epistemological failing:
Patrik: The basic journalistic questions—what, where, how, why, for what purpose—go unanswered, and what’s left is just ‘someone said something’, well ((throws hands in air)) anyone else could say the same thing.
Patrik treats the “basic journalistic questions” as procedural devices capable of objectivising the report. These questions—the ‘material facts’ a good ‘newsman’ ritually leads with (Tuchman, 1972, p. 670)—are supposed to force the reporter to organise reality according to recognisable categories of facticity. In their absence, the report becomes, in Patrik’s words, “just ‘someone said something’.” What fails thus is not only the completeness of the information provided, but also the process by which the report could have detached itself from the reporter’s singular subjectivity.
Prior to this, Patrik disclosed that all six participants, as part of the same year group, had apparently already encountered the video in a media literacy class:
Patrik: I can’t be certain it was that precise video, because I think it was just some photos from a reportage, on the basis of which he ((the course tutor)) explained to us how significant framing can be for information, because that person ((Šibík)) only showed us what he wanted to.
Reference to the media literacy course adds another layer to the analysis. Patrik’s suspicion of selective presentation is not only his as it is ventriloquised through the authority of the course tutor and the concept of framing. Framing, as a critical thinking tool, teaches Patrik to see mediated information as organised by someone’s editorial decisions: “he only showed us what he wanted to.” Yet this form of media literacy also privileges one mode of objectivisation. By foregrounding the reporter’s power to frame, it orients Patrik towards mistrust of Šibík’s visual choices and may make it more difficult for him to grant the images independent evidential agency. Patrik’s claim that, without answers to the basic journalistic questions, “what’s left is just ‘someone said something’,” discounts the possibility that the images could show something else, cross-check the reporter’s words, or potentially object to what he is saying. The effect is to preserve a hierarchy of evidence that subordinates images to words and allows language-oriented critical thinking skills to overshadow visual and other literacies.
Another participant, however, was concerned about what she could see. The visible presence of silent others in front of the camera troubled her, since it communicates, in her opinion, a certain disrespect for their experiential knowledge, which in turn detracts from Šibik’s credibility as a witness.
Sofia: Once there he could have done more than just say look at those people behind me, and even if they’re here, I’m going to tell you what’s happening. He just went there and talked about those people, whom he didn’t know and didn’t ask, and all in all it came across to me as an inhuman report, like (.) these people are fleeing and they’ve left us a mess to clean up, like ((smiles and shrugs)) well …
Sofia’s objection still belongs partly to the regime of procedural decentring as she wants the people in the image to be asked and recognised as sources of knowledge. Yet her intervention foreshadows another regime where objectivity depends not only on the multiplication of voices, but also on the ethical quality of the relation established with those who are being represented. Optically, the reporter scarcely shares the same space as the refugees (they are behind him), and his non-interactive proximity to the people directly affected by events strikes Sofia as “inhuman.”
Sofia’s implied epistemology thus begins to associate witnessing with an ethic of respect or recognition6. Like Patrik, however, she does not treat the images as fully capable of speaking for themselves. She wants to hear the voices of the people in them. Objectivisation, in this first regime, is therefore achieved by redistributing speech. A report fails when it monopolises the right to qualify reality instead of allowing relevant others to participate in this qualification.

5.2. Moral Orientation and Affective Attachment: “He’s Trying to Distort Reality So That We Lose Any Empathy Towards Those People”

A second regime of objectivisation does not seek to eliminate Šibík’s subjectivity, but to orient it morally. Like Martin Bell’s ‘journalism of attachment’, this is a knowledge practice “aware of the moral ground on which it operates” and that it has consequences (Bell, 1998, p. 103). Here, the problem is not necessarily the centrality of the reporter’s point of view, but that his subjectivity appears attached to the wrong objects: indignation at mess, disorder, and waste rather than concern for displaced people and the conditions that produced the scene. Although he may be reporting the empirical facts accurately, he is reporting the wrong ‘moral facts’, which, in this regime, are just as much a part of the reality of a situation. Objectivity is therefore evaluated not only through epistemic procedures, but through the moral attachments a report activates, suppresses, or redirects. That is why we find a useful parallel for this regime in Ettema and Glasser’s (1998) account of investigative reporting as a moral craft.
In a second focus group, also composed of fourth-year students (but from the previous academic cohort), only two of the five participants had already seen the video. One who had not seen it opened the discussion by condemning the reporter’s mode of expression:
Filip: we:::ll above all that wasn’t journalism. Not in terms of the language used (.) absolutely improp- (.) phew
((general laughter))
Filip: Absolutely improper expressions, absolutely openly expressed opinions which the gentleman tries to get across, blatant and very emotionally coloured indignation
Facilitator: Do you perceive it as untrustworthy purely on the basis of its reporting style?
Filip: Definitely, definitely. I cannot take it seriously (.) whatever information is transmitted after that (.) I can’t even think about it. The information was conveyed so offensively.
In keeping with Schudson’s (2001) definition of the objectivity norm, Filip expects reporting to be emotionally ‘cool’. When he detects “emotionally coloured indignation” in the reporter’s voice (and it is the voice he focuses on, not the images), he cannot “take the information seriously.” Šibík, in his judgment, has been blinded by passion, often considered antithetical to reason, which disqualifies him as a reliable eyewitness. Indeed, journalists often deploy “professional norms of detached objectivity” to avoid being blinded by the way situations affect them emotionally (Richards & Rees, 2011, p. 864).
Filip’s uptake of Šibík’s vocal affect can itself be understood as a form of downstream ventriloquation to the extent that the indignation he hears in the reporter’s voice is made to speak as evidence of journalistic failure. Yet as the discussion unfolds, the group invokes another affective attachment, empathy, as something that a more adequate objectivisation of the situation should enable rather than suppress.
Before arriving there, however, the facilitator invited Hana, who had seen the video before, to speak about that occasion:
Hana: I was on a course, a journalism course where we were also talking about critical thinking and we had that- that very ‘reportage’ ((imitates quotation marks with fingers)) as an example
Facilitator: Uhuh
Hana: So:: afterwards we analysed it
Facilitator: Hmhm
Hana: In sum, it wasn’t objective, in fact it was very subjective, it was one-sided and only captured a fleeting incident, there was no respondent, just the position of the photographer himself.
Using the hand signal widely used to distance a speaker from the word they are pronouncing, Hana implies that ‘reportage’ is a misnomer. Her power to perform this generic ‘not-statement’ (Freadman, 1994; Smith, 2026) is boosted by her capacity to ventriloquise a pedagogical source of authority, i.e., a classroom discussion which concluded that this report is “very subjective.” The media literacy classroom thus reappears as an upstream figure that authorises Hana to speak in the name of a prior analysis, which helps stabilise the report’s identity as non-objective.
For Hana, the report is subjective because it is “one-sided,” contains “no respondent,” and shows “just the position of the photographer himself.” From this position, the photographer focuses on the mess left by refugees in the border camps and the apparent waste of humanitarian aid supplies (instead of, perhaps, the vulnerability of people fleeing unsafe countries and the barriers they face before reaching safety in Europe). In Hana’s and the group’s opinion, this emphasis, regardless of its evidential status, constitutes a journalistic failure because journalists also carry a responsibility with respect to how their reports make audiences feel, the moral judgments they exercise, and how this might, or might not, make them act.
The closing exchange followed the facilitator’s invitation to consider how the report might affect ‘ordinary people’:
Filip: He’s trying to distort reality so that we lose any empathy towards those people
Natália: Try and sleep three nights on one of those carry-mats (.) it’s not easy
Mia: And yet empathy is just waiting for a simple explanation=
Filip: =Yes=
Mia: =If they explained the reason why they left a mess behind them, for instance, then the:: receiver of that report would automatically activate their empathy.
Having established that the report is “very subjective”, the accusation that it blocks viewers’ empathy is slightly unexpected. More commonly, observers have blamed excessive adherence to the objectivity norm for journalistic failures to arouse empathy about issues like migration (Chouliaraki & Stolic, 2017). Here, however, participants do not treat empathy as an alternative to objectivity, nor do they imply that empathy itself makes a report objective. On the contrary, they suggest that a fuller objectivisation of the situation, including contextual explanation and moral objectification, would allow empathy to emerge.
Empathy is commonly understood as a “capacity for participation in another’s feelings” (Longman English dictionary). This explains why emotionality (which Filip reproached Šibík for showing) can be championed as an epistemological affordance in journalism for its ability to generate empathy (Kotišová, 2026). However, a second dictionary definition, referring to “the imaginative projection of a subjective state into an object […] so allowing it to be better understood,” helps elucidate Mia’s grasp of the situation’s figurative potential. Empathy has been pushed into the background by Šibík’s “subjective” framing, but it lurks there, a dormant figure, “just waiting for a simple explanation.” Waiting, that is, for someone to speak through it.
Empathy thus becomes an entanglement of the subjective and the objective: a subjective state that can be “activated” or blocked depending on what objects are attached. Empathy is suppressed when someone “distorts” our situational awareness by withholding information (which is a subjective bias), but it flourishes if “reasons” are provided, whereupon its figurative potential is released, ‘allowing an object to be better understood’ by indicating how to feel towards it. In this regime, a report’s objectivity is felt through its attachments: what it invites viewers to care about, what it asks them to disregard, and what it allows them to object to. Šibík’s report is judged subjective not merely because it expresses a point of view, but because participants feel that this point of view blocks the attachment that should matter most in this situation: empathy towards displaced people.
Hence, in our second regime of objectivisation, subjectivity is not rejected per se. It is rejected when it appears to withdraw qualities like empathy or when it attaches to the wrong objects. If subjectivity were mobilised to express compassion for the weak or denunciation of the powerful—in line with the role of investigative journalists as ‘custodians of conscience’ (Ettema & Glasser, 1998)—it might be acceptable or even necessary. This regime places greater justificatory demands on journalists than the previous one, and raises the bar in terms of journalistic responsibility. Mia thinks “they” should have “explained” more elements of the visible situation, instead of just showing and describing it. This implies not accepting face value appearances and not just reporting claims. In other words, it goes beyond the demand that Šibík should have spoken to the refugees and the police and makes him responsible for contextual explanation.
When distinguishing investigative journalism from daily reporting, Ettema and Glasser also highlight the context of justification and the level of responsibility journalists have for claims they report (Ettema & Glasser, 1998, pp. 158–159). But whereas their investigative reporters were “adamant in their rejection of responsibility for any political or other public consequences of their work” and “invoked the notion that ultimately the reader must decide” about issues of right and wrong (Ettema & Glasser, 1998, pp. 155, 173), Filip and Mia treat Šibík’s report as an intervention in public discourse, and make him responsible for what we might call its dialogical consequences. In fact, just before Filip’s claim that the report blocks empathy, Natália and Hana co-enacted an imaginary scenario about the likely reactions to such a report in a Slovakian context:
Natália: oh:: now we’re talking, ‘wave of migrants’, just give it to the government, translate it into Slovak, and it will be ‘in eastern Slovakia this is happening!’
Hana: hmm ((nodding))
Natália: and then it will be right across the media
Hana: Yes, as soon as they got hold of it they’d say this is the truth, this is exactly how they are, this is how they behave, this is what they do.
The problem with the report, they imply, is its moral pliability: it could all too easily be bent or twisted to speak in tune with a nationalistic government narrative on immigration as a threat to social order and ‘Slovakian values’, aided and abetted by other media willing to reproduce those politicians’ moral claims. This is why we insist that this regime, in which a standpoint-taking subjectivity is allowed and even expected, is also objectivising. Taking into consideration the presence of other actors in the wider media ecosystem who can influence public opinion, they are implying that a responsible reporter should stabilise their report’s meaning so that its moral implications are clearer and it would then ‘object’ to hostile (here xenophobic) reformulations. In fact it would ‘automatically’ activate empathy toward the refugees. Objectivisation in this regime thus depends on what Ettema and Glasser call ‘objectification’, that is, the grounding of moral judgments in standards presented as extending beyond individual preference. In our terminology, objectification therefore constitutes one particular operation within the broader process of objectivisation (which, to recall, we define as the communicative work through which evidential authority is distributed across a plurality of figures). This is vital if a report is to be able to move immutably downstream in the kinds of ventriloquial flow which Natália and Hana imaginatively enacted. This mirrors what investigative reporters actually do, for their “protestations […] about facts speaking for themselves and readers or viewers deciding for themselves” are contradicted by their skillful rhetorical work—a ‘moral craft’—to make facts “speak in a way that urges a public decision about right and wrong” (Ettema & Glasser, 1998, p. 180)7.

5.3. Responsive Presence and Visual Witnessing: “It Let Us Form Our Own Judgment That That’s How It Really Looks”

A third regime of objectivisation delegates evidential authority not primarily to additional speakers or morally appropriate attachments, but to the visible scene itself. As in documentary films, images are partially liberated from discursive framing to tell their own story (Nichols, 2016). Longer video sequences, like the shots in Šibík’s film, are particularly effective at mimetic narration (Bjerknes, 2022). In this regime, a report appears objective when it gives viewers a viewpoint from which they can see, judge, and potentially object to the journalist’s account. Objectivisation therefore depends on a passage of witnessing: from the reporter who was ‘where it happened’ to viewers who can form their own judgment about what the situation looked like. This regime dominated a discussion among first-year students, all viewing Šibík’s report for the first time.
Most participants felt they could trust the ‘impression’ the video left on them. Importantly, trustworthiness and objectivity were not synonymous for them, as becomes clear below. They trusted it, firstly, because it produced a sense of proximity:
Júlia: Hmm for me it was trustworthy overall because he was right in the place where it happened and it was visible that there was rubbish all around the place-
((Diana nodding))
Júlia’s evaluation combines two objectivising operations. First, she emphasises Šibík’s embodied presence: he was “right in the place where it happened.” Proximity to events—a ‘being thereness’—is integral to the cultural authority of journalism, and it is especially important to photojournalism (Pixley, 2026) and citizen journalism (Ahva & Pantti, 2014; Chouliaraki & Al-Ghazzi, 2022). Proximity to the scene becomes an objectivising resource because it appears to let the situation pass through the reporter rather than originate in him. Šibík’s body and video camera function as mediators to the extent that they are treated as channels through which the place, the abandoned objects, and the traces of passage can manifest themselves to viewers.
Second, Júlia grants the visible scene its own evidential force: “it was visible that there was rubbish all around the place.” This phrase implies an epistemology less logocentric than the others, a more ocularcentric ‘seeing is knowing’. To use a legal analogy, the students in the two senior groups admit the images only as illustrative evidence, their meaning coupled with Šibík’s words (or the imagined words of alternative ‘explanations’). They recognise the power of images to move people, but subject it to the capacity words have to ‘distort’ their meaning. Most of the first-year students, by contrast, feel that, despite the report’s monologicity (Šibík’s failure to quote the refugees and the police), objectivity can nevertheless be produced by triangulating telling and showing. For them, the images become what lawyers call demonstrative evidence, that is, “evidence addressed directly to the senses without intervention of testimony” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition, 1990, p. 432); authoritative enough evidence not to need ‘sponsoring’ by human eyewitness testimony (Mnookin, 1998).
Diana: […] it wasn’t just an illustrative photo to go with it-
Facilitator: As we had in the press report you looked at earlier?
Diana: -Yes, it let us form our own judgment that that’s how it really looks and it’s not just a photo downloaded from the internet.
When Diana draws a distinction between Šibík’s images and a photo8 she qualifies as “just illustrative,” she upgrades their evidential force. The use of illustrative photos from image banks or news agencies weakens their indexicality (their capacity to point to things in the external world), assuming viewers recognise them as representing only a generic ‘place’ (Simonsen, 2026). By contrast, Šibík’s footage is treated as authentically connected to the place it shows, which leads Diana to augment its indexicality. This permits her to admit it as demonstrative evidence.
Diana’s precise formulation (“it let us form our own judgment that that’s how it really looks”) is important because it shows that visual objectivisation does not eliminate subjectivity. On the contrary, it requires the viewer’s subjectivity. Objectivity, here, is not located in the mechanical neutrality of the camera alone (Carlson, 2019), but in a distributed arrangement involving the camera, the reporter’s bodily presence, the visible scene, and, crucially, the viewer’s mimetic presence and responsive judgment. Diana’s slightly odd formulation (how can what something really looks like depend on judgment?) is a literal description of what happens when objectivisation involves a dialogue between telling and showing, mobilising the subjectivity of secondary witnesses responding to a photographic ‘silent witness.’
Another participant developed this logic further:
Alexandra: Well, I also got the impression that his aim was just to show what was going on there, what had happened, what it looks like and (.) that was maybe why he didn’t speak to the policemen or to the people who were there, that wasn’t his aim, to get at the (.) truth, but just to give a view ((original: prehľad)) and (1.0) as has already been said he’s not a journalist, he’s a photographer so that’s sort of his vocation (0.5) to show us what things look like-
Diana: Hmhm
Alexandra: -What’s going on there.
Alexandra’s statement exempts photographers from ‘getting at the truth’, that is, from knowing completely what their testimony means, having the informed gaze of a knowledgeable journalist, or digging deeper, as an investigative journalist would. Stylistically, ‘just showing what things look like’ implies a documentary way of seeing, in which forms (of life) matter as much as facts, and it is therefore urgent to show how the world looks9. Narratively, ‘just showing what things look like’ implies an external focalisation, in which the narrator knows less than the protagonists know, and his commentary might therefore not be the best guide to what is happening. This would be an unsatisfactory position for most journalists. But if ‘just giving a view’ (or an ‘outline’, which is another possible translation of prehľad) makes the photographer an incomplete witness, it also invites the viewer, as mimetic witness, to fill in the outline.
Hence the apparent weakness of Šibík’s report becomes, for some participants, part of its objectivising force. Because he does not fully explain, quote witnesses, or interpret, viewers are invited to treat the images as things to think with (Edwards, 2001). The footage’s indexicality and polysemy allow it to say things without words and to evade attempts to anchor its meaning in language. As long as there is a responsive viewer to (re)translate the seen into the said (J. D. Peters, 2001), the images can participate in objectivisation. They do not merely illustrate the reporter’s discourse. They become figures capable of demonstrating, confirming, complicating, or even objecting.
This visual-witnessing regime therefore differs from the first two. It does not require the same multiplication of human voices as procedural decentring, nor does it begin by asking whether the report activates the right moral attachments. Instead, it delegates evidential authority to a relation among body, camera, place, visible traces, and viewer judgment. Visual witnessing is an objectivising operation which is not performed by removing mediation, but by arranging mediators so that viewers feel able to encounter the scene, witness it, and form their own judgment. That is why participants in this group were willing to trust a report which, in Júlia’s words, “wasn’t completely objective, like a journalist would have written it”. Importantly, though, the report’s shortcomings in terms of objectivity led them to question its trustworthiness. Objectivity clearly mattered to them. They trusted it nevertheless since they could ‘see for themselves’, which is to say they could objectivise in spite of the journalist’s failure to produce a “completely objective” report. They did not expect a journalist, working with the medium of video, to do all the spadework in terms of producing objectivity, but to give audiences the means to ‘co-objectivise’.

6. Discussion: Objectivity as Contested Delegation

Across the three focus groups, participants did not merely disagree about whether Šibík’s report was biased or objective. We would contend that they implicitly disagreed about what kind of delegation should count as objectivising in the first place. In the procedural regime, the report fails because it does not make enough people speak. Other relevant actors remain visible or mentionable, but they are not granted the status of sources. In the moral regime, the report fails because it makes the wrong attachments manifest themselves. It foregrounds mess, waste, and irritation while suppressing the empathy that participants believe should orient a report about displaced people. In the visual-witnessing regime, however, the report succeeds, at least partially, because it lets the visible scene speak for itself. It gives viewers a position from which they can judge what the place looked like and potentially object to, or reinterpret, the reporter’s account. In Martine and De Maeyer’s (2019) terms, the students make different assessments of the weight of different elements in the ‘chain of references’ which the reporter had (or could/should have) assembled to objectivise reality.
These disagreements do not simply reveal different levels of critical competence. They also and maybe especially reveal different expectations concerning how journalism should make the world speak, that is, ventriloquise it. The media literacy training received by many of the fourth-year students, and probably also other skills and experience acquired in their education, appears to orient them toward the detection of framing, bias, and monologic reporting. This equips them to identify failures of procedural decentring, but it may also make them less willing to grant images independent evidential force. The first-year students, by contrast, are more willing to treat visibility, proximity, and viewer judgment as objectivising resources. Without ignoring some of the report’s limitations, they allow the footage to function as a mediator through which the situation can manifest and speak for itself.
While we cannot attribute these contrasts solely to the students’ prior exposure to the video in a media literacy class, they do suggest a broader implication for media literacy. Teaching audiences to recognise framing or bias is not epistemically neutral: it may itself privilege particular expectations about how journalism should objectivise reality. In our case, participants who had received prior instruction explicitly invoked it when criticising authorial selection, missing voices, and procedural imbalance. These participants were also less willing to credit images with evidential agency of their own, although our design does not allow us to attribute this difference to the instruction itself.
What our analysis does show, however, is that a variety of formal and informal ‘literacies’ were expressed by participants across all three groups. Media literacy, as usually taught, might therefore be understood not only as increasing people’s ability to detect manipulation, but also as cultivating particular ways of seeing journalistic evidence. A more reflexive approach would invite audiences to ask not only where mediation or bias enters a report, but how different mediators, including sources, images, bodies, emotions, and viewers themselves, are being authorised to contribute to what counts as knowledge. That constitutes our study’s first practical contribution.
Our second contribution concerns the links we make between forms of objectivisation and types of journalism, because these links help to clarify how each style of objectivisation relies on a certain way of seeing (events), which implies both a certain way of doing journalism and a corresponding way of responding to journalism by audiences. The procedural regime corresponds to the way of seeing associated with daily reporting, where what sources say is reported without assessing its truth value (Ettema & Glasser, 1998, pp. 159–160), so that reporting more claims (and especially balancing rival claims) is perceived as more objective by an audience which, it is assumed, wants to hear not from the journalist but from ‘credible’ news sources (Ericson, 1998). Taken ventriloquially, objective journalists speak to audiences over, or under, a chorus of ‘credible’ voices. The moral regime is close to an investigative way of seeing, in which the evidential force of a report is a function of how credibly epistemic and moral claims are interrelated (Ekström & Westlund, 2019). In this case, news producers and consumers are assumed to share certain values, thanks to which a situation appears (un)just or (im)moral because the reporting evokes ‘moral facts’, even if the only explicit claims are epistemic (Ettema & Glasser, 1998). The test of objectivity in the moral regime is how much, or how little, news reports object to their own downstream ventriloquation. This is why, from an audience perspective, we regard this regime as a mode of objectivisation, and not, as Ettema and Glasser concluded when considering investigative journalism from a journalist’s perspective, a practice that merely “uses certain stylistic features of journalistic objectivity […] to amplify the call for public indignation” (Ettema & Glasser, 1998, p. 185). The visual-witnessing regime corresponds to a documentary way of seeing, in which images, although still partly framed by discourse, gesture beyond the discursive domain, and are thereby capable of objectivising evidence indexically (Nichols, 2016) and formally (i.e., idiomatically) (Macé, 2016). This way of doing journalism puts the audience at the scene and demands their responsive presence.
Without ignoring news production, our analysis thus highlights the importance of what goes on at the site of consumption to produce, or co-produce, objectivity, and we have distinguished regimes of objectivisation which accept a greater or lesser degree of audience participation in this process. The first two regimes ask journalists to do nearly all the ventriloquation that matters to make the world speak objectively, whether that is quoting credible sources or evoking moral values that audiences can, or must, orient towards. The third regime relies much more on viewers and readers co-enunciating the world.
Turning to the theoretical contributions of our study, our analysis complicates the opposition between objectivity and subjectivity. In all three regimes, and this is a key point of our argument, objectivity is achieved through subjectivities rather than against them. Procedural objectivisation multiplies subjectivities by making several voices speak. Moral objectivisation orients subjectivity toward attachments deemed appropriate to the situation. Visual objectivisation mobilises the viewer’s subjectivity by allowing audiences to form their own judgment. What varies is not whether subjectivity is present, but how it is distributed, disciplined, oriented, and authorised.
Seen from this perspective, Šibík’s report becomes a site of contested ventriloquation. For some participants, the report makes only Šibík speak. For others, it manifests uncalled for expressions of indignation, suspicion, or anti-migrant resentment. For others still, it makes the scene itself speak through images, traces, and embodied proximity. What is being evaluated, then, is not objectivity in an absolute sense, but the communicative organisation of objectivity: who or what is allowed to speak, what is allowed to count as evidence, and which attachments are allowed to guide the viewer’s understanding of the event.
Our study also contributes to debates about how journalism is changing, or should change, to adapt to the social, political and technological upheavals of recent decades. We do not claim that these three regimes cover all the ways in which objectivisation is produced when people interact with the news. Nevertheless, our three focus groups with journalism students provide a window onto ongoing epistemic contests about journalism’s commitment to objectivity. Of principal concern is the very durability of this commitment. If objectivity underpinned professional norms and audience expectations of ‘good journalism’ in the heyday of mass media, are we witnessing an undermining of the objectivity norm in the contemporary media environment, prompted by a “rethinking of what journalism is and ought to be, as well as what it does and ought to do” (Tandoc & Thomas, 2017, p. 33)?
In line with most of the audience research literature, our data do not support this assumption. Whenever objectivity was mentioned in our focus groups, the speaker took for granted that journalism can and should be objective. In each instance, the speaker assessed Šibík’s report as not (very) objective: the only difference was that in the first-year group, this evaluation was followed by a ‘but’. This ‘but’, however, prefaced a conviction not that ‘subjectivity’ could somehow compensate for lacking objectivity, but that objectivity could be produced nevertheless, by responding to the report in a certain way. No participant in any group suggested that a ‘subjective’ report was the kind of news they wanted to read.
Perhaps our most important finding is that, even among a group of young people (journalism students) who all value objective news, objectivity does not mean one thing when we consider how it is produced in the act of news consumption. And yet it does not become a meaningless term or an empty placeholder for making value claims and justifying media consumption choices. It remains a useful way for audiences to describe their expectations about how subjectivities should be arranged in order that the world can speak in a manner they can trust.
More fundamentally, our analysis invites a reconsideration of what objectivity is and where it resides. Rather than treating objectivity as a property of news reports (Tandoc & Thomas, 2017), a professional norm that journalists either respect or violate (Schudson, 2001), or a perception held by audiences (Kelly, 2019), we have approached it as a communicative accomplishment emerging from particular distributions of evidential authority. From this perspective, objectivity is neither the elimination of mediation nor the suppression of subjectivity. It is achieved through arrangements that make certain voices, images, bodies, values, procedures, or experiences speak in ways that audiences recognise as legitimate. The epistemic contests surrounding journalism are therefore not simply contests over truth, bias, or neutrality. They are also contests over how reality should be made to speak and whose forms of witnessing, attachment, and authority should count. Understanding objectivity as a form of contested delegation allows us to better grasp both the persistence of the ideal and the plurality of ways in which it continues to be enacted, negotiated, and evaluated in contemporary media environments.
As already noted, one of our study’s limitations is that academic year and prior exposure to the video were not independently varied, so differences between groups cannot be attributed specifically to media literacy education or stage of professional training. A further limitation is that participants were young people for whom trust and objectivity align relatively well, which is not always the case, particularly in illiberal democracies where most news outlets are openly biased (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024). While we would argue that this is not (yet) the case in Slovakia, if we had interviewed a different selection of young citizens, we might have found a broader spectrum of criteria (besides objectivity) used to justify trust, and we might have observed respondents using the term objectivity in ways that stretch its accepted meaning beyond breaking point. Reproducing the same experiment with a more diverse sample of participants, as well as in countries with different media systems, would be a natural next step in exploring the epistemic contests around journalistic objectivity, in particular to test whether our concept of objectivisation holds water even when common normative assumptions about what makes people trust the media do not.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, S.S. and F.C.; Methodology, S.S. and F.C.; Validation, S.S. and F.C.; Formal Analysis, S.S. and F.C.; Investigation, S.S.; Resources, S.S. and F.C.; Data Curation, S.S.; Writing—Original Draft Preparation, S.S. and F.C.; Writing—Review & Editing, S.S. and F.C.; Visualization, S.S. and F.C.; Supervision, S.S.; Project Administration, S.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

The research work for this paper was funded by the Cultural and Educational Grant Authority of the Ministry of Education, Research, Development and Youth of the Slovak Republic, KEGA project No. 017UKF-4/2024.

Institutional Review Board Statement

The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the protocol was given ethical approval by Committee no.3 (for curriculum integration and diversification in higher education) of the Cultural and Educational Grant Agency (KEGA) of the Ministry for Education, Research, Development and Youth of the Slovak Republic (protocol code 017UKF-4/2024; decision dated 8 January 2024).

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Acknowledgments

We are indebted to Andrea Chlebcová Hečková, PI of the project ‘Social Determinants of Critical Thinking and Their Reflection in the Innovation of Teaching Media Literacy at Universities’, within which the research for this paper took place. We thank the whole project team, and in particular Monika Štrbová, who shared the role of focus group facilitator with Simon Smith. Thank you also to Juliette De Maeyer, Thomas Martine, Veronika Cillingová and our two reviewers for extremely helpful comments on previous versions of this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest. The funding sponsors had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, and in the decision to publish the results.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CCOCommunicative constitution of organisation

Appendix A. English Translation of the Video Discussed in Focus Groups

  • Šibík: Refugees are crossing the Serbian-Hungarian border at will and in their thousands
All words spoken to camera by Jan Šibík
Scene 1
The border between Hungary and Serbia. For the moment the police are letting all the refugees through, and they are coming through freely, around 2000 a day.
Environmental sounds: mechanical chugging/rotating sound (like helicopter blades or a pump), background hum of human voices, frequently punctuated by cries of children
Scene 2
At first the police tried to apprehend each refugee and take them to a camp where they would be registered, but in the past two days they have stopped doing that and instead they have been laying on large numbers of buses to take them almost as far as the Austrian border.
Environmental sounds: sound of many footsteps on gravel, then on sandy ground, background hum of human voices, occasionally punctuated by cries of children
Scene 3
The Hungarian police have stopped around 250 refugees on this road, because they had escaped—instead of going to the camp they wanted to go to the train station to get to Szeged.
Environmental sounds: loud, low-pitch traffic noises, as passing cars and vans rev their engines (this scene has the loudest and closest background sounds)
Scene 4
Unlike on Lesbos, where I was three weeks ago, here on the Hungarian–Serbian border no one is going hungry. On the contrary, food is being wasted. I have to say I was quite shocked by the amount of discarded food.
Environmental sounds: gusts of wind buffeting the microphone, faint chatter of human voices
Scene 5
This [holding up two plastic bottles] is the big problem here—everywhere in the vicinity of this camp there’s an awful lot of food, drink and tents lying around. It’s just everywhere.
Environmental sounds: similar mechanical chugging sounds as scene 1 but fainter, quiet hum of human voices, two loud thuds when Šibík drops water bottles on the ground, Šibík’s voice slightly breathless
Scene 6
I saw discarded Czech wafer biscuits, tin cans, and lots of discarded tents which had only been used once, for one night. Refugees get rid of them, along with the carry-mats, because they don’t want to carry them. Another thing that shocked me was to see carry-mats, and even blow-up mattresses which cost over 1,000 crowns, being burned on open fires.
Environmental sounds: footsteps of two passing boys crushing discarded items as they walk across the camp, wind affecting the microphone, background hum of human voices
Scene 7
Lots of people are calling and asking how they can help. The only way I can think of is to come here and clean up after the refugees.
Environmental sounds: same mechanical chugging sounds as scene 4 but fainter still, very quiet hum of human voices, Šibík’s voice most prominent in this scene.
Available online at:

Appendix B. Focus Group Transcripts

  • Transcription conventions
In this appendix and in the excerpts reproduced in the main article, we adopt the following transcription conventions used in conversation analysis:
  • (.) a micropause
  • (1.0) a number in brackets indicates the length, in seconds, of a longer pause
  • ? rising intonation (not necessarily a question)
  • :: prolongation, or stretching, of the preceding sound. More colons = more prolonged
  • ____ underlining indicates louder talk or stress on part of a word
  • hh laughter (placed in brackets if within a word). More h’s indicate stronger laughter
  • = equal signs at the end of one turn and the beginning of another indicate there was no gap
  • – a dash at the end of a word indicates an unfinished word
  • [] square brackets indicate where overlapping speech begins and ends
  • ((Comment)) transcriber’s comment
Text in bold indicates the excerpts reproduced in the main article.
  • Focus group 1
Year 4 journalism students
F = main facilitator (first author)
F2 = second facilitator
F: You haven’t come across that video before?
All: ((nodding and murmuring))
F: you have? You remember it? Where from? Do you follow that channel-
Patrik: hh in ‘media literacy’, which we had a course in, that man showed us it
F: aha
Patrik: I can’t be certain it was that precise video, because I think it was just some photos from a reportage, on the basis of which he explained to us how significant framing can be for information, because that person [in the video] only showed us what he wanted to, by giving the report a frame, a way of presenting the information in a certain style, whereas if someone else was standing there, they might present the information in a completely different style, so
F: aha
Patrik: that was also how he showed us critical thinking
F: so it was actually presented to you as an exemplary case of how not to make news?
Patrik: you could say so
((general laughing))
F: O(hh)K (.) and those who haven’t seen it before, what did you make of it?
Sofia: no, I’ve also seen it before
Patrik: we’re all classmates
((several people speaking at once))
F: aha, so not much point me asking whether it came across as trustworthy
((general laughing))
F: but:: what helped you form a judgement that it’s untrustworthy (.) mainly (2.0) Patrik already started to tell us, but would anyone like to add to that?
Sofia: well, in my opinion it was also that ((coughs)) I’ve noticed that ((coughs again)) whenever people talk about that kind of news it’s: refugees have arrived, aren’t they ungrateful, look, they don’t want our Czech wafer biscuits, they’ve thrown them on the ground, what ingratitude! But it also occurred to me that it’s saying they came from somewhere else and our things aren’t good enough for them. It was similar when there was a collection for Ukraine—some people thought that those people would be grateful to get anything you wanted to throw away, and if they rejected your gifts it showed they’re ungrateful. I saw it among my own acquaintances, who thought they could help by donating, but ignored requests to bring this, this and this, and brought things they no longer needed, thinking they must want it because they’re refugees. And that came to mind when I was watching the video because it’s a common reaction when those kinds of events are presented, or when people talk about them.
F: hmm
Patrik: one warning signal was that all the time it was only him speaking. He didn’t make space for anyone else to speak. He didn’t ask the refugees about the situation they find themselves in, or ask the police for a statement. The very fact that he’s the only one speaking indicates that it isn’t a particularly objective report.
F: hmm, and does it make any difference if I read you the description underneath the video? “Photographer Jan Šibík filmed this reportage from the Serbian-Hungarian border. The wave of refugees is allegedly completely out of control here. He also observed humanitarian aid supplies being wasted.” (8.0)
Patrik: well, when I just see the report on its own, what strikes me is that the basic journalistic questions—what, where, how, why, for what purpose—go unanswered, and what’s left is just ‘someone said something’, well ((throws hands in air)) anyone else could say the same thing, so … (3.0)
F: nevertheless you do have real, live pictures from that border (.) what kind of commentary do you think should go with those images or (1.0) what kind of news report could you make with those shots so that it didn’t look so one-sided? (4.0)
Sofia: well, in my opinion ((coughs)) once there he could have done more than just say look at those people behind me, and even if they’re here I’m going to tell you what’s happening. He just went there and talked about those people, whom he didn’t know and didn’t ask, and all in all it came across to me as an inhuman report, like (.) these people are fleeing and they’ve left us a mess to clean up, like ((smiles and shrugs)) well … (1.5)
Alex: well, in general I would say it’s a very delicate theme, insofar as it’s a polarising theme? On the other hand he certainly could and should have spoken to both the refugees and the policemen, although there would have been a language barrier with the refugees
Unidentified participant: hmhm
Alex: because they would have probably had to communicate in English and not all of them (.) are able to express themselves in English (.) but even if he’d interviewed them the question of framing becomes even more significant because if he interviewed five, what if one of them said something that he liked, that fitted his (.) agenda (.) wouldn’t he keep just that one? So (0.5) it’s a (.) complicated theme to solve especially when the refugee crisis, the main wave (0.5) well it was everywhere, I would say (1.0) it was constantly in the news (1.0) and it didn’t even affect us (.) central Europe, except as a transit route, of course ((gesturing to the screen where the video was played))
F: and what impact would it have had on people, do you think?
Alex: what do you mean, in particular?
F: how would that news report have affected the public?
Sofia: that one? ((points at screen))
F: yes
Sofia: I’m not saying that we’re all like this but a lot of Slovaks, we’re like (.) and mainly the older generations (.) I know a lot of older people who are like this (.) not that they’re afraid of newcomers and foreigners, but they’re afraid of new things and it’s immaterial where they fled from, the refugees, what country, but it’s just that whoever is foreign is automatically bad (.) I’ve observed how many people seem to go ‘it’s unfamiliar, I don’t know them, they’re foreign, they’re bad’, those ((categories)) are the same for them, and they don’t even have a chance to get to know them because they go ‘they’re not like me, they’re not me, so they’re bad’. So if someone like that saw that it would impel them to say (.) ‘yes, I was right, they’re bad, they’ve no business being here, they should stay at home. It doesn’t matter what’s happening there, they should stay at home’ hh. (1.0)
Alex: and just quickly I would add that, yes, they’re afraid of the new, the unknown (.) but what they fear even more (.) and I noticed this with the Ukrainians (.) that’s a group of people who didn’t arouse so much fear even though they were refugees compared with the ones from the Middle East and Africa, because that’s another culture. After all the Ukrainians, they’re similar people to us, they have a very similar culture, but they feared the others like a devil fears the cross because it’s another culture, another religion, another everything. (12.0)
F2: so it reinforced our xenophobia, eh?
((quiet murmurs of agreement, nervous smiles))
  • Focus group 2
Year 4 journalism students
F = facilitator (the same person as F2 in Focus group 1)
F: that’s it ((pausing video on laptop))
Filip: phew, that was something, that video
((general laughing))
F: ((to Filip)) well, you can start hhh if you’re that full of emotions hhh
((general laughing))
F: so, have you come across that video?
((Mia and Hana nod, Natália and Šimon shake heads))
Filip: no
F: Hana has seen it
Mia: me too
F: Mia as well
Filip: tell me the source, I can’t see over there ((pointing to screen and turning to Šimon who is sitting closer to the laptop))
Šimon: video dot aktualne dot cz
Filip: none the wiser (.) thanks
F: very well then, who would like to speak, Hana? or anyone?, I’m certainly interested to hear Hana’s opinion, who’s seen it before, and then, well maybe first of all Filip, if he needs to let off steam-
((general laughter))
F: -to let those emotions out (.) is it trustworthy for you or how did you perceive it, that video?
Filip: me first?
F: obviously, you seem full of [emotions hh]
Filip: [we:::ll] above all that wasn’t journalism. Not in terms of the language used (.) absolutely improp- (.) phew
Natália: hhhhh ((laughs and moves forward in chair, putting hand to face))
((general laughter))
Filip: absolutely improper expressions, absolutely openly expressed opinions which the gentleman tries to get across, blatant and very emotionally coloured indignation, or the branding when describing the objects which are allegedly being squandered (.) the burning of a carry-mat that costs a thousand crowns, which is irrelevant information for this video
Natália: ((whispering)) six thousand crowns
Filip: did he say six thousand?
((general laughter))
Filip: phew!
Natália: hhh you misheard, I heard him well hhh10
Filip: so, all in all, it’s completely awful.
F: and what about the content? You’ve said that it’s terrible journalism-
Filip: hmhm
F: -what about the content, his claims, tha::t like burning carry-mats, do you think it was trustworthy? (0.5) or do you perceive it as untrustworthy purely on the basis of its reporting style?
Filip: Definitely, definitely. I cannot take it seriously (.) whatever information it transmitted after that ((pause)) I can’t even think about it. The information was conveyed so offensively that for me ((pause)) I’d rather forget I ever saw it.
F: hhhhh
Filip: I don’t even want to think about it, because it was so aggressive, disparaging (1.0) bad, totally bad.
F: hmhm
Natália: if I may err: just add something err (.) I didn’t like it either ((looks and gestures towards Filip)), bu::t I didn’t altogether understand. Was that a journalist or what?
Filip: [That was no journalist]
Natália: [was he just an ordinary Joe] who came along to complain that they’d made a mess of his space, his garden or whatever? He didn’t introduce himself in the video, I don’t know who he is ((looking annoyed and distressed as she gestures at the screen)). He just appeared and started to complain. I really didn’t even understand who those people were. Who were they? ((looking around)) what was the issue (.) [the Romanian-Serbian border or something]]
[((Mia and Hana speaking inaubibly at once))]
Hana: He’s a photo-reporter, it seems to me
Mia: He’s a photographer who decided to make a report ((shrugging her shoulders))
Šimon: it would be useful to know the context of that reportage ((pointing to screen)) is there something below it?
F: where?
Šimon: I don’t know if there’s anything there-
Filip: -it wa- it was a bit wound on ((i.e., we didn’t watch it right from the beginning))
F: ye::s because I: do you want to see it again from the start?
Filip: no no no
((general laughing))
Šimon: I just wondered if there was any text, perhaps-
Natália: underneath
Šimon: -whether it was part of another article
Natália: because I didn’t understand much from that video apart from the fact that they:: (.) made a mess-
F: no it’s just a video (.) aha here there’s something ((reads)) “Photographer Jan Šibík filmed this report from the Serbian-Hungarian border. The wave of refugees is allegedly uncontrollable here and he noticed humanitarian aid supplies being wasted.”
Filip: ‘refugees’ [literally “those who have escaped”—Czech uses the same word for refugee and fugitive]
Mia: Just that word ‘allegedly’ ((throws hand up towards screen)), you know, it says that they’re his opinions and assumptions. Who confirmed them to him?
Filip: yes
F: yes, allegedly means maybe (.) doesn’t it? (1.5)
Filip: because, because refugee:: is a much more emotionally coloured term than migrant
F: in Czech, right?
Filip: a person who escapes is not the same as a person who migrates, is it? That person escaped, that’s very- it evokes (.) a prisoner escaped, an animal escaped-
Natália: it’s utečencia in Slovak, isn’t it?
Filip: yes
Šimon: but in Czech it isn’t used with a pejorative connotation, I don’t think, it’s more like [inaudible]
Filip: [I’m not saying ((inaudible))]
F: [Filip perceived it that way] but I also know the term utečeniec? and it’s commonly used, but Filip perceived it pejoratively?
Filip: sure (.) it is used commonly, but in that context-
F: I understand
Filip: -it sounded very offensive to me. (1.0)
F: would anyone like to add anything? (0.5) about the content? (0.5) was it untrustworthy for everyone? What about you, Hana? You said you had seen that video? In what context did you see it?
Hana: I was on a course, a journalism course where we were also talking about critical thinking [hhh]
F: [hhh]
Hana: and we had that- that very ‘reportage’ ((imitates quotation mark signs with fingers)) as an example
F: uhuh
Hana: so:: afterwards we analysed it
F: hmhm
Hana: in sum, it wasn’t objective, in fact it was very subjective, it was one-sided and only captured a fleeting incident, there was no respondent, just the position of the photographer himself who:: I think that (.) I even mentioned him in my dissertation as he’s quite respected and well known among photographers, so:: (0.5) the disappointment was all the greater.
F: hmhm and let me pose a critical question about the actual content. How might such a video have an impact on ordinary people?
Šimon: [emotionally]
Natália: [oh:: now we’re talking] ‘wave of migrants’, just give it to the government, translate it into Slovak, and it will be ‘in eastern Slovakia this is happening!’
Hana: hmm ((nodding))
Natália: and then it will be right across the media.
Hana: Yes, as soon as they got hold of it they’d say this is the truth, this is exactly how they are, this is how they behave, this is what they do, they don’t appreciate anything, they’re only, only coming to steal our money and the things that belong to us, eh?
Natália: It’s an illustration or a picture of how we, as citizens of one country, perceive migrants. If I say the word migrant, what do you think of? This.
F: hmhm
Filip: and above all else it’s trying to take away our empathy towards those people regardless of the monstrous conditions that they have to endure in those camps, it’s: ‘they’re hungry? but look at how much food they’re discarding, they can’t be hungry, they’ve got it made, carry-mats, fires, food, looks like they’re all at a summer camp’ ((in a high-pitched, comical voice))
Natália: yes
Filip: he’s trying to distort reality so that we lose any empathy towards those people
Natália: try and sleep three nights on one of those carry-mats (.) it’s not easy
Mia: And yet empathy is just waiting for a simple explanation-
Filip: -yes-
Mia: -if they explained the reason why they left a mess behind them, for instance, then the:: receiver of that report would automatically activate their empathy.
  • Focus group 3
Year 1 journalism students
F = facilitator (first author)
F: You haven’t seen that report before?
All: No ((shaking heads))
F: and how did it affect you?
Júlia: hmm for me it was trustworthy overall because he was right in the place where it happened and it was visible that there was rubbish all around the place-
((Diana nodding))
Júlia: -and there was food strewn all over and bottles of water, and carry-mats and tents, so:: (.) which I found a bit of a shame given that perhaps before that err they’d sent those raw materials from Czechia, those tents and carry-mats, so they had somewhere to sleep (.) so maybe on the part of those refugees, those migrants (0.5) they didn’t seem to show appreciation that someone wanted to help them (2.0)
F: And did it strike you as balanced? Or- (2.0)
Júlia: hmm balanced in what way?
F: err (1.0) given that it was introduced as a reportage, should it (0.5) was it-
((Samuel beginning to speak))
F: -was it an adequate interpretation of what was going on?
Samuel: well, he all but accused the policemen of not doing their jobs properly, so it could have done with the policeman’s perspective-
((Diana vocally and gesturally expressing agreement))
Samuel: -on what was really happening, so that the other side was included
F and Diana: hmhm (2.0)
Samuel: hm in other words, there probably is something missing ((literally: something to work on)) in that case (.) and maybe it would have interested me to see, as he said he’d been in some other places before that, because I assume there is more footage than just that one camp-
F: yes
Samuel: -how were those reportages compiled? (2.0)
Diana: hmm I also wanted to hear a statement from the other side (.) from a police spokesperson perhaps (1.0) but on the other hand, as Júlia was saying ((looking at Júlia)) we actually saw directly how it really looked, and that what he was saying (0.5) wasn’t just made up to grab your attention but it really was like that
F: hmm
Júlia: yes, maybe if he’d spoken to one of those migrants (0.5) why they had left it like that, why they do that (0.5) I don’t know just some interaction like that would have been good
F: but on first impressions those live pictures straight from the scene (0.5) are a sign of trustworthiness?
((Júlia nodding))
Diana: err for example the fact that it wasn’t just an illustrative photo to go with it-
F: as we had in the press report you looked at earlier?
Diana: -yes, it let us form our own judgement that that’s how it really looks and it’s not just a photo downloaded from the internet (1.0)
Matej: I wanted that comment from the police because it was really just a personal evaluation by that journalist
F: yes (1.0) although he was actually labelled not as a journalist [but as a photographer]
Matej: [but as a photographer]
F: is that (1.0) does that have any significance?
Matej: I wouldn’t take it so much as a news report as his take on things—what he saw, what he captured (0.5) what he thought, because he often said ‘I think’ or ‘I see this’, but he didn’t ask the police
F: hmhm
Samuel: hm
Diana: I would say that despite the fact that he’s not an expert, in other words not a journalist, well in spite of that he brought us (0.5) a sort of live perspective on what it looked like there
F: hm
Diana: so as a supplement to a news report it would be great, in my view
Júlia: maybe, like Matej said, he gave a classical citizen’s perspective on how he saw things, and it wasn’t completely objective, like a journalist would have written it, but maybe we would have seen and thought the same things as him if we’d been there (3.0)
F: and the source, aktualne.cz [a popular Czech online news portal], is it a brand that means anything to you?
Júlia: I don’t know it at all, but (1.0) I don’t know ((blank looks from others)) (2.0)
F: if you came across such a report, would you want to read the description below the video?
Júlia: definitely
F: so I’ll read it out, to give you a complete picture (0.5) “Photographer Jan Šibík filmed this reportage from the Serbian-Hungarian border. The wave of refugees is allegedly completely out of control here. He also observed humanitarian aid supplies being wasted.” (2.0)
Júlia: hmm (3.0)
Júlia: that makes me think that he was trying to say or to point to something in that video, that reportage (10.0)
F: does anyone want to add anything? (1.0)
Alexandra: well, I also got the impression that his aim was just to show what was going on there, what had happened, what it looks like and (.) that was maybe why he didn’t speak to the policemen or to the people who were there, that wasn’t his aim, to get at the (.) truth, but just to give an overview ((other possible translations: view, outline, survey, summary)) and (1.0) as has already been said he’s not a journalist, he’s a photographer so that’s sort of his vocation (0.5) to show us what things look like-
Diana: hmhm
Alexandra: -what’s going on there
F: so is it sort of a partial perspective where his professional role is to capture a certain (0.5) side of events?
Alexandra: yes
F: and does that mean it’s a case where your informational strategies would need to supplement his perspective with something else?
Júlia: hmhm ((nodding))
F: because you’ve already mentioned (0.5) several of you said that you tend to check one source against another when you’re looking for information. So is this a case where you would want to go and look for something else afterwards?
Júlia: hm so I- I certainly would because I think it was a topic that so many people were dealing with then, it affected a lot of countries in one way or another and so it got into their news (0.5) so there would have been a lot of further information on the internet that you could make connections with or study in more depth. (10.0)

Notes

1
It is important to conduct audience research outside these regions since objectivity norms are not necessarily practised in the same ways in more ‘peripheral’ contexts (Hanitzsch, 2007; Maras, 2013).
2
Appendix A provides a link to the report and an English translation of the narration.
3
Štětka and Mihelj found that, particularly in Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbia and Viktor Orban’s Hungary, many citizens had begun to “place trust in media not because they offer impartial or accurate coverage of public affairs, but because they provide an account of a reality they personally agree with or—in the extreme case—because their account of reality is aligned with the one promoted by those in power” (Štětka & Mihelj, 2024, p. 243), which leads them to question the normative assumption that trust in the media is always a democratic asset.
4
Note that only 13 of the 17 participants actually spoke in this segment.
5
All names used are pseudonyms.
6
Lough (2021) found that photography awards judges placed similar exigences on photojournalists, penalising entries lacking captions introducing the people in a photograph.
7
Even the highly skilled investigative reporters interviewed by Ettema and Glasser, however, felt vulnerable to downstream ventriloquation. As one of them reflected, “I suppose, you would feel very bad if you brought something to light, and there was this completely crazy reaction to it”. He refused to accept any responsibility for responses to his reporting “because you really have no control over the process” (Ettema & Glasser, 1998, p. 188).
8
Diana is referring to a written news report which the group had just discussed.
9
Marielle Macé’s book Styles, a passionate plea to take seriously the ‘how’ of life, includes a ‘little elegy to the documentary’, a genre she argues was born to document critical situations by making “regimes of objects, spatialities and gestures” appear, based on a “belief in the force of appearances” (Macé, 2016, p. 314).
10
In fact it was Natália who misheard.

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