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Philosophies, Volume 5, Issue 1 (March 2020) – 5 articles

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11 pages, 269 KiB  
Article
A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How: Grasping Truths in a Practical Way
by Cathrine V. Felix and Andreas Stephens
Philosophies 2020, 5(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies5010005 - 12 Mar 2020
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 3688
Abstract
For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. [...] Read more.
For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. In this article, we offer a case study of how cognitive-science input can elucidate an epistemological issue that has caused extensive debate. We explore Jason Stanley’s idea of the practical grasp of a propositional truth and present naturalistic arguments against his reductive approach to knowledge. We argue that a plausible interpretation of cognitive-science input concerning knowledge—even if one accepts that knowledge how is partly propositional—must involve an element of knowing how to act correctly upon the proposition; and this element of knowing how to act correctly cannot itself be propositional. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies - Part 2)
13 pages, 1147 KiB  
Perspective
Breakthrough Knowledge Synthesis in the Age of Google
by Ronald B. Brown
Philosophies 2020, 5(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies5010004 - 4 Mar 2020
Cited by 7 | Viewed by 5736
Abstract
Epistemology is the main branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, but how is new knowledge created? In this perspective article, I introduce a novel method of knowledge discovery that synthesizes online findings from current and prior research. This web-based knowledge [...] Read more.
Epistemology is the main branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, but how is new knowledge created? In this perspective article, I introduce a novel method of knowledge discovery that synthesizes online findings from current and prior research. This web-based knowledge synthesis method is especially relevant in today’s information technology environment, where the research community has easy access to online interactive tools and an expansive selection of digitized peer-reviewed literature. Based on a grounded theory methodology, the innovative synthesis method presented here can be used to organize, analyze and combine concepts from an intermixed selection of quantitative and qualitative research, inferring an emerging theory or thesis of new knowledge. Novel relationships are formed when synthesizing causal theories—accordingly, this article reviews basic logical principles of associative relationships, mediators and causal pathways inferred in knowledge synthesis. I also provide specific examples from my own knowledge syntheses in the field of epidemiology. The application of this web-based knowledge synthesis method, and its unique potential to discover breakthrough knowledge, will be of interest to researchers in other areas, such as education, health, humanities, and the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies - Part 2)
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5 pages, 411 KiB  
Article
De Libero Arbitrio—A Thought-Experiment about the Freedom of Human Will
by Johannes Schmidl
Philosophies 2020, 5(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies5010003 - 16 Feb 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3444
Abstract
The discussion of whether or not humans are able to act freely is ongoing, even though, and precisely because, technical methods for detecting the physical state of the brain are constantly improving. The brain as a physical–chemical object seems to be pre-determined by [...] Read more.
The discussion of whether or not humans are able to act freely is ongoing, even though, and precisely because, technical methods for detecting the physical state of the brain are constantly improving. The brain as a physical–chemical object seems to be pre-determined by its physical and chemical states, while at the same time human consciousness gives the impression of being able to decide subjectively and freely on its own. Determinists claim that this free decision is just a form of misinterpretation of an epiphenomenon and that the alleged “free decision” has actually been determined by the physical state of the brain before the human subject gives the impression of being able to decide freely. The basis for this is a set of experiments, the first of which was specified by Benjamin Libet. Determinism, as the philosophical position that all events are entirely determined by previously existing causes, in principle enables the existence of a perfect predictor. In this paper, a thought-experiment is introduced which demonstrates that a subjective consciousness can break any forecast about its physical state, independently of the method of its detection, and, consequentially, to refute claims about its purely deterministic role. The thought-experiment picks up on an idea of the philosopher Alvin I. Goldman. Logically, the proof follows the path of a ‘reductio ad absurdum’. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies - Part 2)
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12 pages, 2604 KiB  
Article
Approximate and Situated Causality in Deep Learning
by Jordi Vallverdú
Philosophies 2020, 5(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies5010002 - 6 Feb 2020
Cited by 15 | Viewed by 6554
Abstract
Causality is the most important topic in the history of western science, and since the beginning of the statistical paradigm, its meaning has been reconceptualized many times. Causality entered into the realm of multi-causal and statistical scenarios some centuries ago. Despite widespread critics, [...] Read more.
Causality is the most important topic in the history of western science, and since the beginning of the statistical paradigm, its meaning has been reconceptualized many times. Causality entered into the realm of multi-causal and statistical scenarios some centuries ago. Despite widespread critics, today deep learning and machine learning advances are not weakening causality but are creating a new way of finding correlations between indirect factors. This process makes it possible for us to talk about approximate causality, as well as about a situated causality. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy and Epistemology of Deep Learning)
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2 pages, 270 KiB  
Editorial
Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Philosophies in 2019
by Philosophies Editorial Office
Philosophies 2020, 5(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies5010001 - 16 Jan 2020
Viewed by 2067
Abstract
The editorial team greatly appreciates the reviewers who have dedicated their considerable time and expertise to the journal’s rigorous editorial process over the past 12 months, regardless of whether the papers are finally published or not [...] Full article
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