Philosophies

15 pages, 234 KB

Open AccessArticle

Enhancing or Jeopardizing Human Creativity? Will Humans Be Able to Defend Themselves Against AI Superpowers in an Age of Ethics Washing and Law Washing?

by Lorenzo Magnani

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 65; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020065 - 20 Apr 2026

Viewed by 922

Abstract

I recently introduced the concept of eco-cognitive openness and situatedness to explain how cognitive systems—human or artificial—dynamically interact with their environments to generate information and creative outputs through abductive cognition. Humans display high eco-cognitive openness, integrating tools and cultural contexts through “unlocked strategies” [...] Read more.

I recently introduced the concept of eco-cognitive openness and situatedness to explain how cognitive systems—human or artificial—dynamically interact with their environments to generate information and creative outputs through abductive cognition. Humans display high eco-cognitive openness, integrating tools and cultural contexts through “unlocked strategies” that also enable exceptional creativity. By contrast, generative AI like LLMs operates via “locked strategies” based on pre-existing datasets with limited real-time interaction, which constrains higher creativity. Although LLMs surpass humans in many cognitive tasks, they lack the openness required for truly advanced abductive performance. Notably, most human cognition is repetitive and imitative—humans themselves often resemble “stochastic parrots.” In this sense, LLMs reveal human intellectual poverty more than they expose flaws in artificial intelligence. I will illustrate how LLMs can act as powerful enhancers of human performance while simultaneously threatening our most distinctive prerogative: creativity. Future human–AI collaboration could expand our eco-cognitive openness, but demands vigilant oversight to counter bias and so-called overcomputationalization. GenAI can serve as an epistemic mediator toward unlocked creativity only if humans maintain agency and embed its outputs in broader socio-cultural frameworks. My greatest concern is that ethical and legal safeguards will remain ineffective in practice, resulting in mere “ethics washing” and “law washing” without genuine enforcement. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intelligent Inquiry into Intelligence)

20 pages, 252 KB

Open AccessArticle

“As If I Could Read the Darkness”: Some Stakes of Reading in Philosophical Investigations

by Steven G. Affeldt

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 64; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020064 - 20 Apr 2026

Viewed by 552

Abstract

The number and variety of images of reading in the Investigations suggest that, for Wittgenstein, reading is an essential part of our natural history and of the human form of life. Further, his treatments of reading show that different forms of reading express [...] Read more.

The number and variety of images of reading in the Investigations suggest that, for Wittgenstein, reading is an essential part of our natural history and of the human form of life. Further, his treatments of reading show that different forms of reading express and sustain different forms of life. This essay explores what the Investigations reveals as the existential stakes of different modes of reading. Beginning with Wittgenstein’s opening engagement with Augustine, it argues that in the Investigations, as in the Confessions, different modes of reading both bespeak, and open us to, blessed or cursed forms of life. It then develops extended interpretations of individual passages in order to detail some specific shapes of, and conditions governing, modes of reading tied to these blessed or cursed forms of life. Finally, given these existential stakes of reading, it examines how the Investigations itself asks to be read and outlines specific ways in which its notorious difficulty and obscurity are essential to achieving its philosophical aims and, in particular, to promoting an ongoing practice of reading through which we are able to awaken to the wonder of our lives in language. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Dawn of Aspects: Wittgenstein and the Life of Meaning)

11 pages, 198 KB

Open AccessArticle

Cosmic Existentialism: Existence in an Indifferent Universe

by Eduardo Duque-Dussán

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 63; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020063 - 17 Apr 2026

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Abstract

The problem of meaning in an apparently indifferent universe has long been a central concern of existential philosophy. Classical existentialism addressed this question by emphasizing human freedom, responsibility, and the creation of meaning in the absence of transcendental guarantees, yet it largely remained [...] Read more.

The problem of meaning in an apparently indifferent universe has long been a central concern of existential philosophy. Classical existentialism addressed this question by emphasizing human freedom, responsibility, and the creation of meaning in the absence of transcendental guarantees, yet it largely remained framed within an anthropocentric horizon. This article introduces the concept of cosmic existentialism as a philosophical framework that situates human existence within the broader context of a scientifically understood cosmos. Through conceptual philosophical analysis, the paper reinterprets key existential categories such as angst, authenticity, and freedom in light of contemporary cosmological perspectives. Within this framework, the indifference of the universe is interpreted as a fundamental existential condition within the cosmological framework adopted in this study that reveals the fragility and contingency of human life. The analysis suggests that recognizing humanity’s lack of cosmic privilege does not lead to nihilism but instead allows meaning to be interpreted as a local, finite, and relational phenomenon. Cosmic existentialism therefore offers a philosophical perspective that integrates existential reflection with modern cosmological understanding and provides a framework for thinking about human existence within an indifferent universe. This standpoint is articulated through several principles, including cosmic indifference, the existential locality of meaning, and the contingency of human existence within the cosmos. Rather than emphasizing the scale of the universe itself, the present analysis suggests that the philosophical significance of cosmology lies in the removal of any privileged standpoint from which human existence can be interpreted. Full article

13 pages, 248 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Beyond the Future: Protentional Friction and Suspended Sense in the Lived Time of Illness

by Donald A. Landes and Kathleen Hulley

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 62; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020062 - 16 Apr 2026

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Abstract

From hours spent in waiting rooms amidst uncertainty to the experience of recovering from medical treatments, the lived time of illness is marked by intervals of suspended sense. By disorienting our relation to the future, illness disrupts and reconfigures lived time from within, [...] Read more.

From hours spent in waiting rooms amidst uncertainty to the experience of recovering from medical treatments, the lived time of illness is marked by intervals of suspended sense. By disorienting our relation to the future, illness disrupts and reconfigures lived time from within, shaping how we navigate our intersubjective milieu and make sense of our unfolding lives. In this paper, we introduce the phenomenological concept of “protentional friction” as a way of understanding these experiences. Drawing upon Simone de Beauvoir’s work on subjectivity and becoming, alongside Henri Bergson’s and Eugène Minkowski’s emphasis on durée and élan, we demonstrate how protentional friction allows us to negotiate the tensions of our situation, orient ourselves toward the future through projects, and gear into the ongoing work of sense-making. As a counterbalance to normalizing cultural discourses surrounding illness, we reinterpret the idea of the “quotidian” as the everyday practice of sense-making to find and sustain an equilibrium. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Critical Phenomenologies of Illness and Normality)

17 pages, 275 KB

Open AccessArticle

Change Before Time: Empirical Equivalence, Mechanics, and Structures for Dynamic Metaphysics

by Mackenzie Hawkins

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 61; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020061 - 15 Apr 2026

Viewed by 565

Abstract

This paper argues that, within established mechanics, a change-first structure of mechanics—one that does not treat background time as fundamental—is as empirically licensed as the familiar time-first structure. Carlo Rovelli’s generally covariant framework and Wonchull Park’s initial conditions framework each provide an independent [...] Read more.

This paper argues that, within established mechanics, a change-first structure of mechanics—one that does not treat background time as fundamental—is as empirically licensed as the familiar time-first structure. Carlo Rovelli’s generally covariant framework and Wonchull Park’s initial conditions framework each provide an independent demonstration of this possibility across classical, relativistic, and quantum mechanics. Park’s Reality View Equivalence is employed as an epistemological constraint on claims of compatibility at the physics–metaphysics interface. The resulting picture of change before time yields structural resources that offer, without mandating, ways of supporting metaphysical projects that emphasize the dynamic nature of reality. Two worked examples are used to illustrate this application: first, by placing local becoming within the change-first state package, and, second, by treating entities that participate in change-first states as necessarily dynamic and thus, arguably, processual. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Foundations in Flux: Process Metaphysics and Its Scientific Applications)

19 pages, 266 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Virtue of Violence in Sport

by Evan Thomas Knott

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 60; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020060 - 10 Apr 2026

Viewed by 999

Abstract

This paper explores the ethical dimensions of violence in sporting contexts, proposing that violence can be a virtue when characterized by controlled physicality. While society often views violence negatively, the paper argues that within rule-governed sports, certain forms of violence are morally permissible, [...] Read more.

This paper explores the ethical dimensions of violence in sporting contexts, proposing that violence can be a virtue when characterized by controlled physicality. While society often views violence negatively, the paper argues that within rule-governed sports, certain forms of violence are morally permissible, strategically valuable, and essential to upholding the integrity of the game. Drawing on Suitsian terms and Kantian ethics, the paper develops a theory of lusory violence, distinguishing it from uncontrolled physicality or unmitigated violence. By examining the roles of enforcers in hockey, the development of MMA, and the ethics of sport jiu-jitsu, the paper suggests that violence is acceptable within a lusory framework only when it is purposive, strategically relevant, and constrained by rules that prioritize technical skill over raw damage. Ultimately, the paper argues that the ability to modulate violent behaviour represents a form of moral development, framing virtuous violence as a necessary tool for maintaining natural justice and personal excellence within specific sporting environments. Yet, virtuous violence is subordinate to technique, justice, and other defining elements of sports. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Sport and Physical Culture)

17 pages, 244 KB

Open AccessArticle

Passed over in Silence: Deleuze, Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and an Ethics of Learning

by Jeffrey A. Bell

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 59; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020059 - 9 Apr 2026

Viewed by 730

Abstract

This essay attempts to bring together the philosophies of Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze by developing an ethics of learning that is implicit, and at times explicit, in each of their works. How this comes to be manifest in their works is that for [...] Read more.

This essay attempts to bring together the philosophies of Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze by developing an ethics of learning that is implicit, and at times explicit, in each of their works. How this comes to be manifest in their works is that for Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze, what is most important about this ethics of learning is that it is irreducible to rigid moral laws and to an understanding of reality that is reducible to forms of representational thinking. Most importantly, this essay shows that Spinoza’s understanding of absolutely infinite substance allows Spinoza to develop the ethical project of his Ethics—namely, his ethics of learning—and it is also what helps us to understand what Wittgenstein believed must be passed over in silence. Although the influence of Spinoza on Deleuze is well known, the focus placed here on learning will highlight, and in large part explain, why Spinoza remains a constant thread throughout Deleuze’s work while the importance of other philosophers, such as Nietzsche, slip to the background. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)

22 pages, 2086 KB

Open AccessArticle

Mathematical Confusions Behind a Common Misunderstanding of Idealism

by Paul Redding

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 58; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020058 - 8 Apr 2026

Viewed by 1055

Abstract

The paper starts by questioning the highly influential but extremely misleading characterizations of Plato and Hegel by Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper. It is argued that mathematical assumptions concerning the ancient problem of the incommensurability of continuous and discrete quantities underlie the ways [...] Read more.

The paper starts by questioning the highly influential but extremely misleading characterizations of Plato and Hegel by Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper. It is argued that mathematical assumptions concerning the ancient problem of the incommensurability of continuous and discrete quantities underlie the ways in which Russell and Popper portray the metaphysics of Plato and Hegel—Popper explicitly, and Russell implicitly, presupposing a particular response to this problem by broadening the concept of number to include irrational numbers. Recent work on Plato, however, suggests a different strategy for responding to this ancient conundrum, one that involves a mediated “duality” of the continuous and discrete that Hegel would later generalize to a duality of determinate and indeterminate aspects of cognition more generally. This Platonic alternative had originated with the Pythagorean natural philosopher Philolaus of Croton and would later be expressed in modern mathematics in a non-Cartesian way of applying numerical metrics to geometric figures in disciplines such as projective geometry. Such an alternative approach to both quantitative and conceptual incommensurability, I claim, had influenced Plato’s later conception of philosophical method that would be adopted by Hegel via the intermediary of Leibniz, the first modern “idealist”. Understanding the actual mathematics modeling philosophical concepts for Plato and Hegel becomes crucial for understanding the philosophical claims of modern idealism. Full article

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21 pages, 320 KB

Open AccessArticle

Xenoepistemics

by Jordi Vallverdú

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 57; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020057 - 8 Apr 2026

Viewed by 635

Abstract

Epistemology remains tacitly anthropocentric: it treats knowledge as something produced and validated through human cognitive capacities such as understanding, intuition, and transparent justification. Yet contemporary science and artificial intelligence increasingly depend on non-human systems that generate mathematically valid results, empirically successful models, and [...] Read more.

Epistemology remains tacitly anthropocentric: it treats knowledge as something produced and validated through human cognitive capacities such as understanding, intuition, and transparent justification. Yet contemporary science and artificial intelligence increasingly depend on non-human systems that generate mathematically valid results, empirically successful models, and operationally reliable inferences that no human can fully survey or interpret. This article develops xenoepistemics, a structural theory of non-anthropocentric knowledge. The central claim is that epistemic evaluation must be reformulated in terms of system-level properties—reliability, robustness, counterfactual sensitivity, and domain transfer—rather than mentalistic notions such as belief or understanding. I offer (i) a definition of xenoepistemic systems as systems that track structure in a target domain without requiring human-style semantic access; (ii) a minimal account of epistemic agency without minds that avoids trivialization; and (iii) a non-circular trust framework that distinguishes empirical success from epistemic legitimacy using independent validation regimes. This paper addresses a reflexive worry—that a human-authored theory cannot dethrone human epistemology—by separating standpoint from object: xenoepistemics is articulated by humans but is not about human cognition. I discuss the pragmatic value of xenoepistemic knowledge production, the limits of independent verification for opaque systems, domain-relative thresholds for xenoepistemic authority, and the problem of constitutionally human-inaccessible knowledge. Finally, I diagnose and formalize the Marcusian regress paradox: recurrent goalpost-shifting, whereby every machine competence is reclassified as irrelevant once achieved. Xenoepistemics reframes this debate by treating non-human knowledge as a present reality requiring new norms, not as a future curiosity. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intelligent Inquiry into Intelligence)

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16 pages, 589 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Fist Is Indistinguishable from Five Clenched Fingers: Mereological Anti-Realism in Sinitic Madhyamaka Buddhism

by Ernest Billings Brewster

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 56; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020056 - 7 Apr 2026

Viewed by 857

Abstract

Mereological anti-realism denies the intrinsic reality of both composite wholes and their constituent parts. This paper analyzes the mereological anti-realist argumentation developed by the Sino-Parthian scholar-monk Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE) targeting the mereological realist doctrine of the Brāhmaṇical Vaiśeṣika tradition in his understudied [...] Read more.

Mereological anti-realism denies the intrinsic reality of both composite wholes and their constituent parts. This paper analyzes the mereological anti-realist argumentation developed by the Sino-Parthian scholar-monk Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE) targeting the mereological realist doctrine of the Brāhmaṇical Vaiśeṣika tradition in his understudied Exegesis on the Middle Treatise (Zhongguan lun shu中觀論疏) and Exegesis on the Hundred Verse Treatise (Bailun shu百論疏). By counterbalancing Jizang’s critiques with the Vaiśeṣika mereological realist doctrine on its own terms, this paper critically assesses the viability and coherence of Jizang’s arguments that there are no entities that instantiate mereological relations or properties. An examination of Jizang’s critique of Vaiśeṣika mereological realism brings to light how the Madhyamaka Buddhist doctrine avoids metaphysical nihilism in accounting for how both wholes and parts can possess causal efficacy without being attributed intrinsic reality in and of themselves. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Metaphysics and Mind in Chinese Philosophy)

24 pages, 1732 KB

Open AccessArticle

New Programming Styles Suggested by Human Languages

by Baptiste Mélès

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 55; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020055 - 7 Apr 2026

Viewed by 596

Abstract

Can human languages help us write programs in a different way than we usually do? To examine this question, we first define exactly what it means for a programming language to be “derived from” a human language. Next, we analyse cases in which [...] Read more.

Can human languages help us write programs in a different way than we usually do? To examine this question, we first define exactly what it means for a programming language to be “derived from” a human language. Next, we analyse cases in which translating a program from one human language to another does not significantly change the program’s structure. Finally, we examine two game-changing cases: a programming language derived from Latin, in which syntax plays a limited role compared to morphology, and another derived from Classical Chinese, in which little linguistic recursion is available. These examples show that human languages, even ancient ones, are a reservoir for innovation in program writing. One can encourage programming language designers to dare learn foreign languages and not be ashamed of their own native language. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Semantics and Computation)

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10 pages, 220 KB

Open AccessArticle

Foucauldian Biopolitics and Homo virtualis in the Context of Anticipatory Governance, Algorithms, and Transhumanism

by Mariam Margaryan, Aghavni Harutyunyan, Silva Petrosyan, Ashot Gevorgyan and Hayarpi Sahakyan

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 54; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020054 - 3 Apr 2026

Viewed by 838

Abstract

This article examines contemporary forms of algorithmic governance through a biopolitical framework grounded in Michel Foucault’s analysis of security, risk, and governmentality. Rather than treating algorithmic systems as a rupture with earlier modes of power, the article argues that they intensify a security-based [...] Read more.

This article examines contemporary forms of algorithmic governance through a biopolitical framework grounded in Michel Foucault’s analysis of security, risk, and governmentality. Rather than treating algorithmic systems as a rupture with earlier modes of power, the article argues that they intensify a security-based rationality already oriented toward probabilistic reasoning, anticipatory intervention, and the indirect regulation of conduct. Governance increasingly operates by organizing environments in advance, shaping the conditions under which action becomes possible rather than correcting behavior after the fact. Situating transhumanism within this framework, the article approaches enhancement-oriented projects not as speculative or external developments, but as an extension of biopolitical governance from the regulation of life toward its optimization and redesign. Human capacities become objects of assessment and intervention, shifting the biopolitical subject from a bearer of risk to an upgrade-eligible profile oriented toward projected futures. To conceptualize the form of subjectivity produced at the intersection of algorithmic prediction and transhumanist optimization, the article introduces the heuristic figure of Homo virtualis. This figure describes a form of subjectivity in which individuals are approached through predictive profiles rather than stable identities, and responsibility shifts toward managing expected outcomes rather than accounting for past actions. By examining these shifts, the article contributes to debates on algorithmic governance by clarifying how biopolitics, prediction, and subjectivity are reconfigured as futures become increasingly organized in advance. This article adopts a descriptive and analytical approach rather than a normative one. Full article

13 pages, 222 KB

Open AccessArticle

Body-Subject or Neo-Liberal Subject? Phenomenology, Depression, and CBT

by Patrick Seniuk

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 53; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020053 - 1 Apr 2026

Viewed by 546

Abstract

Depression is notable for high rates of disability. The medical model typically characterizes depression as a physiological dysfunction or psychological disorder. However, both views fail to appreciate the phenomenology of depressed experience. Drawing on the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, this article contends that [...] Read more.

Depression is notable for high rates of disability. The medical model typically characterizes depression as a physiological dysfunction or psychological disorder. However, both views fail to appreciate the phenomenology of depressed experience. Drawing on the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, this article contends that the lived experience of chronic depression is marked by a disturbance between the body-subject and the world. More specifically, the experience of depression is characterized by alienation from the world, self and others. While anti-depressants have long been the first line of treatment of depression, many governments subsidize cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) as an adjunct treatment. CBT is said to be the gold standard psychotherapeutic treatment given that it is evidence-based, cost-effective, and short in duration. However, not only are these justifications questionable, but the theoretical underpinnings of CBT have ideological significance. Rather than approaching depressed persons as body-subjects, CBT casts service users as neo-liberal subjects, insofar as depression is characterized as disordered thinking that is independent of a person’s situated life. The emphasis on quickly returning people to work to reduce strain on welfare systems, while a valid economic concern, is not a valid therapeutic concern. The limited choice of subsidized psychotherapeutic options fails to recognize that depression is a heterogenous phenomenon, meaning that the CBT model of disordered thinking is not necessarily representative of the way in which depression manifests. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Critical Phenomenologies of Illness and Normality)

19 pages, 280 KB

Open AccessArticle

Social Science in the Age of AI: Unveiling Opportunities, Confronting Biases, and Charting Ethical Pathways

by Tarik Mokadi, Osama Tawfiq Jarrar and Ayman Yousef

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 52; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020052 - 1 Apr 2026

Viewed by 1394

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a significant paradigm of methodology and epistemology in the social sciences. Machine learning (ML), natural language processing (NLP), and generative models enable researchers to work with big, multimodal datasets, identify complex patterns, and recreate events in the social [...] Read more.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a significant paradigm of methodology and epistemology in the social sciences. Machine learning (ML), natural language processing (NLP), and generative models enable researchers to work with big, multimodal datasets, identify complex patterns, and recreate events in the social world in ways that previously were not feasible. At the same time, these innovations also lead to ethical challenges related to algorithmic bias, black boxes, data extractivism, and reinforced structural inequalities in welfare, government services, education, and criminal justice. The article critically questions the social sciences in the light of AI on three dimensions that are inextricably linked, namely: (1) the opportunities that AI provides to social-scientific inquiry; (2) the biases and constraints generated through data, models, and institutional application; and (3) ethical pathways that are necessary for the responsible governance of AI-facilitated research and decision support. The article is based on a scoping, critical thematic review of the recent literature, and its conceptualization of AI as a socio-technical infrastructure is that it produces knowledge and, at the same time, offers power. It explains the impact AI practices have on restructuring disciplines like sociology, psychology, political science, and policy analysis, and how it blindly predicts how data practices, design choices, and governance arrangements can either preserve or destroy existing hierarchies. The paper suggests an analytical framework synthesizing AI practices, social research practices, and governance structures in ethical frameworks. It argues that the emancipatory promise of AI in the social sciences is dependent on the attainment of something beyond principle-based claims of so-called ethical AI by operational governance mechanisms that make systems visible, debatable, and responsible in their respective situations. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intelligent Inquiry into Intelligence)

17 pages, 614 KB

Open AccessArticle

Abductive Discretization and Residual Politics: From Kantian Schematism to “Open Schema” AI Governance

by Se Hoon Son

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 51; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020051 - 30 Mar 2026

Viewed by 519

Abstract

Fairness and minority exclusion have emerged as the central concerns of contemporary Artificial Intelligence (AI) ethics. However, standard auditing and documentation practices often fail to capture harms affecting edge cases and marginalized groups. This article argues that this failure is structural: the act [...] Read more.

Fairness and minority exclusion have emerged as the central concerns of contemporary Artificial Intelligence (AI) ethics. However, standard auditing and documentation practices often fail to capture harms affecting edge cases and marginalized groups. This article argues that this failure is structural: the act of “discretization”—converting continuous reality into discrete governance categories—inevitably produces a “residual.” Drawing on German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Schelling) and continental philosophy (Dilthey, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty), we reconceptualize residuals not as mere noise but as “surprising facts” that should trigger abductive hypothesis revision. We critique checklist-centered governance as a form of proceduralized auditing that can obscure these residuals. This article makes three key contributions: (i) a structural diagnosis of residual production using systems theory and topology; (ii) a philosophical reconstruction of abductive revision as a hermeneutic necessity; and (iii) an institutional design proposal—specifically, the Residual Ledger and Category Revision Protocols—to operationalize “Open Schema” governance. Full article

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10 pages, 225 KB

Open AccessArticle

Deleuze on Spinoza’s Geometrism

by Florian Vermeiren

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 50; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020050 - 26 Mar 2026

Viewed by 799

Abstract

In his seminars, Deleuze claims that Spinoza is ‘an absolute geometrist’. This article contextualizes, explains and substantiates this aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza. I position Deleuze’s reading within both the long-running scholarly debate on Spinoza’s relationship to mathematics and within the evolution [...] Read more.

In his seminars, Deleuze claims that Spinoza is ‘an absolute geometrist’. This article contextualizes, explains and substantiates this aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza. I position Deleuze’s reading within both the long-running scholarly debate on Spinoza’s relationship to mathematics and within the evolution of Deleuze’s own relation to Spinoza. Deleuze’s idea that Spinoza is a geometrist is shown to consist of three elements. First, according to Spinoza, geometry is more fundamental than arithmetic. Second, Spinoza frees geometry from the realm of fiction and abstract and develops, as Deleuze says, a ‘mathematics of the real’. Third, Spinoza finds in geometry a language of univocity, by which he can avoid the equivocity and hierarchy of the Aristotelian worldview. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)

21 pages, 278 KB

Open AccessArticle

Tone as Ontology: A Structural Account of Being Grounded in Generative Invariants

by Jonah Y. C. Hsu

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 49; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020049 - 25 Mar 2026

Viewed by 1071

Abstract

This paper develops Tone as Ontology, a structural account of being grounded in the invariants of generative systems. We articulate the ontological significance of tone, distinguishing this foundational work from a companion paper that explores its methodological application and formalization. We redefine “tone” [...] Read more.

This paper develops Tone as Ontology, a structural account of being grounded in the invariants of generative systems. We articulate the ontological significance of tone, distinguishing this foundational work from a companion paper that explores its methodological application and formalization. We redefine “tone” as the structural profile of constraints that allows entities to maintain coherence under transformation. The tonal ontology formalizes three invariants—Resonance, Responsibility, and Closure—as conditions of persistence that bridge operational and metaphysical ontology. Concretely, we specify Resonance (relational continuity via recursive feedback), Responsibility (traceable accountability that conserves integrity across transformations), and Closure (recursive self-consistency enabling bounded openness). In contrast to informational or substance-based views, tonal being is understood as the conservation of structure through change. The resulting framework unites physical coherence, informational integrity, and ontological continuity into a generative ontology of integrity, suggesting that to exist is to maintain one’s tone. This paper addresses fundamental questions in meta-ontology, demonstrates how tone generates classical ontological frameworks, and advances a conceptual reorientation for understanding existence as resonant persistence. It outlines testable implications across philosophy of mind, AI ethics, and social/environmental theory. Overall, tonal ontology is presented as a post-informational, structurally grounded account of being. Full article

16 pages, 320 KB

Open AccessArticle

Dual Variations of Globalization and Localization: The Discursive Paradigm Shift of “Wenqi Theory” and Its Aesthetic Integration

by Yan Li and Xinyue Yao

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020048 - 25 Mar 2026

Viewed by 501

Abstract

This article focuses on the origin of “Wenqi Theory”—a core domain of ancient Chinese literary theory—specifically Cao Pi’s proposition that “literature is governed by qi”. It situates this concept within the 21st-century context of cultural globalization to engage in dialogue with [...] Read more.

This article focuses on the origin of “Wenqi Theory”—a core domain of ancient Chinese literary theory—specifically Cao Pi’s proposition that “literature is governed by qi”. It situates this concept within the 21st-century context of cultural globalization to engage in dialogue with Western aesthetics, aiming to revitalize the theory through mutual learning between Chinese and Western civilizations and integrate it into the system of modern transformation for classical literary theory. From the perspective of contemporary theoretical reconstruction, the paper analyzes the modern discourse paradigm of “Wenqi Theory”, traces its philosophical roots, and points out that the “clearness” or “murkiness” of “Wenqi” directly influences the aesthetic value of writing and the evaluation of objects. The study reveals that “Wenqi Theory” possesses rich connotations and unifies multiple dialectical relationships such as author and text, macrocosm and microcosm, personal temperament and acquired cultivation, content and form, fully embodying the distinctive integration of Chinese cultural tradition. Furthermore, the paper studies the lineage of life aesthetics from “Qi-Theory” in philosophy and science to “Wenqi Theory” in literary criticism, and its importance in constructing modern discourse paradigms. Meanwhile, by utilizing the categories of “the sublime” and “the beautiful” in Western aesthetics, it reactivates the contemporary aesthetic implications of “Wenqi Theory” within the context of globalization and cross-cultural exchange. The article endeavours to place this seemingly esoteric concept of classical Chinese literary theory within a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary philosophical horizon for systematic and theoretical interpretation, revealing its universal aesthetic value that transcends specific cultural backgrounds, thereby providing a possible paradigm for the modernization of traditional Chinese literary theory and its participation in international academic dialogue. Full article

33 pages, 429 KB

Open AccessArticle

Cells and Their Organelles as a Testing Ground for Process- and Substance-Based Ontologies in Biology

by Giorgio Dieci

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 47; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020047 - 24 Mar 2026

Viewed by 1129

Abstract

Recently, a shift from substance-based to process-based ontologies of living beings and biological entities has been widely advocated, largely on the grounds that traditional substance thinking, by encouraging biological reductionism, fails to adequately capture the nature of biological wholes. Process-based approaches are instead [...] Read more.

Recently, a shift from substance-based to process-based ontologies of living beings and biological entities has been widely advocated, largely on the grounds that traditional substance thinking, by encouraging biological reductionism, fails to adequately capture the nature of biological wholes. Process-based approaches are instead taken to provide a more appropriate metaphysical framework for the constitutive dynamicity of living systems. These arguments, however, have been criticized for relying on overly reductive characterizations of substances, which both classical and contemporary accounts describe as inherently involving change and activity. In this essay, I address the substance-versus-process debate from the perspective of contemporary cell biology. I argue that conceiving the cell as a substance is not only compatible with the centrality of processes, but that the cell continues to function as the fundamental reference point in biology precisely because it entails processuality as intrinsic to its dynamic mode of being. Within this framework, subcellular entities are identified by their functional subservience to the cellular whole. On this basis, I propose an empirically grounded criterion for distinguishing between purely processual and substance-like subcellular entities. Processual entities, such as the Golgi complex and the nucleolus, lack dedicated repair systems and tend to disassemble upon inhibition of specific metabolic activities. By contrast, substance-like entities, including cell-derived organelles such as the mitochondrion and the nucleus, depend for their persistence on specific repair systems, and their eventual dismantling under non-permissive conditions cannot be straightforwardly understood as the mere interruption of a process, but instead appears as the outcome of an active, regulated response. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Foundations in Flux: Process Metaphysics and Its Scientific Applications)

13 pages, 281 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Death We Owe (for) ~~Beyng~~

by S. Montgomery Ewegen

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 46; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020046 - 23 Mar 2026

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Abstract

This article explores the role that death plays in Heidegger’s ontology after Being and Time, focusing especially on volumes 97–104 of the Gesamtausgabe. Within these volumes, death occupies a pride of place within Heidegger’s being-historical (and post-being-historical) attempts to articulate beyng, [...] Read more.

This article explores the role that death plays in Heidegger’s ontology after Being and Time, focusing especially on volumes 97–104 of the Gesamtausgabe. Within these volumes, death occupies a pride of place within Heidegger’s being-historical (and post-being-historical) attempts to articulate beyng, coming to play a role as significant as, and not unrelated to, the Nothing. In order to give a full accounting of the role that death plays within these texts, a number of other structurally significant terms within Heidegger’s Seinsdenken—such as Gebirg, Enteignis, Brauch, and Sage—will be examined. It is ultimately argued that these volumes, by exposing the human to the heretofore un-thought truth of beyng (as radical concealment), carry out the transition from “human” to “mortal” so essential to Heidegger’s later thinking. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Interpreting the New Heidegger)

16 pages, 267 KB

Open AccessArticle

Temporal Ontology and Non-Markovian Quantum Dynamics

by Hong Joo Ryoo

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 45; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020045 - 22 Mar 2026

Viewed by 915

Abstract

Recent arguments in favor of Presentism leverage Markovianity, the principle of the future’s events being able to be determined/influenced only by current events (and sufficiently near events). These approaches, however, leave the room open for objections centered around recent speculative non-Markovian foundations of [...] Read more.

Recent arguments in favor of Presentism leverage Markovianity, the principle of the future’s events being able to be determined/influenced only by current events (and sufficiently near events). These approaches, however, leave the room open for objections centered around recent speculative non-Markovian foundations of our physical theories. Using insights from Builes and Impagnatiello’s argument and drawing on recent quantum foundations, I explore how non-Markovian quantum dynamics may constrain metaphysical accounts of time. I compare rough versions of Eternalism and Presentism in their ability to accommodate temporally extended correlations and motivate further development with explicit treatment of non-Markovian physics in the metaphysics of time. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Debating Temporal Ontology: The Existence of Yesterday and Tomorrow)

57 pages, 2579 KB

Open AccessArticle

Consciousness, Continuity and Responsibility: Toward a Stratified Relational Model of Human–Animal Difference

by João Miguel Alves Ferreira

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020044 - 19 Mar 2026

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2240

Abstract

The intricate relationships between humans and animals have long shaped philosophical, cultural and scientific inquiry. This narrative review examines evolving conceptions of animal consciousness, agency and sentience within broader historical, ethical and epistemological contexts. Drawing on philosophy, ethology, neuroscience, psychology and animal studies, [...] Read more.

The intricate relationships between humans and animals have long shaped philosophical, cultural and scientific inquiry. This narrative review examines evolving conceptions of animal consciousness, agency and sentience within broader historical, ethical and epistemological contexts. Drawing on philosophy, ethology, neuroscience, psychology and animal studies, it critically engages debates on anthropocentrism, cognitive ethology, moral considerability and relational ontology. By tracing the shift from mechanistic models of animality to embodied and affective accounts of consciousness, the analysis highlights how contemporary scholarship destabilises traditional forms of human exceptionalism. Building on this interdisciplinary synthesis, the article advances a symbiotic humanist orientation that integrates evolutionary continuity with multidimensional models of consciousness and differentiated normative responsibility. The argument culminates in the articulation of a Stratified Relational Responsibility Model (SRRM), which reconciles ontological continuity with asymmetrical accountability. Within this framework, shared evolutionary conditions ground moral considerability, while the emergence of reflexive and institutional normativity intensifies human ethical obligation. The model offers a non-anthropocentric yet normatively robust account of human–animal relations, situating human distinctiveness not in metaphysical superiority but in heightened responsibility within multispecies ecological systems. Full article

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17 pages, 229 KB

Open AccessArticle

Iris Murdoch’s Concept of Imagination and Its Role in Moral Life

by Maria Gallego-Ortiz

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 43; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020043 - 19 Mar 2026

Viewed by 746

Abstract

Iris Murdoch situates imagination at the core of moral life, challenging moral philosophy’s preference for abstract universal principles over the particularity of lived experience. This paper reconstructs Murdoch’s concept of imagination by tracing her engagement with Plato’s distinction between eikasia and the Demiurge’s [...] Read more.

Iris Murdoch situates imagination at the core of moral life, challenging moral philosophy’s preference for abstract universal principles over the particularity of lived experience. This paper reconstructs Murdoch’s concept of imagination by tracing her engagement with Plato’s distinction between eikasia and the Demiurge’s ‘high’ imagination, as well as Kant’s notions of empirical and esthetic imagination. I argue that Murdoch’s imagination is best understood as a hermeneutical capacity essential to moral vision. She distinguishes between egoistic fantasy, which distorts reality, and free and creative imagination, which enables a just and loving gaze upon the world. Through imagination, we can replace obscuring images with truer ones, making moral progress an exercise in vision and attention. Murdoch’s account thus offers an alternative to moral theories that overlook the inner life as a site of ethical transformation. Full article

24 pages, 320 KB

Open AccessArticle

Language Without Propositions: Why Large Language Models Hallucinate

by Jakub Mácha

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 42; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020042 - 19 Mar 2026

Viewed by 2782

Abstract

This paper defends the thesis that LLM hallucinations are best explained as a truth representation problem: Current models lack an internal representation of propositions as truth-bearers, so truth and falsity cannot constrain generation in the way factual discourse requires. It begins by [...] Read more.

This paper defends the thesis that LLM hallucinations are best explained as a truth representation problem: Current models lack an internal representation of propositions as truth-bearers, so truth and falsity cannot constrain generation in the way factual discourse requires. It begins by surveying leading explanations—computational limits on self-verification, deficiencies in training data as truth sources, and architectural factors—and argues that they converge on the same underlying representational deficit. Next, it reconstructs the philosophical background of current LLM design, showing how optimization for fluent continuation aligns with coherence-style evaluation and with broadly structuralist, relational semantics, before turning to David Chalmers’s recent attempt to secure propositional interpretability by drawing on Davidson/Lewis-style radical interpretation and by locating propositional content in “middle-layer” structures; it argues that this approach downplays the ubiquity of hallucination and inherits instability from post-training edits. Finally, the paper offers a positive proposal: Atomic propositions should be represented in the basic vector layer, reviving a logical atomist program as a principled route to reducing hallucination. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Foundations of Artificial Intelligence)

14 pages, 520 KB

Open AccessArticle

When the Ghost Emerges from the Machine: Limits of Semantic Decoding from Complete Microstate Knowledge

by Jeffrey Arle

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 41; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020041 - 19 Mar 2026

Viewed by 583

Abstract

Understanding how high-level meanings emerge from low-level microstate dynamics is a central challenge in both artificial intelligence and consciousness studies. Complex networks can exhibit rich behaviors, yet reliably mapping every microstate onto a semantic label to date seems intractable. To explore these limits, [...] Read more.

Understanding how high-level meanings emerge from low-level microstate dynamics is a central challenge in both artificial intelligence and consciousness studies. Complex networks can exhibit rich behaviors, yet reliably mapping every microstate onto a semantic label to date seems intractable. To explore these limits, a minimal 4-bit model consisting of only a ring of binary cells updated by a parity-flip rule, coupled with a finite lookup table that assigns conceptual tags to selected microstates, is presented. Two core failure modes are noted. First, noise is found to push the system into out-of-training-set states that a semantic decoder cannot label (“missing-label” errors). Second, distinct microstates collapse into the same semantic tag (“many-to-one” grouping), obscuring their unique identities. These findings demonstrate inherent opacity in semantic mapping and suggest fundamental barriers to reverse-engineering high-level content in artificial or biological networks. Future work includes scaling N and examining partial-observability effects. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Consciousness in the Age of Intelligent Systems: Philosophical Frameworks, Neural Theories, and Generative AI)

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29 pages, 312 KB

Open AccessArticle

Unified Observation Layer Theory: A Structural Framework for Visibility, Projection, and Inherent Invisibility

by Yugo Matsumoto

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020040 - 16 Mar 2026

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Abstract

This paper proposes the Unified Observation Layer Theory (UOLT), a structural framework for understanding observation not as an act of cognition, measurement, or subjectivity, but as a layered condition through which the world becomes visible. Contemporary theories across physics, philosophy, and cognitive science [...] Read more.

This paper proposes the Unified Observation Layer Theory (UOLT), a structural framework for understanding observation not as an act of cognition, measurement, or subjectivity, but as a layered condition through which the world becomes visible. Contemporary theories across physics, philosophy, and cognitive science often treat observation as a primary explanatory principle, implicitly assuming that what is observed constitutes the world itself. Such approaches repeatedly encounter paradoxes concerning objectivity, incompleteness, and the limits of visibility. UOLT argues that these paradoxes do not arise from epistemic failure or insufficient data, but from a structural confusion between distinct layers of observation. UOLT introduces a three-layer model consisting of an Invisible Layer, a Projection Layer, and a Visible Layer. The Invisible Layer refers to structural conditions that do not appear directly within a given observational configuration, yet are presupposed by the coherence of what becomes established within it. The Projection Layer specifies the conditions under which certain structural relations become stably manifest, including selection, emphasis, and exclusion. The Visible Layer corresponds to the domain in which objects, quantities, causality, language, and time are articulated as established. By separating these layers, UOLT explains why observation can never access the totality of the world, why visibility does not imply completeness, and why similar structural paradoxes emerge across otherwise distinct domains. Importantly, UOLT does not compete with or replace existing physical or philosophical theories. Instead, it repositions them as descriptions operating within the Visible Layer, without reducing the Invisible Layer to hidden variables or metaphysical entities. Unified Observation Layer Theory offers a non-temporal, non-reductive account of observation that clarifies the structural conditions under which reality appears coherent despite being only partially visible. In doing so, it provides a framework for reconsidering objectivity, visibility, and world formation without privileging observation as an ultimate ground. This paper does not aim to propose a unified theory, but to clarify the structural conditions under which observation becomes possible. Full article

12 pages, 272 KB

Open AccessArticle

From Taqlid to Digital Ijtihad: Al-Ghazali’s Epistemology and the Fake News Challenge

by Mesfer Alhayyani

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 39; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020039 - 16 Mar 2026

Viewed by 913

Abstract

This paper argues that al-Ghazali’s (1058–1111) distinction between taqlid (uncritical acceptance of authority) and ijtihad (independent reasoning) can offer a normative response to the contemporary challenge of fake news, thereby connecting a medieval epistemic framework to a pressing twenty-first-century problem. This study treats [...] Read more.

This paper argues that al-Ghazali’s (1058–1111) distinction between taqlid (uncritical acceptance of authority) and ijtihad (independent reasoning) can offer a normative response to the contemporary challenge of fake news, thereby connecting a medieval epistemic framework to a pressing twenty-first-century problem. This study treats fake news as both an epistemic and an ethical challenge. Epistemically, fake news undermines the aim of belief, which is the aspiration toward truth, by introducing and sustaining falsehoods within the testimonial networks on which individuals depend for knowledge. Ethically, it constitutes a form of deception that manipulates audiences, corrodes intellectual virtues such as honesty, and disintegrates the trust between individuals and public institutions that is essential for collective life. Methodologically, this paper adopts an analytical–critical approach. It examines recent philosophical literature on the epistemology of misinformation, reconstructs al-Ghazali’s taqlid–ijtihad framework from his original texts, and then adapts it to the conditions of digital information environments. The resulting model distinguishes between digital ijtihad, the responsible and competent verification of online information, and justified digital taqlid, the legitimate reliance on credible digital authorities when independent verification is impractical. The findings suggest that this adapted framework not only enriches contemporary epistemic theory but also offers practical normative guidance for cultivating responsible belief formation, including in educational contexts where teaching itself functions as a structured form of testimonial exchange. Full article

21 pages, 2277 KB

Open AccessArticle

Living Metaphysics: Process Thought, Buddhist Philosophy, and the Impact of Ontology

by Tina Röck

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 38; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020038 - 13 Mar 2026

Viewed by 854

Abstract

In this contribution, I explore the idea that reality is best understood as fundamentally dynamic and interdependent, i.e., processual, bringing together resources from process thought, phenomenology and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. I furthermore explore how this view shapes the ways we speak [...] Read more.

In this contribution, I explore the idea that reality is best understood as fundamentally dynamic and interdependent, i.e., processual, bringing together resources from process thought, phenomenology and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. I furthermore explore how this view shapes the ways we speak about, investigate, and understand the natural world. What is novel in my approach is that I bring a phenomenological reading of process in dialogue with Buddhist thought. My paper unfolds in two stages: first, I map key points of convergence between phenomenologically clarified process philosophy and Madhyamaka; second, I consider the broader epistemological and practical consequences of viewing reality as impermanent and dependently arising by looking at Whitehead’s and Nāgārjuna’s views in dialogue. Engaging with Buddhist philosophy alongside phenomenological process thought enables a deeper investigation into the ethical, and lived dimensions of metaphysical inquiry, which are dimensions often sidelined both in Western metaphysics and in some versions of phenomenology, because metaphysical and phenomenological analysis can remain stuck on the conceptual level, detached from both lived experience and practice. By contrast, Buddhist traditions explicitly link philosophical reflection with lived experience and embodied practice throughout. For this reason, sustained dialogue with Buddhist views and practices can expand Western methodology as such and can enrich process-based phenomenological approaches in particular by showing ways to reconnect speculative metaphysics, observation, and the concrete in practical ways. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Foundations in Flux: Process Metaphysics and Its Scientific Applications)

26 pages, 349 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Prohibition of Finality and Reflexive Signature Intelligence: A Causal-Symmetric Framework for Evaluating Agents

by Elias Rubenstein

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020037 - 12 Mar 2026

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Abstract

Intelligence metrics based on benchmark performance or population norms are useful for measuring comparative ability within defined test environments, but they do not directly evaluate the structural coherence of an agent’s trajectory across time, domains, and perturbations. This article introduces Reflexive Signature Intelligence [...] Read more.

Intelligence metrics based on benchmark performance or population norms are useful for measuring comparative ability within defined test environments, but they do not directly evaluate the structural coherence of an agent’s trajectory across time, domains, and perturbations. This article introduces Reflexive Signature Intelligence (RSI) as a bounded theoretical framework for addressing that different problem. RSI is developed within a causal-symmetric informational perspective in which intelligence is understood as the capacity of a system to maintain and restore alignment with a structurally constrained invariant without collapsing the open gradient of development. On this basis, the paper formulates the Principle of Bounded Subjectivity and the Prohibition of Finality as framework-level principles, arguing that intelligence should be assessed not as arrival at a completed end state but as the quality of an asymptotic trajectory. The framework is then operationalized on two coupled levels: a micro-level proposed as a future measurement program linked heuristically to resilience and prediction-error dynamics, and a macro-level expressed through five dimensions of structural integrity, including reflexive regulation, cross-domain integration, internal consistency, stabilization, and signature-setting. The article concludes by outlining implications for AI evaluation and alignment, with particular relevance for distinguishing full agents, partial systems, and human–AI composite configurations. Full article

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28 pages, 331 KB

Open AccessArticle

Spinoza quatenus Deleuze: The Problem of Expression in Language

by Max Lowdin

Philosophies 2026, 11(2), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11020036 - 12 Mar 2026

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Abstract

Spinoza’s theory of language seems to risk the paradox that no expression of true ideas is possible in linguistic terms. One particular term in the Ethics has stood out as addressing its potential contradictions: quatenus, ‘insofar as’ or ‘to the extent that,’ [...] Read more.

Spinoza’s theory of language seems to risk the paradox that no expression of true ideas is possible in linguistic terms. One particular term in the Ethics has stood out as addressing its potential contradictions: quatenus, ‘insofar as’ or ‘to the extent that,’ occurring hundreds of times in the text but still an element of mystery. This article offers an interpretation of this notion inspired by Deleuze’s reading and especially the theme in his seminars, that Spinoza’s project is a ‘general semiology.’ This suggests another way to affirm the coherence of the Ethics, by making a virtuous circle of its ontological and practical registers. Key to this is the notion of ‘sense’ in its genetic role and the overlooked distinction between infinite attributes and the two powers. The senses of words, propositions or demonstrations in the Ethics are not independent of a ‘noncausal correspondence’ between powers of thinking and acting from which they arise, and which quatenus consistently marks. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Deleuze: Teacher of Spinoza’s Philosophy)

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Philosophies, Volume 11, Issue 2 (April 2026) – 43 articles

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