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1 February 2025

15 Pages

A Model of k-Winners

Escuela de Ciencias Sociales y Gobierno, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Ave. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Colonia Tecnológico, Monterrey 64700, Mexico

Abstract

The concept of the Condorcet winner has become central to most electoral models in the political economy literature. A Condorcet winner is the alternative preferred by a plurality in every pairwise competition; the notion of a k-winner generalizes that of a Condorcet winner. The k-winner is the unique alternative top-ranked by the plurality in every competition comprising exactly k alternatives (including itself). This study uses a spatial voting setting to characterize this theoretical concept, showing that if a k-winner exists for some k>2, then the same alternative must be the k′-winner for every k′>k. We derive additional results, including sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a k-winner for some k>2.

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