Games

17 pages, 283 KB

Open AccessArticle

Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality

by Amit Gayer

Games 2026, 17(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020019 - 6 Apr 2026

This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The analysis shows that, in the [...] Read more.

This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The analysis shows that, in the linear case, the monopolist’s optimal offer endogenously collapses to a single quality-price pair, where the quality equals the highest feasible level. In addition, welfare maximization is achieved if and only if the market is fully served in equilibrium. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Economics: Recent Advances in Spatial Competition)

22 pages, 445 KB

Open AccessArticle

by Timothy Flannery

Games 2026, 17(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020018 - 31 Mar 2026

Abstract

Randomized response is a widely used survey technique for measuring stigmatized populations, but it may provide limited information in small samples. This paper introduces a method of elicitation through perfectly correlated questions, showing that correlation can substantially improve statistical performance and allow a [...] Read more.

Randomized response is a widely used survey technique for measuring stigmatized populations, but it may provide limited information in small samples. This paper introduces a method of elicitation through perfectly correlated questions, showing that correlation can substantially improve statistical performance and allow a dominant-strategy mechanism when either the interviewer or respondents hold symmetric beliefs. The framework also allows the interviewer to possess private information about the distribution of questions, further relaxing incentive constraints. Building on an existing survey design game framework, the paper introduces a novel efficiency-normalized comparison that holds statistical performance constant across mechanisms, enabling a direct comparison of incentives. The analysis characterizes incentive properties and estimation under correlated questions and randomized response, and identifies when it is optimal to ask respondents directly, use randomized response, or correlate questions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advancements in Social Choice and Mechanism Design)

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36 pages, 627 KB

Open AccessArticle

Cooperation or Confrontation? An Evolutionary Game Study on Content Clipping Authorization in Live Streaming E-Commerce Under Platform Regulation

by Feng Luo, Xinmiao Zhao and Tiantong Xu

Games 2026, 17(2), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020017 - 27 Mar 2026

Abstract

The rapid rise of live-streaming e-commerce has fostered a new “content clipping” model, in which secondary creators edit and republish anchors’ live-streaming content to promote product sales. While this model can expand market reach and enhance revenue, it also introduces copyright disputes, regulatory [...] Read more.

The rapid rise of live-streaming e-commerce has fostered a new “content clipping” model, in which secondary creators edit and republish anchors’ live-streaming content to promote product sales. While this model can expand market reach and enhance revenue, it also introduces copyright disputes, regulatory challenges, and profit-sharing conflicts among platforms, anchors, and secondary creators. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model to examine strategic choices regarding platform regulation, anchor authorization, and secondary content creation. Results reveal that excessive regulation may undermine equilibrium and profitability, while appropriate authorization can balance risk and reward. Secondary creators’ participation is sensitive to commission rates and cost–benefit trade-offs. This research contributes to the literature by integrating copyright governance into live-streaming e-commerce game theory and offers actionable insights for designing regulatory mechanisms, optimizing authorization policies, and fostering sustainable multi-party collaboration. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)

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28 pages, 7213 KB

Open AccessArticle

Platform Empowerment and Digital Inclusion in Industrial Clusters: A Complex Network Game Analysis with Performance Feedback

by Dingteng Wang, Chengwei Liu and Shuping Wang

Games 2026, 17(2), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020016 - 10 Mar 2026

Abstract

The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates [...] Read more.

The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates whether platform enterprises, as core actors occupying structural holes in cluster networks, can foster the co-construction of a digitally inclusive ecosystem. We developed a complex network public goods game model, incorporating performance feedback into a modified Fermi learning to capture firms’ adaptive decision-making based on historical and social aspirations. The model simulates strategic interactions on both small-world and scale-free networks, characteristic of industrial clusters. Numerical simulations reveal that: (1) The core driver of co-construction is the investment return coefficient; (2) Performance feedback amplifies individual rationality, accelerating the formation or collapse of cooperation depending on the investment return coefficient; (3) Platform empowerment—specifically, selectively connecting and incentivizing cooperative firms—effectively promotes ecosystem co-construction, with this strategy proving most impactful when investment returns are moderate. Furthermore, while this selective empowerment strategy benefits the cluster overall, its effect on the platform’s own revenue is network-dependent, showing a more pronounced decline in small-world structures. This study provides a novel analytical framework for understanding strategic interactions in digital inclusion and offers practical insights for policymakers and platform leaders in orchestrating collaborative digital transformation. Full article

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23 pages, 414 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Measuring Pitcher Production Fairly in Baseball Using the Shapley Value

by Michael McBride

Games 2026, 17(2), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020015 - 10 Mar 2026

Abstract

This paper introduces fairer measures of individual pitcher performance in baseball using the Shapley Value from coalitional game theory. The paper’s key conceptual innovation is a novel two-stage procedure for constructing the coalitionary game value functions for runs allowed and outs recorded by [...] Read more.

This paper introduces fairer measures of individual pitcher performance in baseball using the Shapley Value from coalitional game theory. The paper’s key conceptual innovation is a novel two-stage procedure for constructing the coalitionary game value functions for runs allowed and outs recorded by a baseball team’s defense. This procedure enables the Shapley Value calculation to fairly divide credit for runs and out between different pitchers and between pitchers and fielders. It also results in two new statistics—Shapley Pitcher Runs (SPR) and Shapley Pitcher Outs (SPO)—that, unlike traditional pitching statistics, consistently satisfy several mathematical fairness axioms. A third statistic, called Shapley Run Average, provides a fairer measure of pitcher efficiency. I calculate these statistics for the 2022 Major League Baseball regular season and the 1955–2022 World Series championships. Using SPR and SPO as the standard for fairness, empirical analysis reveals that the traditional pitching statistics systematically and unfairly overcredit pitchers by 40–50%, with starting pitchers miscredited more severely than relievers. Analysis of SRA identifies efficient pitchers whose performance is obscured by conventional statistics and enables a reassessment of historic World Series performances. Overall, this work demonstrates another application of the Shapley Value to creating new performance measures in team sports. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)

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12 pages, 270 KB

Open AccessEssay

Cooperation Collapse in the Harmony Game: Revisiting Scodel and Minas Through Evolutionary Game Theory

by Shade T. Shutters

Games 2026, 17(2), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020014 - 9 Mar 2026

Abstract

Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they documented a striking pattern: subjects [...] Read more.

Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they documented a striking pattern: subjects frequently chose options that reduced an opponent’s payoff by more than their own, even when mutual cooperation was both individually and collectively optimal. These results—especially the behavior observed in their so-called Game H4, a Harmony Game in which cooperation strictly dominated defection—anticipate a central insight of evolutionary game theory: what matters for adaptation is relative payoff, not absolute gain. This essay reinterprets the Scodel–Minas experiments through a Darwinian lens, arguing that they provide an early empirical challenge to Nash-equilibrium reasoning and to models that evaluate strategies solely in terms of absolute utility. By reconstructing the H4 payoff structure and embedding it within a simple evolutionary framework, I show how small levels of “competitive” behavior can destabilize cooperative equilibria that appear self-evident under standard assumptions. I then revisit three later “puzzles” in the evolution of cooperation—altruistic punishment, the fragility of “win–win” treaties, and rejections in ultimatum bargaining—to ask how differently they might have been framed had the Scodel–Minas findings been part of the canonical experimental literature. Rather than treating these phenomena as surprising anomalies, a historically informed, relative-payoff perspective suggests that they could have been recognized much earlier as natural expressions of an already documented pattern. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolution of Cooperation and Evolutionary Game Theory)

20 pages, 888 KB

Open AccessArticle

How to Sell Debt (But Not Money)

by Arup Daripa

Games 2026, 17(2), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020013 - 9 Mar 2026

Abstract

Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we consider [...] Read more.

Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we consider the incentive for participation by relatively uninformed bidders in the presence of more informed bidders under these formats. We characterize the equilibrium under a discriminatory auction and show that discriminatory pricing inhibits uninformed participation. In contrast, the equilibria we construct under a uniform pricing rule show that profitable uninformed participation can occur. The usefulness of widening participation in Treasury auctions makes the latter format a natural choice in these auctions, providing an explanation for the switch to the uniform-price format in US Treasury auctions. We also apply our results to repo auctions and show that a uniform-price format can reduce the ability of a central bank to steer interest rates. This sheds light on the reason for the switch away from the uniform-price format by several central banks in conducting repo auctions. We also consider the question of information aggregation and show that uniform-price auctions might fail to do so. The results also offer an explanation for the fact that the ECB, as well as several other central banks, prefer to allocate liquidity through a fixed-rate tender rather than either uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Full article

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35 pages, 527 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents: Theory and Experiment

by Katsuhiko Nishizaki

Games 2026, 17(1), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010012 - 14 Feb 2026

Abstract

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but [...] Read more.

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because the agent might be able to induce the outcome by revealing its other preference. On the basis of such an understanding, this paper considers an implementation problem with the bounded rationality of agents. The bounded rationality presented in this paper means that the agent might choose its best response which is different from its dominant strategy. To describe such behavior, this paper introduces a new notion of equilibrium, called

(n - k)

-dominant strategy Nash equilibrium at which at most

k \in {0, 1, \dots, n}

boundedly rational agents might choose their best responses which are different from their dominant strategies, and at least

(n - k)

rational agents choose their dominant strategies. In addition, to show what a socially optimal outcome is collectively chosen under the existence of boundedly rational agents, this paper introduces a new notion of implementation, called k-secure implementation, which is a double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and

(n - k)

-dominant strategy Nash equilibria. In specific environments with

k \leq (n + 1) / 2

, this paper shows that majority rule satisfies k-secure implementability, but not secure implementability which is equivalent to n-secure implementability. In addition, this paper shows that majority rule realized the socially optimal outcome in the environments in laboratory experiments. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

16 pages, 319 KB

Open AccessArticle

A Structural Measure of Bargaining Fragility in Multi-Domain Agreements

by Robert Castro

Games 2026, 17(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010011 - 11 Feb 2026

Abstract

Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of agreement-level quantities characterizing dependency architecture: [...] Read more.

Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of agreement-level quantities characterizing dependency architecture: strain τ (the number of operative obligations requiring tracking), curvature κ (the density and strength of interdependencies among elements), compressibility σ (the extent to which complexity can be reduced through modularization without altering functional meaning), and the stability quotient Γ = κ/τ (average interdependence burden per element). We use the inequality Γ > σ as a classification rule; agreements with Γ > σ are classified as structurally fragile and, in the data, exhibit higher sensitivity to perturbations. Across 42 documented agreements, the diagnostic correctly classifies nearly all observed outcomes, with only a single false positive and no false negatives. The framework operates as a pre-equilibrium screen that complements (rather than replaces) Nash and bargaining equilibrium analyses by identifying agreement architectures that are structurally brittle under small shocks. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Advances in Microeconomics and Game Theory)

14 pages, 1171 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Equal Chances or Fewer Victims? Moral Judgments in Autonomous Vehicle Dilemmas

by Alexander Matros, Eren Bilen and Leonid Matros

Games 2026, 17(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010010 - 9 Feb 2026

Abstract

We examine the moral dilemma of how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should be programmed to act in unavoidable crash scenarios involving trade-offs between saving one life and saving many. We report results from three experimental studies that investigate individuals’ preferences over alternative AV decision [...] Read more.

We examine the moral dilemma of how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should be programmed to act in unavoidable crash scenarios involving trade-offs between saving one life and saving many. We report results from three experimental studies that investigate individuals’ preferences over alternative AV decision rules in stylized crash scenarios. Across designs, we find robust support for a probabilistic decision rule that assigns passengers and pedestrians equal ex ante chances of survival (a 50:50 rule). This preference persists across different framings and remains salient even when additional probabilistic options are introduced. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

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12 pages, 249 KB

Open AccessArticle

Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games

by Sam Ganzfried

Games 2026, 17(1), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010009 - 3 Feb 2026

Abstract

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have [...] Read more.

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Advances in Computational Game Theory and Its Applications)

19 pages, 388 KB

Open AccessArticle

Exclusionary Contracts and Incentives to Innovate

by Simen Aardal Ulsaker

Games 2026, 17(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010008 - 3 Feb 2026

Abstract

This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study how exclusionary contracts affect firms’ incentives to invest in innovation. Several symmetric sellers compete to supply an identical product to a set of buyers, and each seller can invest in R&D to develop a higher-quality [...] Read more.

This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study how exclusionary contracts affect firms’ incentives to invest in innovation. Several symmetric sellers compete to supply an identical product to a set of buyers, and each seller can invest in R&D to develop a higher-quality version of the product. Prior to choosing their R&D investments, sellers may offer exclusionary contracts to buyers. In equilibrium, all buyers sign an exclusionary contract with the same seller, which eliminates rival sellers’ incentives to invest in R&D and concentrates innovative effort in a single firm. Banning exclusionary contracts increases the aggregate probability of innovation and the joint surplus of buyers and sellers only when the R&D technology exhibits sufficiently strong diseconomies of scale. Full article

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17 pages, 295 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Communication and Standoff

by Catherine Hafer

Games 2026, 17(1), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010007 - 2 Feb 2026

Abstract

This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players’ types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose their types, resulting in the war of attrition having duration zero. However, [...] Read more.

This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players’ types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose their types, resulting in the war of attrition having duration zero. However, if type constitutes unverifiable information, the results are less sanguine. Pre-play cheap-talk communication has no effect on the play of the subsequent war of attrition. Mediated cheap-talk communication is no better: No institution that relies on players’ cheap-talk reports can systematically allocate the prize to the player who values it more highly at a lower resource cost than is entailed in equilibrium play of the war of attrition. Costly signaling in the form of burning money can effectively supplant the war of attrition as a means of allocating the prize, but it requires the same expected equilibrium resource expenditures, with the same expected distribution across types, as does the war of attrition. Thus, in spite of players’ unanimous preference for a system in which types are made known, and in spite of their disclosing type in equilibrium when type is verifiable, they nonetheless expend resources to credibly communicate their types when type is not verifiable, and the resources expended are, on average, equivalent to those expended in a war of attrition. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Conflict and Communication: Applications of Game Theory to Political Economy)

23 pages, 367 KB

Open AccessArticle

Monetary Policy Committees, Independence, and Influence

by Esteban Colla-De-Robertis

Games 2026, 17(1), 6; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010006 - 16 Jan 2026

Abstract

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and shows how institutional [...] Read more.

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and shows how institutional features—such as committee size—shape the extent of external influence. When political pressure pushes for expansive and inflationary policy, larger committees can enhance de facto independence by diluting this influence. We also show that when anti-inflationary pressures dominate, an appropriate choice of committee size can replicate the preference shift towards more conservativeness familiar from delegation frameworks, even when it is not feasible to appoint a conservative central banker in a systematic way. Full article

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9 pages, 575 KB

Open AccessArticle

On Collusion Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution

by Marc Escrihuela-Villar

Games 2026, 17(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010005 - 14 Jan 2026

Abstract

We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods. Since our model exhibits a one-to-one [...] Read more.

We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods. Since our model exhibits a one-to-one relationship between the elasticity of substitution and demand price elasticity, we demonstrate that a larger elasticity decreases the sustainability of collusion. Intuitively, a more elastic demand function causes the increase in deviation profits to compensate for the increase in collusive profits, making collusion less easily sustained. This result holds regardless of whether firms compete in quantities or prices. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)

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10 pages, 272 KB

Open AccessArticle

Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited

by Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler

Games 2026, 17(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010004 - 14 Jan 2026

Abstract

We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX₀—i.e., envy-freeness up to any item, where EFX restricts attention [...] Read more.

We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX₀—i.e., envy-freeness up to any item, where EFX restricts attention to positively valued items and EFX₀ allows removing zero-valued items as well—can conflict with Pareto-optimality (PO), maximin (MM), or maximum Nash welfare (MNW). Normatively, we argue that envy-freeness (even as EFX or EFX₀) is not a panacea for allocating indivisible items and should be weighed against efficiency and welfare criteria. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Algorithmic and Computational Game Theory)

23 pages, 1141 KB

Open AccessArticle

Randomized Algorithms and Neural Networks for Communication-Free Multiagent Singleton Set Cover

by Guanchu He, Colton Hill, Joshua H. Seaton and Philip N. Brown

Games 2026, 17(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010003 - 12 Jan 2026

Abstract

This paper considers how a system designer can program a team of autonomous agents to coordinate with one another such that each agent selects (or covers) an individual resource with the goal that all agents collectively cover the maximum number of resources. Specifically, [...] Read more.

This paper considers how a system designer can program a team of autonomous agents to coordinate with one another such that each agent selects (or covers) an individual resource with the goal that all agents collectively cover the maximum number of resources. Specifically, we study how agents can formulate strategies without information about other agents’ actions so that system-level performance remains robust in the presence of communication failures. First, we use an algorithmic approach to study the scenario in which all agents lose the ability to communicate with one another, have a symmetric set of resources to choose from, and select actions independently according to a probability distribution over the resources. We show that the distribution that maximizes the expected system-level objective under this approach can be computed by solving a convex optimization problem, and we introduce a novel polynomial-time heuristic based on subset selection. Further, both of the methods are guaranteed to be within

1 - 1 / e

of the system’s optimal in expectation. Second, we use a learning-based approach to study how a system designer can employ neural networks to approximate optimal agent strategies in the presence of communication failures. The neural network, trained on system-level optimal outcomes obtained through brute-force enumeration, generates utility functions that enable agents to make decisions in a distributed manner. Empirical results indicate the neural network often outperforms greedy and randomized baseline algorithms. Collectively, these findings provide a broad study of optimal agent behavior and its impact on system-level performance when the information available to agents is extremely limited. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Algorithmic and Computational Game Theory)

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14 pages, 305 KB

Open AccessArticle

All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

by Benjamin Kang and James Unwin

Games 2026, 17(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002 - 9 Jan 2026

Abstract

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. [...] Read more.

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game-Theoretical Analysis of the Division of Labor and Trade Conflict)

21 pages, 1386 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis

by Garrett Milam and Andrew Monaco

Games 2026, 17(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010001 - 4 Jan 2026

Abstract

This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics—linear other-regarding preferences and inequity aversion—and examine the [...] Read more.

This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics—linear other-regarding preferences and inequity aversion—and examine the predictions of each with a laboratory experiment. Our experimental results roundly reject the majority of these explanations: in treatments with endowment inequality, high endowment individuals invest more in the common pool resource than low endowment individuals. We discuss these results in the context of the literature on psychological entitlement and positional preferences. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

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