Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining
A section of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Section Information
Cooperative game theory is concerned with multiagent decision problems in which coalitions, i.e., subsets of the set of players, can enter into binding agreements to follow a prescribed course of action. To address the different ways in which the resulting reward or cost is allocated to the players, the theory has developed many solution concepts, and much research has been devoted to their axiomatic foundations, their interrelationships, and their dynamic and/or noncooperative implementation. Cooperative game theory also has deep ties to several areas of mathematics, including analysis, fixed point theory, KKM theory, algebra, graph theory, and combinatorics.
The Games Section on Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining invites contributions to all areas of cooperative game theory. New applications as well as new theoretical results are especially encouraged.
Keywords
- TU games
- NTU games
- Axiomatic solutions
- Dynamic models of cooperative game theoretic solutions
- Cooperative gams with asymmetric information
- Cooperative games with infinitely many players
- Coalition formation
- Coalition structures
- Cooperative games on networks
- Supermodular games
- Simple games
- Banzhaf value
- Stable sets
- Shapley value and Harsanyi solution
- Core
- Bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus
- Fair division
- Allocation of indivisible objects
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Dynamic implementation of bargaining models
- Bargaining models with asymmetric information
Editorial Board
Special Issue
Following special issue within this section is currently open for submissions:
- Evolution, Cooperation and Conflict (Deadline: 28 February 2025)
