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6 September 2026

20 Pages

XBRL and the Transparency Challenge: Evidence from Earnings Management in Jordan’s Industrial Sector

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1
Department of Accounting, Al-Balqa Applied University, P.O. Box 7075, Al Salt 19117, Jordan
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Department of Accounting, Business School, The Hashemite University, P.O. Box 330127, Zarqa 13133, Jordan
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Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration, University of Business and Technology, P.O. Box 33335, Jeddah 21448, Saudi Arabia
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Abstract

Drawing on Agency Theory, Institutional Theory, and the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) framework, this study examines the relationship between mandatory adoption of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) and earnings management in an emerging market. Jordan introduced compulsory XBRL reporting for listed firms in 2020, providing a natural setting to evaluate its governance implications. The analysis is based on firm-level data for 40 industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange over 2016–2023 (320 firm-year observations). Accrual-based earnings management is measured by absolute discretionary accruals from the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model,. Firm fixed-effects regressions with firm-clustered standard errors, an event-study specification with year fixed effects, and an extensive robustness battery (performance-adjusted accruals, pooled estimation, balance-sheet accruals, exclusion of the pandemic years, and a placebo adoption date) consistently show no statistically detectable change in accrual-based earnings management after adoption. By contrast, absolute abnormal production costs increase significantly after the mandate, an effect that strengthens when the COVID-19 years are excluded and disappears under a placebo date, a pattern consistent with partial substitution from accrual-based towards real-activities manipulation. The findings suggest that digital reporting mandates alone do not discipline reporting behavior in environments with limited institutional enforcement and may redirect rather than reduce managerial opportunism. Implications for regulators, auditors, and standard setters are discussed.

1. Introduction

The deliberate distortion of financial records to present inaccurate economic performance remains a critical issue for regulatory bodies, investment professionals, and academic researchers. The practice of earnings management undermines financial transparency, erodes investor trust, and disrupts the efficiency of resource allocation in capital markets (Remlein et al., 2024). Digital reporting technologies have been implemented through worldwide regulatory reforms to improve financial transparency and prevent unethical managerial conduct. XBRL stands out as a significant reform because it provides a standardized electronic system for transmitting financial information, aiming to enhance reporting precision and enable better data access and comparison (Li et al., 2021; Troshani & Rowbottom, 2021).
The worldwide movement toward XBRL adoption has not yielded definitive academic conclusions on its effectiveness in preventing earnings management (Kristensen, 2022). Some academics assert that XBRL reduces information asymmetry and diminishes manipulative practices by enhancing transparency (Kim et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2015). Without strong institutional enforcement mechanisms, XBRL enables firms to appear compliant while concealing opportunistic behavior through subtle manipulation of real activities (Mokodompit et al., 2024). This disparity in findings raises an important question: Can XBRL serve as an effective governance instrument in emerging markets that continue to develop institutional quality?
Jordan offers a strong contextual insight into this discussion. The regulatory environment, alongside Jordan’s digital infrastructure and corporate governance practices, differs significantly from those of developed countries because Jordan is an emerging economy. The Amman Stock Exchange required XBRL reporting from its listed firms starting in 2020, and Jordanian companies have been working through initial implementation steps since then (Slehat, 2018; Moawad et al., 2026). Research in the Jordanian context has predominantly used qualitative methods or perception-based approaches, resulting in a significant empirical gap in assessing XBRL’s financial behavioral impact. Research has not yet established whether Jordan’s institutional framework, along with its technological and organizational structure, allows XBRL to fulfill its governance objectives.
This research fills the empirical gap by evaluating how XBRL adoption influences earnings management practices of industrial shareholding companies in Jordan. This study stands out as one of the earliest to use the Modified Jones Model to analyze longitudinal Jordanian market data spanning 2016–2019 and 2020–2023, and to evaluate the effects of XBRL implementation. This approach shifts the research focus from perception-based analysis to evidence-based assessment of financial behavior.
The study draws upon several theoretical foundations. According to Diffusion of Innovation theory (DOI) new technologies expand throughout different organizational sectors. Institutional Theory demonstrates how external forces drive organizations to adhere to specific standards. The study applies Agency Theory to demonstrate how adopting XBRL technology can minimize agency problems by improving transparency and monitoring managerial performance. Managerial discretion becomes limited when shareholders gain better access to financial data, thereby reducing the likelihood of earnings manipulation.
The research on Jordan focuses on the country due to its mixed institutional framework, which features high regulatory goals alongside enforcement limitations, and the recent implementation of digital reporting reforms. The current setting presents an exceptional opportunity to study the influence of XBRL on managerial behavior in contexts where enforcement mechanisms are still developing (Alharasis, 2025). This investigation explores the initial adoption effects of XBRL in a low-governance environment with limited resources while established studies have primarily focused on developed markets.
This paper makes three key contributions. This study presents new empirical findings on XBRL’s post-adoption effects in an emerging market, using real accrual-based metrics rather than perception-based methods. The study broadens theoretical discussions by combining agency theory with models of technology and institutional structures. The study provides policymakers and regulators with insights into the effectiveness of digital reforms in controlling earnings management under specific conditions.
This research produces important practical outcomes. The promotion of XBRL as an instrument to enhance corporate transparency in other emerging markets could be validated if it proves effective at reducing earnings manipulation in Jordan. The research outcomes will provide deeper theoretical insights into the ways digital technologies interact with governance frameworks to affect managerial conduct. The research ultimately focuses on backing policy decisions with evidence to enable greater regulatory changes in developing nations.

2. Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis Development, and Literature Review

2.1. Historical Development of XBRL

XBRL’s development marks a critical step forward toward the digital evolution of financial reporting practices. The transition from paper-based reports to structured, machine-readable formats via XBRL improves transparency and enables more effective data comparison and analysis. PDF and HTML, as traditional formats, lacked a structured metadata framework, which made automated data processing and cross-entity analysis impossible, thereby limiting their usefulness (Debreceny & Gray, 2001).
To address existing financial reporting deficiencies, Charles Hoffman launched XBRL in 1998, leveraging XML’s flexibility to create a unified digital reporting standard (Hoffman & Strand, 2001). XBRL International became operational in 1999 to establish worldwide governance, and the launch of XBRL 1.0 in 2000 created a universal taxonomy.
XBRL has achieved widespread adoption across jurisdictions since its first release. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required publicly listed companies to use it beginning in 2009, which strengthened its institutional standing (SEC, 2009). Following the U.S. SEC’s mandate, countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and Singapore issued their own mandates or strong recommendations to implement XBRL to enhance regulatory transparency and investor information disclosure.
XBRL employs XML-based tagging systems to attach semantic metadata to financial items, thereby enhancing interoperability and boosting accuracy and efficiency, according to Pinsker and Li (2008). Developing economies face significant adoption barriers, including high implementation costs, technical complexity, and skill shortages, which remain persistent challenges (Troshani & Lymer, 2010).
The combination of blockchain and semantic web technologies with XBRL will boost its functionality through improved audit capabilities and real-time analytical tracking (Yoon et al., 2011). XBRL transformed from an innovative concept into a worldwide reporting norm, completely changing financial communication and building essential infrastructure for today’s transparency and accountability standards.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

Analyzing how XBRL affects financial reporting and earnings management requires utilizing a diverse set of theoretical perspectives. The study will be based on three theoretical views, which are complementary: Agency Theory, Institutional Theory, and the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) framework to explain the interaction between digital reporting reforms and managerial behavior and the structure of enforcement.
The agency theory framework formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) describes the conflict of interest between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals). Earnings can be manipulated to secure personal gains or the manager’s reputation. When using XBRL, such opportunistic behavior is likely to be minimized because it promotes transparency and reduces information asymmetry in this study’s context. Some previous studies (De Martinis et al., 2020; Mayapada et al., 2020) support the notion that digital reporting systems enhance monitoring and reduce managerial discretion.
Institutional Theory is an approach introduced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that examines how organizations adopt new practices in response to coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures. The implementation of XBRL in Jordan is mainly coercive, requiring regulators to adopt it, but it can also spread mimetically, with firms copying others’ work to appear legitimate. According to Borgi and Tawiah (2022), the quality of enforcement and professional norms determine whether adoption is a mere formality or has a positive impact on the credibility of reporting.
The DOI framework, developed by Rogers (1962), describes the process of innovation diffusion in terms of stages of awareness, evaluation, and implementation. Effective diffusion is based on perceived compatibility, observability, and complexity of the technology. The DOI theory is used in this study to explain the effectiveness of XBRL in enhancing reporting quality through changes in firms’ technological preparedness, as well as the learning curves it entails. Empirical evidence by Uyob et al. (2023) demonstrates that organizational capacity has a strong impact on the success of XBRL implementation in emerging markets.
The combination of the three theories gives a consistent analytical tool. Agency Theory explains why information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is minimized by the transparent digital reporting. According to the Institutional Theory, the intensity of regulatory enforcement and the norms employed in the profession is what defines whether XBRL adoption will bring about a real behavioral change, or something superficial. These concepts are complemented by the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) model, which explains how innovation spreads across organizations at varying levels of preparedness. Generally, agency incentives, institutional enforcement, and diffusion dynamics collectively imply that the effectiveness of XBRL is not mere technology but also depends on the nature of governance and learning within the organization. Collectively, these theoretical insights provide a solid basis for assessing XBRL’s influence on earnings management in emerging markets such as Jordan.

2.3. Hypothesis Development

The intentional alteration of financial reports by organizations to produce preferred results remains an important governance concern where market regulations are insufficient. Multiple jurisdictions have implemented XBRL to improve financial reporting transparency and standardization through digital formats.
Various models provide the theoretical underpinnings of XBRL adoption. XBRL, within the paradigm of Institutional Theory, is presented as the instrument of legitimacy that organizations use in response to regulatory pressures and to achieve compliance with the established reporting norms. A complementary approach is the Diffusion of Innovation concept, which explains the dynamics of adoption by the theoretical principles of perceived compatibility, observability, and technological readiness and further influences the spread of digital reporting systems. All these frameworks explain how institutional pressures and intra-organizational innovation processes interact to affect XBRL implementation.
Research on XBRL’s effectiveness shows mixed results. Research evidence from developed countries and emerging markets, including the United States and Indonesia, shows that XBRL implementation reduces discretionary accruals (Kim et al., 2019; Tasbi & Jamaluddin, 2024). Research shows that XBRL benefits fail to appear in Saudi Arabia and Jordan without proper audit quality and regulatory enforcement (Mustafa, 2023; Hamdan et al., 2024).
The study investigates the impact of XBRL adoption on earnings management in Jordan, using the Modified Jones Model to analyze changes in discretionary accruals before and after implementation. The Null hypothesis is formally stated as follows:
Given the conflicting theoretical predictions, the competing empirical evidence reviewed above, and the mixed institutional setting of Jordan, the hypothesis is stated in a non-directional form. H0: There are no statistically significant differences in earnings management before and after the mandatory adoption of XBRL. H1: There are statistically significant differences in earnings management before and after the mandatory adoption of XBRL. No direction is imposed on H1 because Agency Theory and the enforcement-quality argument of Institutional Theory allow for either a disciplining effect or a substitution response, whereas the DOI framework predicts that the effect depends on organizational readiness.

2.4. Literature Review

Research investigating XBRL’s impact on earnings management (EM) is expanding yet remains complex, as it encompasses diverse theoretical frameworks, empirical findings, and methodological approaches. Experts debate whether digital financial reporting systems, such as XBRL, serve as effective tools for limiting managerial manipulations across different institutional, regulatory, and organizational environments.
Empirical research indicates that firms’ technological readiness and user acceptance are central to defining the level of XBRL implementation. According to the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) model, companies with robust digital infrastructure and higher levels of technological readiness are more likely to implement XBRL in their workflows and to derive greater benefits from its capacity to enhance transparency. Recent findings by Uyob et al. (2023), Borgi (2022), and Ilias et al. (2021) validate the idea that a company with greater digital capabilities and suitable infrastructure has an easier XBRL transition and better report quality.
Research findings show that the use of XBRL improves financial transparency and reduces earnings management. According to Tasbi and Jamaluddin (2024), manufacturing companies in Indonesia exhibit statistically significantly lower earnings management (EM) after implementing XBRL, implying that a digital disclosure framework can eliminate discretionary accruals. Manaf et al. (2024) and Alkayed et al. (2023) conducted a survey-based investigation in Jordan that suggests that XBRL technology enhances financial disclosures in terms of timeliness and transparency. Nevertheless, these positive results are based on a subjective perception data, instead of objective financial data, which restricts the ability to provide causal relations. Abhishek (2024) used a 10-year dataset of Indian companies and found that XBRL positively affects the quality of both financial and non-financial reporting when combined with the Enhanced Business Reporting framework.
These works can be theoretically supported by the Institutional Theory and the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) framework. Enforcement of regulations, technological preparedness and organizational ability are invaluable to effective adoption. Compliance processes in jurisdictions such as the European Union and the United States have used mandatory XBRL reporting to catalyze standard disclosure and transparency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Valentinetti & Rea, 2013).
Research literature presents conflicting views regarding the consistency of positive results from these studies. Frista et al. (2023), using panel data on Indonesian companies, reported higher levels of both accrual and real earnings management following XBRL adoption. Big Four auditors played a significant role in reducing this effect while demonstrating that XBRL’s effectiveness depends on additional governance structures. Using the Modified Jones Model and ANOVA in the Saudi context, Mustafa (2023) found an increase in EM post-XBRL implementation and contradicted the underlying assumptions of the Diffusion of Innovation theory. Likewise, Hamdan et al. (2024) demonstrated that XBRL does not significantly mediate the relationship between board characteristics and earnings management in Jordan, which supports the view that technological tools require both user training and institutional support to be effective.
A further dimension emerges from Hsieh et al. (2019), who found that U.S. firms experienced a decline in accrual-based EM with the introduction of XBRL, alongside an increase in real-based EM, indicating a behavioral shift in which firms changed their manipulation tactics due to heightened external scrutiny. Agency theory posits that managerial opportunism persists despite information asymmetry, even with the implementation of partial transparency measures.
In Jordan, a survey by Qushtom (2021) found that financial statement users widely supported XBRL technology for its ability to improve both the relevance and comparability of financial reporting. The continued use of conventional financial and disclosure reporting practices indicates an ongoing transitional stage in the implementation process. A related study from Europe demonstrates that European Single Electronic Format (ESEF) requirements have enhanced report precision and accessibility, but preparers encounter persistent obstacles, including user education deficits, technical challenges, and a lack of enthusiasm for applying Inline XBRL to other report formats. The researchers indicate that achieving the full advantages of ESEF requires additional standardization efforts and development of user capabilities, according to Miścikowska (2021, 2022), Virguti et al. (2021), and Staňková (2021).
Research focusing on the capital market adds an important dimension to understanding XBRL’s influence. Razak et al. (2019) found that both market liquidity and investor reactions became better after XBRL adoption in Indonesia. In the U.S., Kim et al. (2019) applied a difference-in-differences method, which revealed a notable decrease in discretionary accruals after the implementation of standardized tagging, underscoring the importance of quality implementation. The Taiwanese research of Tzu-Yi et al. (2016) revealed comparable advantages following XBRL adoption. The researchers established that XBRL adoption reduces bid-ask spreads and earnings volatility, confirming reduced information asymmetry and aligning with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) predictions.
The study by Benbouali and Berberi (2018) confirmed these findings in North African Markets, with evidence of rising investor confidence and improved market efficiency. Yang et al. (2018) observed that the use of XBRL enhances the consistency and comparability of financial statements over time, thereby allowing analysts to detect unusual patterns with greater accuracy. The early adopters of XBRL examined by Premuroso and Bhattacharya (2008) in the U.S. were associated with better governance and liquidity, implying that proactive firms adopt XBRL as a transparency signal beyond mere compliance requirements. The research by Yoon et al. (2011) demonstrated that XBRL adoption in South Korea reduced bid-ask spreads among large-cap firms, thereby improving trust and limiting opportunities for earnings manipulation.
However, the previous literature reveals differences and variations in their methodology. Research conducted in the Jordanian and regional contexts largely relies on perception-based questionnaires to assess regional trends. Although these approaches help assess the introduction’s viability and participants’ perceptions, they fail to evaluate XBRL’s influence on actual disclosure behavior. Manaf, Alkayed, and Hamdan’s research demonstrates XBRL’s perceived benefits but fails to provide conclusive insights into its impact on earnings manipulation.
Beyond the above perception-based studies in Jordan, Alharasis (2025) used the NiCE disclosure index to evaluate XBRL’s impact on the usefulness of financial information in Jordan’s financial sector. The research revealed improvements in the relevance and timeliness of financial information, as well as in faithful representation, but showed no improvement in understandability (Alshbiel, 2026; A. H. Alzboon & Alshbiel, 2026; M. I. Alzboon, 2026; Kanana, 2026). The research did not investigate behavioral consequences like earnings manipulation.
The current paper will address the research gap by using real financial data from the annual reports of publicly listed industrial firms in Jordan to investigate whether there are discretionary accruals in the pre- and post-implementation phases of the XBRL system. The research utilizes the Modified Jones Model to assess earnings management and conducts intensive statistical tests to develop an empirical framework for evaluating the behavioral effect of digital financial reporting reform. The shift from perception-based assessments based on survey data to analyses grounded in real financial statements provides useful insights that connect Jordan’s experience to the broader international literature (O. B. B. Kinana, 2026a, 2026b; S. B. Kinana, 2026; Qafisheh, 2026).
Cross-country comparative studies indicate that the use of XBRL for financial disclosure helps minimize manipulation and earnings management by increasing transparency and enhancing regulatory supervision of disclosure practices by securities commissions and stock exchanges. Nonetheless, the emerging markets show that institutional preparedness to embrace and deploy XBRL reporting, audit quality, and capacity building are all determining factors. Putri and Setiawan (2024) found that the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting disclosure among Indonesian state-owned enterprises had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on the time at which financial reports were prepared and published. This implies that reporting speed and financial discipline are more reliant upon firm profitability and organizational strength rather than on digital reporting. On the same note, Tawiah and Benjamin (2022) established that the quality of financial reporting has improved globally, but the impact was more pronounced in developing economies, where the benefits of structured financial reporting are greater due to higher levels of information asymmetry.
These findings indicate that XBRL has various dimensions on the management of earnings. The success of digital reporting in making the company more transparent depends on contextual factors, including the quality of governance, the capacity of institutions to enforce it, and the integrity of implementation practices. This research contributes to the literature by offering a detailed empirical analysis of digital financial reporting in Jordan’s industrial sector, thereby making both theoretical and practical contributions to the field. In addition, XBRL enhances the broader purpose of transparency by increasing the availability of financial information to various stakeholders, including investors, regulators, and the population at large (Altarawneh, 2021; Association of Chartered Certified Accountants [ACCA], 2009), thereby contributing to its social and informational potential in new markets, including Jordan.

3. Methodology

The paper employs a quantitative research approach to empirically examine the effects of XBRL implementation on earnings manipulation practices among industrial shareholding firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The analysis covers an eight-year period, divided into two phases: 2016 to 2019, prior to XBRL implementation, and 2020 to 2023, after XBRL became active. This research employs firm-level financial information to present an objective assessment of financial reporting behavior using accrual-based earnings management indicators.

3.1. Sample and Data Description

The most important and economically significant sector of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) is the industrial sector, which had a market capitalization of USD 6.466.7 million in 2022 and accounted for 29.6 percent of the total market value (Amman Stock Exchange, 2022). The industrial sector is sufficiently large and exhibits significant economic concentration among traded companies, providing a useful, specific context for studying financial reporting behavior in response to the adoption of XBRL.
The final sample comprises 40 industrial companies that were continuously listed on the ASE throughout the entire eight-year window 2016–2023. Continuous listing over the full period is the sole selection criterion; it implicitly excludes firms that exited through delisting, suspension, merger, acquisition, or restructuring and ensures a balanced panel with complete financial statements for estimating accrual-based earnings management. Table 1 details the selection procedure from the initial ASE industrial population, and Table 2 reports the composition of the sample across the official ASE industrial sub-sectors.
Table 1. Sample selection.
Table 2. Sample composition by official ASE industrial sub-sector.
The main sources for extracting financial indicators, based on the calculation of discretionary accruals, were the annual reports of the selected firms and data from the ASE Companies Guide. Moreover, the peer-reviewed literature and regulatory documents were also used as secondary sources to provide the contextual incentive and theoretical environment of the study.
The panel is balanced for the core variables used in the main analysis. Financial statement data are available for all 40 firms in each of the eight years, yielding 320 firm-year observations with no missing values for absolute discretionary accruals, firm size, leverage, return on assets, operating cash flow to total assets, asset tangibility, and the loss indicator. Three variables have incomplete coverage and are reported with their effective sample sizes throughout. Sales growth has 319 observations because one firm-year was set to missing when lagged revenue was close to zero, and the resulting growth rate was not meaningful. Firm age has 288 observations (eight firms), because the listing date required to compute it is not available in LSEG Workspace for those firms. Market-to-book has 256 observations (12 firms) because market price data have limited coverage of the smaller and thinly traded companies in the sample. The real earnings management measures, which are constructed from items not required for the accrual models, have 240 to 288 observations depending on the measure, as reported in Section 3.3.2.
Missing observations are handled by listwise deletion within each estimation, and the effective sample size is reported in every regression table. The main specifications use 319 firm-year observations, the loss of a single observation arising entirely from the sales growth variable; the event-study specification uses the same 319 observations. Market-to-book and firm age are deliberately excluded from the main specification precisely because their inclusion would reduce the sample to 255 observations, a 20 percent loss; they are reported in a supplementary specification to make transparent their effects on both the coefficient of interest and the sample size. The robustness specifications range from 107 to 319 observations, reflecting the design of each test rather than data attrition: the placebo specification is restricted by construction to the pre-mandate window, and the pandemic-exclusion specification omits two years of data by design. No firm is dropped from the panel in its entirety in any accrual-based specification.

3.2. Variable Definitions

Discretionary accruals (DACC) serve as the primary dependent variable for this research because it represents a standard measure for earnings management according to accounting literature (Dechow et al., 1995; Farah Freihat et al., 2025). DACC is calculated as the difference between estimated nondiscretionary accruals (NDACC) and total accruals (TACC), after scaling TACC by the previous period’s total assets. This technique allows researchers to distinguish between accruals created through management discretion and those that develop through standard business functions.
The study uses the absolute value of DACC (AbsDACC) to evaluate the intensity of earnings management without considering its direction. The measure evaluates the extent of discretionary reporting actions without considering their direction and serves as a standard tool in empirical research for assessing the strength of earnings manipulation. The analysis compares AbsDACC values between pre-XBRL (2016 to 2019) and post-XBRL (2020 to 2023) periods using paired statistical techniques. Throughout the paper, AbsDACC denotes the firm-year measure used in the regressions (320 observations), while AvgAbsDACC denotes the firm-level average within each sub-period used only in the paired Wilcoxon comparison (40 observations).
The primary regression model includes a binary XBRL indicator as the explanatory variable of interest, taking the value 1 for the post-adoption period (2020–2023) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2016–2019). The same indicator is used in the robustness analyses.
The regression analyses include eight firm-level control variables identified by the earnings management literature as significant determinants of discretionary accruals: firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), leverage (total liabilities to total assets), profitability (return on assets), operating cash flow scaled by total assets, sales growth, asset tangibility (property, plant and equipment to total assets), and a loss-firm indicator (Kothari et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2019). Market-to-book and firm age are added in a supplementary specification because their coverage reduces the sample by 65 firm-year observations. Governance characteristics such as audit quality, board independence, and ownership concentration could not be included because the required data are not systematically available for Jordanian listed firms; this is acknowledged in the limitations section, and parsimony is advisable given the sample size to avoid over-parameterization.

3.3. Estimation Technique

This study estimates discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) as a key input for the main regression analysis. The calculation of total accruals (TACC) begins by identifying the difference between net income and operating cash flow, as given by Equation (1).
T A C C i t   =   N I i t −   C F O i t … …
where
  • TACCit: The total accruals value for firm i in year t.
  • NIit: Net income.
  • CFOit: Cash flow from operations.
The modified Jones model is estimated cross-sectionally for each year using the regression in Equation (2).
T A C C i t T A i t − 1 = a 0 + β 1 1 T A i t − 1 + β 2 ( Δ R E V i t − Δ R E C i t T A i t − 1 ) + β 3 P P E i t T A i t − 1 + ε i t … …
where
  • TAit−1: Total assets at the end of year t − 1.
  • ΔREVit: Change in revenue from year t − 1 to t.
  • ΔRECit: Change in accounts receivable.
  • PPEit: Property, plant, and equipment.
  • εit: Residual term, representing discretionary accruals (DACC).
We derive the estimated nondiscretionary accruals (NDACC) values from the regression model’s predicted outcomes shown in Equation (3).
N D A C C i t = a ^ 0 + β ^ 1 1 T A i t − 1 + β ^ 2 ( Δ R E V i t − Δ R E C i t T A i t − 1 ) + β ^ 3 P P E i t T A i t − 1 … …
Total accruals less estimated nondiscretionary accruals yield discretionary accruals (DACC), which is illustrated in Equation (4).
D A C C i t = T A C C i t T A i t − 1 − N D A C C i t … …
The absolute value of the residual term (|εit|) measures the extent of earnings management without directionality; this measure is known as AbsDACC. This metric functions as the leading indicator for examining alterations in earnings manipulation across periods before and after XBRL adoption. This approach provides an objective accrual-based measure derived from audited financial statements, which is subsequently used in the main regression analysis to examine the impact of XBRL adoption on earnings management.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Discretionary accruals are estimated at the firm-year level: Equation (2) is estimated cross-sectionally within each fiscal year (40 firms per regression), the residual for each firm-year is the discretionary accrual, and its absolute value (AbsDACC) is the dependent variable in the regression analysis (320 firm-year observations). The firm-level average across each four-year sub-period (AvgAbsDACC, 40 observations) is used only in the paired Wilcoxon signed-rank comparison. Because 40 observations per annual cross-section is a thin basis for estimating the normal-accrual coefficients, a pooled estimation across all years is reported as a robustness check.

3.3.1. Empirical Model

The main empirical model regresses the absolute value of discretionary accruals on the XBRL adoption indicator and the full set of firm-level control variables, with firm fixed effects. The estimating equation is specified as follows:
AbsDACCit = αi + β1 XBRLt + γ′ Controlsit + εit ……
where AbsDACCit is the absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t obtained from Equation (4); αi denotes firm fixed effects; XBRLt is a binary indicator equal to 1 for the post-adoption period (2020–2023) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2016–2019); Controlsit is the vector of eight firm-level control variables defined in Section 3.2 (firm size, leverage, return on assets, operating cash flow to total assets, sales growth, asset tangibility, and the loss-firm indicator, with market-to-book and firm age added in a supplementary specification); and εit is the idiosyncratic error term.
Equation (5) is estimated by ordinary least squares with firm fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The clustering choice is not adopted by convention but is justified by the formal heteroskedasticity tests reported in Section 4.2 (Breusch–Pagan p = 0.046; White p = 0.036). Pooled OLS and random-effects estimates of the same equation are reported alongside the fixed-effects results in Section 4.3, together with the Hausman specification test, so that the sensitivity of the findings to the estimator is transparent.
Firm fixed effects absorb time-invariant firm heterogeneity, so β1 is identified from the within-firm change in AbsDACC across the single 2020 break, averaged across firms. Because every listed Jordanian firm adopted XBRL simultaneously, there is no untreated control group; therefore, β1 cannot be separated from any other shock common to all firms after 2020. The coefficient is consequently interpreted as an association throughout the paper rather than as a causal effect. Section 4 addresses this identification limitation through an event-study specification with year fixed effects, the exclusion of the pandemic years 2020–2021, and a placebo test using a counterfactual adoption date. All estimations were conducted in Stata 17.

3.3.2. Measures of Real Earnings Management

To examine possible substitution towards real-activities manipulation, the three Roychowdhury (2006) measures are estimated. Normal levels of operating cash flow, production costs, and discretionary expenses are modeled as follows:
CFOit/Ait−1 = α0 + α1 (1/Ait−1) + α2 (Sit/Ait−1) + α3 (ΔSit/Ait−1) + εit ……
PRODit/Ait−1 = α0 + α1 (1/Ait−1) + α2 (Sit/Ait−1) + α3 (ΔSit/Ait−1) + α4 (ΔSit−1/Ait−1) + εit ……
DISXit/Ait−1 = α0 + α1 (1/Ait−1) + α2 (Sit−1/Ait−1) + εit ……
where CFO is operating cash flow, PROD is production costs measured as the cost of goods sold plus the change in inventories, DISX is discretionary expenditure measured as selling, general and administrative expenses plus research and development expenses, S is sales revenue, ΔS is the change in sales revenue, and Ait−1 is lagged total assets. Each model is estimated cross-sectionally by year, and the residuals are the abnormal components: abnormal operating cash flow (AbCFO), abnormal production costs (AbPROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (AbDISX). A combined index is computed as −AbCFO + AbPROD − AbDISX, so that higher values indicate greater upward real earnings management. Each abnormal component, in absolute value, is then used as the dependent variable in Equation (5) in place of AbsDACC.
The production-cost and discretionary-expense items required for Equations (7) and (8) were collected from LSEG Workspace (Refinitiv) and validated against the hand-collected financial statements, with a median absolute difference in total assets of 0.00 percent. Coverage is 240 to 288 of the 320 firm-year observations, and the reduced coverage is reported in Section 3.1 and acknowledged in the limitations.

4. Results and Analysis

4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for all variables over 2016–2023 (320 firm-year observations). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles following standard practice in the accruals literature (Dechow et al., 1995). Before treatment, AbsDACC displayed pronounced right skewness (5.22) and excess kurtosis (51.76); winsorization reduces these to 1.80 and 7.09, respectively, confirming that a small number of extreme observations, rather than the bulk of the distribution, generated the non-normality. The mean of AbsDACC is 0.0709 over the full period, 0.0708 in the pre-adoption years (2016–2019) and 0.0709 in the post-adoption years (2020–2023); the two sub-period means are statistically indistinguishable (t-test p = 0.997; Mann–Whitney p = 0.885). These descriptive comparisons are reported for transparency only and are not interpreted as evidence of an XBRL effect.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, winsorized variables, 2016–2023.

4.2. Correlation Matrix and Diagnostic Tests

Table 4 presents Pearson correlations below the diagonal, Spearman correlations above the diagonal, and variance inflation factors in the final column. No pairwise correlation among the explanatory variables exceeds |0.65| except that between ROA and the loss dummy, which is expected by construction. The variance inflation factors never exceed 2.577, and all remain below the conventional threshold of 10 and the stricter threshold of 5, so multicollinearity is not a concern. The remaining diagnostic tests are reported in Table 5: the Breusch–Pagan (p = 0.046) and White (p = 0.036) tests reject homoskedasticity in the baseline model, which justifies the use of standard errors clustered at the firm level throughout; the Wooldridge test detects no first-order serial correlation (p = 0.565); and the Pesaran CD test detects no cross-sectional dependence at the 5% level (p = 0.142). The Hausman test favours fixed effects in the baseline specification (p = 0.017) but does not reject random effects in the extended specification (p = 0.263); both estimators are therefore reported alongside pooled OLS.
Table 4. Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix and variance inflation factors.
Table 5. Diagnostic tests.

4.3. Main Regression Results

Table 6 reports the main model (Equation (5)) with the full set of firm-level controls under the three panel estimators: pooled OLS, random effects and firm fixed effects, all with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The effective sample size is 319 firm-year observations across all three columns, one observation fewer than the full panel of 320 due to the single missing sales-growth value discussed in Section 3.1. Presenting the three estimators side by side follows from the mixed Hausman evidence in Table 5, which favors fixed effects in the baseline specification but does not reject random effects in the extended one; firm fixed effects is retained as the preferred specification because the rejection in the baseline indicates correlation between the firm effects and the regressors, and because it is the standard choice in the earnings management literature. Alternative specifications, including the baseline control set, ASE sub-sector fixed effects (which cannot be combined with firm fixed effects, as the sub-sector is time-invariant within firms), a linear time trend, and market-to-book and firm ageas robustness checks. Because every sample firm adopted XBRL simultaneously in 2020, the XBRL indicator is a perfect linear combination of year indicators; year-by-year dynamics are therefore examined separately in Section 4.4.
Table 6. XBRL adoption and absolute discretionary accruals: pooled OLS, random effects and firm fixed effects, extended controls.
The coefficient on XBRL adoption is statistically insignificant under all three estimators (+0.0046, p = 0.441; +0.0048, p = 0.419; +0.0032, p = 0.592), and its magnitude is economically negligible relative to the sample mean of AbsDACC (0.0709). Absolute discretionary accruals therefore show no detectable shift after the mandate. Among the controls, profitability and the loss indicator are strongly and negatively associated with AbsDACC, and the fixed-effects model’s R-squared is 0.272, indicating that the extended control set captures substantial variation.

4.4. Event-Study Specification with Year Fixed Effects

To trace the year-by-year path of discretionary accruals, Equation (5) is re-estimated replacing the XBRL indicator with a full set of year fixed effects, with 2019 (the last pre-adoption year) as the base. If the mandate altered accrual behavior, the post-2019 coefficients should differ from zero while the pre-2019 coefficients should not. Table 7 shows that no single-year coefficient is significant, and the joint Wald test that the four post-adoption-year effects are zero cannot be rejected (χ2(4) = 1.366, p = 0.850). The absence of any pre-adoption trend also indicates that the null result is not driven by offsetting pre-period dynamics.
Table 7. Year effects relative to 2019, firm fixed effects, extended controls, clustered standard errors.

4.5. Real Earnings Management

Because managers may substitute real-activities manipulation for accrual manipulation when the visibility of reported accruals increases (Hsieh et al., 2019), the three Roychowdhury (2006) measures are estimated as described in Section 3.3. Table 8 reports firm fixed-effects estimates of Equation (5) with each real earnings management proxy as the dependent variable, together with univariate pre/post comparisons. Abnormal production costs in absolute value rise significantly after adoption: the sub-period means increase from 0.0791 to 0.1114 (t-test p = 0.003; Mann–Whitney p = 0.030), and the fixed-effects coefficient is +0.0278 (p = 0.072), strengthening to +0.0644 (p = 0.004) when the pandemic years 2020–2021 are excluded. A placebo test that assigns a false adoption date of 2018 within the pre-mandate window has no effect on production costs (p = 0.917), indicating that the shift is specific to the actual adoption date rather than a general time trend. Abnormal discretionary expenses and the combined index show no significant change, and the abnormal cash-flow channel is not relied upon because the same placebo test produces a spurious effect there. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with a partial substitution from accrual-based towards production-based real earnings management and is presented as suggestive rather than conclusive.
Table 8. Real earnings management before and after XBRL adoption.

4.6. Robustness Tests

Table 9 reports six robustness regressions, each estimated with firm fixed effects and the full set of controls, with firm-clustered standard errors. The null result for accrual-based earnings management is unchanged when discretionary accruals are measured by the performance-adjusted model of Kothari et al. (2005) (+0.0053, p = 0.420), when the Modified Jones Model is estimated on a pooled rather than an annual cross-sectional basis, which addresses the thinness of the 40-firm annual regressions (+0.0099, p = 0.176), when total accruals are constructed from the balance sheet rather than the cash flow statement (+0.0015, p = 0.885), and when the pandemic years 2020–2021 are excluded (+0.0084, p = 0.388). A placebo test that assigns a false adoption date of 2018 within the pre-mandate window likewise yields no effect (+0.0058, p = 0.558), confirming that the null is not an artifact of a general time trend. Column (6) re-estimates the same specification with absolute abnormal production costs as the dependent variable; the coefficient is positive and marginally significant (+0.0278, p = 0.072) and, as reported in Section 4.5, strengthens to +0.0644 (p = 0.004) once the pandemic years are removed while vanishing under the placebo date. Further checks not tabulated for brevity, namely the baseline control set, ASE sub-sector fixed effects in a pooled design, a linear time trend, the addition of market-to-book and firm age, and a corrected firm-level Wilcoxon signed-rank test (18 firms increased, 22 decreased; p = 0.858), lead to the same conclusion.
Table 9. Robustness regressions: alternative earnings management measures, sample restrictions, and placebo test.

5. Discussion

This study examined the relationship between mandatory XBRL adoption and earnings management in Jordan’s industrial sector using the Modified Jones Model for accrual-based manipulation and the Roychowdhury measures for real-activities manipulation. Across seven regression specifications, an event-study design and an extensive robustness battery, absolute discretionary accruals show no statistically detectable change after the mandate. The corrected firm-level Wilcoxon test points in the same direction. At the same time, absolute abnormal production costs rise significantly after adoption, an increase that strengthens when the pandemic years are excluded and vanishes under a placebo adoption date.
The null result for accrual-based earnings management contrasts with the significant reductions documented in strongly enforced settings such as the United States (Kim et al., 2019) and with the increases reported in some emerging markets (Frista et al., 2023; Mustafa, 2023), while aligning with Jordanian evidence of insignificant effects (Hamdan et al., 2024). Viewed through Institutional Theory, a mandate that changes the format of disclosure without a commensurate change in enforcement intensity need not alter reporting incentives: firms may comply with the tagging requirement while their underlying accrual behavior remains unchanged. The DOI framework points in the same direction, since the effectiveness of a reporting technology depends on organizational readiness and user capability, both of which were still developing in Jordan during the sample period.
The rise in abnormal production costs is consistent with the substitution mechanism documented by Hsieh et al. (2019): when structured, machine-readable disclosure raises the visibility of reported accruals, managers may shift towards operational levers, such as overproduction, that standard accrual models do not capture and that digital tagging does not expose. This interpretation should be treated as suggestive. The effect is significant in the univariate comparisons and after excluding the pandemic years, but only marginal in the full-sample multivariate model; it concerns one of the three real-activities channels; and, in the absence of an untreated control group, it remains an association rather than an established causal effect. Institutional explanations such as symbolic compliance, limited enforcement capacity, and insufficient user training are plausible readings of the overall pattern, but none of these constructs is measured directly in this study; they are offered only as possible interpretations.
For agency theory, the results indicate that information asymmetry is not mechanically reduced by disclosure technology: the channel of opportunism can move rather than close. The contribution of the paper is therefore twofold. It provides accrual-based and real-activities-based evidence from an emerging market where prior work was largely perception-based, and it shows that evaluating digital reporting reforms requires examining both manipulation channels jointly, since a null result on accruals alone would understate the behavioral response.

6. Managerial and Policy Implications

The results carry implications that are framed as policy inferences informed by the broader literature rather than as direct empirical prescriptions. For regulators, the finding that mandatory XBRL adoption left accrual-based earnings management unchanged, while production-based real earnings management rose, suggests that digital disclosure mandates should be accompanied by proportionate enforcement capacity and by monitoring that extends beyond reported accruals to operational indicators such as production and inventory behavior. The Jordan Securities Commission and the Amman Stock Exchange could complement the XBRL infrastructure with analytical review of tagged filings, targeted training for preparers and users, and incentives for high-quality disclosure. For audit committees and external auditors, the substitution pattern implies that scrutiny calibrated to accrual manipulation alone may miss the margin along which opportunism migrates. For managers, XBRL is more likely to yield credibility benefits when it is embedded in internal control and governance processes rather than treated as a formatting requirement.

7. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research Directions

This study examined whether the 2020 mandatory adoption of XBRL by firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange was associated with changes in earnings management among industrial companies over 2016–2023. Using the Modified Jones Model, seven regression specifications, an event-study design, and a comprehensive robustness battery, no statistically detectable change in accrual-based earnings management is found. Evidence from the Roychowdhury measures indicates a significant post-adoption increase in abnormal production costs that survives the exclusion of the pandemic years and fails a placebo test in the expected direction, consistent with partial substitution towards real-activities manipulation.
These results qualify as evidence for Institutional Theory and the Diffusion of Innovation framework: a technological mandate, absent enforcement intensity and organizational readiness, changed the form of disclosure without disciplining the behavior it was intended to constrain, and may have redirected it. They also caution against evaluating disclosure reforms through a single channel of manipulation.
The research has several limitations. First, because all listed firms adopted XBRL simultaneously, there is no untreated control group, and the estimates are associations; the post-adoption window also overlaps the COVID-19 pandemic, which is addressed through exclusion tests and a placebo design but cannot be ruled out entirely. Second, the sample of 40 firms is small, and the annual cross-sections used to estimate normal accruals are thin, a limitation mitigated but not eliminated by pooled estimation. Third, the real earnings management measures are available for 240–288 of the 320 firm-years, and the missing observations are concentrated in 2019–2021 for six firms. Fourth, governance variables such as audit quality, board independence, and ownership concentration could not be included owing to data unavailability in the Jordanian setting.
Fifth, although the panel is balanced on the core variables, three variables have incomplete coverage due to limited availability of market and listing data for smaller Jordanian firms. Firm age and market-to-book are therefore reported in a supplementary specification rather than the main model, and the real earnings management measures are available for 240 to 288 of the 320 firm-year observations. The effective sample size is reported for every specification, and no substantive conclusion rests on a specification with reduced coverage.
Future research should exploit staggered adoption settings or cross-country designs that provide a control group, incorporate governance and audit-quality data as coverage improves, examine the remaining real-activities channels with richer operating data, and investigate whether the production-cost shift documented here persists, reverses, or extends to other sectors as enforcement of the XBRL mandate matures.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; methodology, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; software, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; validation, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; formal analysis, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; investigation, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; resources, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; data curation, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; writing—original draft preparation, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; writing—review and editing, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; visualization, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; supervision, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; project administration, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H.; funding acquisition, A.F.F., H.A.-H., H.A. and N.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The financial data used in this study are publicly available from the annual reports of the sampled companies and from the Amman Stock Exchange Companies Guide. The assembled panel dataset, the estimation code, and a reconciliation of all reported statistics are available from the corresponding author upon request and have been provided to the Editor to support independent verification of all results reported in this version.

Acknowledgments

The authors used OpenAI’s ChatGPT (2026 version) to improve language clarity and readability. The authors reviewed and edited all content and take full responsibility for the publication’s integrity and accuracy.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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