Transcending the Paradox of Statistical and Value Rationality: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of E-Commerce Algorithmic Involution

The unbridled pursuit of statistical rationality has precipitated a crisis of value rationality in e-commerce ecosystems, leading to algorithmic involution—a dilemma characterized by destructive hyper-competition. To reconcile this theoretical paradox and explore effective governance pathways, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving e-commerce platforms, government regulators, and consumers. Simulation results indicate that high-intensity government deterrence constitutes the necessary stability foundation of hard constraints, while consumer activism acts as the decisive accelerator of the soft environment contingent on high synergistic gains and low information screening costs. Furthermore, a platform’s pivot toward “algorithm for good” is not driven by altruism, but by the rational calibration between short-term extractive gains and long-term benevolent returns. Sensitivity analysis confirms that reducing the ratio of these two factors is the effective lever to speed up system convergence. Finally, effective governance requires restructuring this payoff matrix by establishing dynamic penalty mechanisms and transparent low-cost feedback channels to render ethical algorithmic behavior a dominant strategy in terms of economic rationality. This research aims to guide the e-commerce ecosystem from a zero-sum game of involution toward a sustainable equilibrium of multi-party value co-creation.