Skip to Content
You are currently on the new version of our website. Access the old version .
MDPIMDPI

Advanced

EncyclopediaEncyclopedia
PDF
  • Entry
  • Open Access

19 March 2026

15 Pages

Economic Resilience After Globalization: Regional and Global Perspectives

and
1
Department of Economic and Business Sciences, Faculty of Economics and Financial Sciences, Walter Sisulu University (WSU), Buffalo City 5200, South Africa
2
Department of Commerce, Ramanujan College, University of Delhi, Delhi 110019, India
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Encyclopedia2026, 6(3), 67;https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia6030067
This article belongs to the Section Social Sciences
Version Notes
Order Reprints

Definition

In an era of rising geopolitical tensions, repeated global crises, and growing uncertainty in trade and finance, economic resilience has become a key priority for policymakers. This study presents an understanding by distinguishing regional resilience from global resilience, offering hardnosed explanations of both concepts and outlining mensurable indicators for each. Regional resilience is the capacity of an economy to endure and recuperate from shocks by way of strong, cost-effective connections in its region. These could be seen in terms of intra-bloc trade power, trade concentration, intra-regional investment flows and constant capital flows, which indicate the deep economical integration and interdependence. On the contrary, global resilience is concerned with the extent to which an economy is guarded by larger global diversification. It is quantified by the distribution of exports and investments geographically, the extent and diversity of trade partners, membership on global value chains, and the stability of the cross-border capital flows. Understanding the difference between these two forms of resilience has become increasingly important for policy design, especially in a period marked by repeated crises, geopolitical tension, and shifting trade and financial conditions. Countries must decide not only how open their economies should be, but also whether openness should be integrated regionally, diversified globally, or stable through a hybrid approach. Further, it argues that regional integration is peculiarly invaluable during region-wide disruptions such as pandemics, financial crises, or supply shortages, where integrated policies can reduce adjustment costs and protect demand and supply chains. However, global diversification becomes significant in areas such as energy and commodity security, where dependence on limited suppliers can magnify risks. Ultimately, most economies benefit from combining both approaches (a hybrid approach), adapting their strategy to the development stage, institutional strengths, and exposure to external shocks.

1. Introduction

Today, resilience is the ability of regions and the global system to handle shocks like pandemics, war, trade disruptions, and extreme weather, and to adapt over the period. The issue of resilience has always been important to the survival and growth of people. It is the ability to change, recuperate, and continue despite the problems [1]. The trend of 2020 is that policymakers are no longer pursuing quick solutions but instead developing long-term resilience through supply chain diversification, more climate finance, and better global crisis responses. According to recent reports, though resilience is holding, it is still weak, as it faces increased trade strains and financial risks [2].
Some of the factors that are driving the current risk environment include geopolitical fragmentation, and this is largely due to the tensions between the U.S. and China over technology and export restrictions, and it is making companies and governments reconsider their supply chains. Following the introduction of stricter export controls in late 2025 by China, numerous European companies have begun seeking alternatives [3]. In addition, extreme weather and climate change are also raising the issues of loss and damage. The COP28’s new loss and damage fund by the UNFCCC is altering the manner in which vulnerable areas are handling financial risk [4]. Moreover, macro-financial weaknesses persist, as the IMF has alerted that global growth is stunted and has problems brought about by barriers to trade, excessive debts, and overvalued assets [2].
Areas that experience diverse economies, well-organized local institutions, and that are targeted financially can better manage disruptions and bounce back. For example, nearshoring and multi-sourcing are increasingly becoming popular strategies of more EU manufacturers, so as not to be dependent on a single supplier country and remain efficient and competitive [5]. According to OECD reports, the presence of a variety of suppliers is beneficial to regions in case of problems in global trade or abrupt shortages. In a similar manner, IMF research results indicate that post-major economic shocks, enhancing social protection and active labor market initiatives, including worker retraining, mobility assistance and portable benefits, can reduce long-term unemployment. These tools have enabled areas to be flexible, as workers and businesses find it easier to transport and relocate between sectors when they are needed, hence maintaining the same level of productivity [6,7].
The world has developed resilience systems, though these are yet to be completed. Multilateral organizations have achieved a certain success, including developing loss and damage financing under the UNFCCC and making new commitments through new G20 climate and development efforts to be more generous with adaptation finance and developing development loans [8]. The above actions indicate that an increasing number of individuals are becoming aware that global issues, especially the ones related to climate change, should be addressed collectively on the international level and cannot be resolved unless hefty funding is taken into account. Nevertheless, there are still huge gaps because development has been slow, and the political differences complicate collaboration. World organizations would be able to handle the crisis faster and with increased resources, yet political limits tend to complicate matters, as organizations do not have enough funds to raise enough. Both the IMF and OECD not only caution that further policy ambiguity, the introduction of new tariffs, and deteriorating trade relations may undermine the already thin veneer on current global economic projections, but also state that this might happen [2,6]. This implies that global resilience is not a given, and it has to be reinforced by continuous and collaborative leadership.
Accordingly, this paper presents an understanding by comparing regional and global resilience using indicators of trade and investment. It shows how each level reacts differently as the world economy becomes more fragmented. By 2025, resilience should include both technical work in supply chains, finance, and capital, and political efforts in cooperation, trade, and governance. For this reason, it is important to clearly separate regional and global resilience. New measures like operational loss and damage financing and updated OECD/IMF guidance are positive steps. However, ongoing geopolitical tensions and tighter budgets mean that the global system is still only partly resilient and remains vulnerable to repeated shocks. The study, therefore, will present indicators to track diversification, regional integration, external risks, and institutional strength. The aim is to help researchers and policymakers identify gaps in resilience and develop practical policies.

2. Economic Resilience, Regional Resilience and Global Resilience: Definition and Dimensions

Economic resilience refers to the capacity of an economy to absorb, adapt and be able to recover from external shocks, whether it is an economic, geopolitical, environmental, or social shock [9]. The World Bank considers that there are two components of economic resilience. The former is sudden resilience, the capacity to limit the instantaneous decline in output or welfare when a shock occurs, such as a natural disaster affecting production or a financial crisis affecting exports. The second one is dynamic resilience, which is the capacity to restructure, adjust, and recuperate with time [10].
Economic resilience includes microeconomic aspects, which include the management of households and businesses in terms of savings, insurance, social protection, and income and the macroeconomic aspects include total output, fiscal reserves, structural flexibility and robust institutions. Recent studies indicate that resilience is not only the ability to bounce back after a shock [11]. It may also entail modifying or transforming the economy to suit emerging circumstances, which aids in the development of long-term uncertainty, variety, and robustness. Concisely, economic resilience refers to the ability of a system to respond to disruptions, adapt to new conditions, and recover or re-arrange and still maintain its core-functions and conducive well-being [6].
Regional resilience, in its turn, is based on the robust trade and investment relationships in subnational regions, economic blocs, or trade zones. Areas specializing in trading and investing between members of the same group, like a trade bloc or a geographical cluster, are usually less vulnerable to disruption in the world [5,12]. Bloc trade is usually more stable and less prone to fluctuations in the global market, with internal connections resulting in additional protection. Regional resiliency can be used to reduce the threat of global shock diffusion. A region that is over-reliant on a distant or unfavorable partner may be affected by incidences such as trade wars, sanctions or declining demand very quickly [13]. Well-developed local systems can be used to mitigate these. The new trend in trade is returning to regional trends with the escalation of geopolitical tensions. Regional value chains, regional FDI blocs, and regional supply networks within the areas are the topics on which companies and governments are concentrating on in order to create resilience [14]. Regionalization can, however, reduce efficiency and competitiveness, increase economic disparities, and limit globalization and access to additional markets. Regional resilience, therefore, refers to the concentration of trade and investment in trusted or local blocs to assist in maintaining flows in case of disruptions in the world [15].
Moreover, global resilience is established on the basis of diversification. Rather than one trade and investment partner having a profound level of power, it is preferable to distribute economic links to other nations, regions and groups [16]. The fact that there are many trade and investment partners means that a single occasion like a crash in the market will not lead to a significant setback for the economy or the region. In the case that exports to one partner decline, then exports to others can be used to offset this [17].
Global value chains apply various sources and networks in different areas so that production, supply and assembly can be transferred to other areas in case one region is going through difficulties. Those economies that have a wider array of supply chain members and are more multifaceted in terms of their functions and tend to recover more positively following disruptions [18]. Another pillar that ensures global resilience is the presence of powerful international accords, flexible institutions and open trade systems. These assist in ensuring that issues in one region do not develop and expand across the globe [19]. To summarize, global resilience is strong when it has a large number of partners compared to depending on a single group. The richer a country is in terms of trade and investment associations, the better it can cope with outside shocks and change flows, and greater difficulties can be avoided [20].

3. Trade Theory and Risk Diversification: Developing Theoretical Understanding

The connection between international trade and economic resilience is that both are positively related under classical and modern trade theory, yet recent world shocks have demonstrated that models that have concentrated solely on measures of efficiency are limited. Trade theory is mainly used to explain how countries can benefit in the case of specialization and trade-offs due to the comparative advantage available, the resources available, and economies of scale [21]. Nevertheless, to comprehend resilience, trade theory should also incorporate the concept of risk diversification, which not only appreciates efficiency but also robustness, redundancy and adaptability [14].
The classical theory of trade, which was initially developed by David Ricardo, asserts that as long as there are stable conditions in the world, it is more beneficial to specialize in an area where a comparative advantage is present [22]. Subsequently, the Heckscher–Ohlin model and new trade theory also accentuate the virtues of trade as a result of specialization, product differentiation and economies of scale. The assumption of these theories is that there are predictable political relations, a stable supply chain, and low systemic risks [23,24]. Within this background, integration is deeper, and the targeted trade relations enhance efficiency. However, in the contemporary world, where pandemics, geopolitical tensions, sanctions, and climate shocks are the order of the day, these concepts are questioned and demonstrate that excess specialization and concentration can make systems fragile [25].
The theory of risk diversification, which is based on finance and portfolio management, is an explanation of how to reduce risk. In finance, capital allocation in a multiplicity of asset classes lowers the likelihood of exposure to the idiosyncratic disturbances of any single asset. Diversification of operations with heterogeneous markets, suppliers and alliances is one way of protecting against shocks, which originate in one partner, in the case of international trade and investment [26]. Therefore, to trade, countries with a wide range of export markets, sources of imports and investment partners are more able to absorb shocks like trade embargos, slowdown in demand, or supply side effects [27]. Empirically, nations and companies with a more diverse trade network recuperate better than those that are contingent on a few partners [28].
Contemporary global value chain (GVC) theory also contributes to the validity of the concept of diversification. Although GVCs can increase efficiency by spreading production phases across jurisdictions, this dispersion also creates dependencies that have the power to spread disturbances [29]. In the case of a discrete part of the chain getting plagued by war, an unexpected catastrophe or even the introduction of new regulatory shackles, the effects might trickle down to the whole chain. The use of a diversified supplier base, manufacturing in various locations and creating alternative logistical routes all provide redundancy, which enhances the resiliency of the system against external shocks [30]. This, therefore, grounds resilience in the strategic diversification and flexibility of integration on a global level.
In addition to that, the theory of trade under uncertainty explains a major trade-off between efficiency and resilience. Concentrated forms of trade are cheap in normal conditions but may incur significantly increased costs in a crisis situation [31]. On the other hand, a primary scattering of trade relations cannot be as efficient, but it can cushion the losses in case disruptions take place. This paradigm is already encroaching on policy discussions of so-called strategic autonomy, friend-shoring, and near-shoring because governments and businesses tend to pay higher short-term costs to decrease overall risk exposure [14,32].
The activities of risk diversification have a qualitatively different character on regional and global levels. At the regional level, risk sharing in a bloc promotes resilience, as the member states can redistribute capital amongst reliable partners that have similar institutional frameworks [33]. Diversification in terms of blocs in the world is a way of avoiding overdependence on one hegemony. Trade theory provides an insight on how to differentiate between regional resilience, which is based on managed concentration within the blocs on one hand, and global resilience, which relies on wide diversification across the international system on the other hand [34].
Therefore, combining trade theory with risk diversification (Table 1) shows that resilience is a key feature of trade and investment networks. This approach goes beyond just looking at efficiency and instead focuses on how economies can handle, adjust to, and recover from shocks. This is a crucial way to think about resilience in today’s uncertain global environment.
Table 1. Synthesis of regional vs. global resilience.

4. Political Economy of Fragmentation

Global trade is being shifted by current trends, including increased geopolitical tensions, sanctions, export controls, and strategic rivalries. Due to this, resilience strategies have become economic and political–economic decisions [35]. Nations are moving towards a pattern of geo-economic trade fragmentation, where security, sovereignty and political alignment are given priority at the expense of openness in integration. They depend less on global interdependency by opting to be autonomous on national or regional levels. This may reduce diversification and resilience across the world. This tendency tells the political trilemma of the world economy, which is concerned with the tension between democracy, national sovereignty, and economic integration on a global scale [36].
With growing global markets, most countries and corporations are establishing new trade and investment networks, including regional blocs and friend-shoring arrangements, to reduce geopolitical risks [37]. Although these measures may assist in dealing with risk, they also may restrict the gains of global diversification, decrease efficiency and augment economic partitioning. In the long run, this will weaken the global economy as integration will reduce. In order to comprehend it, it is also worth considering economic terms, including diversification, redundancy, and adaptability, and political and economic aspects of geopolitical alignment, institutional choices, and strategic fragmentation [38].
Political and economic forces are increasingly defining the global economy and disputing the conception of a free trading system that is rule-based. Geopolitical tensions, increased sanctions, export restrictions on important technologies, and increased rivalries among the big powers are altering the way nations trade and invest [39]. Due to this fact, resilience plans are no longer only about efficiency and growth. They are now political and economic choices that represent issues of security and power relations, as well as interests in strategy formations. Trade was viewed by political economists as one means through which countries could make mutual gains and thus intertwine more closely; they thought that by integrating their economies, countries would work together and become more stable. However, recent incidents have revealed that there are also just as many dangers that can be caused by economic relations and provide certain countries with an advantage in relation to others. These advantages also put pressure on countries that possess control over significant technologies, financial systems, or key resources by exerting sanctions, trade restrictions and regulations [40]. Business and finance as instruments of guidance have become a significant component of the international system today. Due to this, trade has become not only a means of growing, but also a potential threat to the security of the citizens of the country [41].
The political economy of fragmentation demonstrates the influence of variations in power on resilience. Countries that are at the heart of global trade or those possessing major resources like advanced semiconductors, energy, or financial systems are able to cope with shocks more effectively and transmit costs to others [42]. Conversely, those nations that heavily rely on other countries are more vulnerable to shocks caused by sanctions, export restraints or diplomatic arguments. It is this asymmetry that defines the reaction of countries: major economies can attempt selective decoupling or de-risking, whereas small ones seek safety in regional integration or selection diversification [43].
Domestic politics also forms fragmentation. This is due to governments being under pressure to cushion important industries, and preserve jobs and stable supplies, particularly following post-crisis periods such as the COVID-19 pandemic or energy crises. Such are concerns which frequently translate into locally biased policies, local requirements, or special trade arrangements centering on resilience rather than efficiency [44]. Although these measures can help countries or regions become stronger, they can also undermine the ties and the international organizations which are supposed to handle common risks. From political economic perspective, fragmentation is not accidental but a result of a chain of deliberate decisions based on uncertain and competitive times [45].
A conflict between regional and global resilience can also be developed by the political economy of fragmentation. Trying to establish trust, enhance coordination in policies, and assist member states in a region to manage shocks, regional plans such as friend-shoring or bloc-based integration have the potential to solve problems. Simultaneously, these strategies may restrict international diversification, increase the distance between systems, and lead to the rise in the risk of rival economic blocs [15]. In this case, shocks may be relaxed in the bloc and difficult to resolve globally since there is less cooperation and institutional capacity. The organizations that are supposed to stabilize the world economy, like trade dispute mechanisms, and develop finance or climate coordination platforms are based on large-scale involvement and trust. Due to the increase in geopolitical competition, it is more difficult to find an agreement, which delays the response and minimizes its effectiveness [46]. It is a paradox, because risks to the world are increasingly becoming complex and interrelated, and global resiliency pillars are crumbling.
To conclude, the political economy of fragmentation renders the concept of resilience as a strategy that is based on power, security, and domestic politics rather than economic effectiveness. In order to know about resilience today, some questions that take the focus are who is assuming risk, who is governing significant networks and who is a political influence on trade and investment. This perspective can be used to understand why resilience strategies are increasingly becoming more differentiated regionally and why the organization of global resilience is becoming increasingly both important and difficult in an era of geopolitical competition.

5. Indicators of Regional Resilience

In the present globalized society, where disruptive events such as financial crises, pandemics, and political shocks are widespread, the need to measure and comprehend resilience at the regional level is more important than ever [9]. Analysts usually employ trade and investment indicators to have a complete picture of the level of interconnectedness and stability of the economy of a region [47].

5.1. Trade-Based Indicators

Key indicators to consider are as follows:

5.1.1. Intra-Bloc Trade Share (As a Percentage of Exports and Imports)

This measure demonstrates the proportion of the total trade of a nation in the region it belongs to. In the case that this share is high, it implies that the member countries are dependent on one another in terms of goods and services, which in turn implies that the countries are closely related in terms of the economy [48]. As an example, within the European Union (EU), EU trade between EU countries has traditionally comprised a significant portion of aggregate trade. This tight connection has enabled the EU to remain stable, as issues or developments in external markets do not affect its local economy as much [49].

5.1.2. Regional Concentration Index (Using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index Within the Bloc)

Market concentration is normally determined with the help of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), although it can also be used to determine the distribution of trade within an area among its participants. The smaller the HHI, the more trade is evenly distributed, and this implies that the countries do not rely on one partner. An increase in the HHI implies that most of the trade is controlled by a few countries. Although the presence of a significant economic player can bring about efficiency in the process, it is risky to over-depend on one country in case that country experiences issues [50]. The HHI is useful in determining the strength of a trade network by the way it looks in a regional bloc and whether trade is balanced or it is controlled by a few countries.

5.2. Investment-Based Indicators

5.2.1. Share of FDI from Regional Partners

Foreign direct investment (FDI) also demonstrates the level of commitment and connectedness of countries, as it entails long-term capital that ties the economies of the countries together. A high level of trust and interdependence in a region is indicated when countries make massive investments in one another [51]. As a case in point, in ASEAN, Singapore and Malaysia have frequently made investments in other member nations, contributing to the expansion of manufacturing, services and infrastructure. When the degree of regional FDI is high, local firms find good opportunities near their residences and decide to expand in the region instead of seeking opportunities in other areas [52].

5.2.2. Intra-Bloc Capital Flow Stability

Measured in millions of dollars per year, intra-block capital flow stability is a measure calculated by dividing money flow across borders within a specific region by the total Gross Domestic Product of the region (GDP). Not only is the magnitude of investment significant, but also the consistency of capital flows in a region. In the event that investment flows in and out are fast, the region may experience instant inconveniences in stressful times, thus compromising stability. Capital flows being stable means that investment relationships are long-lived and not easily influenced by world financial fluctuations. The adoption of similar financial rules can enhance stability, as well as the sharing of risks and developing regional safety nets [53]. Indicatively, the Chiang Mai Initiative in East Asia was established to assist nations to collaborate financially and minimize chances of sharp outflows of capital during a crisis [54].

6. Indicators of Global Resilience

Global economic resilience refers to the capacity of a nation to absorb and adjust to external shocks that are not within the geographical location of the country, e.g., financial crises, pandemics, wars or abrupt disruptions in supply chains.
Diversification of exports to various regions is one of the major indicators of global resilience. The fewer countries that are dependent on one market to sell their goods, the less likely they are to be affected by issues in one area. In the case that the demand in one region declines, these countries can then direct their exports to other stronger markets, which will ensure that their economy remains stable [55].
The other consideration is the quantity of the major trade partners of a country, which is typically expressed as partners taking up a greater portion of exports or imports. Bigger partners of a country imply that the country has a wider and balanced array of trading relations, hence it is not as reliant on a few markets [56].
Another major prerequisite trade measure is the global value chain (GVC) participation index. It demonstrates the extent of the integration of a country in global production relations. Participation in a GVC is both forward and backwards, where a country exports and imports goods and services, respectively, as components of exports in other countries and imports, respectively [57]. Higher GVC involvement may render a nation more resilient by linking its companies to the global production systems to make them adapt rapidly in the event of disruptions. It also implies global exposure of countries to global supply chain shocks, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic [58].
Alternatively, indicators of investment, including FDI, can be used to measure global resilience to emphasize the long-term capital flows and financial risks. One of the indicators is the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and outflows of a country. When economies receive the FDI of numerous nations, and their companies are located in different locations, they become less prone to the abrupt withdrawal of investment caused by issues in one nation [59].
Another important measure is volatility-adjusted global capital inflows. This method examines the quantity of inflows of capital in addition to the predictability of such inflows within a period of time. Though big inflows may enhance growth and investment, unpredictable flows of capital may cause more susceptibility of economies to abrupt halts, currency crises and financial crises [60].

7. Implications of These Indicators in the Comparative Framework

Indicators, such as trade, investment, intra-bloc trade share, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of trade concentration, intra-regional foreign direct investment (FDI) share, and the stability of intra-bloc capital flows, are strengths in analyzing the resilience of a region. These indicators are quantifiable, have a data basis, and are usable both inter-regionally and through time [61]. Nevertheless, these indicators have significant flaws as well. The fact that intra-bloc trade or investment are high does not necessarily imply resilience. It only proves that trade or investment are redirected sometimes and not that integration is more efficient. When such instances occur, emphasis on the area will minimize the connection with international markets and diversification, which might render it more susceptible to local shocks [62]. In addition, tools such as the HHI emphasize the identity of trade partners but disregard such aspects as the differences in products, value added, supply chains, and relationships between companies [63].
Indicators based on investment also have their issues; FDI information is generally incomplete, late, or ambiguous, particularly in developing regions, and it is difficult to assess the extent of connection between the regions. Moreover, stable intra-bloc capital flows may conceal risks when most investment is made in a few sectors, countries or firms [64]. Moreover, these indicators primarily quantify economic connections and do not reflect essential attributes such as the effectiveness of institutions in collaborating with one another, adherence to the rules, the state of the infrastructure, or the readiness of the territory to manage a crisis. These are also important to the ability of a geographic region to respond to and recover from shocks.
The indicators can be summed in comparative research to present a more powerful assessment of the resilience of a region. This could be done by creating a bloc-wide resilience index of the region. This index may comprise normalized intra-bloc trade share, an inverted HHI (less concentration implies greater resilience), intra-bloc FDI share and intra-regional capital flow stability. By observing these indicators over time, particularly prior to and following some global shocks, such as financial crises, pandemics, or trade wars, researchers may observe a change in resilience, whether regional integration will be strengthened or weakened during stress [65]. A comparison of outcomes in blocs of countries like the EU, the ASEAN and the MERCOSUR can reveal which forms of trade and investment offer the most diversification or the greatest concentration to protect against global shocks. Lastly, it is possible to incorporate external shock data into these indicators to enable researchers to test the extent to which measured resilience is consistent with actual world results, which include ability to absorb shock, quick recovery, and long-term adaptation [66].
An economic resilience framework supports the determination of how different countries and regional blocs react to shocks, using various mixtures of trade, investment, and policy frameworks. Collectively, these dimensions enable analysts to categorize economies based on whether they are resilient regionally, through thick intra-bloc interconnections, or globally, through the interconnections between diverse regions and markets [67]. Trade diversification in this framework is used in the sense that it deals with a relationship where an economy has limited partners, as opposed to many regions. Diversification tends to increase resilience, as there is minimal reliance on one market. Investment diversification evaluates a country’s distribution of inward and outward investments, and indicates whether there is a high concentration of long-term financial exposure or a wide distribution. Volatility shows the stability of both trade and capital movement through time, noting that highly diversified linkages may be the cause of vulnerability in the case that they are very volatile [59]. Further, adaptability is the ability of an economy to alter the production structure, reorient the supply chain, and provide policy responses to a shock. Although adaptability is not more measurable, it may be proxied by indicators such as being a part of global value chains, flexibility in sectors, and institutional efficacy [68].
One of the most important lessons is the existence of the trade-offs between efficiency and resilience. Extensive regional or globalization usually brings the benefits of efficiency in the form of specialization, economies of scale and reduced transaction costs. Nonetheless, the same efficiencies can make them more vulnerable when there is too much or too little concentration when integrating or when there is a supply chain that is inflexible. As an example, just-in-time production networks, which have been optimized to a high degree and decrease costs, may increase disruption upon system failure of important nodes [69]. Regional integration can cushion members against the external shocks of the world, yet it is likely to make them more sensitive to region-specific shocks. In contrast, global diversification distributes risk but could elevate adjustment expenses and diminish the depth of connections with any of the partners. Policymakers hence have to make strategic decisions on the extent to which they should create redundancy and diversification in economic systems without compromising on competitiveness [70].
The comparison between the European Union and Singapore allows a comprehensive understanding of how this framework functions. The EU is a paradigm of resiliency, which is highly regional in nature. It has a single market and customs union that has established a very high scope of intra-bloc-level trade and investment, which are underpinned by harmonized regulation and common institutions [71]. In the perspective of the matrices, the E.U. has high ratings of integration of trade and investment in the region and relatively high volatility management, due to its financial safety nets and coordination policies. Such an organization improves stability to external shocks based on internal demand and supply chains. Nonetheless, it may equally lead to exposure to crises in the region, such as that witnessed during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, where shocks were transmitted quickly among member states [72].
Singapore, on the other hand, reflects a resilience hub in the world. Although very small, it has exceptionally high trade and investment diversification in Asia, Europe, the Americas and the Middle East. Singapore has a very high rating in trade and investment diversification and flexibility in the comparative matrix, as it is a logistics, financial and services center integrated in several global value chains [73,74]. It is more exposed to volatility than larger or more inward-facing economies, but the risk is minimized by good institutions, fiscal buffers, and policy flexibility. The model of Singapore illustrates how global diversification can replace the regional scale in enabling a small economy to be resilient despite the high openness [75].
In general, these frameworks offer a structured approach to the analysis of resilience that goes beyond openness or integration measures. It makes it possible to compare regions and countries, elucidates the efficiency–resilience trade-off, and assists in determining the most effective types of economic linkages to utilize in various situations in the world. In addition, the indicators of trade and investment provide a general picture of how economies respond to an unstable international setting. These will be useful by considering the kinds of measures, such as diversification, network size, production connections, and financial stability, in explaining why some countries may be more accommodative to global shocks [76,77].

8. Conclusions

This study sheds light on distinguishing between regional resilience and global resilience, and presents the concepts of these two and how to quantify them. Resilience in a region is observed in terms of intra-bloc trade, concentration in trade, regional investment, and consistent capital flows, which are strong signs of economic integration into a region. Global resilience, conversely, is determined by the degree of regional distribution of exports and investments, the scope of trade partners, inclusion in global value chains, and the stability of the international flow of capital. All these indicators would allow analysis of how economies respond and recover at various levels to external shocks.
Regional and global resilience is an economic policy issue, particularly in the current times of crises, geopolitical strains, and uncertainty in trade and finance. Economies do not only have to make decisions concerning the extent to which their economies can be open, but also have to decide where they want to be open, whether within regions or across the world or a combination of both. It is important to understand when to think locally (regional resilience) and when to think globally (diversification) and strike the right balance (hybrid) between the two in order to create robust economic strategies that are sustainable and able to meet future requirements.
Integration of regions comes in handy when an economy is facing a financial crisis, a pandemic, or a shortage of supplies that affects its immediate neighbors at the same time. Trade and investment relationships within a region can be strengthened, and coordinated policies can be used to keep demand intact, keep the supply chain steady and reduce adjustment costs. There exist cases where diversification around the world is instrumental. This is good in terms of energy security and commodity markets. When an area relies heavily on a small number of suppliers of oil, gas, minerals or food, the area can experience severe issues whenever there is conflict, sanctions, or weather changes. Decentralization of suppliers and markets throughout the world assists in reducing the danger of shortages and price spikes. Similarly, an economy that depends largely on local demand might fail in the case that the whole region experiences a decline. Access to global markets enables countries to move their exports, source new suppliers and be able to get investments from other regions. As a matter of fact, the majority of countries perform best when they are hybrid, i.e., both with strong connections in the region and extensive global networks. An example of this is that the country could establish manufacturing supply networks in its area to minimize logistical risks and other legal requirements of the country, and also retain global export business and investment facilities, open to not being overdependent on one group. Various strategies are used to allow countries to balance and manage regional shocks without being isolated.
Additionally, these policies have various implications for developing and advanced economies. Regional resilience can be particularly critical to developing countries. Regional markets simplify the process of getting into export business, reduce expenditure and provide opportunities to learn and graduate into global value chains. Investment in the region is usually more reliable, and it is localized depending on local needs. But when developing countries over-depend on a region, in the case that it is small, and the economy is low-income, or in case the region is similar, developing countries can also restrain their growth. More developed economies, however, tend to possess better institutions, are more diversified and have stronger financial markets, which allow them to deal with more global exposure. In their case, diversification in the global market is beneficial in terms of risk distribution among markets and industries. Nevertheless, recent developments, like supply chain issues and geopolitical tensions, have demonstrated how untrustworthy too much dependency on a limited number of sources may be.
That is why resilience is not merely the choice between a regional and a worldwide approach. It must be modified to suit the economic framework, level of development, risk levels and institutional capacity of individual countries. Those economies that value the trade-offs and develop flexible and hybrid strategies are in a better position to manage shocks, aid recovery, and maintain steady growth in a more uncertain world.
Although this contribution offers quantifiable indicators of the economic strength of a region and the world at large and builds a definite conceptual framework, additional research should be conducted to support these indicators. Future scholars might validate the reliability, predictability and the relative explanatory ability of the proposed indicators in varying shock circumstances, including monetary crises, supply chain interruptions, and geopolitical antagonisms. In addition, testing these indicators would be useful to determine the interactions between regional focus and global diversification strategies, the ability to detect context-specific variation, and better standards of measurement. Future research such as this would be useful in bringing the framework into a better practical application and assist in transforming the conceptual model into a fully testable analytical tool.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, A.Y. and B.A.I.; methodology, and investigation, A.Y.; writing and original draft preparation, A.Y. and B.A.I.; review and editing, A.Y. and B.A.I.; funding acquisition, B.A.I. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

The Article Processing Charge (APC) for this publication was funded by Walter Sisulu University, South Africa.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

  1. Global Peace Institute. The Power of Resilience in a Turbulent World. 2025. Available online: https://globalpeaceinstitute.org/the-power-of-resilience-in-a-turbulent-world/ (accessed on 19 August 2025).
  2. International Monetary Fund. Global Economy in Flux, Prospects Remain Dim. In World Economic Outlook; International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, USA, 2025; Available online: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/text.pdf (accessed on 7 November 2025).
  3. World Economic Forum. Global Risks 2025: A World of Growing Divisions; Global Risks Report 2025; World Economic Forum: Geneva, Switzerland, 2025; Available online: https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2025/in-full/global-risks-2025-a-world-of-growing-divisions-c943fe3ba0/ (accessed on 24 February 2025).
  4. UNEP. About Loss and Damage; United Nations Environment Programme: Nairobi, Kenya, 2025; Available online: https://www.unep.org/topics/climate-action/loss-and-damage/about-loss-and-damage (accessed on 5 October 2025).
  5. Sutton, J.; Arcidiacono, A.; Torrisi, G.; Arku, R.N. Regional economic resilience: A scoping review. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 2023, 47, 500–532. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  6. OECD. Strengthening Regional Policy for Resilient Places: Key Issues and Policy Considerations; OECD Regional Development Papers; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2025. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  7. Kentikelenis, A.; Stubbs, T. Social protection and the International Monetary Fund: Promise versus performance. Glob. Health 2024, 20, 41. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  8. World Bank Group. Rising to the Challenge: Success Stories and Strategies for Achieving Climate Adaptation and Resilience. 2024. Available online: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/rising-to-the-challenge-climate-adaptation-resilience (accessed on 11 June 2025).
  9. Capoani, L.; Fantinelli, M.; Giordano, L. The concept of resilience in economics: A comprehensive analysis and systematic review of economic literature. Contin. Resil. Rev. 2025, 7, 121–145. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  10. Hallegatte, S. Economic Resilience: Definition and Measurement; Policy Research Working Paper; World Bank Climate Change Group, Office of the Chief Economist: Washington, DC, USA, 2014; Available online: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/350411468149663792 (accessed on 29 June 2025).
  11. Eichengreen, B.; Park, D.; Shin, K. Economic resilience: Why some countries recover more robustly than others from shocks. Econ. Model. 2024, 136, 106748. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  12. He, C.; Li, J.; Wang, W.; Zhang, P. Regional resilience during a trade war: The role of global connections and local networks. J. World Bus. 2024, 59, 101567. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  13. Bonadio, B.; Huo, Z.; Kang, E.; Levchenko, A.A.; Pandalai-Nayar, N.; Toma, H. The Economics of Trade Bloc Formation: Who Wins from Decoupling? Empirical Macroeconomic Policy Center of Texas: Austin, TX, USA, 2025; Available online: https://sites.utexas.edu/macro/2025/04/18/the-economics-of-trade-bloc-formation-who-wins-from-decoupling/ (accessed on 14 August 2025).
  14. UNCTAD. Global Trade in 2025: Resilience Under Pressure. 2025. Available online: https://unctad.org/news/global-trade-2025-resilience-under-pressure (accessed on 9 November 2025).
  15. Kassa, W. Regionalization of global trade: A new order in the making. Glob. Policy 2025, 16, 773–776. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  16. Ahn, J.; Tan, B.J. Supply Chain Diversification and Resilience; IMF Working Paper; Western Hemisphere Department: Washington, DC, USA, 2025; Volume 2025. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  17. UNCTAD. Building More Diverse and Resilient Economies. 2024. Available online: https://unctad.org/news/building-more-diverse-and-resilient-economies (accessed on 10 September 2025).
  18. De Backer, K.; De Lombaerde, P.; Iapadre, L. Analyzing global and regional value chains. Int. Econ. 2018, 153, 3–10. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  19. Zheng, Z. Enhancing Supply Chain Resilience amid Rising Global Risks. UNCTAD, 2024. Available online: https://unctad.org/news/enhancing-supply-chain-resilience-amid-rising-global-risks (accessed on 30 August 2025).
  20. World Economic Forum; McKinsey & Company. Resilience for Sustainable, Inclusive Growth; World Economic Forum: Geneva, Switzerland; McKinsey & Company: New York, NY, USA, 2022; Available online: https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/risk/our%20insights/resilience%20for%20sustainable%20inclusive%20growth/resilience-for-sustainable-inclusive-growth_final.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2025).
  21. OECD. Risks and Resilience in Global Trade: Key Trends in 2023–2024; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2024. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  22. Findlay, R. Comparative Advantage. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics; Palgrave Macmillan: London, UK, 1987. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. Jones, R.W. Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics; Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E., Eds.; Palgrave Macmillan: London, UK, 2008. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  24. Uddin, G.E. A Critique of Modern Theories of Trade; MPRA Paper; Munich Personal RePEc Archive: Munich, Germany, 2021; Available online: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105194 (accessed on 29 June 2025).
  25. McKinsey & Company. A New Trade Paradigm: How Shifts in Trade Corridors Could Affect Business. 2025. Available online: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/geopolitics/our-insights/a-new-trade-paradigm-how-shifts-in-trade-corridors-could-affect-business (accessed on 4 December 2025).
  26. Koumou, G.B. Diversification and portfolio theory: A review. Financ. Mark. Portf. Manag. 2020, 34, 267–312. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  27. You, K.; Raju Chinthalapati, V.; Mishra, T.; Patra, R. International trade network and stock market connectedness: Evidence from eleven major economies. J. Int. Financ. Mark. Inst. Money 2024, 91, 101939. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  28. Böschemeier, J.; Mau, K. Foreign Supply Shocks and the Structure of Trade in a Small Open Economy. De Econ. 2023, 171, 303–342. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  29. Khorana, S.; Escaith, H.; Ali, S.; Kumari, S.; Do, Q. The changing contours of global value chains post-COVID: Evidence from the Commonwealth. J. Bus. Res. 2022, 153, 75. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  30. Razzaq, A.; Shahbaz, P.; Haq, S.U.; Zhou, Y.; Erfanian, S.; Abbas, A. Assessment of the heterogeneous impacts of global value chain participation on sustainable economic growth and environmental quality. Heliyon 2024, 10, e35348. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  31. Baley, I.; Veldkamp, L.; Waugh, M. Can global uncertainty promote international trade? J. Int. Econ. 2020, 126, 103347. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  32. Pegoraro, D.; Chidlow, A.; De Propris, L. Exploring factors influencing manufacturing home-shoring strategies: Insights from three diverse geographical regions. J. Int. Bus. Policy 2025, 8, 53–79. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  33. Su, X.; Zhao, S.; Li, W.; Fan, W. Geopolitical risks and resilience strategies in driving investment in clean energy infrastructure along the Belt and Road Initiative. Int. Rev. Econ. Financ. 2025, 104, 104611. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  34. Essuman, D.; Owusu-Yirenkyi, D.; Afloe, W.T.; Donbesuur, F. Leveraging foreign diversification to build firm resilience: A conditional process perspective. J. Int. Manag. 2023, 29, 101090. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  35. Bednarski, L.; Roscoe, S.; Blome, C.; Schleper, M.C. Geopolitical disruptions in global supply chains: A state-of-the-art literature review. Prod. Plan. Control 2025, 36, 536–562. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  36. Aiyar, S.; Chen, J.; Ebeke, C.H.; Garcia-Saltos, R.; Gudmundsson, T.; Ilyina, A.; Kangur, A.; Kunaratskul, T.; Rodriguez, S.L.; Ruta, M.; et al. Geo-Economic Fragmentation and The Future of Multilateralism; IMF Staff Discussion Notes; International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, USA, 2023; Volume 2023, p. A001. Available online: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/sdn/2023/english/sdnea2023001.pdf (accessed on 4 December 2025).
  37. Grover, A.; Vézina, P.L. Geopolitical Fragmentation and Friendshoring Evidence from Project-Level Foreign Investment Data; Policy Research Working Paper; World Bank Group, International Finance Corporation: Washington, DC, USA, 2025; Available online: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0083881b-2ca1-4745-b4e3-4637dc66459d/content (accessed on 9 November 2025).
  38. Habibi, F.; Chakrabortty, R.K.; Abbasi, A.; Ho, W. Building resilient closed-loop supply chains: Resilience enablers and diversified sourcing under global disruptions. Int. J. Prod. Res. 2026, 64, 192–219. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  39. Hurrell, A. Geopolitics and global economic governance. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 2024, 40, 220–233. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  40. Hover, R.; Buchenrieder, G.; Sokolsky, J. Economic interdependence and the likelihood of war—A systematic literature review. Cogent Soc. Sci. 2025, 11, 2488114. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  41. Aggarwal, V.K.; Reddie, A.W. Searching for global equilibrium: How new economic statecraft undermines international institutions. Asia Glob. Econ. 2024, 4, 100076. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  42. Attinasi, M.G.; Mancini, M.; Boeckelmann, L.; Giordano, C.; Meunier, B.; Panon, L.; de Almeida, A.; Balteanu, I.; Banbura, M.; Bobeica, E.; et al. Navigating a Fragmenting Global Trading System: Insights for Central Banks; ECB Occasional Paper; European Central Bank: Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 2024; Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5065237 (accessed on 9 November 2025). [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  43. Bednarski, L.; Subramanian, N.; Roscoe, S.; Blome, C. Geopolitical rivalry over strategically important industries: Understanding the effects on global supply chain design. Prod. Plan. Control. 2025, 36, 1–23. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  44. Ghazalian, P.L. Globalization and the Fallout of the COVID-19 Pandemic. World 2025, 6, 4. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  45. Snidal, D.; Hale, T.; Jones, E.; Mertens, C.; Milewicz, K. The power of the “weak” and international organizations. Rev. Int. Organ. 2024, 19, 385–409. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  46. Milesi-Ferretti, G.M.; Wessel, D. Is the Global Financial System Fracturing Under Geopolitical Pressure? Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, USA, 2025; Available online: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-global-financial-system-fracturing-under-geopolitical-pressure/ (accessed on 18 December 2025).
  47. Pan, S.C.; Hu, T.S.; You, J.X.; Chang, S.L. Characteristics and influencing factors of economic resilience in industrial parks. Heliyon 2023, 9, e14812. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
  48. de Sousa Filho, J.F.; Santos, G.F.D.; de Santana Ribeiro, L.C.; de Cerqueira, R.B.; Lima, L.L. Global value chains and intra-BRICs trade in value-added. J. Gov. Econ. 2024, 16, 100127. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  49. Berg, A. Europe and The Global Economic Order; Policy Brief; Centre for European Reform: London, UK, 2025; Available online: https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2025/europe-and-global-economic-order (accessed on 22 October 2025).
  50. Eurostat. Glossary: Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). 2025. Available online: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=542901 (accessed on 22 October 2025).
  51. Loungani, P.; Razin, A. How beneficial is foreign direct investment for developing countries? Financ. Dev. 2001, 38, 6–9. [Google Scholar]
  52. Mustafa, F.; Mordi, C.; Elamer, A.A. The role of foreign direct investment and environmental taxation in promoting renewable energy sustainability. J. Clean. Prod. 2025, 505, 145515. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  53. Estevão, M.; Director, M.; Economist, C.; Fortun, J.; Economist, S. Capital Flows in an Age of Fragmentation; IIF Capital Flows Report; Institute of International Finance: Washington, DC, USA, 2025; Available online: https://www.iif.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=W9JFSHrl3Lo%3d&portalid&_cldee=jyUaZJT_cMQpH9Gg-B0QuODuvPoev4jHs2k_erQXlAF-vBo8Ethxfv6oyC-ltti9&recipientid=contact-40555d6ae7f0e81180d102bfc0a80172-3bf1e80f81db412aae7b44a0e6d09441&esid=2f7ed01f-c051-f011-877a-000d3a9886ab (accessed on 9 October 2025).
  54. Kawai, M. From the Chiang Mai Initiative to an Asian Monetary Fund; ADBI Working Paper; Asian Development Bank Institute: Tokyo, Japan, 2015; Available online: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/160056/adbi-wp527.pdf (accessed on 10 September 2025).
  55. Sangita, S. India’s exports through the lens of diversification. In Changing the Indian Economy: Renewal, Reform and Revival; Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2018; pp. 21–35. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  56. Afonso, A.; Alves, J.; Menescal, L.; Monteiro, S. Determinants of Trade Partner Concentration: An Analysis for European Countries; CESifo Working Paper; Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research: Munich, Germany, 2024; Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5046307 (accessed on 10 September 2025). [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  57. Chawla, I.; Kumar, N. FDI, international trade and global value chains (GVCs): India’s GVC participation, position and value capture. Asia Glob. Econ. 2023, 3, 100071. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  58. Shimbov, B.; Éltető, A.; Alguacil, M. Global value chain participation and the technology structure of exports: Experience from the Central and Southeast European countries. J. Appl. Econ. 2025, 28, 2564968. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  59. OECD. Measuring Foreign Direct Investment. 2025. Available online: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/foreign-direct-investment-fdi.html (accessed on 4 December 2025).
  60. Pagliari, M.S.; Hannan, S.A. The Volatility of Capital Flows in Emerging Markets: Measures and Determinants; IMF Working Paper; International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, USA, 2017; Available online: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2017/wp1741.pdf (accessed on 10 September 2025).
  61. Wu, J.; Zahoor, N.; Khan, Z.; Meyer, M. The effects of inward FDI communities on the research and development intensity of emerging market locally domiciled firms: Partial foreign ownership as a contingency. J. Bus. Res. 2023, 156, 113487. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  62. McKinsey & Company. Beyond the Headlines: How Trade Agreements Are Reshaping Business. 2025. Available online: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/geopolitics/our-insights/beyond-the-headlines-how-trade-agreements-are-reshaping-business (accessed on 4 December 2025).
  63. Hersi, A.A.; Alasow, A.A.; Omar, M.M. Economic integration and trade performance: Assessing the effectiveness of the East African Community as a trade bloc. Cogent Econ. Financ. 2025, 13, 2516712. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  64. Mistura, F.; Roulet, C. The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Do Statutory Restrictions Matter? OECD Working Papers on International Investment; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2019. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  65. Feo-Valero, M.; Botella-Andreu, A.; Martínez-Moya, J.; Pallardó-López, V.J.; Requena-Silvente, F.; Sala-Garrido, R. Exploring supply chain and regional resilience through the analysis of the transport dimension. Case Stud. Transp. Policy 2024, 16, 101216. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  66. Bista, R.B.; De, U.K. Measuring Vulnerabilities of Trade Blocs During the COVID-19 in the World. J. Econ. Integr. 2025, 40, 631–653. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  67. Rose, A.; Krausmann, E. An economic framework for the development of a resilience index for business recovery. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 2013, 5, 73–83. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  68. Anbumozhi, V.; Kalirajan, K. Building innovative, inclusive and resilient global value chains. J. Soc. Econ. Dev. 2021, 23, 439–446. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
  69. Aligica, P.D.; Ciobanu, R.G. The Global Integration Dilemma: Functionalist Efficient Stability Versus Geoeconomic Vulnerability Risks. J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2025, 18, 56. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  70. European Stability Mechanism. Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Implications for the Euro Area and ASEAN+3 Regions; European Stability Mechanism: Luxembourg, 2024; Available online: https://www.esm.europa.eu/system/files/document/2024-12/ESM_DP_Geoeconomic_fragmentation.pdf (accessed on 4 December 2025).
  71. Blizkovsky, P.; De Gregorio Merino, A. ASEAN and the European Union—From strong regional integration to closer external links. AEI Insights 2016, 2, 42–62. [Google Scholar]
  72. International Monetary Fund, European Department. Euro Area Policies: Financial System Stability Assessment; IMF Staff Country Reports; International Monetary Fund, European Department: Paris, France, 2025; Volume 2025, p. 84. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  73. Heng, Y.K. A global city in an age of global risks: Singapore’s evolving discourse on vulnerability. Contemp. Southeast Asia 2013, 35, 423–446. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  74. Tan, H.H. Singapore: A Global Exemplar by So Many Resilience Measures; Factory Mutual Insurance Company: Johnston, RI, USA, 2025; Available online: https://www.fm.com/uk/insights/singapore-a-global-exemplar-by-so-many-resilience-measures (accessed on 4 December 2025).
  75. Srinivasan, K.; Leigh, L. Singapore’s Economy Rebounded on Decisive Policy Action, But Challenges Lie Ahead; International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, USA, 2022; Available online: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2022/08/05/cf-singapore-economy-rebounded-decisive-policy-action (accessed on 9 December 2025).
  76. OECD. OECD Supply Chain Resilience Review: Navigating Risks; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2025. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
  77. OECD. Economic Resilience. 2025. Available online: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/economic-resilience.html (accessed on 9 December 2025).
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Article Metrics

Citations

Article Access Statistics

Journal Statistics
Multiple requests from the same IP address are counted as one view.
The Combination of Artificial Intelligence and Formative Assessment in Teacher Education: A Systematic Review
Previous
Vincenzo Galilei and Musical Experiments
Next