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17 November 2026

11 Pages

The Role of Uncertainty in Becoming Oneself

Philosophy Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel

Abstract

While Kierkegaard’s assessment of uncertainty as playing a positive role in human existence is notably posited in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), the present article turns to another of his texts, The Sickness unto Death (1849), to demonstrate how his understanding of the tight connection between selfhood and despair also reflects an endorsement of this state. Uncertainty, according to the reading I suggest, can be evaluated as a positive aspect of human existence because it plays a crucial role in uncovering the conditions for living a meaningful life, or, rather, in Kierkegaardian terminology, the conditions for achieving the state of being healed from despair.

1. Introduction

In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard presents a detailed inquiry into despair, which he takes to be the burden of the self who fails to be the self that he or she is intended to be. And while Kierkegaard’s view is that despair—being a state of unrest and dissatisfaction—is typical of the human condition, he does allow for a different possibility by providing a “formula” for being healed from despair. It is this formula that ends the first section of The Sickness unto Death. The section begins, however, with Kierkegaard’s notoriously complicated definition of the self:
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates to itself … A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. … [This] is the human self, a relation that relates to itself and, in relating to itself, relates to another. (SKS 11, 129-130/SUD, 19-20). Kierkegaard 2023 [1849], pp. 19, 20 (hereafter SUD).
While the terminology is indeed condensed, I take it that the idea it expresses is quite straightforward. In describing the self in this way, Kierkegaard is offering an account of what it means to live as a human being, namely, what the very experience of living amounts to. As such, The Sickness unto Death can be read as a text that depicts the ‘what it is like’ to exist, as a human being, in a world that transcends human control and understanding. Such an experience, among other things, is imbued with uncertainty. Always lacking in knowledge and capacity, the question regarding the positive value of the decisions that we humans make, the courses of action that we take, and, ultimately, the value of our lives as a whole, often arises. This kind of uncertainty is part and parcel of what I take to be the question of life’s meaning.
As I understand it, Views regarding this question are divergent. In the current literature on the topic, ‘meaning’ is typically understood to be a further value (alongside values such as happiness and morality) that makes for a good life. Accordingly, often the aim is to formulate the conditions needed to acquire this value. Roughly speaking, some hold an objective view, claiming these conditions to be applicable to all; some hold a subjective view, claiming them to be dependent on the pro-attitudes of each subject; and some hold a “hybrid” view, in which meaning is understood to arise “when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness” ([1], p. 8. For an overview of central positions in the field, see [2]). My own approach to the question regarding life’s meaning, however, is somewhat different and cannot be easily discussed in these terms. Accordingly, I will not engage here with prevailing positions in the field, as they are less relevant for the present discussion.
As I understand it, when asking about the meaning of life, the individual asking this question is primarily concerned with his or her relation to their own life. That is, I postulate that this question is ultimately a personal (as opposed to a general) one and betrays one’s need to both judge and experience one’s life as good. Referring in the present article only to the latter, I suggest that experiencing life as good is the phenomenological content of the state of being healed from despair. Here it should be emphasized that by “experiencing life as good” I do not mean experiencing life as pleasing, namely, as characterized by one feeling happy or content. Rather, I refer to the more complex state of experiencing life as being good and desirable, namely, as valuable (even at times when life is not pleasing and one does not feel happy or content). Hence, although Kierkegaard does not formulate his inquiry in these terms, I suggest that there is a case for understanding the state of being healed from despair as equivalent to finding what it is that one is seeking, when seeking the meaning of life.
Accordingly, my aim in this article is to set forth the conditions for achieving the state of being healed—and thus the conditions for living a meaningful life. To do so, I pay specific attention to a central element of human experience that seems to threaten one’s experience of life as good: uncertainty (over attaining goodness). Interestingly, we will see that Kierkegaard’s analysis implies that uncertainty is in fact a vital—hence positive—component in the ongoing process of healing from despair. Now, the positive role that uncertainty plays in the good life was already discussed by Kierkegaard in his 1846 Concluding Unscientific Postscript-being, as it is, a part of the subjective relation to the truth, which is a major concern of Kierkegaard in that work. As opposed to the truth of logic and science, for which attaining certainty is indeed the model, the state of “objective uncertainty” is, for Kierkegaard, the only possible relation to the truth of faith (and, relatedly, of love and morality). For recent illuminating discussions regarding the positive role of uncertainty as being integral to the subjective relation to the truth, see, for example, [3], chapter 9; [4,5,6,7,8,9]. However, I suggest that his analysis of selfhood and despair in the Sickness unto Death (1849) brings to light a further constructive aspect of the state of uncertainty.
Given that for Kierkegaard both the state of despair and the state of healing from it are tightly connected to being ‘a self,’ a good place to begin our inquiry is to clarify Kierkegaard’s conception of being a ‘self.’ We will do so by focusing on his definition of the self as he presents it in the first section of the Sickness unto Death. Within Kierkegaard’s highly challenging corpus, The Sickness unto Death stands out as particularly complicated. Accordingly, there are scholarly disagreements regarding different aspects of the text and competing interpretations of Kierkegaard’s analysis of both selfhood and despair. In presenting here my own interpretation of these ideas, my aim is not to defend it against alternative readings—this I do elsewhere (see, for example, [10], and in particular chapter 6). Rather, I wish to demonstrate how, in light of the reading that I suggest, the state of uncertainty can be evaluated as a positive aspect of the human condition and not (only) as a threat to the good life. For other perspectives on Kierkegaard’s notion of the self (and of despair), see, for example, [3,11,12], chapter 1; [13,14,15,16,17].

2. Kierkegaard’s Conception of the Self

2.1. What Does Kierkegaard Mean by the Notion ‘Self’?

First, a terminological clarification is required. When Kierkegaard refers to being ‘a self,’ he refers, in my understanding, to the possession of both an outwardly recognized identity and an inwardness. That is, to be a self is to be not just a person, but an individual, a person with a name (‘recognized identity’), and, further, being a self is to possess an ‘inner world’ composed of the individual’s thoughts, desires, feelings, memories, and so on (‘inwardness’). The two, of course, are intertwined—the ‘outward’ and the ‘inward’ strongly affect one another—and in his analysis Kierkegaard examines both. He explores one’s existence in the world as a person with a distinctive identity—say, ‘Anna,’ as distinct from ‘Kitty’—as well as one’s experience of living as Anna (rather than Kitty).
For Kierkegaard, when one fails to be oneself, one is in despair. A claim for a failure in this regard is at all sensible only under the conception—which I take Kierkegaard to hold—that one’s selfhood is given to one in a state of potential. Outwardly, this means that there are many possible versions of ‘being Anna,’ and that to the extent that Anna does not fulfil her potential to be the Anna she is intended to be, she is in despair. Inwardly, this means that every human has the potential to attain harmony in his or her inner world; namely, to be at peace with one’s reality, to have a sense of being anchored, or rooted, in the specific reality of one’s life. In other words, such an ‘inward’ harmony means that one is involved and interested in—as opposed to being detached or alienated from—whatever it is that there is in one’s life. This state of life’s affirmation is what I take experiencing life as good (i.e., valuable) to amount to. As already stated, in my view this experience is ‘what it feels like’ when one is healed from despair. And if despair is a state of failing to be oneself, it means that when healed, one succeeds in being oneself. But what is a self? This is precisely what Kierkegaard is asking, as well as answering, in the quote that opened this article. Let us examine it closely.

2.2. Kierkegaard’s Definition of the Self

Kierkegaard’s definition of the self begins with the assertion that “A human being is spirit.” I suggest treating this assertion as Kierkegaard’s presupposition for his entire thesis of selfhood, and as a key to understanding it. What does he mean, then, by “spirit”? Often one thinks about the human being as not only a physical but also a mental entity. Kierkegaard, accepting that, adds a further dimension. In his view, the human being possesses not only a (physical) body and a (mental) mind, but also, crucially, an ontological connection to God. This connection, it is important to understand, is independent of what a person knows, believes, or acknowledges; it amounts to being tied to God by virtue of being created by God and in His image. Philosophically speaking, the meaning of such an ontological connection is that there is an essential shape to ‘being human,’ and that this shape is in God’s image. That is to say that the essence of ‘being human’ is a combination of those qualities that characterize (as traditionally accepted) God: rationality, creativity, free will, and, above all, the capacity for love. It is in this sense, then, that the human being is spirit: Namely, by virtue of their ontological connection to God. We can therefore understand Kierkegaard’s claim “A human being is spirit” as stating “Humans are created in God’s image.” Accordingly, what is to follow (in the definition that Kierkegaard provides) is an elaboration of this core idea; a detailing of what it entails to be created in God’s image.
The next claim is that to be spirit—namely, to be in God’s image—is to be a self, and that the self is “a relation that relates to itself.” In what sense is a human being—an entity—“a relation”? Kierkegaard’s next claim answers this: “A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity.” Given that “a synthesis,” as Kierkegaard says, “is a relation between two terms” (SKS 11, 129/SUD, 19), then in claiming that the human being is “a relation,” Kierkegaard is in fact saying that human nature cannot be adequately accounted for without using these three pairs of related categories. To be human is to be both finite and infinite; both subject to necessity and free; both temporal and eternal. Each of these three pairs expresses the state—unique to humans—of being both limited and capable of transcending limitation. What does this mean?
A human being—say, Anna Karenina—is finite in the sense that there is an assemblage of facts that forms her identity as Anna: her physicality, age, nationality, family status, the choices she made, and so on. At the same time, Anna’s identity is not reducible to these facts, because ‘being Anna’ is also to possess an imagination and a will that allow her to transcend (even if only mentally) these facts. The same holds with regard to the necessity-possibility pair. Anna is subject to limiting necessities, but she always has the freedom to ponder what is possible for her and how it would be possible to transcend limitation. Finally, the third pair—the temporal and the eternal—also describes one’s state as both limited and transcendent. In what way?
Above I suggested that a central key to understanding Kierkegaard’s definition of the self is the theological premise that the human being is created in God’s image. Further to this, I now add the suggestion that one’s divine image is given to one in a limited, particular shape, making one not a ‘universal person’ but a person with a name: Anna. This means that her identity as ‘Anna’ emerges from a cluster of qualities, particular to her, that reflect God’s image. Now, keeping in mind that Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair as a failure to be oneself implies the conception of possessing one’s selfhood in a state of potential, I posit that ‘the eternal’ signifies one’s particularized divine image in its potential state, and ‘the temporal’ signifies its actualization into one or another version of oneself. Understood in this way, this is another manifestation of being both limited and transcendent. While, given the present version of herself, Anna is limited by being that version rather than another, the very fact of possessing a potential means that she can transcend the present version of herself and transform into a different—possibly better—one.
Talking about the human being as “a relation,” then, I take Kierkegaard to mean that being human is to be a relation between different kinds of limitations and the capacity to transcend them in different ways. However, being a self, the human being is not only a relation, but a relation that relates to itself. This is to say that Anna develops her inner world and forms her identity as Anna by virtue of understanding herself in terms of these categories and ‘negotiating’—that is, relating—between her limitations and her capacity for transcending them. That is, in defining the self as a relation that relates to itself, Kierkegaard refers to the very process of becoming oneself (i.e., self-realization). This also serves to clarify why Kierkegaard posits three different pairs of categories in order to describe the same phenomenon: I suggest that while each pair indeed describes the state of Anna as being both limited and capable of transcendence, they differ in signifying different levels of ‘becoming Anna’ and, accordingly, different levels of Anna’s self-understanding. Let me explain.
Grasping her life, and hence implicitly also herself, only by means of the finite-infinite categories is to possess the lowest awareness with regard to her role in shaping her life and herself. It is to experience and understand herself only in terms of the facts in her life (for example, being married to Karenin), and by imagining and desiring different states of affairs that transcend her present situation (for example, having an affair with Vronski). As opposed to such a passive position, the categories necessity-possibility express more agency. It is to relate to the facts in her life—and to situations that transcend them—in a way that involves her more actively. She is related to the situation and not only subjected to it; she experiences it not only through the lens of “that which befalls me” but also through the lens of her position towards that which befalls her. Namely, she relates to her life through the prism of what she can—and cannot—do. The focus moves, then, from “what the situation is” to “what is possible for me.”
Typically, these two pairs—finite and infinite, necessity and possibility—come together, with the person shifting back and forth between the more immediate and passive state (namely, understanding life through the categories of the finite and the infinite), and the more reflective and active one (namely, understanding life through the categories of necessity and possibility). The third pair, however, is not as commonly in use, since employing the categories of the temporal and the eternal requires a deeper self-understanding. In what sense?
Thinking of oneself in terms of the first two pairs is to deal only with the facts of one’s life and one’s position towards them—it is to understand oneself only by means of the contingencies of one’s life. The category of the ‘eternal,’ on the other hand, reflects an understanding of oneself as not only dependent on temporal contingencies but as possessing essence. In the same way that Anna is not contingently a person (as if she could equally be a cat), so she is not contingently Anna (as if she could equally be Kitty). This is so because ‘being Anna’ is not reducible to the contingencies in her life but is also rooted in an essence that precedes temporal existence. A further understanding of oneself would acknowledge this essence as amounting to a particular version of God’s image (as opposed, say, to rationality or universal humanism). One’s lifelong task, according to Kierkegaard, is to fulfil this potential and become the self—the particular individual—that God intends one to be.
To be a self, then, is to understand oneself—in various degrees of understanding—as both limited and capable of transcending limitations. Kierkegaard, as we have just seen, expresses this unique human state in terms of ‘a relation’ (between limitation and transcendence) ‘that relates to itself,’ namely, ‘negotiates’ between limitation and transcendence. However, this does not exhaust Kierkegaard’s definition, as a further important element is now added to the picture: “in relating to itself, [the human self] relates to another.” Now, ‘the other’ is that which is not the self. We already saw that Kierkegaard’s premise (“A human being is spirit”) entails the idea of one’s relation to the divine other, as does the category of the eternal. ‘The other,’ however, is not only the divine one. The typical human experience of relation to that who is not oneself is relating to the human other.
Thus, Kierkegaard’s definition of ‘the self’ reveals that, in his view, to be human is to necessarily maintain three sets of relationships: with oneself, with God, and with the human other. Failing in adherence to any of these three relationships—either with oneself, with God, or with the human other—necessarily affects the other two. And this is precisely the existential state that Kierkegaard terms ‘despair.’

3. Despair and Uncertainty

3.1. What Is Despair?

To begin with, it is important to understand that despair, for Kierkegaard, is not an emotional state; the criterion for judging whether one is in despair is not how one feels. This does not mean that despair does not have an affective aspect—it does, and importantly so—but it is first and foremost an ontological state. Namely, it has to do with a person’s state of being, the way he or she understands themselves and relates to the reality of their life. Keeping in mind the analysis of the self that was demonstrated above, a person—say, Anna—is in a state of despair, according to Kierkegaard, when one of two options is the case: She is in despair if she succumbs to her limitations, thus relating to herself and her life only through the categories of finitude, temporality (or contingencies), and necessity. And she is in despair if she ignores or belittles these limitations—taking them to be unreal or unimportant—thus relating to herself and her life only through the categories of infinitude, the eternal (or essence and potential), and freedom.
Further to this, the degree to which Anna is conscious of her state as being in despair is another matter. Kierkegaard distinguishes between exploring despair in its different forms, and exploring the state of mind of the despairer as she becomes conscious of herself as being in despair. Thus, while the former inquiry addresses the question of ‘what despair looks like,’ the latter addresses the question of ‘how is despair understood by the despairer.’ And that which triggers one’s consciousness of one’s state—that which awakes one’s awareness (and understanding) of oneself as being in despair—is precisely the affective side of despair, i.e., the experience of despair. Kierkegaard speaks, for example, of “an unrest, a discord, a disharmony, an anxiety” (SKS 11, 138/SUD, 30); that is, the experience of negative feelings that indicate that something is wrong. In the same way that physical symptoms—feeling physically bad—indicate the existence of a prolonged bodily sickness, so feeling emotionally bad may well be indicative of one’s prolonged state of despair.
Normally, the occasion for the experience of despair—for feeling those bad feelings that disclose that one is in a state of despair—is a painful encounter with one’s limitations; when reality is discordant with one’s understanding, desires, plans, and expectations. Indeed, there are many occasions for such an encounter. When failing to achieve something of importance, when time takes away something that one cares deeply about, when, upon achieving something one has desired passionately, it turns out to be not what one imagined, and so on. However, a particularly prevailing occasion for encountering one’s limitation—which is always present, even in times of happiness and thriving—is uncertainty, and, specifically, uncertainty over attaining goodness.

3.2. The State of Uncertainty

“In the eyes of the world … not to venture—that is prudent. And yet, by not venturing, one can so frightfully and easily lose … oneself. For if I have ventured wrongly, well then, life helps me with chastisement. But if I have not ventured at all, who will help me then?” (SKS 11, 150/SUD, 45).
“In the eyes of the world,” venturing is not recommended, and even dangerous, because it is to act without having enough knowledge to predict or plan the results of one’s actions. In other words, it is to take a risk with regard to the consequences of one’s pursuit. Venturing, then, reflects—and is rooted in—a state of uncertainty regarding the successful attainment of the good results one is hoping for. Using Kierkegaard’s distinction between possibility and probability (see SKS 11, 156-157/SUD, 53–54), we can say that to venture is not only to act within the kingdom of possibilities but, moreover, it is sometimes to act against probability. However, Kierkegaard is very explicit. Venturing—i.e., acting in the realm of the uncertain (while leaving behind the calculations of probabilities)—is crucial for becoming oneself. Why?
Kierkegaard does not recommend venturing for the sake of taking a risk, and, of course, not every risk is worth taking. His praise of venturing is, I suggest, meant to remind us that we possess a potential that enfolds the possibility for us to become a better version of ourselves, closer to the self that we are intended, by God, to be. To become that self is hard, demanding, risky, and painful work. It is much easier to stay in one’s comfort zone, as it were, to stay static and acquiesce to the familiar and (seemingly) secure. In other words, it is tempting to stay in the realm of the probable and not to venture. However, to do so is to “lose” oneself, in the sense of not becoming the self that one has the potential to be. This is so, because becoming one’s intended self is a task that one cannot succeed in without help. That is, without letting “life” guide one by means of the interactions it offers with other humans who respond to the way one acts and to the paths upon which one ventures. This help may come in the positive form of encouragement and praise, but also, and no less edifyingly, in the negative form of “chastisement,” i.e., of clarifying that one has taken the wrong path. Without venturing—when the lack of certainty (hence the fear of making mistakes) prevents one from acting—no help will come. Venturing, which is rooted in uncertainty, is therefore important because it engages us with that which is beyond ourselves, and makes available to us the help we need in order to become ourselves. Hence, uncertainty is crucial because it forces us to ‘step out’ of ourselves; a move which is necessary for becoming ourselves.
However, seeking the help of “life” is not enough—and here again uncertainty plays an important role. While we usually shrink from the unknown and the uncertain, there are situations in which uncertainty is rather welcome—or, at least, is better than certainty. If a person becomes severely ill, for example, it is preferable that the doctors be uncertain whether recovery is possible than certain that it is not. Thus, although uncertainty about attaining goodness can of course be deeply unsettling, it does leave a place for hope, that is, for the possibility that goodness will nevertheless be attained. What happens, then, if one is certain about not attaining goodness? Kierkegaard imagines a person whose worst fears come true:
“[H]e understands that, in human terms, his downfall is the most certain thing of all. … Ordinarily, a person knows nothing other than that he hopes that this or that thing, most likely, etc., will not happen to him. Then, if it happens to him, it is his downfall. … In human terms, the person of faith sees and understands his downfall (in what has befallen him or in what he has ventured), but he has faith. Therefore he does not succumb. … he has faith that for God everything is possible” (SKS 11, 154/SUD, 51, emphasis in the original).
Inasmuch as uncertainty is to lack knowledge with regard to reality and a future state of affairs, then the possibility of attaining goodness—particularly if the present state of affairs is bad—is the positive side of uncertainty. Accordingly, when human understanding and capacities lead to the dead end of certainty over the impossibility of attaining goodness—that is, when, “in human terms,” one’s downfall is certain—there is a need to widen the circle of possibilities by opening oneself to another dimension of reality. This dimension is, according to Kierkegaard, the kingdom of possibilities ruled by God. For the person of faith, possibilities are not limited to what a human being knows, understands, and is capable of. The attainment of goodness is possible even when, from a human point of view, “downfall is the most certain thing of all”—because “for God everything is possible.” Now, by opening oneself to that realm of possibilities, one also returns to the state of being uncertain. However, here the help that one needs is not available simply by venturing and letting life help, as it cannot come (at least not directly) from humans. In other words, the person of faith, in her state of uncertainty, seeks help from God.
Hence, if the former kind of uncertainty—that is, the uncertainty that is at the root of ‘venturing’ in life—opens one up to the required help coming from the human other, the latter uncertainty opens one up to the required help coming from God. Uncertainty, then, is the ‘occasion’ for taking the steps that are necessary in the lifelong journey of self-discovery, self-understanding, and self-realization. One cannot become oneself (one’s intended self) without understanding that one possesses a divinely-bestowed potential, and that this potential must be actualized by ‘negotiating’ between one’s limitedness and transcendence—an undertaking that essentially involves relationships with, and thus receiving help from, the (human and divine) other. To put it somewhat figuratively, we may say that uncertainty is like a hand that pulls one out of oneself in order to help one to become oneself. That is, as the state of uncertainty makes evident the insufficiency of oneself to oneself, it brings to the fore the human need for a relationship with another. We can therefore say that uncertainty in fact exposes the significance of relating to the others in one’s life. It is fitting, then, that one of the severest forms of despair is that of “self-enclosure.”

3.3. The Value of Uncertainty: “Self-Enclosure” as a Test Case

What does the despair of “self-enclosure” amount to? To answer this requires a short explanation of Kierkegaard’s map of despair. This map is very complex, not only because there are many forms and stages of despair, but also because Kierkegaard delineates this map from two complementary yet distinct perspectives. As stated above (see Section 3.1), one perspective is that of asking ‘what despair looks like.’ Here, the exploration is of the different forms that despair takes, when one either conceives oneself as only limited, or belittles limitations and conceives oneself as essentially transcendent. This inquiry does not take into consideration the question of whether the despairer experiences and acknowledges herself as being in despair. The second perspective, on the other hand, is precisely that of asking ‘how despair is understood by the despairer’—namely, whether, and to what degree, the despairer is conscious of her despair and understands its nature. Here the exploration is of the different degrees of despair—how well the despairer understands her own state—regardless of the form despair takes (i.e., whether it is despair of limitations or that of transcendence).
The despair of “self-enclosure” is presented as a part of the latter inquiry. In the context of this inquiry, we learn that there are two fundamental stages of despair—Kierkegaard calls them, respectively, “weak despair” and “defiance”—each of which encompasses several stages. However, defiance is rather rare, as it involves a high degree of self-understanding which, Kierkegaard holds, is not ordinarily the case for most humans. Hence, typically, a person will be situated on the spectrum of “weak despair,” which Kierkegaard characterizes as “not to will to be oneself.” This is the state of a person who, deeply unhappy about the way her life is, does not want to be the self who lives that life. On this spectrum, the most common is “despair over the earthly,” when the despairer locates the reason for her despair outside herself, i.e., in failing to achieve things of importance to her. That is, she is conscious of herself as despairing, but wrongly believes that if only things in the world were different, she would not be in despair. This finally brings us to self-enclosure.
On the spectrum of weak despair, self-enclosure is the most extreme and, accordingly, “is found less often in the world” (SKS 11, 177/SUD, 81). This kind of despair is not “over the earthly” but rather “of the eternal or over oneself,” meaning that the despairer understands that the reason for her despair is not ‘the world’ but rather herself: the self who fails to attain goodness and is too weak to endure this failure. This kind of despair is therefore “over” the despairer herself, in the sense that she is the object of her despair; and it is “of the eternal,” in the sense that she loses all hope and does not see any possibility for change; that is, she fails to conceive that for God—the eternal—“everything is possible.” Accordingly, she refuses all help that may come from the outside—human or divine. This explains why Kierkegaard terms this kind of despair “self-enclosure.” After all, this is the despair of a person who inwardly-‘inwardly’ because ‘outwardly’ she continues to be a functioning member of society (see SKS 11, 177-178/SUD, 82)-retires, thus secluding herself, from the world. That is, she refuses to share her tormented inwardness with anybody, to open up, to let someone take part in her inner world. She lives only inside herself, as it were, disconnecting her inwardness from any effect coming from the world outside. Having her life thus governed only by herself, there is indeed no place for uncertainty—but there is no place for otherness as well. By way of analogy, think of someone who prefers not to initiate a romantic relationship because, uncertain about its success, she is not willing to take the risk of getting hurt. Hence, although she indeed does not have to face uncertainty, she also does not experience love. The “self-enclosed” despairer is the extreme manifestation of this kind of taking control over one’s life at the price of narrowing down one’s world. And without the other, there is also no healing from despair.

4. The Struggle Towards Healing

To recap, at the beginning of this article I proposed that the state of perceiving one’s life as meaningful is equivalent to the state of being healed from despair and suggested that in seeking life’s meaning, what a person is seeking is, primarily, to experience their life as good (namely, as valuable). Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suppose that the state of uncertainty—particularly with regard to attaining goodness—should pose a threat to this experience. How can one experience life as good, if the endurance of goodness is uncertain? In this sense, uncertainty may seem to be in an irresolvable tension with the kind of experience that stands for a meaningful life, and thus with healing. However, relying on Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair, I suggested evaluating uncertainty as, in actuality, a rather important part of the process, in light of its power to reveal something which is crucial for one’s healing. Uncertainty, we said, exposes one’s need for help coming from ‘outside’ of oneself—both from the other people in one’s life and from God. In other words, by demonstrating this further contribution of uncertainty to the life of faith, The Sickness unto Death, as already posited, enhances the positive evaluation of uncertainty already presented in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. As a final step of this article, it is now time to ask: How do these relationships serve to constitute the experience of life as good and, thus, as living a meaningful, ‘healed’ life?
Having delineated his conception of being a self, and simultaneously tying it to the state of despair, Kierkegaard concludes the first section of The Sickness unto Death by positing the “formula” for the state of being healed from despair: “[I]n relating to itself, and in willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in [God]” (SKS 11, 130/SUD, 21). When healed, then, one is fully and truly oneself—let us call this state ‘fulfilled-selfhood,’ or ‘authenticity’—and Kierkegaard later asserts that this same state is also the state of faith. Hence, inasmuch as faith is the highest relation to God, we can say that in the state of being healed, one’s highest relation to God (faith) and one’s highest relation to oneself (authenticity) converge. Now, if we accept the idea that every human is created in a particular shape of God’s image, and that this ‘shape’ is possessed as a potential in need of actualization, then the connection between faith and authenticity is quite clear: To become who one truly is (i.e., authentically)—one’s intended self—is to comply with God’s will (in faith).
But how does one become one’s intended self? We saw that “in relating to itself [the human self] relates to another” (SKS 11, 130/SUD, 20), and this other, we said, also includes the human other. Thus, we can infer that one becomes oneself by relating not only to God but also to another person. However, not any relation will do; it must be the highest kind of relation. Such a relation, as Kierkegaard demonstrates in another of his texts, Works of Love, amounts to universal love; namely, to having every human interaction in one’s life be that of love. Thus, adhering to our humanity—by fulfilling our essence and becoming our intended selves—depends on loving universally. I elaborate on the ideal of universal love, and its cruciality for the good life, in [18].
Faith, authenticity, and universal love are therefore interrelated, so that we cannot achieve the state of being healed without appealing to all three elements. To be grounded transparently in God is to be in harmony with God’s will, with oneself, and with every given person in our lives: namely, to live in a state of rootedness and life affirmation. As suggested in Section 2.1 above, this state is what experiencing life as good amounts to. Thus, the state of being healed from despair crucially involves experiencing life as good. And if so, then in seeking the latter (in our search for life’s meaning), we should aspire to the former. And while, obviously, the state of being healed—as well as the state of living, constantly and fully, a meaningful life—is very difficult to achieve, there is much to be gained by aspiring towards it. Indeed, attaining perfect health is the goal, but the process of healing is no less important.
To conclude, in this article I claimed that The Sickness unto Death can be read as exploring the experience of being human, in a world that entails painful limitations while at the same time also allows for goodness. Succeeding in experiencing the latter through dealing with the former is, I suggested, what we have in mind when we seek ‘meaning’ to our lives. And the way to achieve this, as The Sickness unto Death demonstrates, is by adhering to our humanness—namely, to our essence as created in God’s image—throughout our lifelong journey to becoming our intended selves. However, such an adherence can be successful only when relating properly to (that is, loving) the human other. And while there are many ways to recognize the centrality of human relationships to the kind of life that we experience as good, in this article I have pointed out one specific way to acknowledge our insufficiency for ourselves: namely, the state of uncertainty. Having a lack of knowledge and capability is part of the limitations that define human nature. We can succumb to it or ignore it and, in so doing, eventually close ourselves off within a secured inwardness that is under our control, or we can venture, open ourselves up, and let ourselves receive outside help—both human and divine.
It is clear which option Kierkegaard recommends.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Acknowledgments

I thank the anonymous reviewers of this article, and in particular reviewer 2, for constructive feedback and helpful comments. Special thanks to the two editors of this volume, Genia Schönbaumsfeld and Caecilie Varslev-Pedersen, for inviting me to participate in this project and for encouraging me to carry on with it.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CUPConcluding Unscientific Postscript
SUDThe Sickness unto Death
WLWorks of Love

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