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27 August 2026

14 Pages

The Adventures of Seeing-as in Cinema: A Philosophical Investigation Between Phenomenology and Grammar

HIPHIMO, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 75231 Paris, France

Abstract

This article offers a philosophical investigation into the phenomenon of seeing-as within the experience of cinema, through a dialogue between phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s grammatical method. It seeks to question the myth of direct access to an experience independent of language and technical apparatuses, and instead proposes an analysis of the complex relations between language, perception, and human practices. The study first examines the relationship between seeing-as and intentionality, questioning the possibility of a phenomenological account of aspect perception. Although seeing-as appears close to certain analyses of form (Gestalt), particularly because of its interpretative character, cinema reveals the limits of an approach grounded solely in natural perception. The cinematic image introduces a technical, symbolic, and temporal dimension that transforms our way of seeing. Through an analysis of Rear Window, the article argues that film does not merely reproduce a perceptual experience: the apparatuses of recording and editing produce meanings of their own. Cinema thus becomes a privileged field for examining how our ways of perceiving are shaped by techniques, signs, and forms of life.

1. Introduction

The story I want to tell traces what happens to seeing-as once it is applied to the experience of watching a film. What I seek to show concerns a particular relation between grammar and the description of experience. Here, I am taking the term ‘investigation’ quite literally: as a police inquiry that seeks to establish the facts and motives of a case based on a set of evidences. At stake is the way in which experience itself functions as a sign, through marks, symbols, clues, and traces. Thus, it is the story of a crime, the murder of phenomenological analysis, and of the ensuing investigation: the search for the missing body, namely the description of how things appear to me.
There is no mystery about the prime suspect: Wittgenstein. Yet, neither the motive nor the murder weapon is immediately apparent. Put less figuratively, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s aim is not to argue that language closes in upon itself. Nor is it to seek access to a supposedly pre-linguistic domain, to what phenomenology calls the ante-predicative. Rather, the task is to inhabit the gap and correlation between language and experience: to understand how description can reach experience, and how experience, in turn, informs our linguistic practices. What is required, then, is an analysis of the double movement from experience to language and from language to experience, without reducing one to the other.
This interrelation, however, implicates a particular relationship between the grammatical method and the phenomenological method. In other words, it concerns whatever in aspect perception is akin to intentionality. Up to a certain point, the parallel holds and is even reinvigorated by the analysis of seeing-as, which allows us to question the extent to which perception is permeated by interpretation. Yet, I wish to show that the specific case of cinema relocates this confrontation onto a different terrain, one on which a strictly phenomenological analysis reaches its limits.
At first glance, the most general question that concerns me is a familiar one and may be formulated as follows: should seeing-as be understood as a form of intentionality? After a preliminary discussion of the status of phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Section 2), this question constitutes the central thread of the first half of the article (Section 3), leading us to examine the status of the figure, situated between perception and drawing (Section 4).
This classical question, however, leads me into a series of more specific investigations of an aesthetic nature, which take us somewhat off the beaten track. I begin by mapping the aesthetic uses of seeing-as in the Philosophical Investigations (Section 5). I then widen the frame and examine the status of cinema in Wittgenstein’s work (Section 6). Finally, I put this theoretical framework to work through an interpretation of Rear Window (Section 7).
In sum, this investigation is guided by two intuitions. First, aesthetic experience provides a privileged point of entry, since it is there that an excess of meaning manifests itself: a form strikes us, an emotion affects us, temporarily exceeding our available means of expression. This excess is not that of some absolutely ineffable content. Rather, it belongs to a meaning that has not yet fully taken shape. For this reason, the question of the relation between language and experience is displaced: it no longer concerns a foundation, but a dynamic of mutual adjustment.
Second, while Wittgenstein’s remarks on seeing-as undoubtedly involve a certain relation to drawing, I shall take a further step and suggest that they also invite us to consider a relation to cinema. This move will lead me to shift the terms of the inquiry itself. Film perception, I shall argue, turns out to be the crucial test case: it shows that seeing-as cannot simply be assimilated to intentionality.

2. Grammar and Phenomenology

It might be useful to recall at the outset one general issue under debate and the major opposing positions that structure it. I shall then propose a new avenue through an unconventional reading of Wittgenstein’s texts on seeing-as. During an intermediate phase of his work, particularly around 1929, Wittgenstein entertained the possibility of a phenomenological language, conceived as a means of directly designating elementary sensations. Yet the starting point of our inquiry is the fact that, in the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein explicitly abandons this project of developing a phenomenological language [1]1. More precisely, Wittgenstein reorients the phenomenological project by assigning the task of establishing the structures of appearance to grammar [2] (p. 22). In other words, he retains the philosophical aim of investigating the conditions of possibility of phenomena—including an inquiry into the possibility of mathematical physics—but relocates this aim within the domain of grammar. This shift leads him, at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, to define the object of his inquiry not as phenomena themselves, but as the possibility of phenomena, characterizing his method as grammatical ([2] (p. 17); [3], PU, §90, §94). The paradox of the notion of grammar lies in the later Wittgenstein’s attempt to conceive a form of immanent normativity: in this respect, the challenge is to think of conditions of possibility that emerge from use, rather than governing it a priori. Without diving too much into the comparison between Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches (See [4], p. 187; see also [5], p. 6; [6]), it is enough to suggest that the grammatical cannot be reduced to the transcendental, precisely because it includes a dimension grounded in experience. It is insofar as phenomenology belongs to this regime of description that it must be assimilated to grammar, whose program is likewise descriptive. This point bears directly on the way in which grammar comes to take over, simultaneously, the roles formerly assigned to phenomenology and logic in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Indeed, the failure of the project of constructing a phenomenological language is inseparable from the abandonment of logical reconstruction and the corresponding revaluation of ordinary language. Grammar determines the space of possibilities of ordinary language; it therefore constitutes a form of immanent normativity, distinct both from transcendental categories and from logical reconstruction. Whereas Kant sought to describe the a priori conditions of sensibility, and Husserl sought to trace logical forms back to pre-predicative experience [5,7,8]2, Wittgenstein moves in the opposite direction, descending from the purity of logical forms to everyday language. Yet, if grammar is henceforth to provide a means of interrogating the conditions of possibility of phenomena [3] (PU, § 90), this is because the possibilities of seeing increasingly come to be aligned with the possibilities of saying.
What is implied by the theoretical project of a grammar of the sensible is that we cannot escape this hybrid domain: what we encounter from the very beginning is experience already intertwined with language. Language games are the primary phenomena. It would no doubt be theoretically advantageous if we could arrive at a universal structure of color experience, whether physiological or transcendental. Yet, it remains to be shown by what means such a level could be reached, one that would override the cultural fact of the diversity of color perceptions and color names; and it remains equally necessary to establish the methodological warrant for discourses concerning the natural or transcendental structures of experience as it appears to us. The later Wittgenstein places increasing emphasis on the way color concepts are acquired through socialized experience, and through education in particular, and on the reciprocal fact that experience itself is woven through with these shared concepts. For example, we would find it difficult to imagine a “greenish red,” not because such a combination is ruled out by the structure of appearance itself, but because English does not ordinarily categorize shades of brown in those terms ([8], II, pp. 137–138).
Indeed, any attempt to work back to the pure framework underlying the grammatical grid is itself an abstraction. The point is not so much to deny that experience is structured as to emphasize the gap between the formal structures of experience and the conceptual structures of language. In this sense, the structures of experience do not furnish the blueprint for those of language. Not only must we abandon the myth of grounding knowledge in pure experience, but the relation between experience and language is not one of foundation at all. Thus, the private language argument deprives of its meaning any phenomenological inquiry that seeks to be foundational and claims to exploit the myth of the immediately given character of experience. More fundamentally still, to dream of a rich and highly articulated phenomenological language would be to fail to recognize that our ordinary language is entirely adequate to our descriptive needs ([2], p. 24; [9], p. 22). For Wittgenstein, phenomenological description becomes one of those philosophical myths that lead language astray. We should not attempt to speak of the structures of experience as though they were distinct from the structures of ordinary language.

3. Seeing-as and Intentionality

Yet, within Wittgenstein’s work, the question of the relation between experience and language is reopened in two ways: through a recognition of the greater diversity of our language games, and through a renewed attention to the manner in which we perceive. In this sense, it seems essential not to read the second part of Philosophical Investigations in isolation, but to view it in close connection with its context, specifically with an inquiry into the possibility of a phenomenological grammar. Wittgenstein thus raises the question of what it means to understand a painting, a drawing, a poem, or a piece of music. One might, admittedly, hesitate over the status of such experiences; nevertheless, I am inclined to think that aesthetic experience should not be regarded as an exceptional form of experience so much as an exemplary form of experience. This bears directly on the status of seeing-as: is all seeing, to some extent, a form of seeing-as, or is it essential to the grammar of seeing-as that it constitute a secondary grammar? It would seem, in fact, that one must first master the grammar of seeing before one can subsequently employ the derived grammar of seeing-as. This is, in particular, the thrust of Baz’s remarks against interpretations that generalize seeing-as and advance the notion of a continuous perception of aspects [5,7,10]3. In developing this criticism, Baz appeals to a key passage from the Philosophical Investigations; however, he quotes it only in part. It therefore seems worthwhile to reconsider the passage in its entirety:
“I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit from the first. That is to say, if asked “What’s that?” or “What do you see here?” I should have replied: “A picture-rabbit”. If I had further been asked what that was, I should have explained by pointing to all sorts of pictures of rabbits, should perhaps have pointed to real rabbits, talked about their habits, or given an imitation of them.
I should not have answered the question “What do you see here?” by saying: “Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit”. I should simply have described my perception: just as if I had said “I see a red circle over there.”—Nevertheless someone else could have said of me: “He is seeing the figure as a picture-rabbit.””
[3] (PU, pp. 204–205)
It seems to us crucial to bring out the two dimensions of this passage. It is possible that I see the duck–rabbit only as a rabbit. In that case, I cannot say that “I see it as a rabbit.” In this respect, Baz is right to maintain that the grammar of seeing-as does not apply to my experience of the figure. Yet, he passes over the end of the passage, which makes a rather different point. Although I cannot characterize my experience as one of seeing-as if I do not perceive multiple possibilities, alternatives, or layers, someone else may nevertheless say of me: he sees the figure as a rabbit. The grammar of seeing-as, then, is not confined to the first-person perspective. This point is decisive for its relation to phenomenology. Seeing-as must be understood through its dual relation to intentionality and to context. And this has direct implications for aesthetics. Wittgenstein defends the view that the network of connotations constitutive of aesthetic experience is not, strictly speaking, private: musicality, for instance, is something that is learned. It must be understood, on the one hand, as the sedimentation of particular contexts and, on the other, as a disposition toward certain utterances, images, or forms of action.
These considerations reopen the possibility of a more nuanced articulation between phenomenology and grammar. Indeed, by the 1940s Wittgenstein had developed a philosophy of psychology rich in phenomenological descriptions, and the term “phenomenology” itself reappears [2] (pp. 14, 40). This may be read as an attempt to restore a certain balance between phenomenology and grammar. From this perspective, we may return to the question: do the structures of experience prepare the way for linguistic structures? Caution is required here. Baz suggests a rapprochement between Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty on the grounds that the phenomenal world is the “text” that our various forms of language seek to translate, while also providing the background against which those attempts at translation make sense. Yet, such formulations strike us as deeply ambiguous. Everything depends on how precisely these relations of reference are characterized. We must resist the tempting confusion between the formal structures of experience and linguistic structures. Against a certain Merleau-Pontian tendency, one must insist, with Wittgenstein, that the world is not a “quasi-text”; things do not speak to us.
Conversely, does language determine perception? To a very large extent, no doubt, but not entirely. The difficulty is that concepts neither precede experience nor ever fully encompass it; yet, experience, in the proper sense of the term—not Fechner’s stimulus, not sense-data—does not precede concepts either. It therefore appears as though experience were a condition of concepts and concepts a condition of experience. Formulated in this way, the problem has all the appearances of nonsense. One must first recognize a figure in order to be able to ask the question, “What is this?” and thereby learn a word; yet, actual experience is constantly animated and informed by language, insofar as words guide attention and carve up reality. What remains necessary, however, is a more precise analysis of this mutual support of experience by language and of language by experience.

4. The Gestalt Between Perception and Drawing

To pursue this issue, we may consider a key example: the status of Gestalt, insofar as it is neither a mere sensation nor quite a concept. At first glance, its status appears crucial, in that it constitutes a point of articulation between sensation and concept. Moreover, the notion of Gestalt provides a fruitful point of entry for a dialogue with a certain strand of phenomenology [5]4. The question at stake here concerns, first and foremost, the manner in which experience presents itself. Although the issue is difficult to disentangle, it seems plausible to maintain that experience is structured by forms, figures or Gestalten that may exceed, and perhaps even precede, conceptual determination. One may perceive a triangle before being able to name it; indeed, the acquisition of the concept of a triangle may presuppose a prior form of seeing-as, cultivated through practical exercises and perceptual training. In this sense, the experience of a Gestalt appears to precede its concept.
This observation invites a reconsideration of Wittgenstein’s distinction between two uses of the verb “to see” in the Philosophical Investigations. Aspect perception stands at the threshold of phenomenology insofar as it raises the question of how things appear and, more specifically, of the intentional structure of appearance. Wittgenstein’s analyses of figures and Gestalten, such as the duck–rabbit, turn on the question whether my visual impression has in fact changed. Yet, the drawing I would make of it would remain exactly the same. The investigation of the figure therefore takes the form of a complex interplay, one side of which concerns perception and the other representation through drawing. From the outset, this engages a certain relation to the aesthetic question of representation. We must therefore ask whether this means that the drawing of the figure constitutes an incomplete description of my visual experience. Wittgenstein’s answer is no: rather, the circumstances determine whether more specific descriptions are required, and, if so, which ones. The paradox lies in the fact that the expression of an aspect-change is at once the expression of a new perception and of an unchanged perception. The example of the word Pleasure written backwards introduces the idea that, in this case, the difference at the level of seeing-as is connected with the fact that it is easier to copy the word Pleasure in its normal orientation than when it is inverted. It is thus the different practices to which the image gives rise that make the phenomenon of seeing-as manifest.
At a broader level, Wittgenstein’s discussion raises the question whether all seeing is, in some sense, seeing-as. At the level of painted or drawn images alone, it seems to us that the full implications of Wittgenstein’s analysis have not been drawn. The very choice of example immediately gives rise to a difficulty, for Wittgenstein struggles to provide an example of pure seeing that is not empty or trivial (“I see this”). We shall argue, moreover, that photography only deepens this difficulty. The same issue extends to the sudden recognition of a face, to the possibility of producing a different portrait of it, and to the question of expression, as illustrated by the example of the inverted face [3] (PU, p. 208). Is all perception a form of recognition? At first sight, this may seem contradictory, since recognition appears to presuppose an initial encounter or impression. In that respect, seeing-as would always be secondary. Yet, what, precisely, would a perception that was not also a recognition amount to? One may grant that not all perception falls under the grammar of seeing-as. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, it is cases of pure, primary seeing that appear exceptional.
Wittgenstein draws two important consequences from this analysis. First, a phenomenological grammar undermines the notion of a private or purely inner experience. In his discussion of ambiguous figures, he rejects the idea that a private object accompanies the public one, urging us instead to “get rid of the private object.” [3] (PU, p. 218) Here, the confrontation between phenomenological and grammatical approaches becomes most fruitful: on the one hand, an investigation into the structures of appearance; on the other, an analysis of grammar in context. It is by no means impossible that the two might ultimately converge. Yet, before seeking points of contact, we must first acknowledge the distance between them and resist the temptation to smooth over their differences too quickly. At the very least, any phenomenological inquiry into the relation between experience and language must take a methodological stance on the question of private experience.
Second, Wittgenstein resists both the closure of language upon itself and the reduction of perception to passive sensory reception. His introduction of aspect-blindness shows that seeing cannot be understood solely in terms of external stimuli. Painting is particularly revealing in this respect, since it makes visible differences in aspect and modes of attention that are not given as objects but as ways of seeing. This is why Wittgenstein’s analysis of aspect perception proved so important for later aesthetic theory, notably in reflections on pictorial representation. Painting thus emerges as an art capable of manifesting differences in aspect, to the point of distinguishing a genuinely loving gaze from a merely simulated one [3] (PU, p. 240). The aesthetic issue at stake here lies in the capacity to make visible nuances that are not given as objects but as ways of seeing. This is the significance of Wollheim’s analysis when he takes up Leonardo da Vinci’s remarks on the training of the painter [11]. He thereby suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of aspect perception can serve as a framework for reflecting on the nature of our relation to representations, and to painting in particular.
What Wittgenstein’s analysis of figures teaches us is that the structured character of experience is not identical with its capacity to be meaningful. The two levels should not be conflated. Certainly, the structures of experience are not reducible to the structures of language; yet neither do they determine them. Not only do linguistic structures fail to derive passively from experiential structures, but linguistic structures, in turn, actively organize experience itself. Wittgenstein rejects as misguided the attempt to bypass language in order to recover a supposedly prior experience, especially when the aim is to move beyond shared concepts in search of a so-called private experience. To be sure, one may encounter in practice structures that are not themselves linguistic; but this does not amount to a regression to conditions of possibility. In the end, what a phenomenological grammar points toward is not a reduction of figures to concepts, but rather an inquiry into the norms governing the relation between figures and concepts. From a methodological standpoint, it is doubtful that this articulation can be fruitfully approached in diachronic or foundational terms. It should instead be conceived synchronically, as the coherent articulation of heterogeneous functions.

5. Aesthetic Significance of Aspects

This articulation becomes particularly salient in the aesthetic domain. Not only can seeing-as account for the way painting presents differences in expression, but it acquires a broader significance in the analysis of photography, where it sheds light on the fact that we immediately see objects and spaces where there are, strictly speaking, only coloured surfaces [3] (PU, pp. 216, 224), an interpretation stabilized by our practices. This is where the relation between seeing and seeing-as becomes most acute. If painting and drawing may initially appear as paradigmatic sites of seeing-as, the notion extends well beyond them. Photography, and later cinema, lead to new consequences. Already in music, seeing-as becomes a form of hearing-as: one hears a sequence of bars as an introduction, grasps a tempo, or perceives a passage as being in a particular key [3] (PU, pp. 213, 220). In the literature, it involves modulations of intonation and meaning, as in the expressive reading of a poem [3] (PU, p. 225). In all these cases, aesthetic experience does not consist in gaining access to an ineffable content, but in the formation and transformation of ways of seeing and hearing. Before turning to the case of photography, which is central to our concerns, we shall briefly consider its application to music and fiction.
Wittgenstein explicitly extends the notion of seeing-as to listening: “you must hear these bars as an introduction” [3] (PU, p. 213). Likewise, the emergence of the “right tempo” or the distinction between major and minor demonstrates that musical perception is structured by aspect perceptions [3] (PU, p. 220). Such aspects may have an expressive dimension, but they may also be purely descriptive: to hear a passage as an introduction is not to project a feeling onto it but to grasp a particular organization. The notion of aspect-blindness [3] (PU, p. 224), analogous to a lack of musical ear, suggests that aesthetic experience depends upon the education of perception. Seeing-as (or hearing-as) thus becomes a condition of possibility for aesthetic judgment: without this capacity, certain forms remain inaccessible.
A second important line of analysis concerns literature, language, and fiction. Reading a poem “with feeling” transforms the experience of the sentences themselves: they “sound different,” and intonation becomes decisive [3] (PU, p. 225. Here, again, the point is not to add a subjective content but to alter the way the text is apprehended. The child’s game of seeing a box as a house [3] (PU, p. 217), or the variation in the significance of a sign according to the fiction surrounding it [3] (PU, p. 225), shows that seeing-as lies at the heart of symbolic activity. Aesthetics thus emerges as a domain in which language does not merely describe properties but directs ways of seeing and hearing (“you must see it like this” [3] (PU, p. 213)). Far from being ineffable, aesthetic experience opens up a rich discursive space capable of capturing subtle differences [3] (PU, p. 230), precisely because it rests on the articulation of perception, use, and imagination.
From our perspective, however, a particularly important issue emerges in Wittgenstein’s analysis of photography. He observes that we tend to regard a photograph as the object itself: “Perhaps the following expression would have been better: we regard the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the object itself (the man, landscape, and so on) depicted there” [3] (PU, p. 216). Yet, this transparency of the image is by no means necessary. We can imagine a different form of life in which images would not be seen in this way [3] (Ibid). Photography therefore provides an exemplary case of the manner in which a seeing-as can become simply a seeing. Moreover, photographic spatiality is itself a construction of our gaze: “There are various forms of ‘three-dimensional seeing’. The three-dimensional character of a photograph and the three-dimensional character of what we see through a stereoscope.” [3]5. The concept of seeing-as allows us to understand that visual perception is already an interpretation stabilized by practices. To see a photograph as a three-dimensional space is to have learned to read it in a particular way. Something decisive is at stake here. Our aesthetic attitude toward images depends, to some extent, upon our capacity to internalize an interpretation to the point that it ceases to appear as an interpretation at all. Attention to this case further illuminates the scope of seeing-as. Although we do not ordinarily employ the grammar of seeing-as to describe the spatiality of visual perception, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that philosophical work can profitably proceed in that direction. We take this to reveal a particular relation between aesthetics and ontology. Does the grammar of seeing-as expose the ontological question as nonsensical, or does it instead provide a way of reformulating it?

6. Watching a Movie

I now wish to apply this aesthetic dimension more specifically to the analysis of cinema. What does it mean to watch a film? What kind of reality is a film? What changes when a film unfolds in time? At first glance, cinema lies at the intersection of the lines of analysis concerning photography, music, and narrative. However, it is then necessary to examine in what sense cinema invites us to move beyond the analysis of seeing-as. Wittgenstein undertakes an inquiry into our forms of understanding, immersion, and distance with respect to cinematic images. Ultimately, in Wittgenstein’s work, cinema is never an autonomous theoretical object; rather, it functions as a device for conceptual experimentation, and especially serves to illuminate problems concerning the grammar of our perceptions [12,13,14]. His reflections on cinema can be organized around four main ideas.
A first set of remarks emphasizes that we do not merely watch a film; we can be absorbed by it. Wittgenstein describes several experiences: we follow characters “as if they were real”; we have affective reactions (fear, compassion) to what is shown; we may “enter into the film” as into a lived situation; and afterwards we may “step out of the film” and see nothing but patches of light:
“Only the intended picture reaches up to reality like a yardstick. Looked at from outside, there it is, lifeless and isolated.”—It is as if at first we looked at a picture so as to enter into it and the objects in it surrounded us like real ones; and then we stepped back, and were now outside it; we saw the frame, and the picture was a painted surface. In this way, when we intend, we are surrounded by our intention’s pictures and we are inside them. But when we step outside intention, they are mere patches on a canvas, without life and of no interest to us. When we intend, we exist among the pictures (shadows) of intention, as well as with real things. Let us imagine we are sitting in a darkened cinema and entering into the happenings in the film. Now the lights are turned on, though the film continues on the screen. But suddenly we see it “from outside” as movements of light and dark patches on a screen
[15] (p. 98)
Cinema thus reveals a general structure of experience: the same image can be lived either from within (immersion) or from without (descriptive distance). The same image presents two radically different aspects depending on whether I participate in its movement and grasp the intention that animates it, or whether I remain external to it and observe it coldly. Cinema is therefore paradigmatic insofar as it makes visible this oscillation of seeing, which is at the same time an oscillation of lived experience: being “in” a representation, an image, a sign, or seeing them as objects.
A second major theme concerns the understanding of images. Wittgenstein insists on a strong thesis: to understand an image does not consist in translating it into another language (for example, into a realist or conceptual language). In the Remarks on Colour, he suggests in particular that we understand photographs or films without mentally “correcting” them; we do not transform a film into a “realistic coloured version”; nor do we require an additional interpretation in order to “grasp” what we see:
“In the cinema we can sometimes see the events in the film as if they lay behind the screen and it were transparent, rather like a pane of glass. The glass would be taking the colour away from things and allowing only white, grey and black to come through. (Here we are not doing physics, we are regarding white and black as colours just like green and red).—We might thus think that we are here imagining a pane of glass that could be called white and transparent. And yet we are not tempted to call it that: so does the analogy with, e.g., a transparent green pane break down somewhere?”.
[16] (§ 25)
Cinema thus reveals something decisive for the philosophy of language: there exists a form of immediate yet non-interpretative understanding; to understand does not always mean to “translate into something else.” This is also suggested by the idea that an image “works” without requiring a hidden key. Cinema thus becomes a laboratory for criticising the philosophical temptation to think that understanding always consists of converting into propositions. Now, it is precisely in this context that the term phenomenology reappears in the Remarks on Colour: “There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems” [16]6. Thus phenomenology designates a problematic intermediary between logic and science, or between grammar and physics, one exemplified, in Wittgenstein’s view, by Goethe’s theory of colours [2] (pp. 14, 40). The specific status of colour in cinema should lead us to introduce a conceptual shift that Wollheim, in a form of self-critique, proposes: he suggests conceiving the aesthetic attitude toward images as seeing-in rather than seeing-as [11]. This seems particularly applicable to cinema and to the ambiguous status of reality we attribute to film. We see colorful objects in the black-and-white film, we view events in the film.
A final axis we wish to highlight concerns knowledge of others. In the psychological remarks, we recognize faces on screen; we respond to filmed emotions; we may learn from “false films” or caricatures. But cinema also brings into tension a classical problem: how do we understand others as living subjects? Wittgenstein thus imagines observing human life as if it were a film, without participation:
““Human beings sometimes think.” How did I learn what “thinking” means?—It seems I can only have learned it by living with people.—To be sure, one could imagine seeing human life in a film, or being allowed merely to observe life without participating in it. Anyone who did this would then understand human life as we understand the life of fish or even of plants. We can’t talk about the joy and sorrow, etc., of fish.”
[17] (RPP, II, p. 29)
In such a case, he says, we would understand human beings as we understand fish or plants. Cinema thus becomes a limit-experience: if we were mere spectators of human life, we would lose access to what makes human expressions “alive.” Understanding others is not a matter of mere observation, but of participation in a form of life. It is this ethical status of the spectator’s position in cinema that we would like to question further as a concluding opening. Cinema reveals an alternation between immersion and distance. It shows that understanding is not always interpretation or translation. It serves as a model for thinking intention and forms of life. It illuminates our relation to others as expressive beings. But above all, Wittgenstein uses cinema as a site for showing something more general: we constantly live between seeing images as the world, and seeing the world as images. It is this grey zone that remains to be explored.

7. Rear Window

To do so, we would like to test these few remarks against Hitchcock’s classic film, Rear Window. What is the status of this window? And what does it lead us to think about cinema? We may ask whether looking through a window is a direct perception, natural in that sense, or whether it is already a perception framed by a dispositif. To say this is immediately to call into question the possibility for phenomenology to approach cinema, or to propose its reconversion into a phenomenological grammar [18]7. Here, what reinforces this concern in Hitchcock’s staging is that the protagonist, L.B. Jefferies, is not quite a normal subject: he is immobilized by his plastered leg, he speaks on the telephone, he looks through binoculars, or, above all, through the zoom lens of his camera. Jefferies’ experience is not immediate, yet it is nonetheless truthful. The same applies to Hitchcock’s treatment of clocks, thermometers, and all these measuring devices that frame cinematic experience. Yet their status of truth is not diminished by these mediations; rather, the mechanical image stages its own power of truth. The zoom makes things more true. In this sense, the opening scene frames the narrative not through dialogue, but through a photograph, or more precisely, through Hitchcock’s staging of photographs and the broken camera itself. The photographic image is meaningful; it explains here why the hero’s leg is broken. The death of phenomenological analysis comes with the loss of the very idea of a natural perception. What we call ordinary perception is already shaped by techniques of seeing. It is the apparatus that substitutes itself for the body [18]8.
The second point I wish to highlight concerns the status of aspect perception in Rear Window. The film plays on several spatial arrangements organized around Jefferies’ room and its window. There is confinement [19,20], no doubt, but it is that of the camera obscura, into which light enters. The huis clos [21] thus gives rise to a staging of the ordinary, of everyday life, of neighbourhood quarrels heard in summer when windows are open. It is the space of the inner courtyard, a closed space in which nothing happens. It is opposed to the open space described by Jefferies to Lisa, that of the great reportage, of a life full of danger. Yet, the film reverses this opposition: something does happen in the inner courtyard. It becomes the site of events; the backstage becomes a stage. And it is cinema that shows this, for cinema simultaneously films multiple scenes, superimposes them, intersects them, edits them together. Thus, from the separation between rooms: the husband on the telephone, the wife trying to listen. There is therefore a reversal, a revelation of the event within the ordinary through cinema, which also passes through a process of narration. It is Lisa Fremont who asks Jefferies: “tell me everything you saw and what you think it means”. There is this double level of perception and interpretation. An ordinary perception, an inner courtyard, which nevertheless, when correctly interpreted, reveals a drama [18]9. The whole film is driven by this ability to see things as something else, revealing what is extraordinary in ordinary perception. A particular form of attention brings into relief figures that would otherwise go unnoticed or seem meaningless. Through this joint training of perception and interpretation, we learn to see the world in a more interesting way. One might argue that this is precisely one of cinema’s central functions. I have already shown that this interpretation is made possible by the mediation of optical devices. It is in a sense because Jefferies’ body is powerless that it is relayed by the mechanical apparatus [18]10.
There is both this theme of the body made invisible and simultaneously fixed on film. I suggest that the question of how the murderer, Lars Thorwald, made the body disappear, also refers to the question of what becomes of the filmed body. What is the ontological status of the body in cinema? It is no longer quite the body fixed by photography, analogous to a death mask. It is the image of a body whose movement bears witness to another time, analogous to a ghost [22]. This spectral presence raises the question of the reality status of what is happening [23]11. Paranoia and delirium run through the film, along with the projection of interpretation onto perception. One finds a feverish seeing-as that detaches perception from reality [23]12, alongside a more restrained seeing-in, grounded in abduction, that reads marks and symbols [18]13. In doing so, the question arises of an ethical dimension of aspects: of what in aspect perception is both a vision of value, and more specifically of the ethical scope of the cinematic spectator’s experience. This is a point often emphasized by commentators on Hitchcock. Rear Window stages the ethical question of the spectator’s position: seeing without being seen. Thus, Jefferies pulls his wheelchair back into the shadows. He asks himself: “I wonder if it’s ethical”. To the traditional theme of marriage responds the anxiety of being a Peeping Tom. This theme is that in which cinema offers us a ring of Gyges, granting us, for the duration of the film, a form of invisibility [23]. Yet, Wittgenstein’s philosophy does not lead us to abandon ethical concern; it transforms it into a form of conversion of vision [12] (pp. 64–76). Here, a further contrast with Kantianism emerges: ethics is not primarily a matter of applying moral rules, but of the capacity to see correctly what is at stake in a human situation. From this point of view, cinema presents itself as an ethical laboratory, ambiguous, no doubt, but decisive for thinking our contemporary moral condition:
“When you come out of a movie onto the street, you sometimes have the experience of seeing the street and the people as if they were on the screen and part of the plot of a movie. How come? How does one see the street and the people? I can only say: I have the fleeting thought, for example, “Perhaps this man will be a main character in the plot”. But that’s not all there is to it. Somehow my attitude toward the street and the people is like the one toward the action on the screen. Perhaps something like mild curiosity, or enjoyment.—But initially I can’t even say all that.”
[17] (RPP, p. 493)
There is thus a transfer of seeing-as from the cinema to the street. We come to see life as a film, and others as characters. In doing so, what is transformed is my attitude toward the world and toward others, in a way that most often remains imperceptible to me. The point is therefore not that we should learn to see life as a film. Rather, cinema provides a privileged context in which we acquire or refine perceptual abilities that can subsequently be brought back into our ordinary forms of life. In this respect, Rear Window is an ethical laboratory not because it substitutes spectatorship for participation, but because it trains a mode of attention that finds its proper fulfilment in ordinary life. The stakes of seeing-as therefore extend beyond artistic appreciation and reach into ordinary life. In other words, the implications of this analysis are not merely aesthetic but also ethical.

8. Conclusions

I have proposed a detective inquiry into the adventures of aspect perception in cinema. Its guiding thread has been the relation between grammar and phenomenology. In other words, one could describe it as the murder of phenomenology by Wittgenstein, and its replacement by something that merely takes its place while passing itself off as phenomenology: the grammar of psychological language (like, in Rear Window, the woman seen with the murderer at the station, whom one takes to be his wife, but who is not).
I have first sought to clarify the motives of the crime: namely, the abandonment of the project of grounding linguistic forms in a univocal description of the sensible given. I then showed that this very abandonment opens up the possibility of a reconciliation, and examined what brings seeing-as closer to intentionality, and more specifically to a certain phenomenological analysis of form (Gestalt). Yet, this reconciliation ultimately fails, and there is indeed both murder and replacement. Phenomenology is abandoned insofar as it seems able to unfold only on the terrain of so-called natural perception; as soon as it leaves this ground, it is like a fish out of water. And it is replaced by an alternative modality, because Wittgenstein’s analysis of form leads rather to the view that perception is always already permeated by techniques whose full significance emerges only within practical contexts.
Therefore, we had to pursue the investigation on the terrain of signs and technique, that is to say, within the grey zone of visual techniques. Here, the aesthetic stakes of seeing-as become decisive. The notion makes it possible to think not only the spatial constitution of visual space, but also the development of our capacities for musical listening, or the ability to read a text with the right intonation. Above all, the status of photographic and cinematic images deepens the question of the ontology of artworks, and the extent to which grammar can illuminate, or even take over from, ontological inquiry.
The analysis of film perception situates us on a terrain where we see movement as if it were unfolding before us, within a suspended temporality in which the past is made present. Rather than seeing movement as past, we should say that we see a past movement in its present image. Of course, I do not claim to exhaust the analysis of Rear Window, but I have sought to bring out three main points. First, it is important to take seriously the idea that the film has a meaning in itself, one that is already constituted prior to any interpretation: the recording apparatus and editing process produce a form of signification that cannot be grasped through a phenomenological analysis of expression. Second, the status of this technical relay is admittedly ambiguous; yet, there is not only the destruction or covering-over of living meanings, but also the production of effective meanings that cannot be accounted for solely in terms of the intertwining of flesh and world. All the ambiguity lies in the fact that the perception of a film takes place within a frame: this frame can be understood either as what isolates it from forms of life, or as an image-game. Third, this kind of perception is far from anecdotal. Our perception of the world is far from natural perception; it is continuously overlaid and disrupted by technical, virtual, and audiovisual images and signs. What is at stake is the reality of images, and a way of learning to see the world in images rather than seeing the world as an image.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

1
“A proposition is completely logically analysed if its grammar is made completely clear: no matter what idiom it may be written or expressed in. I do not now have phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language. That is, if we so to speak describe the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience. Each time I say that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented. A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language. Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories.” (PR, §1).
2
We are dealing with intersecting philosophical itineraries which nonetheless converge upon life itself—whether as Lebenswelt or Lebensform. Baz ([5], p. 19) further suggests that the notion of forms of life marks a profound point of agreement with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Moreover, concerning the possibility of a grammatical reconsideration of phenomenological propositions, see Mulhall’s treatment of Heidegger and his positioning of Heidegger vis-à-vis Wittgenstein ([7], ch. 5, pp. 123 ff).
3
(Baz [5], p. 26): For Strawson and Mulhall, the fact that Wittgenstein focuses on the dawning of aspects was merely an over-emphasis. ([7], p. 43; [10], p. 93).
4
In particular, for the reception of Gestalt psychology in Merleau-Ponty (see Baz [5], pp. 7, 35).
5
(PU, p. 212). However, it is worth noticing that the German term refers to spatiality (Räumlichkeit or räumlichen Sehen) rather than three-dimensionality.
6
RC, I, §53 (repeated in III, p. 248).
7
«Ce que la phénoménologie érige en norme, c’est la perception naturelle et ses conditions. Or, ces conditions, ce sont des coordonnées existentielles qui définissent un ancrage du sujet percevant dans le monde, un être au monde, une ouverture au monde qui va s’exprimer dans le célèbre « toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose». Dès lors, le mouvement perçu ou fait, doit se comprendre, non pas certes au sens d’une forme intelligible (Idée) qui s’actualiserait dans une matière, mais d’une forme sensible (Gestalt) qui organise le champ perceptif en fonction d’une conscience intentionnelle en situation. Or, le cinéma a beau nous approcher ou nous éloigner des choses, il supprime l’ancrage du sujet autant que l’horizon du monde, si bien qu’il substitue un savoir implicite et une intentionnalité seconde aux conditions de la perception naturelle.» (Deleuze [18], p. 84).
8
Deleuze ([18], p. 271) clearly illustrates Hitchcock’s opposition to the Actors Studio: his insistence that the actor perform as simply as possible, guided by the camera rather than dialogue, explains why the protagonist of Rear Window has a broken leg: “que l’acteur agisse le plus simplement, la caméra se chargeant du reste. Ce reste, c’est l’essentiel ou la relation mentale. C’est la caméra, et non pas un dialogue, qui explique pourquoi le héros de fenêtre sur cour a la jambe cassée (photos de voiture de cours, dans sa chambre, appareil photo brisé).”
9
Deleuze ([18], p. 24): “L’image ne se donne pas seulement à voir. Elle est visible autant que lisible.”. See also 270: “Chez Hicthcock, les actions, les affections, les perceptions, tout est une interprétation, du début jusqu’à la fin”.
10
Deleuze ([18], p. 276): “Le héros de Fenêtre sur cour accède à l’image mentale, non pas simplement parce qu’il est photographe, mais parce qu’il est dans un état d’impuissance motrice: il est réduit en qq sorte à une situation optique pure. S’il est vrai qu’une des nouveautés dH était d’impliquer le spectateur ds le film, ne fallait-il pas que les personnages eux-mêmes, d’une manière plus ou moins évidente, fussent assimilables à des spectateurs ? Mais alors (…) l’image mentale serait moins un accomplissement de l’image action, et des autres images, qu’une remise en question de leur nature et de leur statut. Bien plus, c’est toute l’image-mouvement qui serait mise en question, par la rupture des liens sensori-moteurs, dans tel ou tel personnage. Ce que Hitchcock avait voulu éviter, une crise de l’image traditionnelle au cinéma, arriverait pourtant à la suite d’Hitchcock, et en partie par l’intermédiaire de ses innovations.”
11
This question is central to Cavell [23], who shows that when we look at a photograph, we see things that are not present, and emphasizes the importance of automatism in the act of taking a photograph.
12
Cavell [23] also highlights the magical dimension of cinema.
13
Deleuze ([18], p. 274) shows that Hitchcock introduced the mental image into cinema. However, he points out, it has often been noted that the detective plays only a minor, secondary role, and that clues are of little importance. On the other hand, Hitchcock creates original signs: marks (the yellow flowers) and symbols (the wedding ring).

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