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31 May 2026

14 Pages

A Critique of Hobbes’s Mechanical Materialism and Its Principle of Motion

Research Center of Humanities and Medicine, Zunyi Medical University, Zunyi 563000, China

Abstract

This paper examines the essence and dilemmas of Hobbes’s mechanical materialism, which posits that all things—God, the soul, and the mind—are bodies subject to mechanical laws. Rejecting metaphysical assumptions, Hobbes emphasizes the absoluteness of bodies over appearances, insisting that all knowledge originates from sensory experience. A central issue in his philosophy is the nature of motion: if every movement requires an external cause, what initiates the first? While Hobbes dismisses the concept of a self-moved mover as incoherent, his appeal to agnostic theology introduces contradictions. To resolve this, he proposes the concept of endeavor (conatus) as the fundamental principle of motion, but it remains insufficient to explain motion’s origin fully. Nevertheless, Hobbes’s philosophical framework offers a materialist perspective for understanding the world, revealing how mechanical processes serve as the foundation for comprehending reality.

1. Introduction

Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy offers a unique and ambitious attempt to construct a comprehensive materialist worldview grounded in mechanical principles. His major works—De Corpore, De Homine, and De Cive—form a coherent system that extends from natural philosophy to political theory. While Hobbes is often studied for his political philosophy, his metaphysical views on the nature of bodies and motion are equally crucial, offering a radical departure from Aristotelian and dualist traditions. Central to Hobbes’s thought is the rejection of metaphysical assumptions about self-causing agents, as he insists that every motion must be driven by external causes. This stance, however, raises significant challenges: if all motion requires an external force, what explains the first movement in the universe? To address these challenges, Hobbes introduces conatus—an imperceptible inner motion—as the principle underlying all change. Yet, his materialism remains entangled in contradictions. His rejection of a self-moved mover seems incompatible with his occasional recourse to divine causality, exposing tensions between his strict determinism and his attempts to explain the origins of motion. These tensions highlight the broader philosophical dilemma of grounding causality within a purely material framework. This paper examines Hobbes’s effort to build a coherent materialist system through the concepts of body and motion. It explores both the philosophical strength and limitations of conatus as a foundational principle, critically reflecting on the unresolved tensions within Hobbes’s attempt to explain causality from a mechanistic perspective. This problem should be situated within the broader context of early modern natural philosophy and metaphysics. In the seventeenth century, the decline of Aristotelian-scholastic physics and the rise of the new mathematical sciences compelled philosophers to reconsider the relation between body, motion, causality, and the first principle of nature. Hobbes’s mechanical materialism was developed within this intellectual transformation, alongside Galileo’s mechanics, Descartes’ dualist mechanism, Gassendi’s atomism, Spinoza’s monism, and Leibniz’s critique of purely mechanical explanations. The critique of Hobbes’s principle of motion therefore belongs not only to the history of materialism, but also to a wider debate concerning whether matter itself can explain motion, life, perception, and agency without appealing to immaterial forms, souls, or final causes.

2. The Construction of Separated Metaphysics

Hobbes’s metaphysics is a kind of separated metaphysics. It begins with the ‘hypothesis of the destruction of the world’, where Hobbes once said, ‘In the teaching natural philosophy, I cannot begin better (as I have already shewn) than from privation; that is, from feigning the world to be aonihilated’ ([1], p. 91). This hypothesis of the destruction of the world is crucial to the construction of Hobbes’s metaphysics. Here several questions arise: if the world is destroyed (except for the thinking subject), what remains in the world? Or, what can still be reasoned about? Or, what is there left to be named for the sake of reasoning? ([1], p. 91).
In Hobbes’s view, from this hypothesis of world destruction, it follows that the world and thought must be separated. He believes that our perceptions of the world’s colors, sounds, shapes, movements, etc., will enter into our memory and imagination before the world is destroyed. Even if the world were destroyed, these memories and imaginations would still exist. This is one aspect; on the other hand, beyond what the previous world left to the subject, the subject will no longer receive any further material for thought from external sources.
Based on this hypothesis, when returning to our present world, Hobbes reaches an important conclusion: ‘though all things be still remaining in the world, yet we compute nothing but our own phantasms’ ([1], p. 92). This conclusion separates objective things from subjective judgments. Objective things exist in reality, and all subjective judgments stem from our sense of objective things. Sense is the starting point of all knowledge, and intellective judgments detached from sense are impossible. This is why Hobbes is often labeled an empiricist. However, when we represent these perceptions, they are already detached from the things themselves. What we represent is not the essence of the things but rather our subjective imagination.
Some might argue: how does this differ from Berkeley’s notion that ‘to be is to be perceived’? After all, all forms of appearance are merely our subjective ideas, and since appearances still exist after the world is destroyed, that means ideas exist whether matter does or not. In fact, Hobbes and Berkeley are diametrically opposed in this regard. Berkeley follows a path of subjective idealism, denying the real existence of things, whereas Hobbes turns towards materialism. Hobbes acknowledges the separation between appearance and the world, but he does not regard subjective ideas as real. On the contrary, for Hobbes, the material world is what truly exists. The ideas of the subject are all derived from the material world.
Hobbes asserts that knowledge originates from sense, emphasizing that ‘We must begin with sense. If it indeed be sufficiently accepted and familiar that there is nothing in the human intellect that was not previously in the sense’ ([2], p. 364), and that ‘The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception in a man’s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.’ ([3], p. 9). Sense is also the foundation of imagination, which Hobbes defines as nothing more than a decayed or weakened sense in the absence of the object. The diversity of sense allows us to represent objects, and ‘it is simultaneously the condition for awareness of the world and awareness of oneself’ ([4], p. 25). Sense is a premise for all knowledge, and, unlike Berkeley’s concept of ideas, for Hobbes, sense forms the basis for the separation of appearance from things. Zarka argues that ‘the concept of appearance is to divide sense and things into completely heterogeneous entities in Hobbes’s ([4], p. 32). Appearance is no longer the point of contact between external objects and the senses, but rather the dividing line where external things stop. During the process of appearance, the subject inserts subjective imagination and preferences, and the real objective thing is projected into a different image. For Hobbes, this is never a restoration of the essence of the thing: ‘appearance is nothing more than an imagination or fiction created by a sensing subject, which, in itself, is opposed to things and Being’ ([4], p. 33). Heidegger, in his critique of Hobbes, also accurately points out Hobbes’s basic position: ‘Hobbes stresses in a completely one-sided way that being true is a determination of the proposition, and that we speak of true things merely figuratively’ ([5], p. 33). So, although external things exert pressure and cause appearance, the appearance itself, as a subjective accidentality, is no longer identical to the external thing. This contradicts Aristotle’s view that appearance and being are identical, and it means that the process by which the subject represents the world is a process of separation from it, which is a hallmark of Hobbes’s metaphysics.
On this basis, Hobbes’s concept of space also exhibits characteristics of separation: ‘Space is an image of something simply existing outside the mind; that is to say, space is an image in which we do not consider other accidents, but only its manifestation outside of us’ ([1], p. 93). In Thomas White’s DE MUNDO examined, Hobbes said that ‘What we call the concept of space (SPACE) is, in reality, imagined space, because it is only a mental image, which is what all people refer to as space’ ([2], p. 41). Space is imagined because it is not already filled; it is only something that can be filled. This potentiality to be filled demonstrates the separateness of bodies and space. When we remove an object, the space does not disappear but is instead filled by another object. According to the nature of motion, nothing can eternally occupy a single space, and the appearance of objects in space is fluid. This fluidity allows us to imagine the existence of space. Hobbes emphasizes this point in Thomas White’s DE MUNDO examined: ‘It is obvious that, by its action on the organs of sight, any visible object produces a certain image or conceit of itself when we register some object we have seen’ ([2], p. 39). Space appears as an image or imagination of a body. When the body moves and another occupies its space, the space we imagine is merely the next body. The existence of space seems to depend on the appearance of the body, but in fact, it is not determined by the body; it is solely dependent on our ideas. The spatial attributes of bodies are obtained through imagination. The separation of space from the body further highlights the material nature of body. We are able to know things because we can construct an imagined space based on sensory responses. Hence, objective things such as stones, houses, and trees can all become bodies in imagined space. When we conceive of the spatiality of things, we are actually attributing them a real spatial property, which is their extension. This is the foundation for understanding things: bodies that possess conceivable spatial properties can be known, while those that do not remain beyond our comprehension. In this way, Hobbes also addresses one of his theological questions. God is beyond human comprehension because we cannot obtain an imagined space for God. This is crucial for Hobbes’s moral philosophy because, as an incomprehensible God, we cannot fathom His perfect goodness; we can only know that God is the first reason of the world, so that, for Hobbes, even the concept of evil can be rationally ascribed to God.
In Hobbes’s metaphysics, the concept of time is also separated from bodies. Time is the idea of a body’s continuous transition from one space to another. This idea exists in the subject’s appearance, not within the thing itself. Hobbes emphasizes that his view of time is similar to Aristotle’s, who believed that time is the number of motion in respect of before and after, and it is continuous. Hobbes defines time as ‘an image of before and after in motion’ ([1], p. 94; [2], p. 339). Throughout the history of philosophy, many philosophers have considered motion as the reference and source of time. Aristotle and Hobbes have similar viewpoints. They are entirely different from Augustine and Kant, who reject the notion that time originates from the subject. Hobbes certainly does not deny that we, as subjects, can imagine the passage of time, but this imagination ‘merely projects images of movement from our memory onto those moments that have not been perceived’ ([6], p. 88). As Hobbes emphasizes, apart from the motion of bodies, we have no way of perceiving time. To measure time, we must observe the motion of celestial bodies or other objects. However, Hobbes argues that both the past and future do not exist, and the present is only a fleeting moment, so ‘time is nothing but imagination’ ([2], p. 339). He believes that any discrepancy between his view and Aristotle’s might lie in whether Aristotle considered the number of motions to be something. Hobbes stresses that, even if time comes from the movement of bodies, it is separate from them. Time is not a body; it is merely a product of the subject’s imagination.
The separative characteristics of Hobbes’s metaphysics lead him to split the world from thought. What people appear is significantly different from the essence of things, and the two fundamental elements of philosophy—time and space—are also subjective imaginings. Appearances themselves are insufficient to reveal the truth of being because appearances are subjective appearances that divide us from the essence of things. Through this separative metaphysics, Hobbes establishes the absoluteness of bodies.

3. The Essence of Hobbes’s Mechanical Materialism

Hobbes’s thoughts on materialism originate from his critique of Descartes. Hobbes and Descartes lived during the same period, and most scholars regard Descartes as the inaugurator of modern philosophy, as he sought to construct philosophy through a scientific approach, elevating it to the level of scientific argumentation and thus avoiding the long-standing problem of philosophical dogmatism. Descartes found the foundation of subject philosophy in the fact ‘I cannot doubt that I am doubting’, leading to his famous dictum: ‘I think, therefore I am’. Hegel, a key figure in subject philosophy, remarked in Lectures on the History of Philosophy that, with this discovery, philosophy had finally found solid ground in the midst of an ocean. Not only did Descartes attempt to reconstruct the foundation of philosophy, but many philosophers of the time were also contemplating how to integrate new science with philosophy. The certainty of knowledge brought by the new sciences had a profound impact on the people of the time, making philosophers acutely aware of the crisis facing philosophy.
Within this context, Hobbes’s materialism should be understood as one radical version of early modern mechanical philosophy. While Descartes retained a dualistic distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, Hobbes sought to eliminate such dualism by reducing all entities, including mind, soul, and even God, to bodies and their motions. This radicalization of mechanism made Hobbes’s system philosophically powerful, but it also made the problem of motion more pressing. If everything is body, and if body is defined through extension and motion, then the explanation of motion becomes the central test of the coherence of Hobbes’s entire system.
This contrast with Descartes becomes clearer when Hobbes’s philosophy is placed within the broader context of early modern science. Like Descartes, Hobbes was deeply influenced by the new scientific worldview represented by Copernicus, Galileo, and other natural philosophers of the period. He also sought to reconstruct philosophy according to scientific and demonstrative principles. Yet, although his methodological ambition resembled Descartes’, his philosophical conclusions diverged sharply from Cartesian dualism. This difference is especially evident in Hobbes’s objections to Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. In the Third Set of Objections and Replies, Hobbes challenges Descartes’ account of thinking substance and uses this critique to clarify his own materialist position. For example, Hobbes wrote in his objections: ‘What I want to add is that we have no concept of substance. The concept of substance, insofar as it is the subject of accidents and change, is established solely through reasoning. It is not something that we can conceive of, nor does it present any concept to us’ ([7], p. 20).
Hobbes’s view on substance is consistent with his idea of separated metaphysics. Additionally, in Descartes’ philosophy, although he begins with ‘I cannot doubt that I am doubting,’ his argument is that everything exists because of God. While Hobbes also acknowledges the existence of God, he directly expresses existence in terms of bodies: existence itself is self-evident. Hobbes asserts that we cannot conceive of a person existing without a body or a world. The priority of bodies lies in their eternality—they cannot be destroyed. In this regard, Hobbes is aligned with classical atomism. The concept of a body is foundational in Hobbes’s philosophy: ‘It is so fundamental that it points to other concepts, such as space, time, number, parts, and wholes’ ([8], p. 4). According to Hobbes’s notion of separated metaphysics, the body is absolute, and Hobbes denies the immaterial nature of the mind. He argues that what is called the mind is actually material—similar to wind or moving air ([3], p. 262). The reason we lack a clear understanding of the mind is that its movements are so minute that they are difficult to observe.
So why is the world composed of bodies? In Hobbes’s epistemology, all knowledge must begin with sense, and the importance of sense leads Hobbes to realize the significance of space and movement. Hence, he asserts, ‘ens and body are the same’ ([2], p. 311), because substance is any entity that occupies space, or can be measured by length, width, and height. In his view, it is impossible to imagine a substance without form; an immaterial substance is inconceivable ([9], p. 399). Therefore, Hobbes reaches the famous materialist conclusion: ‘The world (I mean not the earth only, that denominates the lovers of it worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body, is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the universe, is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the universe.’ ([3], pp. 446–447).
It is necessary to clarify here the relation between Hobbes’s corporealism and his materialism. Strictly speaking, Hobbes’s own ontology is formulated primarily in terms of body or corpus rather than matter in the later philosophical sense. This distinction is important because, as Duncan notes, Hobbes is often “standardly described as a materialist,” yet the precise meaning and scope of this materialism remain open to interpretation, especially in relation to his doctrine of body ([10], p. 437). To exist, for Hobbes, is to be a body, that is, to have extension, magnitude, and spatial existence. In this sense, Hobbes’s position may be more precisely described as corporealism. Springborg similarly argues that Hobbes’s project should be understood in terms of corporealism, and she shows that this corporealism commits Hobbes to the view that the universe is body and that what is not body is not in the universe ([11], pp. 903, 909, 911). However, this corporealism also provides the ontological basis of his materialism, because Hobbes denies the existence of incorporeal substance and treats mind, soul, God, and human action as explicable through bodies and their motions. Therefore, when this paper uses the term “mechanical materialism,” it does not mean to ignore Hobbes’s corporealist vocabulary. Rather, it refers to the combination of Hobbes’s corporealist ontology with his mechanistic account of motion, causality, perception, and human behavior. In this broader sense, Hobbes’s materialism can be understood as a materialist ontology combined with a mechanistic psychology and a theory of matter in motion ([12], p. 814).
In De Mundo, Hobbes also states that ‘the universe is an aggregation of bodies’ ([2], p. 318). Even in Hobbes’s view, God is also a body, just an incomprehensible one. In Leviathan, chapter 34, Hobbes discusses God’s need to satisfy the spatial properties of a body. The Old Testament begins with God’s creative act described as follows: ‘The earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters’ [13]. Hobbes interprets this to mean ‘Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is motion attributed to God, and consequently place, which are intelligible only of bodies, and not of substances incorporeal; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is body’ ([3], p. 262).
God’s spatial property is, in fact, the property of extension, so God is also a body. In conclusion, Hobbes is consistently a materialist, even in religious belief. He is a materialist theist, meaning that even his belief in God is based on the concept of a material body. Some scholars have argued that ‘Hobbes uses the concept of body to replace Descartes’ concept of God as the perfect being, with the concept of body containing the necessity of existence’ ([8], p. 5).
Since the world is composed of bodies, even the mind and soul are material. This implies that all things are merely products of mechanical motion. In this regard, the influence of Galileo’s natural science on Hobbes is evident. It is also worth noting that Hobbes was not the only philosopher of the time whose thoughts exhibited mechanical characteristics. Descartes, for instance, also incorporated elements of mechanism into his philosophy, but Hobbes’s expression of mechanicalism is more thorough. In the introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes presents a famous description: ‘why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer’ ([3], p. 7)?
Looking at this statement from the opposite perspective, it implies that humans, too, are like machines. This assertion is typical of the new science of the time, and Hobbes integrates the concept of mechanical materialism into his entire philosophical system. He criticizes Descartes for explaining the world in terms of an intangible, immaterial, spiritual God, whereas Hobbes himself believes that all phenomena can be explained through mechanical and material means. For things we cannot explain or do not understand, it is not because they lack necessity but because we are ignorant. As Hobbes remarks in De Mundo: ‘Hence, [I say,] all results are necessary because of their causes; consequently they seem fortuitous for no reason other than this: that we do not perceive all their causes’ ([2], p. 460). Hobbes is a prominent proponent of determinism, asserting that in a chain of motion, there must be an initial cause. This initial motion can only come from God, and when God created the world, He set in motion all that would follow. When He wound the clock of the universe, everything began its course as designed. However, this leads to a series of difficult questions: Why did God act in this way? What was God doing before creation? And as a body, how did God create other bodies? Hobbes responds by asserting, ‘Forasmuch as God Almighty is incomprehensible, it followeth that we can have no conception or image of the Deity; and consequently all his attributes signify our inability and defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature’ ([14], p. 53).
Many philosophers found the analogy of humans as machines difficult to accept. Leibniz, for instance, argued that ‘We can understand that a machine could produce the most wonderful things in the world, but never that it might perceive them’ ([15], p. 128). However, to criticize Hobbes’s mechanical materialism by resorting to a view that separates the subject from matter does not undermine his theory. After all, for Hobbes, the mind, soul, and other subjective characteristics are also material. Although it may be unsettling to regard humans as cold, unfeeling machines, this is how Hobbes’s theory depicts them. The greatest dilemma facing mechanical materialism, however, lies in the problem of motion in bodies.

4. The Dilemma of Mechanical Materialism and Hobbes’s Attempted Solution

Hobbes’s concept of the body primarily has two characteristics: extension and motion. He states that ‘the essence of a body is extension’ ([1], p. 117), where extension refers to the body’s size and its occupation of space. In Hobbes’s view, extension is an accident of bodies, ‘and size is its cause; it is an accident of the mind, and an accident of bodies outside the mind’ ([1], p. 105). In general, while the position of a body can change many times during motion, its size remains unchanged. The accidental property of extension allows us to fix the body’s position in imagined space, serving as the foundation for movement. The size and volume of a body are primitive sensations of the object, as the first steps in the appearance of light. Based on extension, the most important feature of a body is its motion. The movement of a body is defined as ‘the continuous abandonment of one position and the occupation of another’ ([1], p. 109).
Motion is an extremely important and complex concept. Hobbes discusses it in many of his works. He views motion as the fundamental property of bodies, as he emphasizes in Leviathan: ‘For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense’ ([3], p. 41). Of course, Hobbes’s consideration of motion goes beyond human movement, encompassing many different kinds of movement. It is precisely his attention to different kinds of motion that gives rise to various sciences. The study of ‘simple movements of points, lines, planes, and bodies, and their properties and consequences constitutes geometry. The study of what results when one moving body acts upon another, and what results from the movements of the parts of any body constitutes physics. And the study of “the motions of the mind” forms moral and political philosophy’ ([1], pp. 70–73).
In Hobbes’s view, all movement arises as a result of other movements: ‘when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of’ ([3], p. 10). Likewise, Hobbes stresses that when a body is in motion, if unimpeded, it will continue to move forever. In De Corpore, he emphasizes this point twice: ‘Any body in motion, if not impeded by another body, will move forever in the same way, at the same speed’ ([1], p. 205). If this is the case, then all bodies in the universe must be in motion, for the world we perceive is one of motion, and motion itself produces further motion. This concept of motion clearly stems from Galileo’s principle of inertia. It can be said that Hobbes’s concept of motion is a precise and clear explanation of Galileo’s law of inertia ([16], p. 120). However, this raises a problem: if all bodies are in motion, and the motion of a body is necessarily caused by another motion, what is the ultimate cause of motion?
In mechanical materialism, the most challenging issue is how to explain the motion of bodies. Leibniz famously criticized this, denying that matter itself could generate motion. He argued that ‘It is true that the Form or the Soul has this advantage over matter, that it is the source of action, having within itself the principle of motion or of change, in a word, το αυτοκινητον, as Plato calls it; whereas matter is simply passive, and has need of being impelled to act, agitur, ut agat’ ([17], p. 324). In Leibniz’s view, matter is inert and devoid of vitality, needing the push of a soul or form to produce motion. Within the chain of causation for motion, philosophers have often concluded that something capable of self-moved mover must exist. However, many philosophers believe that matter cannot have the property of self-motion. In response to this, Hobbes does not attempt to prove that matter can be a self-moved mover; instead, he directly denies the existence of a self-moved mover from the perspective of mechanical materialism and causal determinism.
Hobbes uses a method of reductio ad absurdum to argue his point: ‘some body S moves itself at some time tn in virtue of its having some property P. Now the argument: either S had P at the immediately prior time tn–1 or it did not. Let us consider each alternative. If S did have P at tn–1, then S moved itself at that time and not at the later time tn’ ([18], p. 316). Here, Hobbes emphasizes that as long as a cause exists, it will exert an effect. If P was not present at tn, then S would need to bring about the existence of P. However, S itself would need to bring P into existence. Thus, S would need to cause its own existence, which is impossible. Therefore, self-moved mover cannot exist.
Hobbes denies the existence of self-moved mover, which naturally raises the question: is God a self-moved mover? In Hobbes’s view, God is the cause of all things, but God is also a body. Recent scholarship has shown that this corporeal conception of God is not a marginal issue in Hobbes’s philosophy, but a central difficulty generated by his strict monistic materialism: if only bodies exist, then even God must be understood in corporeal terms; yet this position also makes Hobbes vulnerable to the charge that a corporeal God is incompatible with traditional theology ([19], p. 1). According to Hobbes’s theory, any body’s movement must be caused by another body. So, does this mean that God’s movement is also caused by something else? According to Hobbes’s theory, it is clear that God cannot possibly be a self-moved mover, as self-moved movers do not exist. However, what then causes God’s movement? God created everything and set the universe in motion, but what moved God? Here, Hobbes adopts an agnostic stance. His response to this question aligns with Christian tradition and has received considerable support, but it does not resolve the issue. From his perspective, God is incomprehensible. This means that we do not know the source of God’s creative power or his purpose. Humanity, as a limited entity, cannot comprehend the infinite God—a view consistent with Christian tradition. As for why we are certain that God is the cause of all things, Hobbes argues that this is because, in the process of reasoning, every result must have a cause, and through this reasoning, one inevitably arrives at a first cause, which people call God.
However, this explanation remains paradoxical. As Holden notes, Hobbes’s religious philosophy appears to contain a series of tensions: human reason can establish the existence of a first cause, but it cannot completely rule out an infinite regress of causes; Hobbes also says that God is a corporeal body, while denying that God is part of the world ([20], p. 2). After all, if God is the first cause, then He cannot be in motion; otherwise, He would not be the first cause—there would have to be another body causing His movement. According to Martinich, Hobbes’s theory contains contradictions in many places, and this is one of them. This is not solely Hobbes’s problem; all materialists face this dilemma. Regardless, Hobbes remains committed to his thorough mechanical theory and causal determinism, just as he firmly believes in the possibility of squaring the circle, despite the widespread criticisms of this view in the mathematical world. In summary, Hobbes’s examination of the cause of motion leads to the conclusion that all things are in motion, and the motion of any body must be caused by another.
Beyond the cause of a body’s motion, mechanical materialism also faces the challenge of explaining the principles of body movement. Since Hobbes has already denied the existence of self-moved movers, it becomes exceedingly difficult to solve the issue of the principles of motion. In many philosophers, such as Descartes and Spinoza, the distinction between spirit and matter allows for an easy explanation of the principles governing the movement of bodies. However, for Hobbes, not only does he deny the independence of the mind, but he also refers to God as a body. So, how does he resolve the issue of the principles of motion? Hobbes introduces a unique concept—endeavor (in Latin, Conatus).
What does endeavor mean? Hobbes first uses the Latin word conatus, which in Latin means striving, attempting, or undertaking. In his English texts, he uses the word endeavor. In De Corpore, Hobbes defines endeavor as follows: ‘I define ENDEAVOUR to be motion made in less space and time than can be given; that is, less than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number; that is, motion made through the length of a point, and in an instant or point of time’ ([1], p. 206). The first part of this definition is easy to understand, as endeavor itself refers to an activity aimed at increasing efficiency. However, why does Hobbes emphasize that endeavor is motion at a point? In Hobbes’s geometric concept, a point is something with extension, and thus endeavor involves motion that is not of a non-material nature. Furthermore, a point is extremely small, so the motion of endeavor involves a characteristic that is difficult to observe.
Endeavor itself is a type of motion, because each part of a motion is composed of motion. Therefore, Hobbes emphasizes that ‘conatus is therefore the same as the principle of motion’ ([2], p. 148). However, endeavor differs from ordinary motion in that ordinary motion can be perceived by the senses, while endeavor may be invisible to the naked eye. Such a concept is easily understood today in terms of modern physics, where the minute movements of molecules and atoms can only be observed with special instruments. Of course, Hobbes’s endeavor refers not only to the motion of molecules and atoms but also to the motion of the mind. Therefore, it is more subtle. In De Mundo, Hobbes suggests that ‘So conatus is nothing but an actual motion, either of the whole body that tends, or of its inner and invisible parts’ ([2], pp. 149–150). Hobbes insists that endeavor is a real motion, because, in his view, Descartes’ definition of conatus as a tendency to motion is meaningless in natural philosophy. What matters is actual motion, not tendencies.
The principle of body motion is endeavor. The conatus principle, as it has been called by scholars, signifies that bodies, including humans, strive through their own power to maintain their existence. Endeavor has two aspects: positive motion and resistance. Hobbes states, ‘I define RESISTANCE to be the endeavor of one moved body either holly or in part contrary to the endeavor of another moved body, which toucheth the same’ ([1], p. 211). He gives an example, the endeavor at the two ends of a line represents opposite endeavors, or what we would today call opposing forces. In addition to defining resistance as an opposing endeavor, Hobbes’s concept of pressure is also related to endeavor: ‘I may define what is to PRESS, I say, that of two moved bodies one presses the other, when with its endeavor it makes either all or part of the other body to go out of its place’ ([2], p. 211). The two aspects of endeavor exert pressure on each other. Whether in the form of positive or opposing endeavor, each force strives to occupy the position of the other.
Another feature of endeavor is that when only one body is moving, the first endeavor will typically follow the original trajectory of motion, ‘all endeavor tends towards that part, that is to say, in that way which is determined by the motion of the movement’ ([2], p. 215). This concept aligns with Galileo’s idea of inertia. Hobbes argues that, like straight-line and circular motion, if a body is in circular motion, its first endeavor will follow the circular motion. If there are multiple moving bodies, they will move along the trajectory determined by the collective, just as the various celestial bodies in the solar system follow the same general direction of motion as the solar system itself. In a collection of multiple moving bodies, if any individual body stops moving, the collective motion will continue along the path defined by the other bodies. According to Hobbes, endeavor is transmissive; that is, the motion of one body in space causes the displacement of others, and this displacement is not limited to the interaction of two bodies but is transmitted indefinitely: ‘seeing endeavor is motion, that which stands next in its way shall be removed, and endeavor further, and again remove that which stands next, and so infinitely’ ([1], p. 216).
The concept of endeavor is undoubtedly central to Hobbes’s philosophical system. Some scholars suggest that ‘with the conatus principle, Hobbes’s physics, psychology, and political philosophy form a unified whole’ ([21], p. 71). ‘The concept of endeavor pervades Hobbes’s philosophy, and it is particularly prominent in his treatment of natural philosophy’ ([22], p. 73). Hobbes uses the concept of endeavor many times in his discussions of physics and mathematics. As a principle of motion, endeavor can indeed be used to explain all three major branches of Hobbes’s philosophy—On Body, On Man, and On Citizen—since the motion of both natural and artificial bodies must adhere to the characteristics of endeavor.

5. A Critical Analysis of Hobbes’s Principle of Motion

Hobbes’s use of the concept of endeavor to resolve the dilemmas of mechanical materialism is highly innovative and provides a more reasonable explanation for the motion of bodies in a mechanistic framework. However, the concept of endeavor still faces some issues.
First, the problem of the origin of motion. One of the most persistent and significant criticisms leveled against Hobbes’s concept of endeavor lies in its failure to adequately address the origin of motion. Within Hobbes’s materialist framework, every instance of motion arises from prior motion; no object can move itself unless acted upon by an external force. This strict determinism follows the classical principle that ‘nothing moves unless moved by something else’. Hobbes therefore rejects the scholastic idea that a thing may be moved or produced “by itself” or by an internal active power, reducing causal explanation instead to the motion of bodies acting upon other bodies ([23], p. 187). However, this framework introduces a profound paradox: if all motion requires a prior cause, how does the first motion come into existence? Hobbes categorically rejects Aristotle’s concept of a self-moved mover—a metaphysical principle devised to explain the universe’s first cause of motion. For Aristotle, an unmoved mover was essential: a being or force that initiates motion without itself being subject to movement. Hobbes, however, regarded this idea as incompatible with his mechanistic materialism since it implied the presence of a non-material agent producing physical effects. In his effort to avoid this metaphysical implication, Hobbes insisted that all motion, including that found in living beings, originates from external causes within a closed material system.
Nonetheless, Hobbes’s explanation raises more questions than it answers, particularly concerning the original cause of motion. If every body is moved by another, what set the first body in motion? Hobbes’s occasional invocation of God as the ultimate source of motion sits awkwardly with his materialist commitments. If God is understood as a corporeal being, as Hobbes’s later theology appears to suggest, then God too seems to fall under the same principles of body and motion that govern all other entities ([19], p. 1). This view creates a theological conundrum: how can God, as a material body, serve as the origin of motion without himself being moved by another force? Scholars such as Yves Charles Zarka have identified this unresolved tension, arguing that Hobbes’s materialism fails to provide a coherent account of how motion begins. Adding further complexity to this issue are later developments in physics, particularly the theory of inertia as formulated by Galileo and Newton. Hobbes was influenced by Galileo’s insight that bodies in motion tend to remain in motion unless acted upon by an external force. Recent scholarship has therefore emphasized that Hobbes’s natural philosophy should be understood in relation to Galilean mechanics rather than merely as a continuation of Aristotelian natural philosophy ([24], p. 2) However, Hobbes did not fully assimilate this principle into his theory of endeavor. Newton’s first law of motion extends this concept by asserting that a body remains at rest, or continues in uniform straight motion, unless it is compelled to change that state by impressed forces ([25], p. 416) This eliminates the need for a continuous cause to sustain motion, thereby undermining Hobbes’s idea that endeavor explains why objects remain in motion. The result is a stark disconnect between Hobbes’s 17th-century framework and the more sophisticated mechanics developed by Newton, exposing limitations in Hobbes’s attempt to apply mechanistic principles universally. the difficulties surrounding the origin of motion, coupled with the evolution of physical theory, reveal significant gaps in Hobbes’s philosophical system. While his concept of endeavor was a bold attempt to reconcile materialism with an explanation of human and natural motion, it ultimately struggles to account for motion’s initial cause and becomes outdated in light of later scientific advancements.
Another significant problem of Hobbes’s concept of endeavor concerns the ambiguous status it occupies between empirical observation and metaphysical principle. Hobbes firmly maintained that all knowledge is derived from sensory experience, arguing that any meaningful explanation of the natural world must rest upon what can be observed through the senses. However, the notion of endeavor—an imperceptible, internal motion—raises profound doubts about whether it constitutes a tangible, observable phenomenon or simply a theoretical device meant to resolve specific philosophical problems. Hobbes conceptualized endeavor as the most rudimentary form of motion, one that occurs below the threshold of sensory detection. Since we cannot perceive it directly, endeavor assumes an abstract and almost metaphysical quality, distancing it from the empirically verifiable framework Hobbes sought to uphold. This has led critics like Juhani Pietarinen to argue that Hobbes’s endeavor aligns uncomfortably with the type of metaphysical explanations he aimed to reject. Pietarinen suggests that ‘Hobbes’s idea seems to be that inclinations or endeavours, as he called them in his later works, can-not be analyzed correctly without assuming something about the intrinsic states of bodies’ ([21], p. 76). Pitarinen employs a sentence to conclude this: ‘X endeavors to A = if X is not prevented by external causes, then X does A in virtue of its intrinsic state’ ([21], p. 76). The portrayal of endeavor as a striving force within bodies echoes earlier teleological notions of purpose or intention, which fundamentally clash with Hobbes’s commitment to a purely mechanistic, materialist worldview.
The universality of endeavor as a principle of motion has also been questioned, especially in light of advancements in modern physics. Newton’s laws of motion, as discussed earlier, provide more precise, empirically grounded explanations for how objects move. Furthermore, developments in 20th-century physics, such as quantum mechanics and relativity theory, have exposed the limitations of classical mechanics, including the mechanistic framework Hobbes embraced. Relativity theory, in particular, shows that classical mechanics requires modification when velocities are no longer negligible in relation to the speed of light ([26], p. 42). Hobbes’s concept of endeavor, crafted within the intellectual context of early modern science, lacks the explanatory power necessary to address motion across both subatomic and cosmic scales. For example, in quantum mechanics, particles do not adhere to the deterministic patterns Hobbes relied upon; rather, their behavior is governed by probabilistic uncertainties, challenging the notion that all motion arises predictably from prior causes ([27], p. 3).
Hobbes’s concept of endeavor is further complicated by his philosophical distinction between appearance and reality. According to Hobbes, sensory experience offers only an appearance of the external world, while the true nature of material bodies exists independently of perception. Slowik’s analysis of Hobbes’s theory of imaginary space shows that Hobbes treats certain objects of experience as phantasms of the mind, while still maintaining that bodies themselves exist independently of thought ([28], pp. 63, 66). This separation, which bears similarities to Descartes’ dualism, implies that the internal motion of endeavor may not correspond to any empirical evidence, rendering it more speculative than observable. Hobbes’s emphasis on the disjunction between appearance and being fosters a form of metaphysics in which the material world is considered real but remains inaccessible to human perception. In this context, endeavor functions as a conceptual bridge between sensory appearances and underlying reality, yet it is a bridge that lacks empirical validation. Adams notes that Hobbes explains perceived light by referring to bodily resistance, or endeavor, which generates the phantasm of light within the perceiver ([29], pp. 2–3). This ambiguity around endeavor highlights a fundamental tension within Hobbes’s system. On one hand, he sought to construct a purely materialist account of the universe, grounded in observable phenomena. On the other, endeavor—a central piece of his philosophy—operates more as a metaphysical postulate, underscoring the limitations of his attempt to explain motion and behavior strictly through sensory-based materialism.
Furthermore, endeavor has significant limitations when applied to human behavior. Perhaps the most significant criticism of Hobbes’s concept of endeavor lies in its application to human behavior. Hobbes’s broader philosophical project sought to explain not only the natural world but also human psychology, ethics, and politics through the same mechanistic principles. In this view, human beings, like all other bodies, are subject to the same laws of motion. Human desires, actions, and social interactions are explained as the result of internal endeavors—small, imperceptible motions that precede voluntary action.
Hobbes posits that self-preservation and self-interest are the fundamental motivators behind all human actions, serving as the primary drivers for individuals in the state of nature. Nonetheless, this interpretation of human behavior as mere mechanical responses has faced extensive criticism, especially for its failure to accommodate phenomena such as altruism, self-sacrifice, and actions that appear to run counter to self-interest. For example, the unequivocal sacrifices parents make for their offspring, instances of martyrdom, or charitable deeds that offer no immediate personal gain are challenging to reconcile with Hobbes’s perspective. Critics such as Gregory Kavka have argued that Hobbes’s concept of endeavor, when applied to human behavior, oversimplifies the complexity of human motivations. In his analysis of Hobbesian ethics, Kavka notes that Hobbes’s reduction of all human actions to self-interest fails to account for the wide range of human emotions, moral judgments, and social commitments that shape behavior ([30], pp. 76–79). Human beings often act in ways that are contrary to their immediate self-interest, whether due to moral principles, empathy, or long-term goals.
Within Hobbes’s theoretical framework, instances of seemingly irrational human behavior, which appear to contradict the principle of self-preservation, can be observed. In the state of nature, individuals might resort to retaliatory violence, despite the potential threat it poses to their own survival. The pursuit of revenge or honor may compel individuals to act against their self-interest, thereby further questioning the idea that all human actions are motivated solely by the drive to preserve oneself. These apparent inconsistencies underscore the constraints of Hobbes’s mechanistic interpretation of human behavior and imply that human motivations are shaped by a more complex array of influences, encompassing emotions, social norms, and ethical considerations.
In summary, while Hobbes’s concept of endeavor was a bold and innovative attempt to integrate human behavior into a mechanistic, materialist framework, it is not without its flaws. The unresolved question of the origin of motion, the empirical and metaphysical challenges posed by modern physics, and the complexity of human behavior all reveal the limitations of Hobbes’s theory. While endeavor provided Hobbes with a way to explain the motion of bodies and the actions of human beings without resorting to metaphysical or theological explanations, it ultimately falls short in addressing the full range of physical and psychological phenomena.

6. Conclusions

Hobbes’s mechanical materialism occupies a distinctive position in the history of modern philosophy because it attempts to construct a unified materialist account of reality, according to which all phenomena—including mind, consciousness, human action, and even theological questions—can ultimately be explained through bodies and their motions. By rejecting metaphysical dualism and reducing existence to corporeality, Hobbes offered a systematic alternative to both scholastic metaphysics and Cartesian dualism, marking an important moment in the emergence of modern materialism and the mechanistic worldview. Yet the strength of this system also gives rise to its central difficulty. If all motion must be caused by another motion, then the origin of the first motion becomes deeply problematic. Hobbes’s appeal to God as the ultimate cause does not fully resolve this difficulty, because God himself is described in corporeal terms within Hobbes’s materialist framework. The concept of conatus, or endeavor, represents Hobbes’s most important attempt to address this problem. As a minute and imperceptible form of motion, conatus allows him to explain bodily change, psychological activity, and human action within a single mechanistic framework. This concept demonstrates the originality of Hobbes’s philosophical project, but it also exposes its limits. Since conatus cannot be directly observed, it appears to conflict with Hobbes’s empiricist orientation; moreover, later developments in physics, especially Newton’s theory of inertia, weakened its explanatory necessity by showing that motion does not require such an inner principle in order to continue.
This limitation becomes even more apparent when Hobbes’s mechanical logic is applied to human behavior. By explaining human action primarily in terms of self-preservation and self-interest, Hobbes provides a powerful but reductionist account of motivation, one that struggles to explain altruism, sacrifice, moral commitment, and other forms of action that cannot be easily reduced to mechanical drives or calculations of self-interest. The problem of conatus therefore reveals not only a difficulty in Hobbes’s natural philosophy, but also a broader limitation in his attempt to explain human agency through mechanical causality alone. For this reason, the critique of Hobbes’s mechanical materialism remains philosophically significant. The critics of Hobbes did not merely expose weaknesses in his system; they helped clarify the limits of mechanistic explanation and opened later debates on matter and force, body and mind, causality and agency, determinism and freedom. Revisiting Hobbes today is therefore not only a matter of historical interpretation. It also contributes to contemporary discussions of naturalism, reductionism, embodiment, and the possibility of explaining human action within a materialist framework. The enduring value of Hobbes’s philosophy lies precisely in this tension: it offers one of the most systematic attempts to explain the world mechanically, while also revealing the conceptual difficulties that any purely mechanistic materialism must confront.

Funding

This research was funded by the Doctoral Research Start-up Fund of Zunyi Medical University, grant number FB-2025-4.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing is not applicable. No new data were created or analyzed in this study.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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