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20 June 2026

12 Pages

On the Impossibility of Dwelling in the Metaverse

Departamento de Filosofía, Lógica y Estética, Edificio FES, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Spain

Abstract

This paper examines whether genuine dwelling—understood as embodied engagement with a world that resists, endures, and exceeds human control—can occur in the metaverse. Drawing on Heidegger’s account of dwelling and Ingold’s concept of the ‘taskscape’, it argues that the metaverse is structurally unable to sustain dwelling in the full ontological sense. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, dwelling is shown to depend on friction: bodily cost, temporal irreversibility, material resistance, and exposure to mortal finitude. Second, the metaverse is interpreted as a technological and commercial project oriented toward reducing these frictions through attenuated bodily burden, reversible action, programmable environments, and artificial scarcity. Third, the paper extends the concept of the metaverse beyond immersive hardware to describe a broader condition of digitalized life in which experience becomes increasingly modifiable, personalized, and optimized. In this wider sense, the difficulty of dwelling in the metaverse is not limited to a niche technology but reveals a tendency within late-digital culture itself. The paper concludes by proposing a politics of friction: a public deliberation over which resistances are unjust and should be transformed, and which are constitutive conditions of ethical, ecological, and responsible life.

1. Introduction

The question addressed in this paper is not whether digital environments can be useful, affectively meaningful, or socially consequential. It is whether they can sustain the kind of worldly relation that dwelling names. This question matters because the metaverse has repeatedly been presented not merely as a technological tool, but as an alternative horizon of habitation: a persistent digital environment in which work, sociability, economic exchange, and cultural life might increasingly unfold [1,2,3]. In that sense, the metaverse is not simply a new interface, especially at a time when concepts such as digital natives and onlife seem increasingly descriptive of contemporary experience [4,5]. To discuss the metaverse today is to confront how reality itself is being organized and inhabited.
The term metaverse emerged in speculative fiction [1], but its contemporary significance has been shaped by corporate ambition, platform strategy, and renewed investment in immersive computing. Simone Arcagni has described the metaverse as part of a broader shift toward spatial and interactive computing rather than a single device or application [2]. Matthew Ball’s influential account similarly frames it as a persistent and shared three-dimensional internet, marked by continuity of identity, event, and economic life across digital environments [3]. Even where the corporate rhetoric of imminent transformation has recently softened—partly because of the rise in AI—the conceptual ambition remains: the metaverse names a project of synthetic world-building rather than merely an enhancement of existing media.
This project becomes philosophically significant once it is viewed through Heidegger’s distinction between dwelling and mere residence. Not every occupied place is a dwelling place, and not every form of presence in an environment amounts to genuine inhabitation [6]. Dwelling refers to a mode of relation in which human beings do not merely use spaces, but inhabit a world through care, preservation, and exposure to what exceeds them. It names not simply occupancy, but a form of worldly belonging structured by finitude, dependence, and relation to other beings [6,7].
The central claim of this paper is that the metaverse is structurally at odds with dwelling in this stronger sense. The argument does not depend on nostalgia for a pre-digital world, nor on the assumption that virtual environments are unreal in any simple sense. Nor does it deny that digital worlds can generate attachment, ritual, labor, memory, and forms of social belonging. Anthropological work on virtual worlds has shown that they can host durable communities and meaningful practices [8]. The issue, however, is whether such environments can support the ontological and ethical conditions of dwelling rather than only its simulations or partial analogues.
The paper proceeds in four stages. Section 2 reconstructs dwelling as a relation of embodied and ontological friction, drawing primarily on Heidegger and Ingold. Section 3 argues that the metaverse, in its canonical form, is oriented toward the reduction in bodily burden, temporal irreversibility, material resistance, and exposure to genuinely other beings. Section 4 extends the argument beyond immersive hardware to the broader condition of digitalized life. Section 5 concludes by proposing a politics of friction: a normative and public deliberation over which frictions might be unjust and should be transformed, and which are constitutive of ethical, ecological, and responsible life.

2. Dwelling as Friction

2.1. Heidegger and the Ontology of Dwelling

In his 1951 lecture Building Dwelling Thinking (Bauen Wohnen Denken), Heidegger argues that dwelling cannot be reduced to shelter, habitation, or residence [6]. To reside somewhere is to be physically located there; to dwell is something else altogether. It is to stand in a relation of preservation and care with a place, to remain genuinely at home in it, and to inhabit a world in such a way that beings are not reduced to mere objects of use. Buildings belong to dwellings because human beings do not first exist as self-contained subjects and only later occupy locations. Their existence is already worlded; it unfolds through relations of nearness, care, and belonging: “To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word bauen, which says that man is insofar as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine” [6] (p. 147).
Two features of Heidegger’s account are especially relevant here. First, dwelling presupposes non-mastery. Human beings inhabit a world that precedes them, exceeds them, and cannot be fully subordinated to their will. Second, dwelling is inseparable from mortality. Heidegger’s insistence that mortals dwell as mortals means that finitude is not an accidental limitation added to life from outside, but one of the conditions through which a world becomes meaningful [6,7]. This connection between dwelling and finitude already suggests why a digital environment, from which the weight of finitude is largely removed, would be uninhabitable in the relevant sense: a space one might occupy, but not a place in which one could truly dwell.
Julian Young’s reconstruction of Heidegger’s later philosophy helps clarify the point: dwelling is not merely a matter of physical settlement, nor simply a nostalgic attachment to origins, but a mode of being at home in the world through care for what appears in its own right rather than only under the aspect of use. “What needs to be emphasized is that a dwelling space is not just a region of physical space. It is, rather, an interconnected complex of natural and cultural features which adds up to the notion of place” [7] (p. 101). Such being-at-home is not achieved through mastery or total control; it depends instead on restraint, responsiveness, and a kind of guardianship that lets beings be rather than reducing them to mere resources. To belong to a place is to be committed to its ethos.
This is why modern technology matters here. In Young’s reading of Heidegger’s notion of Gestell (enframing), modernity is marked by the tendency to disclose everything as nothing but resource, thereby flattening the world into an infinitely available environment and undermining the conditions of dwelling [7] (p. 88). The world becomes fit for dwelling only where things retain their boundaries, where they are not frictionlessly available, but preserve enough alterity to solicit reciprocal care rather than one-sided command use.

2.2. Ingold: The Taskscape and the Resistance of the World

Tim Ingold’s ‘anthropology of dwelling’ develops a complementary and, in some ways, more concrete account of what genuine habitation requires. For Ingold, the standard view—that organisms first exist and then occupy a pregiven environment—inverts the actual order of things. The dwelling perspective he proposes reverses this: the world is not a container that beings inhabit; it is something that beings and world bring forth together through ongoing, skilled, embodied engagement [9] (p. 153). Walking, repairing, tending, waiting, carrying, building, and adapting are not secondary activities performed within an already given world. They are among the processes through which a world becomes habitable.
Central to this account is the concept of the taskscape: the ensemble of activities through which a community inhabits a place and, in doing so, leaves traces that both record the past and shape future engagement. “In short, the taskscape is to labour what the landscape is to land, and indeed what an ensemble of use-values is to value in general” [9] (p. 195). The taskscape is irreducibly temporal and corporeal. Tasks impose fatigue, demand patience, and develop skill over years of practice. They leave calluses on hands, wear paths into soil, and shape the posture of bodies that repeat them across seasons and generations. The world, in this account, has its own grain: to work with it requires attending to its particular resistances, textures, and rhythms, and to work against it always costs something. This is what Ingold means when he speaks of the education of attention that skilled practice entails: one learns the world by being shaped by it, by allowing its resistance to inform one’s movements and judgments.
What matters here is that such inhabitation is irreducibly resistant. Materials have grain. Paths are learned through repeated movement. Bodies are educated by fatigue, repetition, adjustment, and failure. Dwelling is thus inseparable from the experience that the world pushes back. The earth is not simply available. It demands effort, imposes delay, and shapes the beings who inhabit it. This description helps introduce the concept of friction, grounding this paper: friction is not merely an inconvenience or technical inefficiency; it is the convergence of bodily cost, temporal duration, material recalcitrance, and the need to adapt oneself to what is not fully pliable.
Ingold’s account thus makes explicit what remains implicit in Heidegger: the resistance of the world—its grain, its weight, its tendency to push back against our intentions—is not an inconvenience to be engineered away but the very medium through which genuine habitation takes place. Dwelling depends on friction because only through such resistance does a world become more than an instrument. If everything yielded immediately to preference, as in many digital environments, there would be no need for patience, skill, memory, or care. There would be no taskscape.

2.3. Synthesis: Friction as the Mark of the Real

Taken together, Heidegger and Ingold converge on a shared structure. Genuine dwelling—the kind that constitutes a home, educates a subject, and generates ethical relations—requires a frictional world: the encounter with a reality that is genuinely other than our will and our preferences. We can specify this structure along four dimensions.
The first is bodily cost: the world imposes real effort on the flesh, tires the muscles, develops skill, and leaves lasting marks. The second is temporal irreversibility: what has been done has been done; the past accumulates as genuinely past, and the weight of having-been—Heidegger’s Gewesenheit—gives depth and seriousness to present action. The third is material constraint: the world has a grain that cannot be dissolved by will; genuine scarcity, as opposed to artificial or simulated scarcity, is such that obtaining something here entails forgoing it elsewhere. The fourth is mortal finitude: we dwell as beings toward death, and so does everything we dwell with; the perishability of things—including ourselves—is what makes care possible and necessary.
This is not a romanticization of hardship, nor a defense of suffering as such. Many forms of friction are clearly unjust and should be transformed. Yet it does not follow that all resistance is dispensable. Some forms of friction are oppressive, others are constitutive. The philosophical problem is to distinguish between them. The claim advanced here is strictly ontological: a world that systematically eliminates these four dimensions is not a world in the full sense. It is a simulation of a world, one in which the possibility of dwelling, and with it the possibility of an authentic existence and responsible life, is structurally foreclosed. That is the threat the metaverse represents.

3. The Metaverse as a Frictionless Environment

3.1. The Promise of a Synthetic World

The metaverse is often described as a persistent, immersive, and interoperable digital environment in which social interaction, economic exchange, and cultural activity can be spatially organized [2,3]. This description matters because it signals an ambition that exceeds earlier forms of networked media. The metaverse is not simply a communication platform or content repository. It is presented as a habitable, world-like environment. Even if it does not currently allow bodily existence in any literal sense, it often participates in a broader techno-imaginary oriented toward overcoming bodily limitation, at times even through uploading consciousness.
To understand what the metaverse promises—and, by extension, what it systematically excludes—it is necessary to begin with the way the concept was first defined and later popularized. The word itself was coined by Neal Stephenson in his 1992 novel Snow Crash, where it names a shared virtual reality in which users appear as avatars and participate in a persistent social and economic world distinct from the physical one [1]. This science-fiction genealogy matters because, from the outset, the metaverse was imagined not simply as a tool, interface, or communications medium, but as an alternative space of habitation: a “second world” in which social interaction, status, commerce, and identity could be reconstituted in virtual form.
The commercial instantiation of this vision gained decisive momentum in the early 2020s. Tim Sweeney of Epic Games and Mark Zuckerberg of Meta publicly advanced the metaverse as a major new platform for social interaction, creation, and commerce: Epic through Fortnite as a creator-driven virtual ecosystem, and Meta through Quest and Horizon Worlds. Several of the world’s largest technology firms converged on this broader direction, albeit under different names and with different emphases: Microsoft pursued enterprise mixed reality through HoloLens and Mesh; Apple advanced Vision Pro under the banner of “spatial computing”; and Google explored adjacent experiments in immersive and three-dimensional communication, such as Glass Enterprise Edition 2 and Project Starline. Until generative artificial intelligence displaced it as the dominant technological horizon, the metaverse—or, more broadly, the ambition to build persistent and spatially organized digital environments—was among the most ambitious promises of its moment. By late 2025, this reversal had become explicit across the industry: Meta announced deep cuts to its metaverse division, Microsoft retired its dedicated Mesh application in favor of AI-integrated “Immersive Spaces” for Teams, and broader industry analyses described the original metaverse vision as having collapsed even as its components were being reabsorbed into AI-centered products [10,11,12].
The most systematic account of this broken promise is provided by Matthew Ball in The Metaverse: And How It Will Revolutionize Everything (2022), subsequently revised as The Metaverse: Building the Spatial Internet (2024) [3]. The revision of the title is itself revealing: Ball’s initial framing positioned the metaverse as an imminent revolution, while the second edition adopts a more gradualist perspective, reconceiving the metaverse as the incremental construction of a “spatial internet” in which artificial intelligence plays an increasingly central role. This shift—from revolutionary immediacy to staged construction—registers a broader modulation of the commercial promise without altering its fundamental structure.
Ball’s essay relevance is not primarily theoretical. His significance derives from his position within the technological and commercial ecosystem actively constructing the metaverse. The book alternates technical passages with accessible explanations and has become a point of reference for both builders and the wider public. Ball takes as his starting point a basic definition: the metaverse as “a shared, living, three-dimensional version of the internet” that enables continuity of identity, events, and economic life. On this premise, the metaverse is not merely a type of interface or a particular experience, but an autonomous virtual world with persistent identity, stable possessions, and shared activities. Its core technical challenge, Ball argues, is persistence [3]1: the capacity to ensure that identity, objects, and experiences remain consistent across millions of simultaneous users.
This emphasis on persistence makes visible the underlying ambition: to create a digital world that behaves, in relevant respects, like the physical world—stable, continuous, and shared—while minimizing those features of embodied life that impose cost, inefficiency, and irreversibility. It is commercial design in its most radical form: the offer of a world calibrated entirely to user preference, with the resistant features of reality—fatigue, loss, scarcity, and even death—systematically removed.
In contrast, virtual-reality pioneers entertained a far more revolutionary idea of the metaverse. For instance, in Dawn of the New Everything, Jaron Lanier discusses VR as a medium that could shape perception, cognition, and development at the deepest level. He therefore remembers to discuss with other hackers the possibility of raising his own children in a VR world so that they “would grow up in a four-dimensional world and become the best mathematicians ever” [10].
The metaverse depicted by Ball is not aimed at such speculative provocations. The corporate metaverse is structured as a persistent platform for interaction, coordination, and digital economic activity. It is thus a world distilled of friction—not because virtuality as such requires it, but because its prevailing commercial form marginalizes the slow, dependent, and ethically demanding dimensions of human existence. Its frictionlessness belongs to the economics of the metaverse’s design logic. Even when technical limitations remain—such as heavy headsets, sensory mismatch, limited haptics, latency, and cybersickness—these features are treated as barriers to adoption rather than as disclosures of what it means to bodily inhabit a digital world.

3.2. Three Axes of Frictionlessness

(a) The body without fatigue. The first axis on which the metaverse eliminates friction is the body. In immersive VR, the avatar does not sweat, does not tire, does not age. Ryan Hoover, editor of Hooked [13], has discussed how one’s avatar is an online brand that should not be allowed to ‘age’ [14]—even though, in one of those curious internet exchanges, Felix Krause’s later experiment with “continuous delivery” for his profile picture is revealing in the opposite direction: even aging in digital life must be deliberately engineered, staged, and maintained, thereby reintroducing a small measure of real-world friction into an otherwise frictionless regime of self-presentation [15].
As such, the digital body is exempt from the physical costs that, in Ingold’s account, make embodied engagement educative: it cannot develop calluses, cannot accumulate fatigue, cannot be changed by repeated exposure to the grain of a material world. The education of attention that skilled practice requires—the long, patient modification of the body through its encounters with resistant things—is severed at its root.
The problem runs deeper than it might initially appear, and its depth is inadvertently illuminated by Jaron Lanier in a comment on developing the DataGlove in the 80s. He describes the central engineering challenge of haptic interfaces in terms that are philosophically revealing:
Perhaps the most serious problem with the DataGlove was arm fatigue. Try holding your arm out without any support for a few minutes. You’ll start to notice little tremors in your arm muscles and soon after that you’ll wonder where all your strength went […] A glove interface ended up with a starring role in the film Minority Report, and the production designers spent tremendous effort making that style of virtual interaction look sustainable when it actually would have caused arm cramps […] A real design that caused a strain was used to symbolize a fictitious future world that looked supercool on the surface but also hid its cramps [16].
Lanier’s observation is a report on an engineering problem. But read philosophically, it reveals a deeper truth: body fatigue is not simply a flaw of the interface that better engineering will eventually overcome; rather, it is the body’s way of asserting its reality and its insistence on being a body rather than a cursor. This point is underscored by cybersickness (or kinetosis), the nausea associated with the misalignment between vestibular, proprioceptive, and visual signals in VR environments. The issue remains one of the major barriers to the mass adoption of immersive technologies.
For the economics of the metaverse’s design logic, it is imperative for VR to precisely minimize this assertion: to make interaction feel effortless, continuous, and consequence-free. Thus, from the standpoint of the industry, it is a problem to be solved. From the standpoint of this paper’s argument, it is philosophically significant: it is the body refusing to be deceived. The body knows—proprioceptively and vestibularly—that it is not where the eyes say it is. Cybersickness is thus a form of somatic friction that the metaverse cannot fully eliminate, because VR cannot completely subdue the body to a different reality, precisely because the body is an organism with its own orientation in the world.
(b) Infinite reversibility and the weakening of the past. The second axis of frictionlessness is temporal. One of the major attractions of digital environments is that actions can be revised, spaces reconfigured, selves cosmetically reconstructed, and histories selectively managed. This capacity is often treated as emancipatory, and in many contexts it is. It permits experimentation, play, and iterative design without the same stakes as irreversible action. Death becomes a respawn. Buildings can be demolished and rebuilt without comparable cost. Relationships can be blocked, reset, and archived. Avatars can be redesigned. Worlds can be reloaded. This reversibility is a constitutive feature of digital environments, one that their designers typically celebrate as a form of freedom.
The philosophical stakes of this reversibility are well captured by an apparently modest example. Deltarune, a video game released beginning in 2018, opens with an extended character-creation sequence in which players are invited to choose the attributes, appearance, and name of their avatar. When the sequence concludes, however, the created avatar is discarded with the message: “No one can choose who they are in this world”. The irony is sharp. In the real world, this statement is simply true: our existential condition, our body, and our history are not options selected from a menu. They are what we are, inalienably. In the digital world, by contrast, the statement reads almost as a joke, a deliberate subversion of the expectation of customization. We enter virtual spaces not to reproduce the constraints of our existence but to suspend or reconfigure them.
The metaverse user is, in this sense, structurally exempt from the full weight of their digital past: they can always reload. The ethical consequences are direct. An agent trained to expect the reversibility of action—an agent for whom consequences are always, in principle, manageable or undoable—is not thereby trained in responsibility. Responsibility, as Hans Jonas insists, requires that the agent take seriously the irreversibility of what they do: that harm cannot always be undone, that the other harmed remains harmed, and that the world bears the mark of one’s action [17]. A subject formed in environments of radical reversibility is therefore a subject whose capacity for genuine responsibility is structurally weakened.
(c) The abolition of scarcity. The third and perhaps deepest axis of frictionlessness concerns the elimination of genuine scarcity and, with it, the elimination of the genuinely other. In immersive VR, the non-human world is fully anthropocentric by design: it contains only what was placed there by human or human-designed algorithmic intention. Even where artificial scarcity is imposed, its underlying ontology differs from that of earthly materials: it is scarcity by design.
This point calls for a further distinction. The scarcity engineered into many digital platforms—freemium accounts, in-game purchases, tiered access to computational resources—might seem to reintroduce the kind of constraint whose absence this section analyzes. Subscription models for generative AI, for instance, impose usage limits that require users to plan, ration, and evaluate their actions in a manner superficially resembling the disciplines Ingold associates with skilled practice. Yet this scarcity differs in kind from the scarcity that grounds dwelling. It is not a constraint imposed by the finitude of bodies, materials, or time, but a parameter set, adjusted, and frequently suspended by its platform designers. A “free tier” subsidized to capture market share, only to be withdrawn once dominance is secured, reveals such scarcity for what it is: a variable of business strategy, not a feature of the world. Genuine scarcity is non-negotiable: a body tires regardless of preference; a material degrades regardless of demand. Designed scarcity, by contrast, is calibrated to engagement and revenue, and can be loosened or tightened at will. While it may elicit behavior that resembles care—such as budgeting tokens or in-game currency—it does not produce the orientation toward a world that genuinely exceeds and resists the self. The difference is not one of degree but of kind: the difference between a constraint the world imposes on us, and a constraint a platform imposes for us.
Digital objects do not weather, decay, or exhaust natural substrates in the same way. Their persistence is a function of computational maintenance rather than biological or geological processes. The more-than-human other—the animal that bites back, the weather that ruins plans, the forest that disorients—is absent or domesticated into the code. Co-dwelling becomes structurally impossible because there is nothing genuinely other with which to co-dwell.
Ball presents the metaverse as an economic revolution, but he is careful to note that it is not a revolution imposed by historical necessity [3]. The survival of humanity does not depend on the construction of a spatial internet. The metaverse is an option, a product, and a commercial proposition. This means that its design is not determined by genuine need but by market logic: by the imperative to maximize adoption, retention, and continued use. The friction that remains in the metaverse—the challenges, the difficulties, the costs—is calibrated with commercial precision so as to produce engagement without producing abandonment. This is a fundamentally different relationship to difficulty from the one required by genuine dwelling.

4. Extending the Concept: Digitalized Life as a Generalized Metaverse

4.1. The Metaverse Beyond Headsets

At this point, an objection becomes pressing. If the metaverse remains largely confined to immersive platforms and specialized hardware, then a philosophical critique of it might seem to address only a marginal phenomenon. But the metaverse matters not only as a device or platform: it matters as the clearest image of a broader social logic. It points toward a more general reorganization of (digital) life. Ball’s own account already suggests that the metaverse need not depend on a single interface [3], and Arcagni similarly interprets it as part of a wider shift toward spatial and interactive computing [2]. In that sense, the metaverse names less a bounded technological object than a tendency: the tendency to reorganize experience in increasingly modifiable, personalized, and friction-light ways. What the preceding analysis has shown, then, is not simply why dwelling is difficult in immersive virtual worlds, but why a wider process of digitalization may increasingly erode the conditions under which dwelling becomes possible.
Discussing the metaverse therefore connects to a broader philosophical debate, one in which oft-quoted authors such as Luciano Floridi, Evgeny Morozov, and Byung-Chul Han have all intervened. Floridi’s account of life in the infosphere situates this tendency more precisely. Digitalization increasingly reorganizes lived environments so that action becomes modifiable, measurable, and continuously mediated by informational systems [18]. The resulting condition is not simply “online” in contrast to an offline world. It is ambient. Recommendation systems, smart environments, streaming platforms, delivery infrastructures, ranking algorithms, and predictive interfaces reshape everyday life by reducing delay, friction, unpredictability, and exposure to the genuinely foreign. Morozov’s critique of technological solutionism is instructive here. The tendency of digital systems is to reframe resistance as inefficiency and complexity as a problem awaiting optimization [19]. Han, in turn, describes a cultural condition increasingly organized around positivity, immediacy, and the suppression of negativity [20]. These diagnoses point toward the same problem: a growing difficulty in enduring alterity, delay, opacity, and limit.
The metaverse should therefore be interpreted as the explicit image of a more general social logic. It is the spatialized and immersive formulation of an orientation already present in digitalized life: personalization, editability, reversibility, seamless access, and low-friction interaction. The difficulty of dwelling in the metaverse is thus not only a problem internal to virtual reality. It reveals a broader reconfiguration of what users come to expect from worlds.

4.2. A World for Dwelling, Swallowed by Digitalization

The logic of the metaverse, transplanted from immersive VR to everyday digital existence, takes three primary forms corresponding to the three axes of frictionlessness analyzed in Section 3.
The first is the reduction in effort through marginal-cost reproduction. In the digital economy, reproduction costs approach zero: a piece of music, a film, an article, or a social media post can be duplicated and distributed at negligible cost. The physical effort involved in the production and circulation of cultural goods—the effort that, in Ingold’s account, educated attention and built skill—is progressively replaced by the click. One no longer needs to go to the library, wait for a record, or travel to a concert; one clicks, and the good arrives. This is not trivially bad. Access and convenience have real value. But the systematic elimination of the effort involved in obtaining cultural goods is also the systematic elimination of certain educative frictions that such effort once entailed.
The second form is the modifiability of experience. Digital content can be edited, deleted, filtered, and optimized after the fact with an ease that has no physical equivalent. Posts can be deleted, photographs retouched, and memories algorithmically curated. The past becomes increasingly optional: one can construct a digital self-narrative from which the inconvenient, the embarrassing, and the painful have been removed. Han has analyzed this tendency under the rubric of the transparency society: a social formation in which everything must be positive, shareable, and optimizable, and in which the negativity of genuine experience—its resistance, obscurity, and capacity to wound—is systematically expelled [20]. The irreversibility of action is increasingly an opt-in feature of digital existence.
The third form is the personalization of the world. Algorithmic recommendation systems progressively eliminate the encounter with the genuinely foreign. The digital experience is already calibrated to my preferences, my history, and my predicted future choices. The serendipitous encounter with the other—the book I did not know I needed, the perspective that challenges my assumptions, the stranger who asks something of me—is replaced by the mirror of my own tastes, amplified and confirmed. Morozov diagnoses this tendency as solutionism: the tendency to reframe every human problem as a design problem to be solved by a frictionless interface, thereby foreclosing the possibility that the problem might be constitutive of something valuable [19]. The elimination of the encounter with the genuinely foreign is not merely a cultural impoverishment; it is, in Jonas’s terms, the elimination of the conditions under which genuine responsibility can be formed [17].
In this sense, the subject formed through years of experience in frictionless digital environments—where the world responds to preference, where difficulty is calibrated for engagement, and where otherness is algorithmically filtered—is a subject whose capacity for ethical exposure has been structurally weakened. Not necessarily destroyed, but weakened and retrained to expect a world that accommodates rather than a world that resists. This is not merely a psychological or cultural observation; it is an ethical one. A subject trained on frictionlessness will struggle to generate the responsive care that, for example, more-than-human ethics requires, because that care is constituted precisely by exposure to what exceeds and resists the self.
The ecological crisis makes this structural argument concrete and urgent. Climate change, biodiversity collapse, and ecosystem degradation are, among other things, the consequences of a civilization that has treated the non-human world as a resource to be optimized rather than another to be dwelt with. The metaverse, in its literal and extended forms, intensifies this tendency: it offers a world without weather, without animals that bite, without soil that must be tended, etc., a world, in short, from which the claims of the more-than-human have been engineered away. To the extent that we inhabit this world more and the physical world less, our ethical exposure to the genuinely other is progressively diminished.

4.3. Toward a Politics of Friction

What follows from this diagnosis? The conclusion is not a call to abandon digital technology. Digital technologies have genuine and substantial value, and the point is not to condemn them wholesale but to understand what they cost when deployed without ethical reflection. The conclusion is rather the proposal of a politics of friction. As argued above, resistance, harm, and otherness are not unfortunate defects of the real world that technology has to overcome. They are part of the ontological signature of a world that is genuinely other than us. Not all friction is desirable; many burdens are unjust and should be transformed. Yet the elimination of all resistance is neither possible nor normatively coherent. Some forms of friction are constitutive of dwelling and, by extension, of an ethical, ecological, and, in a general sense, good life.
This connection between friction and the good life has been widely articulated in the philosophical tradition. A useful analogy can be drawn from Rousseau’s critique of luxury in the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts. His concern was not only that luxury produces inequality, but that it reorganizes habits, expectations, and forms of valuation in ways that corrode civic and moral life [21]. The parallel with contemporary digital culture is not exact, but it is structurally suggestive. Technologies that promise to reduce burdens may also alter what subjects come to expect from the world. The danger lies not merely in comfort, but in the normalization of a world in which resistance itself comes to appear illegitimate—as hedonism and distraction quietly colonize existence.
In the same vein, Albert Borgmann anticipated this dynamic before the attention economy conquered everyday life:
The technological measures that have freed us from hunger, disease, and illiteracy have become part of the inconspicuous periphery of everyday life. The commodities that fill the center of our lives with entertainment and diversion gratify us in a passing and shallow way [22].
What Borgmann diagnosed as the displacement of genuine engagement by commodity consumption finds a particularly sharp contemporary expression in the architecture of frictionless design, where not even the resistance of a slow page load remains to remind us that the world has weight.
A politics of friction would therefore ask which resistances are unjust and which are conditions of dwelling. It would distinguish between avoidable suffering and forms of limit that make responsibility, attention, care, and co-dwelling possible. Such a politics would not reject technological mediation as such. It would instead insist that any digital future adequate to ethical and ecological life must preserve meaningful exposure to what is not fully adjustable to preference.
This is not Luddism. It is not a refusal of the future or a romanticization of past hardship. It is an ontological demand: that we remain exposed to what is genuinely beyond our control, to what can end, to what does not need us, and to what resists our preferences with a resistance not of our making. The ecological crisis is perhaps the most powerful reminder currently available that the Earth is not a metaverse. It pushes back. Its pushback does not care whether we find it convenient. And it is precisely this indifference to our convenience—this irreducible otherness—that makes the Earth not only a physical habitat but also a moral one: the only world in which we can genuinely dwell.

5. Conclusions

This paper has examined whether the metaverse can serve as a site of genuine dwelling. It has been argued that dwelling requires friction: the encounter with a world that imposes real bodily costs, accumulates irreversibly in time, constrains through genuine scarcity, and reminds us, through finitude and death, that the world is not ours. The metaverse, in its canonical technical form, systematically eliminates each dimension of this friction, offering in its place a world of frictionless desire-fulfillment, infinite reversibility, and the abolition of the genuinely other. The significance of this claim extends beyond immersive media. The metaverse is best understood as an explicit articulation of a broader social orientation already present in digitalized life, one that constitutes a structural tendency of late-digital culture. Such a disposition may be convenient, but it sits uneasily with ethical and ecological life, both of which depend on responsiveness to what exceeds human control.
The broader implication is that the question of digital life should not be framed only in terms of utility, innovation, or access. It must also be framed in terms of what it means to be human. The issue, then, is whether digital environments leave their users capable of dwelling responsibly in a world that is not theirs alone. The ecological crisis makes that question especially urgent. The Earth is not a programmable platform: it resists, withdraws, and pushes back.
The politics of friction outlined above would, institutionally, take the form of a normative intervention into the commercial logic of frictionless design: a public deliberation over which frictions to preserve, which to redistribute, and which to eliminate. These decisions cannot be left to the structural incentives of platform shareholders, for they are fundamentally social and political issues. A culture increasingly conditioned by frictionless environments may therefore find itself less capable of inhabiting the very world on which it depends. Friction, then, may be the anchor that reattaches the apparent infiniteness of digital experience to the finite human world that grounds it.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Data is contained within the article.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have helped clarify several points in this article and, above all, have helped guide my future research. I am also grateful to Professor Luca Valera for inviting me to contribute to this Special Issue, More-than-Human Ethics: Rethinking Nature, Dwelling, and Responsibility, on a topic I have found particularly engaging.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Note

1
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