Philosophies

50 pages, 1354 KiB

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Semiosis and nāmarūpa: Exploring the Early Buddhist Theory of Signs Through Cognitive Semiotics

by Federico Divino

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 93; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040093 (registering DOI) - 21 Aug 2025

This article aims to offer a comparative analysis between Buddhist thought and Peircean semiotics, situating the discussion within the framework of a Buddhist theory of signs that addresses aspects related to perceptual processes and cognitive experience. The influence of signs on cognition is [...] Read more.

This article aims to offer a comparative analysis between Buddhist thought and Peircean semiotics, situating the discussion within the framework of a Buddhist theory of signs that addresses aspects related to perceptual processes and cognitive experience. The influence of signs on cognition is what led Buddhism, from its earliest formulations, to adopt contemplative practice as a means of liberation from the effects of semiosis—an aspect that this paper hypothesizes to be represented by the nāmarūpa dyad. Following an examination of the perceptual and sensory processes underlying the functioning of nāmarūpa, the paper will analyze occurrences of this technical term and propose its semiosic functions, subsequently exploring how contemplative practice aspires to disengage from the power of signs. Full article

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29 pages, 919 KiB

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Hegel’s Souls: Aristotle, Kant, and the Climax of Life

by Antonios Kalatzis

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040092 - 16 Aug 2025

Viewed by 287

Abstract

The article aspires to delineate Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s concept of soul in post-Kantian European Philosophy. It showcases the way that Hegel fuses central aspects of Aristotle’s theory and Kant’s account of inner purposiveness in order to deliver a hierarchical account of vegetative-, [...] Read more.

The article aspires to delineate Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s concept of soul in post-Kantian European Philosophy. It showcases the way that Hegel fuses central aspects of Aristotle’s theory and Kant’s account of inner purposiveness in order to deliver a hierarchical account of vegetative-, animal-, and human organisms. The article is divided in six parts. The first part offers an introduction to the subject matter. The second part delivers an overall account of the way that Hegel reconstructs Aristotle’s general theory of the soul and fuses it with Kant’s theory of inner purposiveness. The third part highlights Hegel’s distinctive argumentative strategy for delivering a unified, atemporal account of the connection between the various natural realms, both inorganic and organic. Parts four, five and six proceed to his theory of vegetative-, animal- and human life respectively, while showcasing the underlying logic and the upshot of Hegel’s developmental account of these three kinds of life qua soul. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ancient and Medieval Theories of Soul)

11 pages, 209 KiB

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Between Uncertainty and Responsibility: A Philosophical Inquiry into Climate Change Projections

by Fernando Watson-Hernández and Isabel Guzmán-Arias

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 91; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040091 - 14 Aug 2025

Viewed by 465

Abstract

This paper explores how uncertainty in climate change projections both shapes and is shaped by key epistemic, methodological, ethical, and political concerns. Drawing on a review of key philosophical sources, it examines the relationship between scientific objectivity and the influence of social, ethical, [...] Read more.

This paper explores how uncertainty in climate change projections both shapes and is shaped by key epistemic, methodological, ethical, and political concerns. Drawing on a review of key philosophical sources, it examines the relationship between scientific objectivity and the influence of social, ethical, and political values in contexts of deep uncertainty. Authors such as Wendy Parker and Heather Douglas debate the role that social values play in the estimation and communication of scientific uncertainty, particularly when decisions carry significant ethical and political consequences. At the same time, several studies emphasize that, beyond the influence of values, there are structural limitations inherent to complex climate models that prevent uncertainty from being fully reduced. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that both evaluative judgments and technical constraints must be considered when interpreting and managing uncertainty in climate science, especially insofar as it informs collective decision-making processes. The article also examines how certain institutional practices tend to downplay uncertainty, generating biases that affect both scientific communication and public decision-making. It, therefore, explores potential solutions through more integrative approaches, such as robust modeling, risk assessments focused on low-probability but high-impact events (HILL), and collective ethical deliberation. The paper further discusses the concept of normative uncertainty, illustrated through the case of the Tempisque River water conflict, which highlights the difficulty of reconciling competing values. It concludes that, far from being eliminated, uncertainty must be managed through tools that integrate technical rationality, ethical sensitivity, and adaptive governance. Full article

22 pages, 911 KiB

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Conceptualising Programming Language Semantics

by Troy Kaighin Astarte

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 90; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040090 - 9 Aug 2025

Viewed by 304

Abstract

The semantics of programming languages tend to be discussed with high levels of formality; much of the previous research—both philosophical and historical—has investigated them from this perspective. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical and cognitive theories of metaphor and use the [...] Read more.

The semantics of programming languages tend to be discussed with high levels of formality; much of the previous research—both philosophical and historical—has investigated them from this perspective. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical and cognitive theories of metaphor and use the early work of Adriaan van Wijngaarden as a historical case study to explore the conceptual and discursive surroundings of semantics. I investigate the relationships between the texts of semantics, the abstract entities they denote, and the metaphors, analogies, and illustrative language used to accompany or explain the same. This serves to further understanding of the historical developments of work in this area, the nature of programming languages and their semantics, and the importance of the communicative methods used in dissemination and education of computer science. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Semantics and Computation)

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17 pages, 216 KiB

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Inference to the Only Explanation: The Case of the Cretaceous/Paleogene Extinction Controversies

by Keith M. Parsons

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 89; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040089 - 7 Aug 2025

Viewed by 442

Abstract

In the sciences of the deep past, it is taken for granted that the hypothesis that offers the best explanation is the best confirmed. I examine in detail the debate over the K/Pg mass extinctions that began in 1980 with the publication of [...] Read more.

In the sciences of the deep past, it is taken for granted that the hypothesis that offers the best explanation is the best confirmed. I examine in detail the debate over the K/Pg mass extinctions that began in 1980 with the publication of the paper by Alvarez et al. that proposed the impact extinction hypothesis. I summarize this debate and show how the impact hypothesis eventually achieved consensus as the best explanation. I then consider the relevance of that case study to an evaluation of the employment of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in the earth sciences. I first reject a number of the standard objections to IBE and then strongly endorse John Norton’s claim that no form of ampliative inference can receive a priori justification. Nevertheless, drawing on the case study and other instances, we may identify four “abductive virtues” that characterize many of the most successful instances of IBE, making them attractive and even compelling. Full article

18 pages, 11604 KiB

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A Philosophical Framework for Data-Driven Miscomputations

by Alessandro G. Buda, Chiara Manganini and Giuseppe Primiero

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 88; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040088 - 6 Aug 2025

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Abstract

This paper introduces a first approach to miscomputations for data-driven systems. First, we establish an ontology for data-driven learning systems and categorize various computational errors based on the Levels of Abstraction ontology. Next, we consider computational errors which are associated with users’ evaluation [...] Read more.

This paper introduces a first approach to miscomputations for data-driven systems. First, we establish an ontology for data-driven learning systems and categorize various computational errors based on the Levels of Abstraction ontology. Next, we consider computational errors which are associated with users’ evaluation and requirements and consider the user level ontology, identifying two additional types of miscomputation. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Semantics and Computation)

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23 pages, 930 KiB

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The Principle of Shared Utilization of Benefits Applied to the Development of Artificial Intelligence

by Camilo Vargas-Machado and Andrés Roncancio Bedoya

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 87; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040087 - 5 Aug 2025

Viewed by 502

Abstract

This conceptual position is based on the diagnosis that artificial intelligence (AI) accentuates existing economic and geopolitical divides in communities in the Global South, which provide data without receiving rewards. Based on bioethical precedents of fair distribution of genetic resources, it is proposed [...] Read more.

This conceptual position is based on the diagnosis that artificial intelligence (AI) accentuates existing economic and geopolitical divides in communities in the Global South, which provide data without receiving rewards. Based on bioethical precedents of fair distribution of genetic resources, it is proposed to transfer the principle of benefit-sharing to the emerging algorithmic governance in the context of AI. From this discussion, the study reveals an algorithmic concentration in the Global North. This dynamic generates political, cultural, and labor asymmetries. Regarding the methodological design, the research was qualitative, with an interpretive paradigm and an inductive method, applying documentary review and content analysis techniques. In addition, two theoretical and two analytical categories were used. As a result, six emerging categories were identified that serve as pillars of the studied principle and are capable of reversing the gaps: equity, accessibility, transparency, sustainability, participation, and cooperation. At the end of the research, it was confirmed that AI, without a solid ethical framework, concentrates benefits in dominant economies. Therefore, if this trend does not change, the Global South will become dependent, and its data will lack equitable returns. Therefore, benefit-sharing is proposed as a normative basis for fair, transparent, and participatory international governance. Full article

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23 pages, 1461 KiB

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Interfacing Programming Language Semantics and Pragmatics: What Does “Hello, World” Mean?

by Warren Sack

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 86; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040086 - 31 Jul 2025

Viewed by 673

Abstract

In 1978, Brian Kernighan and Dennis Ritchie insisted that the first program to write in a new language is one to print the words “hello, world.” From then until now, “hello, world” has frequently been the first exercise in introductory programming courses. On [...] Read more.

In 1978, Brian Kernighan and Dennis Ritchie insisted that the first program to write in a new language is one to print the words “hello, world.” From then until now, “hello, world” has frequently been the first exercise in introductory programming courses. On one hand, this does seem like a good first program because it makes something familiar—a greeting—appear on the screen. On the other hand, it is extremely strange. How can it be understood as a greeting? Who is greeting whom? Unfortunately, the bulk of formal means for defining programming languages provides very little help for assigning a meaning to the “hello, world” program. It is argued that the weakness of older theories and methods of programming language semantics is due to the historical, disciplinary segregation (in logic, semiotics, and linguistics) of semantics as a study apart from syntax and pragmatics. Drawing from both more recent work in programming language semantics that addresses side effects and on speech-act-based programming language design, this paper proposes a possible reintegration of semantics and pragmatics in order to better define the meaning of “hello, world” and the programming languages used to produce speech acts more generally. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Semantics and Computation)

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6 pages, 160 KiB

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Some Remarks of Anscombe’s on Faith and Justice: A Note

by Duncan Richter

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 85; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040085 - 29 Jul 2025

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Abstract

In G. E. M. Anscombe’s extensive correspondence with G. H. von Wright, one of the many topics that come up is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. What she says in these letters is significant because [...] Read more.

In G. E. M. Anscombe’s extensive correspondence with G. H. von Wright, one of the many topics that come up is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. What she says in these letters is significant because of the interest in what she wrote elsewhere about the use of atomic weapons. It is especially interesting because she might seem to imply here that only a person with religious faith is capable of being just. This paper quotes the relevant passages from the correspondence, explores what she might have meant, and concludes that she is not committed to the view that only the faithful can be just. Full article

29 pages, 901 KiB

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Quasi-Supplementation, Plenitudinous Coincidentalism, and Gunk

by Cody Gilmore

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 84; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040084 - 24 Jul 2025

Viewed by 299

Abstract

Weak Supplementation (WSP) is the view that if a thing x has a part y with which x is not identical, then x has a part z that does not overlap y. I note that there is a slightly weaker principle, Quasi-Supplementation (QS), [...] Read more.

Weak Supplementation (WSP) is the view that if a thing x has a part y with which x is not identical, then x has a part z that does not overlap y. I note that there is a slightly weaker principle, Quasi-Supplementation (QS), which says that that if a thing x has a part y with which x is not identical, then x has at least two parts, z and w, that do not overlap each other. I then argue that QS has WSP’s main virtues while avoiding its main vices. That is the primary aim of this paper. A secondary aim is to explore some potential applications of QS. I note that QS can be used in (i) an argument from a plenitudinous form of coincidentalism to the non-existence of simples and the ‘strong gunkiness’ of all things, (ii) an argument in the other direction—from the possibility of simples to the conclusion that plenitudinous coincidentalism is not necessary, and (iii) arguments for and against certain constituent ontologies, according to which ordinary concrete particulars have formal components. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mereology in Metaphysics, Science and Logic)

14 pages, 452 KiB

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Aristotle and Contemporary Theories of Luck

by Marcella Linn

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040083 - 23 Jul 2025

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Abstract

Contemporary theories of luck face problems when it comes to moral luck, that is, luck that nevertheless partially determines moral responsibility. Either they conceive of luck as chancy or modally fragile, which is too narrow and excludes cases such as choosing to do [...] Read more.

Contemporary theories of luck face problems when it comes to moral luck, that is, luck that nevertheless partially determines moral responsibility. Either they conceive of luck as chancy or modally fragile, which is too narrow and excludes cases such as choosing to do something that is unlikely for you to do or that you do not do in many nearby possible worlds. Others see luck as primarily a matter of lack of control, which is too broad and includes things like the sun’s rising, which is outside of our control, but certainly not a matter of luck. Some try to rescue the moral luck phenomenon by positing hybrid accounts or denying that moral luck is a species of luck. Very little has been written about how Aristotle’s conceptions of luck fit into modern conceptions. Yet, Aristotle has sophisticated accounts of luck and good fortune that shed light on certain problems. I will show how Aristotle fares compared to contemporary theories and what we can learn from his approach to luck and fortune when it comes to how lack of control, modal robustness, and probability factor into luck, the difference between luck and good fortune, and whether moral luck is a species of luck. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Aristotelian Ethics)

14 pages, 216 KiB

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Global Justice and Open Borders: An Inclusive Statist Account

by Borja Niño Arnaiz

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 82; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040082 - 17 Jul 2025

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Abstract

Standard arguments for open borders draw on cosmopolitan premises. By contrast, statism as a theory of global justice seems to be at odds with open borders. If states are only responsible for protecting the autonomy of citizens and do not owe foreigners equal [...] Read more.

Standard arguments for open borders draw on cosmopolitan premises. By contrast, statism as a theory of global justice seems to be at odds with open borders. If states are only responsible for protecting the autonomy of citizens and do not owe foreigners equal consideration of their claims, it appears to follow that they may legitimately exclude unwanted immigrants as long as their human rights are not at stake. In this article, I argue that one can be a statist and still defend open borders. Even though moral equality gives rise to demands of distributive justice only in the context of shared subjection to the authority of the state, such that foreigners are not entitled to equal treatment, moral equality demands that the state shows equal respect for their autonomy. Immigration restrictions that are not aimed at protecting the autonomy of citizens are incompatible with equal respect for foreigners’ autonomy, since they subject the latter to unilateral coercion without it being necessary for the former to lead autonomous lives. Full article

16 pages, 281 KiB

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The Love That Kills: Phaedra’s Challenges to a Philosophy of Eros

by Joseph S. O’Leary

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 81; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040081 - 9 Jul 2025

Viewed by 645

Abstract

Focusing on the legend of Phaedra and Hippolytus as developed in Euripides and Seneca and especially in Racine’s Phèdre and taking into account as well its further development in works by Camillo Boito, Luchino Visconti, and Yukio Mishima, I make the following arguments: [...] Read more.

Focusing on the legend of Phaedra and Hippolytus as developed in Euripides and Seneca and especially in Racine’s Phèdre and taking into account as well its further development in works by Camillo Boito, Luchino Visconti, and Yukio Mishima, I make the following arguments: (1) Contrary to many theologians and philosophers of love, a pathological form of love that issues in murder and suicide should not be regarded as unworthy of serious attention. Racine’s tragedy provides a catharsis for universal experiences of unrequited love and jealousy, a major human phenomenon. (2) Contrary to Paul Valéry, Phèdre’s love cannot be called merely animal, since the analytical insight she develops into her morbid passion carries tremendous moral force and lies at the origin of the European psychological novel, as launched by Madame de La Fayette a year later. (3) Contrary to François Mauriac, even if she is a heroine of desire or concupiscence rather than of “true love” (in contrast to the relatively innocent affections of Hippolyte and Aricie), the incredible beauty of her language resists such an easy categorization. (4) Study of concrete presentations of “love” in literature confirms that the meaning and use of this word is marked by an irreducible pluralism. Philosophical and theological analysis of love has to come to terms with this. (5) The role of a work of art, in crystallizing archetypical emotions and situations in a way that carries authority, is to provide the middle ground between the abstractions of philosophy on the one hand and the uncontrollable diversity of the empirical on the other. Even psychologies or sociologies of love, which claim to be close to the concrete data, need to be anchored in and corrected by the special concrete vision that only great literature can bring. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophies of Love)

14 pages, 246 KiB

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Philosophy of Care, Feminist Care Theory and Art Care

by Mojca Puncer

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 80; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040080 - 1 Jul 2025

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Abstract

Drawing on the epistemological tradition of feminist care theory and care ethics, this article analyzes Boris Groys’s contribution to the philosophy of care in order to highlight the implications of care issues in the context of art, which is an important reference point [...] Read more.

Drawing on the epistemological tradition of feminist care theory and care ethics, this article analyzes Boris Groys’s contribution to the philosophy of care in order to highlight the implications of care issues in the context of art, which is an important reference point for both his and my own investigation. After an introductory overview of the problematic and conceptualization of care, I address Groys’s position. I then provide insights into feminist care ethics and the philosophy of the body, care aesthetics and care work, before turning to art care. In a concluding synthesis, I argue for a different philosophy of care in the light of a reorientation of our understanding of care work in general and in the art world in particular. Methodologically, I combine philosophical exegesis and critical theory, referring to the feminist critique of the Western philosophical tradition as expressed in Groys’s work. I remain at the discursive level of the philosophical study of care and its dialog with the broader field of feminist theory and care ethics, including in relation to care work and art care in the contemporary museum economy. Full article

15 pages, 205 KiB

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From the Philosopher’s Stone to AI: Epistemologies of the Renaissance and the Digital Age

by Bram Hennekes

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 79; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040079 - 30 Jun 2025

Viewed by 747

Abstract

This paper reexamines the enduring role of esoteric traditions, as articulated by Frances Yates, in shaping the intellectual landscape of the scientific revolution and their resonance in the digital age. Challenging the linear, progress-centered narratives of traditional historiographies, it explores how esoteric principles—symbolized [...] Read more.

This paper reexamines the enduring role of esoteric traditions, as articulated by Frances Yates, in shaping the intellectual landscape of the scientific revolution and their resonance in the digital age. Challenging the linear, progress-centered narratives of traditional historiographies, it explores how esoteric principles—symbolized by transformative motifs like the Philosopher’s Stone—provided a framework for early scientific inquiry by promoting hidden knowledge, experimentation, mathematics, and interdisciplinary synthesis. This paper argues that moments of accelerated scientific and technological development magnify the visibility of esoteric structures, demonstrating how the intellectual configurations of Renaissance learned circles persist in contemporary expert domains. In particular, artificial intelligence exemplifies the revival of esoteric modes of interpretation, as AI systems—much like their Renaissance predecessors—derive authority through the identification of unseen patterns and the extrapolation of hidden truths. By bridging Renaissance esotericism with the modern information revolution, this study highlights how such traditions are not mere relics of the past but dynamic paradigms shaping the present and future, potentially culminating in new forms of digital mysticism. This study affirms that the temporal gap during periods of rapid technological change between industrial practice and formal scientific treatises reinforces esoteric knowledge structures. Full article

21 pages, 892 KiB

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A Meta-Logical Framework for the Equivalence of Syntactic and Semantic Theories

by Maria Dimarogkona, Petros Stefaneas and Nicola Angius

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 78; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040078 - 27 Jun 2025

Viewed by 586

Abstract

This paper introduces a meta-logical framework—based on the theory of institutions (a categorical version of abstract model theory)—to be used as a tool for the formalization of the two main views regarding the structure of scientific theories, namely the syntactic and the semantic [...] Read more.

This paper introduces a meta-logical framework—based on the theory of institutions (a categorical version of abstract model theory)—to be used as a tool for the formalization of the two main views regarding the structure of scientific theories, namely the syntactic and the semantic views, as they have emerged from the relevant contemporary discussion. The formalization leads to a proof of the equivalence of the two views, which supports the claim that the two approaches are not really in tension. The proof is based on the Galois connection between classes of sentences and classes of models defined over some institution. First, the history of the syntactic–semantic debate is recalled and the theory of institutions formally introduced. Secondly, the notions of syntactic and semantic theories are formalized within the institution and their equivalence proved. Finally, the novelty of the proposed framework is highlighted with respect to existing formalizations. Full article

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16 pages, 1578 KiB

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The Lack of Other Minds as the Lack of Coherence in Human–AI Interactions

by Lin Tang

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 77; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040077 - 27 Jun 2025

Viewed by 557

Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) undergoes rapid evolutionary advancements, two enduring queries in the philosophy of language and linguistics persist: the problem of other minds and coherence. This can be further explored by the following question: is there a fundamental difference between human-AI interactions [...] Read more.

As artificial intelligence (AI) undergoes rapid evolutionary advancements, two enduring queries in the philosophy of language and linguistics persist: the problem of other minds and coherence. This can be further explored by the following question: is there a fundamental difference between human-AI interactions and human–human interactions? More precisely, does an AI partner’s ability to understand discursive coherence sufficiently approximate that of the human mind? This study frames the problem of other minds as a problem in discourse analysis, positing that linguistic exchange inherently constitutes interactions between minds, where the act of decoding discursive coherence serves as a proxy for apprehending other minds. Guided by this perspective, this study uses four criteria of discursive coherence to examine how AI partners (with a focus on ChatGPT) achieve discursive coherence, thus reflecting whether an AI partner’s ability to understand discursive coherence suffices to simulate the human mind. Through a comparison between human–human interactions and human-AI interactions, the results indicate that while ChatGPT demonstrates proficiency in constructing discursive coherence along dictional, intentional, emotional, and rational coherence lines, the structural complexity and generative creativity of its coherence lines remain significantly below the threshold observed in human–human interactions. Moreover, ChatGPT’s emotional expressiveness pales in comparison to the rich, nuanced affect inherent in human–human interactions. Full article

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24 pages, 769 KiB

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Injecting Observers into Computational Complexity

by Edgar Graham Daylight

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 76; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040076 - 26 Jun 2025

Viewed by 385

Abstract

We characterize computer science as an interplay between two modes of reasoning: the Aristotelian (procedural) method and the Platonic (declarative) approach. We contend that Aristotelian, step-by-step thinking dominates in computer programming, while Platonic, static reasoning plays a more prominent role in computational complexity. [...] Read more.

We characterize computer science as an interplay between two modes of reasoning: the Aristotelian (procedural) method and the Platonic (declarative) approach. We contend that Aristotelian, step-by-step thinking dominates in computer programming, while Platonic, static reasoning plays a more prominent role in computational complexity. Various frameworks elegantly blend both Aristotelian and Platonic reasoning. A key example explored in this paper concerns nondeterministic polynomial time Turing machines. Beyond this interplay, we emphasize the growing importance of the ‘computing by observing’ paradigm, which posits that a single derivation tree—generated with a string-rewriting system—can yield multiple interpretations depending on the choice of the observer. Advocates of this paradigm formalize the Aristotelian activities of rewriting and observing within automata theory through a Platonic lens. This approach raises a fundamental question: How do these Aristotelian activities re-emerge when the paradigm is formulated in propositional logic? By addressing this issue, we develop a novel simulation method for nondeterministic Turing machines, particularly those bounded by polynomial time, improving upon the standard textbook approach. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Semantics and Computation)

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18 pages, 246 KiB

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Faust and Job: The Dual Facets of Happiness

by Elias L. Khalil

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 75; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040075 - 26 Jun 2025

Viewed by 398

Abstract

This paper advances two interrelated theses. As for the first thesis, it distinguishes well-being, on the one hand, from happiness, on the other hand. As for the second thesis, it differentiates between two important facets of happiness: what this paper calls “happiness-as-tranquility” and [...] Read more.

This paper advances two interrelated theses. As for the first thesis, it distinguishes well-being, on the one hand, from happiness, on the other hand. As for the second thesis, it differentiates between two important facets of happiness: what this paper calls “happiness-as-tranquility” and “happiness-as-aspiration”. Actually, in order to differentiate the two facets of happiness, we first need to distinguish happiness from well-being. This is the case because happiness, after all, is a by-product of reflecting upon and ruminating over well-being. Given it is the same well-being, how could it give rise to different facets of happiness? It can only do so if we stop conflating happiness with well-being. This entails taking to task the widely accepted concept of “subjective wellbeing”. Such concept is expressly designed to obfuscate the difference between well-being and happiness. As for the two facets of happiness (the second thesis), this paper relies upon the contrast of two famous works of literature: the story of Job and the story of Faust. The contrast uncovers the criticality of the temporal dimension in the acts of reflection upon and rumination over well-being. If people reflect on past accomplishments, they experience backward-looking happiness along the Job story—i.e., happiness-as-tranquility. If people reflect on desire, they experience forward-looking happiness along the Faust story—i.e., happiness-as-aspiration. While the two facets of happiness seem contradictory, they are indeed complementary if we recognize the temporal element when one reflects upon and ruminates over well-being. Full article

8 pages, 246 KiB

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Dialectic in Early Proclus and the Unity of the Soul

by Georgios Iliopoulos

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 74; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040074 - 24 Jun 2025

Viewed by 1319

Abstract

In Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades, we encounter a conception of dialectic that can be interpreted in terms of the philosopher’s reception of Socratic and Platonic ideas while at the same time being compatible with the relevant Aristotelian conception. We will try [...] Read more.

In Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades, we encounter a conception of dialectic that can be interpreted in terms of the philosopher’s reception of Socratic and Platonic ideas while at the same time being compatible with the relevant Aristotelian conception. We will try to show that this is the case to the extent that dialectic is ascribed a propaedeutic function, aimed both at promoting the search for truth and at practicing and developing persuasive skills that could prove beneficial in theoretical disputes. On this basis, it can become clear that dialectic is related to Proclus’ conception of the soul because it necessarily integrates specific characteristics of partial philosophical disciplines, while, on the other hand, it requires the active participation of the soul as a whole. This means concretely that through the practice of dialectic, the inner differentiation of the soul emerges as a necessary dimension of its coherent unity. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ancient and Medieval Theories of Soul)

8 pages, 169 KiB

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From Disciplinary Societies to Algorithmic Control: Rethinking Foucault’s Human Subject in the Digital Age

by Hayarpi Sahakyan, Ashot Gevorgyan and Arpine Malkjyan

Philosophies 2025, 10(4), 73; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10040073 - 24 Jun 2025

Viewed by 1128

Abstract

In the digital age, the mechanisms of power and control have evolved beyond Foucault’s disciplinary societies, giving rise to a new paradigm of algorithmic governance. This study critically reinterprets Foucault’s concept of the human subject in light of contemporary digital surveillance, big data [...] Read more.

In the digital age, the mechanisms of power and control have evolved beyond Foucault’s disciplinary societies, giving rise to a new paradigm of algorithmic governance. This study critically reinterprets Foucault’s concept of the human subject in light of contemporary digital surveillance, big data analytics, and algorithmic decision-making. The paper looks at how technology, biopolitics, and subject formation interact. It says that algorithmic control changes people’s choices in ways that have never been seen before through predictive modeling and real-time behavioral modulation. The study starts with a comparison of early Foucauldian frameworks and more recent theories of digital governance. It uses a method that combines philosophy, media studies, and political theory. The results show that while disciplinary societies relied on institutionalized norms and body regulation, algorithmic control works through data-driven anticipatory mechanisms, which make subjectivity less clear and more broken up. This shift raises ethical and ontological questions about autonomy, resistance, and the very notion of the self in a hyper-connected society. The study concludes that rethinking Foucault’s insights in the digital era is essential for understanding and contesting the pervasive influence of algorithmic power on human subjectivity. Full article

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Philosophies, Volume 10, Issue 4 (August 2025) – 21 articles

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