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  • Open Access

3 December 2025

25 Pages

Trustworthy Data Space Collaborative Trust Mechanism Driven by Blockchain: Technology Integration, Cross-Border Governance, and Standardization Path

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School of Information and Intelligent Engineering, University of Sanya, Sanya 572022, China
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Academician Rong Chunming Workstation, University of Sanya, Sanya 572022, China
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School of Computing Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Abstract

With the accelerated development of the global digital economy, data spaces have become a crucial infrastructure for cross-domain data circulation and value creation. However, cross-organizational and cross-regional data sharing still faces several challenges, including insufficient trust, fragmented governance, and inconsistent standards. Against this backdrop, blockchain technology, with its decentralized, traceable, and tamper-resistant characteristics, offers new avenues for building collaborative trust mechanisms within trustworthy data spaces. This paper systematically reviews the current research on trustworthy data spaces, the blockchain, zero-knowledge proofs, and federated learning. It proposes a technology-governance-standardization (TGS) framework for cross-border governance. To verify the framework, we proposed a collaborative trust mechanism combining “on-chain light attest, off-chain deep store, and cross-layer verifiable bridge” (LPHS–XV), which achieves data availability without visibility and compliance auditability. A prototype was then validated in the cross-border medical data space at the Macao-Hengqin Station, providing a scalable experience for global data governance.

1. Introduction

Against the backdrop of accelerated development of the global digital economy, data has become a key production factor and strategic resource, and it is gradually becoming a core resource for promoting economic growth and modernizing social governance [1]. However, a series of problems, such as data silos, data security, and privacy concerns, directly limit the full realization of data value [2]. To further promote the compliant and efficient circulation and use of data elements and accelerate the construction of a digital economy with data as a key element, a trustworthy data space [3] has emerged as a new type of data infrastructure and value creation, becoming an important direction for the development of the global digital economy by building a secure, trustworthy, and interconnected data sharing environment to promote the orderly flow of data and value creation.
The concept of trustworthy data space originated from the data space proposed by Michael Franklin et al. [4] in 2005. Based on advanced international practices of the European Union and other countries, and in combination with its own national conditions and actual development needs, China proposed the concept of a “trustworthy data space” in November 2024 [5]. They clearly pointed out that a trustworthy data space is a data circulation and utilization infrastructure based on consensus rules, connecting multiple parties and realizing the sharing and use of data resources [6]. It is an application ecosystem for co-creating data element value and an important carrier for supporting the construction of a national integrated data market [7]. A completely trustworthy data space should enable trust in users and data, discover and share data resources, and collaboratively develop and create value among multiple subjects [8]. Figure 1 shows the structure of a trustworthy data space. However, the trustworthy data space still faces key challenges, including bottlenecks in large-scale, high-frequency data interactions, the lack of cross-border governance mechanisms, and lagging standardization and interoperability. At present, the trustworthy data space mainly has the following problems:
(1)
There is a risk of sensitivity exposure in cross-domain circulation (i.e., when data circulates in an environment with multiple parties and a lack of mutual trust, there is a lack of end-to-end verifiable access control and a minimum disclosure mechanism) [9];
(2)
There are challenges in usability verification under the heterogeneity of master data sovereignty. Due to differences in laws in different countries and regions, it is difficult to make verifiable judgments on data processing activities without relying on centralized approval [10];
(3)
There is difficulty in automating the allocation of stakeholder value. The data value chain involves multiple heterogeneous stakeholders such as platform operators, data providers, data users, and regulatory agencies [11];
(4)
Data island barriers exist in heterogeneous environments. In multi-chain architectures, multi-cloud environments, and cross-industry application scenarios, there is a lack of universal data format standards and interface protocols [12];
(5)
There are performance-privacy-cost trade-offs in high-concurrency scenarios. In large-scale concurrent data transaction scenarios, all three have inherent constraints that may significantly reduce the efficiency of multi-party collaboration and affect overall system performance [13].
Figure 1. The structure of a trustworthy data space.
The blockchain [14], as a decentralized, programmable, and tamper-resistant distributed ledger, offers a basic trust mechanism for secure data circulation through consensus algorithms, smart contracts, and verifiable credentials. In a trustworthy data space, the blockchain encodes data fingerprints, access control, and compliance constraints in smart contracts, which can combine with zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) [15] to verify data sources and compliance without exposing sensitive content. Deeply integrating the blockchain and a trustworthy data space establishes a collaborative trust mechanism for cross-border governance and standardization which responds to global data circulation needs and supports the digital economy. While many researchers have discussed trustworthy spaces, there are no recent articles that systematically review its development, summarize the technical framework, and verify key technologies for the application of blockchain technology and trustworthy data spaces. The main contributions of this article are as follows:
  • Comprehensively review the development of trustworthy data spaces, systematically reviewing related technologies and the latest research progress;
  • Demonstrate the scientific validity of blockchain-enabled trustworthy data spaces, proposing an overall technical framework of “technology convergence, cross-border governance, and standardization path” (TGS) as well as a collaborative trust technology verification scheme of “on-chain light attest, off-chain deep store, and cross-layer verifiable bridge” (LPHS-XV);
  • Conduct an empirical evaluation of the LPHS-XV framework based on real-world application cases to verify its effectiveness and feasibility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background and current research status of related technologies; Section 3 discusses the proposed framework; Section 4 presents a case analysis; Section 5 summarizes the necessity of the blockchain in the framework; and Section 6 concludes the article and discusses future research directions.

3. Framework of Technology-Governance-Standardization (TGS)

3.1. Technology Integration

3.1.1. Ensuring Data Privacy and Controllable Circulation

In the trustworthy data space, the blockchain must work in tandem with privacy-preserving computing, decentralized identity, and cross-chain protocols. First, by utilizing privacy-preserving computing technologies such as zero-knowledge proofs, secure multi-party computation, and federated learning, the raw data remains local, with only encrypted features processed and the results calculated on-chain [67]. This ensures that the data remains “available but invisible” [68]. Second, decentralized identity generates verifiable credentials for data and entities, registering ownership and authorization policies on-chain for dynamic control [69]. Finally, relay contracts and cross-chain protocols synchronize states across multiple chains, allowing business and sovereign chains to instantly adjust permissions in response to policy updates, forming a complete closed loop of authorization, computation, auditing, and recovery [70]. Figure 3 shows the blockchain collaborative privacy computing and trustworthy data space cross-chain governance architecture.
Figure 3. Blockchain collaborative privacy computing and trustworthy data space cross-chain governance architecture.

3.1.2. Cross-Domain Operation and Circulation Realization

To address interoperability issues across heterogeneous data spaces, the “SRv6 relay chain, cross-chain protocol, and standardized interface” solution can be used to encapsulate routing, path tracing, and transaction instructions in IPv6 routing headers, thereby enabling efficient scheduling across heterogeneous chains. It also integrates the IDSA connector and JSON LD semantic model to unify data formats and meta-semantics, adopts an open architecture of “an open architecture comprising one basic network, one capability platform, one operations-and-maintenance center, and N applications”, and connects to standards such as ISO 8000 115 [71] and ISO/IEC 27017 [72] to establish an interoperability framework at the “identification-contract-audit” layer, thereby providing cross-domain data elements with the global circulation capability of “technically verifiable, protocol standardized, and ecologically open”. Its overall architecture is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Cross-domain data flow architecture.

3.1.3. Strengthening Traceability and Auditing

The blockchain naturally supports traceability and auditing, but in the trustworthy data space, it is necessary to further build a comprehensive, four-layer, closed-loop security framework with “full traceability, real-time blocking of violations, audit verification, and cross-domain joint investigation”. Its architecture is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Cross-domain data traceability and auditing architecture.
Among them, the evidence layer, rule layer, audit layer, and collaboration layer undertake the following specific functions:
(1)
Evidence layer: The entire life cycle of data generation, circulation, use, and extinction is recorded through the blockchain, and distributed storage is used to save the original data, achieving traceability in seconds.
(2)
Rule layer: Smart contracts embed data classification strategies and negative lists into the code and use natural language processing to parse legal provisions to generate executable compliance templates.
(3)
Audit layer: A zero-knowledge proof is used to verify whether data operations comply with policies, and SRv6 traffic labels and on-chain evidence are combined to form a visual audit map and realize multi-dimensional log analysis.
(4)
Collaboration layer: Regulatory agencies are introduced as authoritative nodes, multi-party co-governance and automated execution of arbitration contracts, and dispute resolution using verifiable credentials.

3.2. Cross-Border Data Governance

Currently, cross-border data governance faces three major structural barriers. The first is the conflict of sovereignty and compliance; there are contradictions between the legal provisions of different countries. For example, the “adequacy determination” under the EU GDPR conflicts with the data localization requirements of the “Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China” [73]. It is necessary to ensure compliance while guaranteeing the free flow of data. The second is the fragmentation of the technology ecosystem; different regions use different encryption algorithms, identity formats, and cross-chain protocols [12,74], resulting in poor system interoperability, such as the lack of mutual recognition between W3C DID and SM2 as well as the Cosmos IBC and BaaS platforms in China. The third is the judicial enforcement vacuum; cross-border disputes arising from smart contract loopholes lacking a unified legal framework and arbitration mechanism, and there is no consensus on how on-chain electronic evidence should be recognized across jurisdictions.
To address the above issues, we need to advance in a coordinated manner across the system, technology, and scenario perspectives. For example, regarding mutual recognition of rules, we can establish a mutual recognition framework through bilateral or multilateral agreements and transform conflicting clauses in the GDPR and the “Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China” into enforceable smart contract rules. In terms of technical standard alignment, we can rely on the architecture of the international data space association (IDSA) [75], adopt international standards such as W3C DID [76] and ISO 27017 [77], and use open-source cross-chain gateways (such as WeCross) to reduce protocol adaptation costs and achieve mutual recognition of identity, encryption, and cross-chain protocols. In terms of collaborative innovation, a cross-border regulatory sandbox alliance will be established to test dynamic negative lists and joint risk control models in scenarios such as vehicle-road-cloud and real-world assets (RWAs), thereby promoting institutional iteration by isolating policy risks.

3.3. Standardized Path

The lack of standards mainly causes two problems. First, fragmented interfaces and protocols lead to poor cross-platform interoperability. This results in inconsistent data formats, transmission protocols, and semantic definitions. Development and maintenance costs also increase. Second, the compliance framework is vague, and there is no unified certification mechanism. Companies must repeatedly adapt to conflicting rules across jurisdictions, which greatly increases compliance costs. The absence of guidelines for sensitive data classification makes it difficult to deploy dynamic negative lists at scale.
Recent advances in the standardization of blockchain-driven trustworthy data spaces have yielded four pivotal developments:
(1)
Technical layer standards: These focus on making different computer systems work together, especially concerning digital identity, connecting different blockchains, and protecting private information. For digital identity, the standards combine W3C decentralized identifiers (DIDs) [78], a secure way to represent users online, with SM2, a cryptographic algorithm. Developments in connecting blockchains have been made by joining the Cosmos Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) protocol with enterprise platforms that offer blockchain services. Privacy-focused systems now also provide ways for different computers to work together securely using trusted execution environments (TEEs), which protect data even when it is in use, and federated learning, where multiple systems can analyze data together without sharing sensitive information.
(2)
Data layer standards: These standards emphasize data identification, metadata specifications, and hierarchical classification schemes to ensure semantic consistency throughout data circulation. Data identification can adopt the ISO 8000-115 [79] metadata model [80] to refine the rules for classification and grading implementation in industry as well as build a cross-domain understanding bridge based on JSON-LD and semantic interoperability.
(3)
Application layer standards: Vertical field standards should be formulated for supply chain traceability, financial services, and smart city governance scenarios. Traceability auditing incorporates hybrid standards combined with blockchain-based attestation mechanisms, establishing comprehensive “data, credit and product” mapping protocols in the financial field [81], and frameworks for cross-domain spatial interconnection interfaces are defined in urban governance to unify interaction rules across transportation and enterprise mobility scenarios [82].
(4)
Compliance and security standards: These reinforce systems where trust is never assumed, called zero-trust systems, and provide ways to check compliance and manage international rules. Zero-trust specifications control access to systems at all times. Protocols based on ISO 27017 verify compliance with the GDPR and national regulations. Coding rules for sending data across borders are automated to automatically check compliance.
This standardization path represents a comprehensive approach to establishing interoperable, secure, and compliant blockchain-enabled data spaces, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. The structure of a standardized path at different layers [76,77,79].

4. Case Study and Validation

4.1. Case Introduction

The International Cross-Border Trustworthy Data Space-Macao-Hengqin Station was established by the IDSA and the National Engineering Center for Next Generation Internet in July 2025 in the Guangdong-Macao Deep Cooperation Zone in Hengqin. Relying on the “Macao and Hengqin” dual platforms, it adopts the blockchain, a distributed privacy protection architecture, IPv6, and AI governance technologies to build a global two-way cross-border data circulation hub. The site was the first to be piloted in the “Guangdong-Macao Medical Trustworthy Data Space” to achieve secure sharing of medical records, images, and other data across the three locations. It also integrated digital economic resources through the Macao-Hengqin Digital Business Alliance to create a new cross-border data governance model based on a three-in-one, dual-circulation, and dual-buffer with technology, rules, and scenarios.

4.2. Verification Case and Evaluation Results

4.2.1. LPHS–XV Collaborative Trust Verification Scheme

Trustworthy data space requires ensuring data availability while improving data credibility and compliance. We propose a collaborative trust verification solution that combines “On-Chain Light Attest, Off-Chain Deep Store, and Cross-Layer Verifiable Bridge” (LPHS-XV). In the above case, H medical institutions participate in cross-institutional federated learning. The hth institution holds the local dataset D h = { ( x i , y i ) } i = 1 n h , and the global model parameter is w ∈ R p . The goal is to minimize the empirical risk without pooling the original data, as shown in Equation (3):
min w F ( w ) ≜ ∑ h = 1 H n h N f h ( w )
where f h ( w ) = 1 n h ∑ ( x , y ) ∈ D h l ( w ; x , y ) and N = ∑ h n h . In the rth round of communication, the participants complete local training, and the FedAvg aggregation is performed by the coordinator in Equation (4):
θ t + 1 = 1 N ∑ h = 1 H n h N θ i t + 1 = θ t − η ∑ h = 1 H n h N g ˜ h t
where η is the learning rate and g ˜ h t is the noisy local update that satisfies differential privacy.
(1)
On-Chain Light Attest
The hash values or minimum necessary metadata of important events, such as task creation, model snapshots, and privacy credentials, are written into the blockchain to obtain an immutable timestamp and transparent log. For cryptographic primitives, we denote H ( · ) as a collision-resistant hash and Com ( · ; τ ) as a binding commitment to any event A. The unified commitment is defined according to Equation (5):
c = Com ( A ; τ A ) = H ( tag ∥ enc ( A ) ∥ τ A )
In Equation (5), τ is random. Let the set of event commitments for round t be C t = { c A 1 , c A 2 , … , c A m } , and construct a Merkle tree to obtain the root Root t = MerkleRoot ( C t ) . After that, only constant-size tuples will be written into the smart contract in each round, as shown in Equation (6):
Pay t = ( task _ id , r , h θ ( t + 1 ) , Root t , vk _ id , uri _ off )
In Equation (6), h θ ( t + 1 ) = H ( θ ( t + 1 ) ) is the model summary, vk _ id is used to identify the verification key of a zero-knowledge proof, and uri _ off is the address of the object collection stored off-chain.
(2)
Off-Chain Deep Store
The actual model parameters, gradients, differential privacy noise, zero-knowledge proofs, and other related data are stored off-chain, such as on hospital servers or in secure storage, thereby improving the storage and processing efficiency of large-capacity data. For the local gradient g h ( t ) , differential privacy protection is performed first, as shown in Equation (7):
g h ( t ) = g h t · min 1 , ψ ∥ g h t ∥ 2 , g ˜ h t = g ^ h t + ξ h t
where ψ is the clipping threshold and ξ h t ∼ N ( 0 , σ 2 I ) . The off-chain object storage saves the events in round t in the form of Equation (8):
Bundle t = { θ ( t + 1 ) , g ˜ h t , stats t , logs t }
where stats t and logs t are the statistical information of the model training or storage process in round t and the current log information in round t, respectively.
(3)
Cross-Layer Verifiable Bridge
In the cross-layer verification phase, hash consistency is used to reconcile off-chain and on-chain transactions. For any off-chain object C i , the summary h i = H ( C i ) and the Merkle root path “ path ” i of C i are obtained first, and the on-chain root hash R ( t ) of round t is given. The verification is shown in Equation (9):
Verify ( path i , h i , R ( t ) ) = True
In this case, the hospital uses ZK (Groth16) to prove that π and C i are stored off-chain. Setting Verify ( π ) = True allows this to be achieved without accessing the data or gradient plaintext. Finally, aggregate consistency is confirmed using Equation (10):
θ ( t + 1 ) = ? θ t − η ∑ h n h N g ˜ h t

4.2.2. Evaluation Metrics

To objectively compare the LPHS–XV verification scheme, five indicators were used—accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, and area under the curve (AUC)—for evaluation, as shown in Equations (11)–(15):
ACC = TP + TN TP + FP + TN + FN
Prec = TP TP + FP
Rec = TP TP + FN
F 1 = 2 · Prec · Rec Prec + Rec
AUC = ∫ 0 1 TPR ( FPR ) d ( FPR )
where TP is a true positive example, FP is a false positive example, TN is a true negative example, FN is a false negative example, and T P R = T P / ( T P + F N ) , F P / ( F P + T N ) .

4.2.3. Case Result Analysis

Using the above scheme, we conducted a comprehensive privacy-preserving performance evaluation of a COVID-19 case study. The experiment involved two participating medical institutions, labeled hospital_001 and hospital_002, representing cross-border medical institutions in Guangdong and Macao. The global model aggregation server was deployed on a blockchain-enabled IPv6 infrastructure.We used the public COVID-19 X-ray dataset [83]. In our case, we selected 600 samples with complete metadata and clinical indicators. Each sample was represented by eight clinical features (including, for example, [age, sex, fever status, cough, shortness of breath, comorbidities, oxygen saturation, and laboratory findings]) and assigned to 1 of 10 diagnostic categories. The data was split on the patient level into training and test subsets with a ratio of 70% and 30%, respectively, to avoid patient-level information leakage. From the training subset, each participating institution was allocated 210 training samples (420 samples in total) to simulate local data silos, while the remaining 180 samples were used for testing. Before training, continuous clinical features were standardized to a zero mean and unit variance based on the statistics of the training subset, and categorical features were encoded using label encoding. The system employed the Federated Average (FedAvg) algorithm with the following core hyperparameter settings: learning rate η = 0.003 , global training rounds R = 60 , local epochs E = 3 , and batch size B = 64 . All models were implemented in Python 3.8 using the PyTorch framework 2.5.1 trained on a workstation equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-14900HX, 8 GB NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4070 Laptop GPU, and 32 GB of memory running Windows 11. Figure 7 shows the experimental results, where Figure (a) shows the performance convergence trajectory of the federated global model during 60 training rounds; Figure (b) compares the local model accuracy and global model accuracy of the two participants (hospital_001 and hospital_002); Figure (c) depicts the evolution of the gradient update norm of the two participants with the training rounds and Figure (d) summarizes the average evaluation metrics of the final model on the independent test set, including ACC, AUC, F1, Prec, and Rec.
Figure 7. The reuslt of federated learning based on LPHS-XVe.
The federated learning solution based on LPHS-XV demonstrated excellent performance across all evaluation metrics. The global model achieved a final accuracy of 92.33%, exceeding the target threshold of 88% by 4.33 percentage points. The subject AUC reached 93.82%, demonstrating the system’s excellent discriminative ability for COVID-19 diagnosis. A good balance was achieved between F 1 = 92.33 % , A C C = 92.40 % , and R e c = 92.33 % , validating the model’s overall performance.
In terms of cross-border collaboration, the local-global performance comparison chart demonstrates the excellent collaborative effect between participating institutions. Hospital_001 achieved a final local accuracy of 94%, while hospital_002 achieved an accuracy rating of 94%, with an average performance difference of only 3.2% throughout the entire training process. This minimal performance difference demonstrates the effectiveness of the federated averaging mechanism in addressing cross-border data heterogeneity. The privacy protection mechanism successfully implemented ε -differential privacy, ensuring that no sensitive patient information could be inferred from model updates. The blockchain provides an unalterable log record for all training rounds, model updates, and performance metrics. The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof verifies data compliance without leaking actual data.

4.3. Case Summary and Outlook

This case study successfully validated the collaborative trust mechanism of LPHS-XV. In our method, blockchain anchoring, zero-knowledge proofs, and differential privacy were all evaluated. With two medical institutions and 60 rounds of federated training, the tests confirmed strong privacy, verifiability, and practical performance. Across three experiments, the average classification accuracy was 92.33 % , the precision was 92.40 % , the F1 score was 92.33 % , and the AUC was 0.938 . Given the privacy budget, these mechanisms did not weaken the model effectiveness. For a full 60-round run, the average time was 3.245 s (about 54.1 ms per round), giving a round-level throughput of 18.49 rounds per second. This result demonstrates the support for parallel federated scheduling and on-chain anchoring, enabling sub-second iteration cycles. In terms of communication, the model uploaded approximately 4.56 × 10 4 parameters per round (roughly 178 KB in float32), totaling about 2.74 × 10 6 (approximately 10.7 MB ) per session, which is consistent with sessions lacking privacy enhancements. The primary additional overhead stems from local proof generation and chain-side verification, rather than federated communication itself. The integration of differential privacy, secure aggregation, zero-knowledge proofs, and blockchain technologies established a comprehensive privacy and security framework that simultaneously met the technical requirements and cross-jurisdictional compliance needs. In the future, this approach could include the introduction of batch and aggregate proofs, the use of RDP or a moments accountant for privacy budget accounting and adaptive allocation [84], and continuous alignment of IDSA or Digital Business Alliance strategies with the IPv6 identification system [85]. This could be replicated in broader cross-border medical data space scenarios, such as medical insurance audits and drug re-evaluations. Furthermore, Figure 8 illustrates the future applications of blockchain-driven collaborative trust mechanisms in trustworthy data spaces across various fields.
Figure 8. Blockchain-empowered trustworthy data space.

5. Summary

Based on the above technical review and experimental verification, we can summarize the necessity and feasibility of collaborative trust between the blockchain and trustworthy data spaces. The necessity is reflected in three aspects. First, there is the trust deficit. Under the traditional centralized model, it is difficult to simultaneously ensure data authenticity and verifiability in cross-border data flows and define the rights and responsibilities of multiple parties. The blockchain uses the hash chain of the data layer, which cannot be tampered with, and the automatic execution of the policy at the contract layer as its core mechanisms, forming a publicly verifiable trust anchor and a traceable audit trail [86]. Second, there are conflicts of sovereign compliance. When regulatory requirements differ across jurisdictions, it is easy to create barriers to circulation. Combining the blockchain with privacy-enhancing technologies, such as DP, ZK, MPC or TEEs, and dynamic negative lists can achieve minimum necessary disclosure and full process control under a “usable-but-not-visible” paradigm. The third aspect is ecological fragmentation. The lack of interoperability between heterogeneous systems and chains has led to the continued existence of data silos. Relying on cross-chain technologies such as relay, a light client proof, and a standardized message format can establish trusted interaction channels while preserving the autonomy of each domain [87].
In terms of feasibility, at the technical level, the layered architecture has been deeply integrated with privacy computing, IPv6 identification, and traceability systems, which can support high-concurrency, wide-area distributed cross-border data interactions while maintaining constant on-chain costs for audit and compliance expenses. At the policy level, national policies take “technology-governance-standards” as the main line of collaboration, providing institutional and standardized guarantees for the integration of the blockchain and data spaces. In practice, the verification of the LPHS-XV we proposed verified the feasibility and scalability of the collaborative model in case studies. The blockchain serves as the underlying trust foundation through encryption and auditing, enabling different entities to achieve verifiable collaboration without sharing original data. Table 5 compares the proposed method with the latest relevant research.
Table 5. Comparison of trust mechanisms and technical implementations.
As shown in Table 5, the latest relevant research mostly focuses on trust building and access control within a single jurisdiction, employing an on-chain/off-chain partitioning strategy, where metadata, access policies, and audit logs are stored on-chain, while sensitive business data is stored off-chain using IPFS or cloud infrastructure, with only a subset incorporating sophisticated cryptographic primitives such as attribute-based encryption or proxy re-encryption. While progress has been made within specific organizational or regional boundaries, a systematic framework for cross-border data governance is generally lacking. In contrast, the LPHS–XV architecture we explored in this paper, through a unified TGS framework, explicitly addresses the triple challenges of cross-organizational, cross-regional, and cross-border data sharing, effectively bridging the gap between technological trust mechanisms and the interoperability of global data space governance.

6. Conclusions

This paper systematically studied the collaborative trust mechanism of trustworthy data spaces driven by the blockchain. We first examined the development of key technologies, including trustworthy data spaces, the blockchain, zero-knowledge proofs, and federated learning, and highlighted the evolutionary trend from semantic interoperability and gradual integration into cross-domain governance and privacy enhancement. Furthermore, we proposed a “technology integration, cross-border governance, and standardization path” (TGS) framework to address challenges such as sensitivity exposure, sovereign compliance conflicts, and ecological fragmentation in cross-domain circulation. By coupling the blockchain with privacy-preserving computing, distributed identity, and cross-chain protocols, we achieved data availability without visibility and dynamic controllability. We also utilized SRv6 cross-chain relaying and a unified semantic model to construct an open, interoperable architecture, completing the four-layer closed loop of on-chain evidence storage, off-chain storage, and cross-layer verification. Furthermore, our proposed LPHS-XV collaborative trust verification mechanism achieved auditability, security, and privacy protection under highly concurrent data interactions. We tested this mechanism using the Macao-Hengqin Station as a case study. This paper outlines a research path for blockchain-driven trustworthy data spaces and serves as a reference for future research on data element governance.
Blockchain-driven trusted data spaces face three primary challenges in cross-border deployment: (1) legal, identity, and encryption regime heterogeneity; (2) real-time cost limitations of large-scale ZKP and cross-chain verification; and (3) ecosystem fragmentation advancing from inter-chain to space-level interoperability. In the future, we should further explore a series of issues related to these points. First, the heterogeneity of legal regimes, identity systems, and encryption standards across jurisdictions is deeply entrenched. This calls for a programmable “compliance-as-code” middleware layer that can continuously translate evolving legal provisions into on-chain, machine-executable policy contracts. Second, the real-time cost bottleneck of a large-scale ZKP and cross-chain verification has not yet been resolved. Even on consortium-chain platforms, supporting high-volume cross-border medical data authorizations requires zero-knowledge proofs with hundreds of thousands to millions of R1CS constraints per authorization. Our prototype-level analysis indicates that proof generation still incurs end-to-end latencies to the order of hundreds of milliseconds to seconds, while subsequent on-chain verification and consensus introduce non-trivial CPU and network overhead at all consortium nodes, making it difficult to meet sub-second response requirements in emergency or other time-critical scenarios. Third, ecosystem fragmentation is shifting from “inter-chain interoperability” to the more complex problem of “space-level interoperability”, such as medical, financial, and transportation data spaces adopt distinct semantic models and roots of trust. Only by empowering standards bodies to co-design a space-level cross-chain identity framework (S-CID)—with verifiable credential containers and semantic hashes at its core—can a global data-element market of “one-time issuance, multi-space circulation” ultimately be realized.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, Z.-Y.L. and M.Y.; validation, Y.-S.M. and Y.L.; formal analysis, Z.-Y.L. and G.-Y.L.; writing—original draft preparation, Z.-Y.L. and G.-Y.L.; writing—review and editing, Z.-Y.L., G.-Y.L. and Y.R.; visualization, R.-W.J.; supervision, R.-W.J. and Y.L.; funding acquisition, Z.-Y.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was funded by the Hainan Province Higher Education Scientific Research Project under Grants Hnky2025-33 and Hnky2025ZC-13, Hainan Province Key Research and Development Project under Grant ZDYF2023GXJS007.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The data presented in this study are available in covid-19-xray-dataset at https://github.com/v7labs/covid-19-xray-dataset, accessed on 29 November 2025.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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