Religious Discourse as an Instrument of Propaganda: The Case of the Hejaz Railway

Abstract

This study examines how religious discourse was used to legitimize support for the Hejaz Railway Project, tracing its historical foundations, its function within Pan-Islamist policy, and the role of the ulama and other religious actors in its production and dissemination. Alongside relevant scholarship, it draws on articles by Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā in al-Manār, the writings of Muhammad Kurd ‘Alī, and treatises by Muhammad ‘Arif al-Dimashqi, Muhammad Shākir, and Sharīfzāda Muhammad Amīn, while press coverage in İkdam, Sabah, and Tercümān-ı Haqīqat is discussed through secondary literature. The railway was associated with mosque construction, ongoing charity (ṣadaqa jāriya), spending in the path of God, and jihad. Muhammad ‘Arif described it as an act of worship and linked support for Abdulhamid II with obedience to the caliph and, by extension, to God. Riḍā warned that the Prophet’s remains might be transferred to the Louvre, framing support for the railway as a religious duty. Shākir and Amīn, for their part, denied the Bedouin opposition any religious legitimacy. This discourse sought to encourage financial support, while documented contributions, particularly from India and Egypt, reflected the transimperial dimension of Pan-Islamist policy. However, the extent to which religious arguments influenced individual contributions remains uncertain.

1. Introduction

The Hejaz Railway Project underwent a lengthy period of preparation before construction began. During this period, numerous individuals put forward proposals for the line. One of the earliest was submitted in 1864 by Charles Frederick Zimpel (d. 1879), but it was never implemented. In subsequent years, Izzet Pasha, Mehmed Shākir Pasha, and the Austrian engineer Wilhelm von Pressel drew up similar plans. In 1897, Muhammad Inshaullah launched one of the first formal initiatives and publicized his campaign for a railway extending to the Hijaz through The Wakil and Islamic newspapers published in Cairo and Istanbul (Nicholson 2005, pp. 11–12). The fact that the project was mentioned during a meeting between King Abdullah and Talat Pasha, together with Abdulhamid II’s description of the railway as “an old dream,” suggests that the idea had long been under consideration (Sultan Abdülhamid 1975, p. 123). Abdulhamid II finally ordered construction of the line on 2 May 1900 (Gülsoy and Ochsenwald 1998, vol. 17, p. 441). Construction was inaugurated with an official ceremony held in Damascus on 1 September 1900. Owing to shortages of equipment and materials, however, work gained momentum only after 1 May 1901 (Tourret 1989, p. 14). After approximately eight years of construction, the line reached Medina on 1 September 1908 (Eraslan 1996, p. 103).

The Hejaz Railway Project has attracted considerable scholarly attention. A substantial body of literature has addressed its origins, construction, financing, and objectives. William L. Ochsenwald discussed the project’s financing in an article published in 1973 and later treated the subject more comprehensively in his book The Hijaz Railroad. Ufuk Gülsoy’s (1994) Hicaz Demiryolu and Richard Tourret’s (1989) Hedjaz Railway presented comprehensive histories of the line, while James Nicholson’s (2005) The Hejaz Railway and Metin Hülagü’s (2008) Bir Umudun İnşası: Hicaz Demiryolu focused more closely on its construction. More recently, Murat Özyüksel’s (2014) The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire and Jacob M. Landau’s (2016b) The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda have made significant contributions by situating the project within the contexts of modernization and propaganda, respectively. Numerous articles have also addressed various aspects of the subject.

These studies note that religious references were extensively invoked to foster acceptance of the project among Muslim publics. Existing scholarship, however, has generally treated religious discourse as a secondary element supporting the project’s political, military, and economic objectives. The concepts, references, and propaganda instruments underlying this discourse have not been examined as a coherent whole. This article seeks to address that gap by exploring how the religious discourse employed in support of the Hejaz Railway was constructed, the references on which it was based, and the means through which it was disseminated. It argues that this discourse was not merely symbolic rhetoric supporting the project’s political and economic justifications. Rather, it presented the railway as a shared Muslim cause, framed contributions as a religious duty, and sought to mobilize support while promoting Abdulhamid II’s caliphal authority.

This study examines the relationship between religious discourse, propaganda, and Pan-Islamism as it took shape around the Hejaz Railway. Pan-Islamism is understood here as an orientation that aims to transform shared religious affiliation into political and social solidarity. Under Abdulhamid II, this orientation acquired a more distinctly political character aimed at strengthening the loyalty of Muslim subjects to the imperial center (Landau 2016a, pp. 9–10). Propaganda became an important means of disseminating this policy. In this study, propaganda refers to the means employed by the Ottoman administration to increase Muslim support for the Hejaz Railway and to strengthen its authority in the wider Muslim world. Under Abdulhamid II, such propaganda was conducted through education, publishing, the distribution of religious works, the Friday selamlık ceremony, and various religious symbols (Landau 2016a, pp. 38, 57; Deringil 1999, pp. 16–31). The analysis focuses specifically on the religious dimension of these activities through texts produced around the Hejaz Railway. The conversion of a railway carriage into a mosque, complete with a small folding minaret, provides a striking example of the religious symbolism attached to the project (Simonowitz 2014, p. 309). Together with calls for Muslim solidarity around the caliphate and the increased visibility of Abdulhamid II in the wider Muslim world (Özbek 2005, pp. 69–70), such examples make the Hejaz Railway a suitable case for examining the relationship between Pan-Islamism, propaganda, and religious discourse.

In line with this conceptual framework, priority was given to sources that approached the Hejaz Railway through religious arguments and clearly employed religious discourse. The articles published by Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā in al-Manār were therefore examined. The journal’s broad Muslim readership beyond Egypt and the Ottoman domains, together with the support it received especially from Indian Muslims, made al-Manār an important medium for the circulation of Pan-Islamist ideas (Aydın 2017, pp. 66–70; Landau 2016a, pp. 125–26). Other examples include the treatise of Muhammad ‘Ārif b. Aḥmad b. Sa’īd al-Munīr al-Ḥusaynī al-Dimashqī (al-Ziriklī 2002, vol. 6, p. 180) and the treatise written by Muhammad Shākir and Sharīfzāda Muhammad Amīn, both of whom served in Syria. These texts were selected because they explicitly defended the Hejaz Railway on religious grounds and addressed specific audiences, particularly in regions where Bedouin opposition was strong. Although their actual impact cannot be measured directly, they provide important evidence for examining the religious arguments used in support of the railway. In addition, relevant news items and articles published in Sabah, İkdam, and Tercümān-ı Ḥaqīqat were assessed on the basis of existing studies in order to examine how religious arguments were foregrounded in press propaganda in support of the Hejaz Railway.

The study employs a qualitative textual analysis. The primary sources were first read in their entirety and then reassessed in light of the research questions. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which religious discourse was foregrounded, circulated, and linked to the political and religious objectives of the project. The analysis also considered how Abdulhamid II was positioned within this discourse and what broader effects were associated with it. The analytical categories were derived from recurring themes identified in the sources. Since the study focuses on religious discourse, other forms of propaganda that did not have a religious character were excluded from the scope of the analysis.

Following this introduction, the article discusses the place of the Hejaz Railway within Pan-Islamist policy and the process through which the project acquired religious and political significance. The focus then shifts to the religious arguments employed in the Muslim press, including the references on which they were based and the ways in which they were presented to the public. This is followed by an examination of how Abdulhamid II, in his capacity as caliph, was placed at the center of this discourse and how support for the railway was associated with obedience to the caliph. Particular attention is then given to the role of the ulama and other religious actors in the construction and dissemination of religious discourse. The article closes by considering the effects of the propaganda campaign, including the collection of donations, the mobilization of public support, and the acceptance of the project as a collective Muslim undertaking.

2. The Place of the Hejaz Railway Within Pan-Islamist Policy

The term Pan-Islamism is of European origin and was coined by analogy with concepts such as “Pan-Slavism,” which became widespread in the 1870s (Lee 1942, p. 279). The idea it expressed, however, can be traced back to the earliest periods of Islamic history. It has been regarded as a continuation of the ideal of a universal socio-political order established by the Prophet Muhammad, transcending differences in race, language, environment, and tradition (Qureshi 1999, p. 10). Yet the conditions created by the rapid expansion of Islam across a vast geographical area prevented the full realization not only of political unity but even of cultural unity (Özcan 2025). Nevertheless, similar ideas of Muslim unity were expressed among Muslim intellectuals through concepts such as Ittihad-i Islam, wahdat al-Islam, and jamiʿat al-Islam. Rather than developing into an organized and continuous political movement, however, this idea often remained an ideal or aspiration (Landau 2016a, pp. 3–4). Particularly in the nineteenth century, Russian expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia, British rule in India, and French expansion in North Africa contributed to a renewed sense of common Muslim belonging and solidarity (Aydın 2017, p. 37). In this process, existing ideas of unity and solidarity across different Muslim regions gradually acquired a more pronounced political character (Qureshi 1999, p. 6; Aydın 2017, pp. 73–75).

Pan-Islamism found a strong response among Ottoman intellectual circles in the second half of the nineteenth century and gradually developed into a political orientation. Its growing prominence was shaped by foreign debt, European intervention, separatist movements, and especially Russian Pan-Slavist activities in the Balkans. The Herzegovina uprising of 1875, the Bulgarian uprising of 1876, and the declarations of war by Serbia and Montenegro further intensified these pressures (Özcan 1997, pp. 54–56). As these political conditions made Pan-Islamism increasingly useful to the Ottoman administration, different interpretations emerged in the literature regarding the nature of this policy. According to Wilhelm Colmar von der Goltz (Özyüksel 2014, p. 48) and Kemal Karpat, its primary aim was to preserve the internal integrity of the empire by uniting Muslims around the authority of the caliph (Karpat 1993, pp. 1331–32). Nevertheless, it is insufficient to interpret Hamidian Pan-Islamism solely as a policy aimed at preserving internal unity. The presence of large Muslim populations under British and Russian rule also enabled the caliphate to be used in foreign policy and encouraged the strengthening of relations with Muslim communities beyond Ottoman borders (Eraslan 1996, p. 64). Hamidian Pan-Islamism should therefore be understood as a policy with interconnected internal and external dimensions. Internally, it sought to strengthen the loyalty of Muslim subjects to the central administration and the caliph. Externally, it aimed to strengthen relations with Muslims beyond Ottoman borders, create a basis for transimperial solidarity, and increase the empire’s influence in the wider Muslim world (Landau 2016a, pp. 38–40; Özcan 1997, pp. 61–62).

During the reign of Abdulhamid II, the press, educational institutions, and religious establishments were among the principal means used to disseminate Pan-Islamist policy. Newspapers with a Pan-Islamist orientation, such as Thamarāt al-Funūn, played an important role in spreading the idea of unity around the caliphate (Ochsenwald 1973, p. 134). The establishment of new schools and mosques in the Arab provinces, support for religious institutions, and the appointment of Arabs to senior positions in the Ottoman army and bureaucracy were also intended to strengthen the ties of Muslim subjects to the imperial center. One notable example was Izzet Pasha al-‘Abid of Damascus, who served as the sultan’s second secretary and chief adviser. He later played an influential role in the construction of the Hejaz Railway (Nicholson 2005, p. 7). The Hejaz Railway, one of the most concrete manifestations of these policies, became not only a means of strengthening the ties of Muslims within the empire to the center, but also a Pan-Islamist project that appealed to Muslims beyond Ottoman borders (Pears 1917, p. 162). In this respect, the railway can be regarded as one of the principal projects in which the internal and external dimensions of Ottoman Pan-Islamism converged.

The Hejaz Railway was one of the clearest examples of Abdulhamid II’s Pan-Islamist policy in practice. Accordingly, a discourse consistent with its aims was adopted in the justification of the project, in the language used during its construction, and in the fundraising campaigns. The Hejaz Railway had important military and political objectives. In its presentation to the public, however, its religious character was foregrounded. The line was presented as a charitable undertaking that would facilitate the pilgrimage and contribute to the security and development of the Holy Sanctuaries (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 207; Landau 2016b, pp. 13–14; Ochsenwald 1973, p. 130). It was also emphasized that the project belonged not only to the Ottoman Empire but to all Muslims as a shared Islamic enterprise. Within this discursive framework, support for the project was framed as a requirement of religious commitment and Islamic solidarity (Gülsoy and Ochsenwald 1998, vol. 17, pp. 441–42).

It cannot be overlooked that Abdulhamid II, like any other Muslim, wished to see the pilgrimage made easier. The principal aim of the line, however, was to strengthen military and administrative control over the Hijaz. Local actors in the region were also aware of this. Indeed, Sharif Husayn (d. 1931) regarded the railway as an Ottoman attempt to encircle the Hijaz militarily and bring it under direct control. By opposing the extension of the line from Medina to Mecca, Sharif Husayn prevented the completion of the project (Westrate 1992, p. 14). One of the most notable assessments of this issue came from the Palestinian historian Abdullah Mukhlis, who took part in the project. Mukhlis drew a clear distinction between the project’s declared justification and its underlying objective. In his view, the primary aim of the railway was to preserve Ottoman authority against British influence in the Arab lands. Plans were made to connect Jerusalem, the Hijaz, and Iraq to military centers by rail. Secret surveys were conducted for a Baghdad–Mecca line. Insistence was also placed on the construction of the Medina–Mecca and Jeddah–Mecca lines. Mukhlis regarded these initiatives as the railway project’s true objectives, which were not disclosed to the public (Mukhlis 1935, p. 6). This strategic approach was also closely related to the separatist movements in the Balkans. The Ottoman administration feared that a similar process might unfold in Arabia. Retaining control of the Hijaz and Yemen therefore became a distinct priority. As the line approached Aqaba, questions of influence and borders involving Britain and Egypt came to the fore. This situation once again revealed Istanbul’s concerns about Britain (Osman Nuri 1327, pp. 957–58).

To state the railway’s military and political objectives openly might have limited the assistance expected from Muslims outside Ottoman borders. It might equally have proven insufficient to inspire material sacrifice among Ottoman subjects. Religious motivations, by contrast, can be more effective than political rationales in mobilizing broad sections of society and in legitimizing sacrifice. This pattern is also evident in the way states have historically framed soldiers’ sacrifices in wartime through religious concepts such as martyrdom. The use of religious discourse for the Hejaz Railway was thus a deliberate choice, intended both to enlist Muslim support and to render material contributions to the project a religious responsibility. Abdulhamid II’s administration formulated a discourse consistent with this social reality, declaring that the line would be built with God’s help and the Prophet’s spiritual support, and that its principal purpose was to facilitate the pilgrimage (Gülsoy 1994, p. 41). This discourse allowed the project to be perceived as an Islamic and national undertaking. Muslims came to regard the railway as a project that would ease the pilgrimage and contribute to the development of the Holy Sanctuaries (Kurd ‘Alī 1904).

The Hejaz Railway was presented as a project that combined Abdulhamid II’s identity as a reforming ruler with his position as caliph. The Beirut Provincial Yearbook (salnâme), for instance, treated the completion of the line as one of the services of the caliph, described there as the promoter of progress in religion, learning, and public works and as the “guardian of the true religion.” This assessment provides a clear example of how an infrastructure investment was legitimized through the discourse of religious patronage and caliphal authority (Talbot 2015, p. 250). The emphasis on the caliphate was not confined to official records but also received extensive coverage in the press. The project aroused considerable interest across different parts of the Muslim world. In its issue of 27 July 1900, İkdam reported that Muslims in various regions were encouraging one another to contribute to the railway. The same report noted, on the basis of information from Bombay, that Indian Muslims had likewise approached Ottoman representatives and made donations. The newspaper presented this as evidence of loyalty to the caliphate and Islamic brotherhood (Turan 2011, p. 1207). Considered together, the entry in the Beirut Provincial Yearbook and the İkdam report suggest that the Hejaz Railway functioned as an instrument of Pan-Islamist mobilization that rallied Muslim communities across diverse regions around caliphal authority.

3. The Construction of Religious Discourse in the Press in Support of the Hejaz Railway

The press was one of the principal instruments of the propaganda campaign for the Hejaz Railway Project. Newspapers and periodicals emphasized the religious character of the project rather than its political and economic objectives, presenting the line as a sacred undertaking that concerned all Muslims. Press articles stressed that completing the railway would be a service through which Muslims could attain God’s pleasure and the Prophet’s approval. In its issue of 3 May 1900, İkdam presented the railway as an undertaking that would please the spirit of the Prophet and earn the gratitude of the entire Muslim world. Similarly, Sabah stated that the line would facilitate the performance of the pilgrimage and provide substantial benefits to Muslims. In order to reinforce the sacred character of the project, the press also published estimates suggesting that the number of pilgrims might reach five hundred thousand. The Hejaz Railway was portrayed as a religious service of such magnitude that it would lead Muslims to prostrate themselves in gratitude. Contributing to the project was framed as a charitable act that would lead to the forgiveness of sins, the attainment of divine mercy, and an enduring spiritual reward (Gülsoy 1994, pp. 52–53; Turan 2011, p. 1206).

The press campaign conducted through religious discourse became more systematic in subsequent years. Between 2 April and 11 August 1904, Tercümān-ı Haqīqat published numerous articles in support of the Hejaz Railway. In a series of twenty-one articles entitled “The Spiritual and Financial Significance of the Great Hejaz Railway,” Muktesid Musa stressed the line’s spiritual importance for the Muslim world and called upon Muslims to contribute to the project (Özyüksel 2014, p. 86). In its issue of 30 November 1907, the newspaper described the Hejaz Railway as one of Abdulhamid II’s greatest ideals and identified its principal merit as its spiritual benefits. In this respect, the project was compared with such renowned works of the past as the canals of the Nile, the Egyptian pyramids, and the Hanging Gardens of Babylon. It was argued, however, that these works lacked spiritual benefits (Koloğlu 1995, p. 298). The value of the Hejaz Railway was thus based not on its technical scale or economic returns, but on the religious services and spiritual rewards it would provide to Muslims.

The religious and spiritual significance of the Hejaz Railway was similarly highlighted in the Arab press. Muhammad Kurd ‘Alī described the project as a religious and civilizing undertaking that would connect Mecca, referred to in the Qur’an as “a valley without cultivation,” with the lands of Palestine, depicted in the Torah as a land “flowing with milk and honey.” Through this representation, the railway was presented as a project linking the fertile lands of Palestine with the Hijaz (Kurd ‘Alī 1904). Khalīl al-Khūrī, the proprietor of Ḥadīqat al-Akhbār, likewise described the project in a published ode as “the miracle of the age.” The poet emphasized the line’s function of conveying pilgrims to the Holy Sanctuaries. This discourse endowed the Hejaz Railway with a sacred and extraordinary character (Dammūs 1922, p. 334).

Another religious argument employed in the press to secure support for the Hejaz Railway was the emphasis on the fact that the project belonged to Muslims and was being carried out by Muslims. In this context, it was announced that the project would be financed by Muslims. It was also stated that Muslim engineers and workers from among Ottoman subjects would be employed in its construction wherever possible. Moreover, non-Muslims would not be permitted to enter the Holy Sanctuaries. In practice, however, a substantial proportion of the rails and rolling stock was procured from Europe. Foreign technical experts were also employed, most notably the German engineer Heinrich Meissner (Landau 2016b, p. 15). Because of its sacred character, the final section extending to Medina was completed solely by Muslim engineers and workers. The press particularly noted that this approximately 353-km section between Madā’in Ṣāliḥ and Medina was constructed without the direct involvement of foreign experts (Mukhlis 1935, p. 8).

The prominence given to religious discourse in the press served both to forestall religious objections and to safeguard Ottoman interests to some extent (Landau 2016b, p. 13). In this respect, the Hejaz Railway differed from comparable lines in Anatolia and Mesopotamia, which had been built for commercial and strategic purposes and financed largely by British, French, or German capital (Talbot 2015, pp. 248–49). Just as it had previously been emphasized that foreigners would not be admitted into the Holy Sanctuaries, the project itself was also presented as an exclusively Muslim undertaking. This portrayal also helped limit reactions to the Ottoman–German rapprochement. The Times, for example, reported that some pashas were uneasy about the growing German role in the railway’s construction. This sensitivity was further heightened by calls from some Muslim circles in India for closer relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Inshaullah believed that good relations between the two empires would contribute to the advancement of Muslims throughout the world (Wasti 1998, pp. 64–66; see also Argun and Dursun 2024, p. 10). Ultimately, the framing of the project as Islamic also served to ease concerns about foreign influence.

4. The Image of the Sultan-Caliph at the Center of Religious Discourse

In the propaganda campaign designed to increase support for the Hejaz Railway, religious arguments centered largely on Abdulhamid II himself and his caliphal authority. He was aware that the project would strengthen his political standing among both Ottoman subjects and Muslims in other countries (Nicholson 2005, p. 11). Indeed, İkdam emphasized that the railway would increase the sultan’s prestige and influence in the Muslim world (Gülsoy 1994, p. 43). Easier access to the Holy Sanctuaries would also bolster loyalty to the Ottoman caliphate. In this respect, the project was intended to extend caliphal authority beyond Ottoman borders and reinforce Abdulhamid II’s religious leadership (Özyüksel 2014, p. 59; Hülagü 2006, p. 120).

The press directly associated the benefits of the Hejaz Railway with Abdulhamid II. Particular attention was given to the rapid progress of the line, its facilitation of the pilgrimage, and the religious and economic benefits it would provide. The completion of the project was regarded as a charitable service through which Muslims would earn God’s pleasure and the Prophet’s approval. Abdulhamid II was portrayed as the principal architect of these achievements (Hülagü 2008, pp. 232–33; Turan 2011, p. 1216). Another report similarly justified support for the railway on the grounds that it would serve pilgrims visiting the Ka’ba and ensure their safety. It depicted Abdulhamid II as an exalted caliph distinguished by his sincere faith, compassion, and determination to protect pilgrims (Aydānī 1912, p. 531). Sabah likewise praised the sultan as the architect of the project and expressed the hope that his glory would endure (Gülsoy 1994, pp. 52–53; Turan 2011, p. 1206).

This focus on Abdulhamid II also shaped the project’s timing and naming. The project’s launch date and the dates chosen for the opening of its stations were arranged to reinforce this association. The order authorizing the construction of the railway was issued in May 1900 and fell on the anniversary of the sultan’s birth (Özyüksel 2014, p. 39). The commencement of construction was announced as part of the celebrations marking the twenty-fifth year of his reign and was scheduled for the anniversary of his accession to the throne (Tourret 1989, p. 11). The Damascus–Daraa section opened on 1 September 1903, marking Abdulhamid II’s accession anniversary, while the Daraa–Amman section opened in October of the same year on the occasion of his birth anniversary (Mukhlis 1935, p. 7). Because the project’s success was credited largely to the sultan, the line was also called the “Hamidiye Hejaz Railway.” The term “Hamidiye” means “worthy of praise” in Arabic while also referring directly to Abdulhamid II (Tourret 1989, p. 19; Landau 2016b, p. 16). The first train reached Medina on 23 August 1908. The official opening ceremony followed on 1 September, again marking the anniversary of the sultan’s accession (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 216).

Inscriptions placed on rails and at stations gave lasting and visible form to the religious and political prestige that Abdulhamid II sought to cultivate through the Hejaz Railway. They portrayed the railway as a charitable work of the sultan and as the product of his will, attributing its benefits directly to him. A rare section of rail preserved at the Heritage Museum of the Faculty of Tourism and Archaeology in Petra, in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, offers a striking example. Its inscription reads: “This is among the charitable works of our master, the Commander of the Faithful, Ghazi Sultan Abdulhamid Khan II. May God perpetuate his glory and victory.” (Hāshim 2021, p. 676).

A more extensive example is the Hejaz Railway inscription in Haifa, dated 1901–1902. It presented the railway as evidence of Abdulhamid II’s religious services in facilitating the pilgrimage and visits to Medina. It also stated that the Haifa line had been connected to the Hamidiye Hejaz Railway by direct order of the sultan. Abdulhamid II was thereby exalted as the caliph who served the Two Holy Sanctuaries and as the sovereign protector of Muslims. By calling upon pilgrims to pray for the strengthening of his caliphate, the text constructed an explicit discourse of legitimacy around the railway (Kreiser 1997, p. 110). The Haifa inscription contained separate Arabic and Ottoman Turkish versions, each employing a form of propaganda adapted to its intended audience. The Arabic version stressed the railway’s religious function in facilitating the pilgrimage and visits to Medina. The Ottoman Turkish version, meanwhile, placed greater weight on the sultan’s command. The former addressed the local Muslim population through a religious discourse, while the latter adopted a more official and political tone, highlighting the role of central authority and Abdulhamid II’s sovereign will in carrying out the project (Talbot 2015, pp. 263–64; one concrete example of religious symbolism on the Hejaz Railway was the mosque carriage, which featured a small minaret. see: Simonowitz 2014, p. 309).

5. The Role of the Ulama and Other Religious Actors in the Construction of Religious Discourse

The ulama contributed significantly to legitimizing support for the Hejaz Railway through religious arguments. Religious notables, Sufi networks, and bureaucrats who drew on Islamic references also participated in the production and dissemination of this discourse. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq al-‘Aẓmī al-Azharī, the imam of the Menarat Mosque in Bombay, brought the fundraising campaign to a wider audience in 1900 through Urdu-language writings published in various outlets. He regarded contributing to the project as a religious responsibility (Turan 2011, pp. 1209–10). ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq presented Abdulhamid II as the Commander of the Faithful and argued that a railway extending to Mecca would serve the entire Muslim world. In his view, the project would provide significant religious and national benefits. He therefore called upon Muslims to donate, linking such contributions to maturity of faith and love for God and His Messenger. He further regarded the railway as one of the principal means of protecting the Hijaz against possible threats from Christian powers. ‘Abd al-Qayyūm, a scholar from Hyderabad, likewise described the project as a religious and national undertaking at a meeting attended by members of the ulama and journalists in December 1900 (Ochsenwald 1973, pp. 139–40). Members of the ulama also figured prominently among the project’s early donors. The muftis of Nazareth, Jableh, Tiberias, and Nablus were among the first to contribute (Ochsenwald 1973, p. 134). Sufi circles also played an active role. Members of the Naqshbandi order, in particular, became some of the strongest supporters of the fundraising committees (Özyüksel 2014, p. 71).

The Ottoman Empire was aware of the voluntary efforts of religious scholars and, more importantly, of their influence over public opinion, which it sought to use to its advantage. The appointment of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Pasha Yūsuf, who headed the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, to take part in the project helped reduce potential opposition, particularly among religiously conservative circles (Ochsenwald 1980, pp. 6–7). Several figures with close ties to the Ottoman administration also made significant contributions to the propaganda campaign for the Hejaz Railway. Prominent among them were Muhammad ‘Arif al-Dimashqi, the author of Kitab al-Sa’ada al-Namiya al-Abadiyya fi al-Sikka al-Hadidiyya al-Hijaziyya, and Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā, who published a series of articles in al-Manār. The treatise Bashā’ir al-Injāz min Khaṭṭ al-Ḥijāz, written in 1901 by Kaymakam (district governor) Muhammad Shākir and Sanjak Emini (sanjak official) Sharīfzāda Muhammad Amīn, is also relevant to this discussion (Shākir and Amīn 2021, p. 29). Although its authors were bureaucrats, they defended the project through sustained appeals to Qur’anic verses and hadiths.

5.1. Muhammad ‘Arif al-Dimashqi

Muhammad ‘Arif al-Dimashqi probably wrote his treatise toward the end of 1900, primarily to persuade the Bedouins and some residents of Mecca and Medina. These groups opposed the project because they believed that it would harm their livelihoods (Khalil Ahmed 2023, p. 246). In response to these objections, Muhammad ‘Arif emphasized the project’s religious legitimacy. While discussing the economic benefits of the railway, he drew extensively on Qur’anic verses and hadiths. He first compared the construction of the railway to the building of a mosque. He referred to verse 18 of Sūrat al-Tawba and to the hadith stating that whoever builds a mosque will be granted a house in Paradise. Muhammad ‘Arif placed the construction of the Hejaz Railway in the same category as such meritorious acts as building and repairing mosques, making them suitable for worship, and revitalizing religious life. He supported this argument with hadiths and personal examples. He cited reports linking regular attendance at mosques with faith and religious merit. He also referred to his father, who had devoted his life to worship, teaching, and issuing fatwas. Muhammad ‘Arif further argued that the Hejaz Railway would contribute both to the physical maintenance of the sacred mosques in Mecca and Medina and to the revival of worship and educational activities within them. He therefore maintained that those who initiated or supported the railway, or contributed to its construction through their wealth and labor, would receive the same spiritual merit as those who contributed to the upkeep and religious vitality of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. He based this view on the hadith stating that whoever introduces a good practice will also share in the merit earned by those who continue it (al-Dimashqī 2016, pp. 140–42).

Another prominent feature of Muhammad ‘Arif’s treatise is his use of Qur’anic verses revealed during the Medinan period and hadiths concerning the Prophet’s efforts to finance military campaigns and encourage Muslims to take part in the struggle (Kuray 2025, pp. 97–99). He interpreted donations to the railway as both charity directed toward the development of the Holy Sanctuaries and a form of economic jihad intended to strengthen Muslims against the enemy. In this context, he cited reports stating that wealth spent in the path of God would be rewarded, that charitable giving should not be followed by reminders of one’s generosity, and that whoever equips a mujāhid receives the same reward as the mujāhid himself. On this basis, he argued that those who donated to the railway would share in the merit of facilitating the pilgrimage and ‘umra, contributing to the development of the sacred places, and strengthening the Muslim world (al-Dimashqī 2016, pp. 143–49). He also believed that the railway would reinforce solidarity among Muslims. He supported this view with Qur’anic verses and hadiths stating that believers are brothers and form a unified body whose members support one another. He placed contributions to the railway within the framework of righteousness, piety, and spending in the path of God. He stressed that such contributions would lead to personal purification, religious merit, and recompense in the hereafter (al-Dimashqī 2016, pp. 149–53). Through these arguments, Muhammad ‘Arif presented support for the project as an act of worship that would earn God’s pleasure.

One of the most striking arguments in Muhammad ‘Arif’s treatise is his response, on religious grounds, to the criticisms directed at Abdulhamid II in connection with the project. He presented heeding Abdulhamid II’s call to support the railway as a requirement of obedience to the caliph and, consequently, to God and the Prophet. He based this view on the command in verse 59 of Sūrat al-Nisā’, “Obey God, obey the Messenger, and those in authority among you,” and on the statement in verse 80 of the same sura, “Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed God.” Muhammad ‘Arif also cited the hadith stating that whoever obeys the ruler has obeyed the Prophet, while whoever disobeys the ruler has disobeyed him. On this basis, he regarded the Ottoman sultan as the legitimate ruler to whom obedience was due. According to Muhammad ‘Arif, since Sultan Abdulhamid’s order concerning the construction of the railway did not conflict with religious law, Muslims were obliged to contribute to the project through either their wealth or their labor. Such participation constituted both an obligatory act of obedience and a religious responsibility (al-Dimashqī 2016, pp. 153–56). He thus linked obedience to those in authority with obedience to God and the Prophet, equating refusal to support the railway with disobedience to God and the Prophet.

5.2. Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā

One of the scholars who most forcefully defended the project on religious grounds was Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā. In his articles published in al-Manār, he employed conspiracy theories framed in religious terms and adopted a provocative tone. Rashīd Riḍā raised the possibility that European powers might starve the population of the Hijaz if the railway were not built. His most striking argument, however, concerned the Prophet’s tomb, a particularly sensitive issue for Muslims. He alleged that Europeans harbored designs on both the Ka’ba and his burial site in Medina. He also advanced the baseless claim that the Prophet’s remains might be transferred to the Louvre Museum. By presenting the European threat through this religious conspiracy narrative, he sought to secure support for the Hejaz Railway. He argued that harm to the two sacred sites could lead ignorant Muslims to apostasy. In doing so, he invoked the Ridda Wars, one of the pivotal episodes in Islamic history. The analogy, however, was not between resistance to the railway and apostasy. Although opposition to the railway formed part of a broader political conflict over modernization and Ottoman control, Riḍā did not portray such resistance itself as an act of apostasy. Rather, he suggested that foreign domination and, more specifically, any harm inflicted on the Ka’ba or the Prophet’s tomb could so profoundly affect ignorant Muslims that some might abandon their faith. His reference to the Ridda Wars thus served to dramatize the danger of apostasy that he associated with the possible loss of Muslim control over the Holy Cities. After presenting these arguments, Rashīd Riḍā maintained that supporting the Hejaz Railway Project was a religious duty (Riḍā 1900b, pp. 313–18).

In the same article, Rashīd Riḍā grounded his support for the Hejaz Railway in Qur’anic verses. He invoked verse 7 of Sūrat al-Ṭalāq to call upon Muslims to donate according to their means. He turned to verse 40 of Sūrat al-Ḥajj in connection with the protection of the Ka’ba and the Prophet’s burial site. In his view, belief in God’s protection of these sacred places should not lead Muslims into passivity. God’s protection, he argued, operated through human agency and material means. He supported this position with such examples as the Prophet’s injury at Uhud and the damage the Ka’ba had suffered in the past. This led him to regard contributions to the railway as a practical measure for safeguarding the two sanctuaries. He drew on verses 10 and 11 of Sūrat al-Munāfiqūn to link charitable giving to accountability in the hereafter. Against pessimistic claims that the project might never be completed, he cited the call in Sūrat al-Ḥijr not to despair of God’s mercy. According to Rashīd Riḍā, the project’s failure would harm not only the Ottoman Empire but also the standing of the entire Muslim world and Muslims’ resolve to undertake major initiatives. Verses from Sūrat al-Ṣaff and Sūrat Saba' allowed him to associate donations with the concepts of economic jihad and spending in the path of God. He likewise cited verse 29 of Sūrat al-Ḥadīd in response to claims that Muslims were incapable of completing such a major project (Riḍā 1900b, pp. 317–19).

In his second article, Rashīd Riḍā focused more on the technical details of the project. He described Abdulhamid II as “a wise statesman” and stated that the sultan sought to preserve peace. He also regarded Europe’s preoccupation with the China question as an important opportunity to complete the Hejaz Railway (Riḍā 1900a, p. 358). Rashīd Riḍā wrote his third article, entitled “Loving God and His Messenger: Aid for the Hejaz Railway,” in the style of a sermon. In this article, he once again based his appeal for donations on Qur’anic verses and hadiths, presenting support for the Hejaz Railway as a religious obligation within the framework of jihad. He then addressed those who remained reluctant to support the campaign because of their opposition to Abdulhamid II. Describing the project as a good practice initiated by the sultan, Rashīd Riḍā argued that Muslims should demonstrate their devotion to God and His Messenger through worship and obedience. By obedience, he meant heeding Abdulhamid II’s call for support. He also returned to the alleged threat to the Prophet’s burial site that he had raised in his first article, although this time he expressed it in more measured terms. Toward the end of the article, he again referred to the possibility of an attack on the Holy Sanctuaries in order to appeal to Muslim religious sensibilities and thereby increase support for the project (Riḍā 1900c, pp. 361–64).

5.3. Muhammad Shākir and Sharīfzāda Muhammad Amīn

In their treatise, Muhammad Shākir and Sharīfzāda Muhammad Amīn do not describe the Bedouins who opposed the Hejaz Railway merely as communities seeking to protect their economic interests. They also portray them as people who have strayed from the fundamental principles of Islam. The authors particularly emphasize that, apart from the profession of faith, they fail to observe such religious obligations as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and almsgiving. They further regard the Bedouins’ raiding activities as a sign of religious and moral decline. In this way, they characterize Bedouin opposition motivated by economic concerns as religiously invalid and unjustified (Shākir and Amīn 2021, p. 42).

The remainder of the treatise develops the same religious themes in a more systematic manner. These include righteous deeds, the facilitation of the pilgrimage, ongoing charity, spending in the path of God, Islamic brotherhood, obedience to the caliph, and the caliphal legitimacy of Abdulhamid II. Similar themes also appear in the writings of Muhammad ‘Arif and Rashīd Riḍā. The treatise first discusses the sacred sites of the Hijaz and the hardships of the pilgrimage journey. It then associates Abdulhamid II’s services in the region with his wider activities on behalf of the Muslim community. The authors present the Hejaz Railway as a project that would contribute to the development and protection of Muslim lands. They also argue that it would help unite Muslims around the center of the caliphate (Shākir and Amīn 2021, pp. 49, 62). In this context, they present contributions to the project as both participation in a service initiated by the caliph and an expression of religious devotion to him. The concluding prayers refer to Abdulhamid II as the “Commander of the Faithful” and the “protector of religion,” indicating that the religious discourse of the treatise serves to support his caliphal legitimacy (Shākir and Amīn 2021, pp. 62–64, 81–83). The authors also justify contributions to the railway through hadith reports concerning ongoing charity. Drawing on reports about planting trees and leaving behind works from which people may benefit, they portray the railway as a “sapling” that would benefit all people and as “an undertaking founded upon piety.” Through this imagery, they argue that support for the railway constitutes an ongoing charity that would bring lasting spiritual reward (Shākir and Amīn 2021, pp. 55–58).

6. The Impact of Religious Discourse

The railway was financed through a wide range of sources, including allocations from the state budget, deductions from civil servants’ salaries, special stamps, taxes, and revenues from various concessions. Nevertheless, official discourse portrayed the railway as a collective undertaking belonging to all Muslims and called upon the public to contribute (Gülsoy 1994, p. 254). By presenting contributions as religious acts that promised spiritual reward, this discourse was used to encourage broad public support for the fundraising campaign (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 223).

To set an example, Abdulhamid II launched the campaign by making a substantial donation from his personal wealth (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 207). The project soon attracted widespread attention throughout the Muslim world. In India, 166 fundraising associations were established and considerable sums were collected. Rulers such as the Shah of Iran and the Khedive of Egypt also contributed to the campaign (Mukhlis 1935, p. 7). Donations were also sent from such diverse centers as Morocco, Bukhara, Kuwait, Singapore, and Salonica (Abushouk 2009, p. 9; for a detailed discussion of donations from Bosnia, see Karčić 2014, pp. 5–9). Various forms of assistance were provided within the Ottoman Empire as well. Some cities, including Aydın, supplied large quantities of railway sleepers. The inhabitants of Menteşe donated timber, while the Ereğli coal enterprises provided coal (Özyüksel 2014, p. 82). Registers recording the medals awarded to contributors indicate that participation extended across Yemen, Syria, Baghdad, Basra, Beirut, Egypt, India, Turkistan, and Anatolia. Moreover, those listed in these registers constituted only a limited proportion of all who contributed to the project (Ḥumayd 1992, pp. 68–69). The donations covered approximately one-third of the project’s total cost (Abushouk 2009, p. 9). Contributions from outside the Ottoman Empire accounted for approximately nine percent of the total (Özyüksel 2014, p. 70). These figures demonstrate the wide geographical reach of the fundraising campaign, in which religious discourse was prominently employed.

Religious discourse also appears to have contributed to a broad network of solidarity around the Hejaz Railway. Contributions continued throughout the construction process, while the project was increasingly presented as a religious responsibility. Supporting the railway could thus be framed as an expression of personal piety and commitment to the Muslim community. The belief that the line would facilitate the pilgrimage and help protect the Holy Sanctuaries also formed an important part of this supportive discourse (Ochsenwald 1973, p. 148). Muhammad Kurd ‘Alī’s attribution of the line’s completion to divine will likewise illustrated the religious significance that the project had acquired (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 207). Ultimately, this discourse contributed to the presentation of the Hejaz Railway not merely as a transportation investment, but also as a shared symbol of Muslim solidarity.

As discussed in the preceding sections, one of the principal aims of the project was to reinforce the Pan-Islamist policy centered on the person of Abdulhamid II. Contributions from outside the Ottoman Empire illustrated the project’s ability to attract support across different regions of the Muslim world and were consistent with its broader Pan-Islamist character. The conspiracy claims and fears of possible intervention in the Hijaz voiced in Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā’s writings also gave the project a defensive significance. According to Ochsenwald, the railway was perceived as an anti-Western project that combined religious purposes with the aim of strengthening the Sultan-Caliph militarily and politically (Ochsenwald 1973, p. 138). During this process, Abdulhamid II became, in the words of one journalist, the most popular figure in the Muslim world and the hero of the day (Özyüksel 2014, p. 60). Donations from Muslim countries ceased after Abdulhamid II was deposed in 1909. This provided one of the clearest indications of the project’s close association with his person (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 216). According to Gülsoy, his deposition caused profound sorrow, particularly in India, and brought contributions to the railway to an end (Gülsoy 1994, p. 243).

Whatever its political and military objectives, the Hejaz Railway was increasingly presented as a sacred line embodying a shared Muslim ideal. This religious significance was also reflected in its legal status. The Ottoman administration recognized the railway as an Islamic waqf belonging to the Muslim community and therefore managed it independently of the state budget. Although its administrative structure changed over time, the line retained its waqf status. Its later transfer to the Evkaf Administration confirmed the continuation of this arrangement (Kurd ‘Alī 2012, vol. 5, p. 217). The legal implications of the railway’s waqf status became clear during loan negotiations with France. As a condition of the loan, the French government requested that the Hejaz Railway serve as collateral. The Ottoman government replied that the line could neither be sold nor mortgaged and that no authority could dispose of it. It based this refusal on the railway’s status as a perpetual waqf dedicated to the Muslim community (Dammūs 1922, p. 336).

7. Conclusions

The manner in which the Hejaz Railway Project was presented to the public suggests that Pan-Islamist policy was not merely a defensive approach aimed at preserving the internal cohesion of the Ottoman Empire. It also rested on an outward-looking strategy that sought to unite Muslims beyond Ottoman borders around the caliphate. Presenting the project as a religious service was intended to encourage public support, although its actual influence on individual motivations cannot be conclusively established. At the same time, religious discourse closely tied the railway’s success to Abdulhamid II himself. Aligning the project’s key milestones with the sultan’s birth and accession anniversaries, adopting the name “Hamidiye,” and describing the railway in inscriptions as one of his charitable works all personalized its religious legitimacy in the figure of the sultan. Abdulhamid II’s deposition in 1909 coincided with the cessation of donations from across the Muslim world. This temporal association may suggest a connection between support for the Hejaz Railway and Abdulhamid II’s image as caliph, although individual motivations cannot be conclusively established. It also underscores the need for more comprehensive and dedicated research into the effects of the sultan’s deposition across the Muslim world.

A deliberate discourse guided the promotion of the Hejaz Railway and appeals for donations. Religious arguments legitimized the project by presenting it as a means of attaining God’s pleasure and the Prophet’s love, facilitating the pilgrimage, and providing spiritual benefits to Muslims. Religious scholars writing in the press played a significant role in disseminating this discourse, as did the treatises produced in support of the project. These scholars associated support for the railway with such concepts as charity, jihad, Islamic brotherhood, and loyalty to the caliph. Rashīd Riḍā, for his part, employed narratives of threat, including the claim that the Prophet’s remains might be transferred to the Louvre Museum. Through such narratives, he framed assistance to the railway as a religious and political responsibility in the face of possible Western intervention. Appeals for donations thus combined promises of spiritual reward with warnings of external threats. On the one hand, they associated contributions to the project with religious duty and spiritual merit. On the other, they emphasized possible threats to the sacred sites. Recent territorial losses and political defeats further fueled this defensive language. The Hejaz Railway came to be regarded as both a religious service and a shared undertaking aimed at protecting the Muslim world.

The Hejaz Railway’s acquisition of Islamic waqf status demonstrates that the religious discourse developed around the project was not merely a temporary propaganda instrument for raising funds. Official discourse emphasized that Muslims had built the line through their collective contributions, and the railway was therefore seen as a sacred trust belonging to all Muslims. This discourse did more than secure public support for the project. It also shaped the political meaning and legal status of the Hejaz Railway.