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18 June 2026

24 Pages

Messaging Dissent: WhatsApp as Alternative Media in Times of Protest—The Case of “Tikva”

Department of Government, Communication and Diplomacy, Jerusalem Multidisciplinary College, Jerusalem 9101001, Israel
This article belongs to the Special Issue Technology, Digital Media and Politics

Abstract

This article examines the utilization of WhatsApp as an alternative communication tool for disseminating visual content among social activists during protests. While WhatsApp is typically conceptualized as an interpersonal or group messaging platform, research on its role as an infrastructure for alternative media and citizen journalism remains limited. The study focuses on the “Tikva” group, established at the onset of the public struggle against the 2023 judicial reform in Israel, which evolved into a nine-month mass protest movement described as one of the largest in the country’s history. Through qualitative thematic content analysis of videos distributed within the group, the article explores how WhatsApp functions simultaneously as a channel for digital activism and as a site of bottom-up, democratic, non-institutional news production. The findings indicate two primary trends: functionally, WhatsApp operates as a mechanism for resource mobilization, calls to action in physical and digital spaces, and the cultivation of belonging and solidarity among activists facing institutional power; in terms of content and production, the videos articulate an anti-hegemonic discourse and challenge mainstream media conventions. The analysis shows how these videos dismantle delegitimizing frames and construct a counter-narrative depicting protesters as citizens defending democracy, thereby sustaining the protest movement’s momentum.

1. Introduction

In January 2023, Israel’s right-wing government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, announced a judicial reform that was widely perceived as threatening judicial independence and the democratic balance between branches of government. Critics argued that the proposed overhaul would significantly weaken the Supreme Court’s ability to review government actions and undermine existing checks and balances. The announcement triggered what was widely described as the largest protest movement in Israel’s history. The mobilization was characterized by weekly Saturday-night demonstrations, mid-week “days of disruption,” and large-scale participation, amounting to several million protesters across the country over nine months (Lief et al. 2023), until it was interrupted by the outbreak of war on 7 October 2023 (Swords of Iron War). The protest also brought together a broad range of sectoral organizations and social groups, including high-tech workers, academics, women’s organizations, LGBTQ activists, and reservists’ groups, reflecting the breadth of opposition to the judicial overhaul across Israeli civil society. Within the first weeks of the protest, the Tikva initiative was established as a volunteer-based project that disseminated daily protest videos via WhatsApp groups, expanding from an initial group of several hundred members to a network comprising 60,000 subscribers (according to its founder, in a video from 25 August 2023). Three months after its establishment, the initiative launched a crowdfunding campaign and has since relied on public donations to sustain its independent media activity. Positioned within this wider protest ecology, Tikva served as an alternative communication channel designed to circulate movement information, mobilize participants, and provide narratives often absent from mainstream media.
This article analyzes Tikva’s WhatsApp groups as a case study of how social change activists use a mobile messaging application as an alternative communication channel during a large-scale protest. Drawing on qualitative content analysis of videos distributed in Tikva’s Hebrew-language WhatsApp groups between April and October 2023, the study examines how WhatsApp was used to support protest mobilization, articulate critical narratives about political and institutional actors, and facilitate citizen-driven news production within a closed messaging environment. The analysis focuses on the organizational, symbolic, and production-related dimensions of this activity. Accordingly, the study addresses the following research question: How are Tikva’s WhatsApp videos used as an alternative media infrastructure amid the Israeli anti-judicial-overhaul protests for the purposes of protest mobilization and engagement, counter-hegemonic discourse, and citizen-driven news production?
The study contributes empirically grounded insight into WhatsApp’s role in contemporary protest communication. It demonstrates how a messaging app can function as an infrastructure for long-term mobilization and as a site for alternative media practices, extending existing research that has emphasized coordination and interpersonal communication. The article is structured as follows: the next section provides a literature review, followed by a description of the methodology, presentation of the findings, a discussion and conclusion section, and a final section that offers concise concluding remarks.

2. Literature Review

In the upcoming literature review, I situate the present study within three intersecting theoretical frameworks: alternative media and citizen journalism, digital activism on social media, and recent discussions of WhatsApp as an alternative communication infrastructure during protests.

2.1. Alternative Media and Citizen Journalism

Alternative media is a broad term that encompasses a variety of communication models whose core characteristics are a non-commercial orientation, non-professional production, and non-institutional control. These media are typically operated “from below” by individuals and groups (Atton 2004, 2011; Downing 2001). They advance an agenda that is distinct from that of the mainstream press, continuously challenging hegemonic narratives and voicing criticism of political, economic, and media institutions (Atton and Hamilton 2008; Downing 2003). Unlike commercial, professional news media that claim objective reporting and are driven by financial profit, alternative media openly acknowledge their ideological standpoint, rely on first-hand testimonies, and explicitly seek social change (Allan 2009; Allan and Thorsen 2026; Atton and Hamilton 2008).
Within this field, citizen journalism constitutes a central expression of alternative media. “Witnessing citizens” document events in real time, often from locations that are difficult for professional journalists to access, and produce raw evidence of injustice, violence, or protest (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013; Cooper 2026). Studies show that such documentation adds information and perspectives that are frequently missing from mainstream news coverage, especially in situations of conflict and emergency (Horoub 2026). Early alternative online media platforms such as Indymedia, founded around the late-1990s anti-globalization protests, enabled activists to publish reports, photographs, and raw testimonies from the streets, bypass commercial news channels, and offer alternative framings of clashes with the police and collective protest identities (Atton 2004; Downing 2003). In these contexts, citizen journalists act as “moral journalists” who expose injustices and speak in the name of social justice, thereby challenging the professional press’s monopoly over defining what counts as news and which perspectives are legitimate (Walker 2026; Wall 2015; Wiesslitz and Ashuri 2011).
These content and organizational characteristics position alternative media as an important democratic resource that strengthens civil society and fosters a more pluralistic public sphere (Benkler et al. 2015; Downing 2001). For social movements, such media enable activists to produce and circulate representations of themselves that they perceive as more accurate and trustworthy and to build political communities around shared narratives and collective belonging (Bailey et al. 2008; Chan 2026; Couldry and Hepp 2017).

2.2. Digital Activism and Social Media as Infrastructure

The diffusion of the internet and social media has significantly expanded the repertoire of action available to protest movements and social change organizations. Digital activism is commonly defined as the use of online platforms and technologies to advance social, political, or environmental goals by circulating information, mobilizing supporters, and coordinating collective action (Castells 2015; Gerbaudo 2012). Social media platforms allow activists to bypass mainstream media gatekeepers and generate alternative representations of protest that challenge the dominant “protest paradigm” in legacy news (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Jiang et al. 2022; Wiesslitz 2019, 2023).
Beyond their communicative role, social media also function as organizational infrastructures: they reduce coordination and organizational costs for collective action (Farrell 2012) and enable recruitment, the construction of collective identities, and the strengthening of solidarity among activists (Jost et al. 2018; Kavada 2015). Movements such as Occupy Wall Street and the Spanish Indignados relied on Facebook and Twitter (now X) to convene assemblies in public squares, disseminate real-time logistical information from the ground, and maintain online protest communities that remained active between street demonstrations (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Castells 2015; Poell and van Dijck 2018).
Research on networked social movements shows that contemporary repertoires of action—organizing demonstrations, running online campaigns, and sustaining protest communities—increasingly depend on digital infrastructures and on the logic of “connective action” embedded in social media platforms (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). Building on this, platform affordances shape how activists construct visual symbols and collective identities around protest (Gerbaudo and Treré 2015; Khazraee and Novak 2018). Papacharissi’s work on affective publics (2014) shows how emotional expressions and short, affect-laden content on social media foster networked publics organized around political events and protests. Along these lines, Makhortykh and González Aguilar (2020) demonstrate how such publics take shape around protest campaigns through the interplay of political memory, emotions, and visual repertoires expressed in memes and other emotionally charged visual content.
At the same time, critical scholarship points to important constraints. The commercial and algorithmic logics of these platforms, combined with the growing possibilities for monitoring and surveillance, may limit the autonomy of movements and undermine their capacity to sustain long-term protest (Dencik and Leistert 2015; Heh and Wainwright 2022; Kavada 2015). Tufekci (2017) emphasizes the possible gap between visible “signals” of viral attention and the underlying organizational “capacities” of movements, suggesting that digital media are a source of power but also of structural fragility for contemporary protests.

2.3. WhatsApp as Alternative Media During Protests

Against this backdrop, WhatsApp stands out as a digital platform whose sociotechnical features differ from those of open, algorithmically curated platforms such as Facebook or Twitter (X). Instead of public feeds governed by recommendation systems, WhatsApp is based on conversations and relatively closed groups grounded in pre-existing ties, trust, and stronger user control over group composition and information flows (Milan and Barbosa 2020; Scherman et al. 2022). Empirical studies show that in a variety of protest contexts worldwide, WhatsApp has served as a key infrastructure for logistical coordination, real-time information sharing, and the maintenance of protest networks over time (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Scherman et al. 2022). For example, Milan and Barbosa (2020) analyze the Brazilian WhatsApp group #UnidosContraOGolpe and show how participants used it to schedule marches, share information neglected by mainstream media, and construct a collective identity as “WhatsAppers.” Treré (2020) highlights the role of WhatsApp groups in Mexico and Spain as “backstage” spaces of everyday activism, where logistical updates, political rumors, humor, and practices of solidarity intermingle in ways that help sustain activist networks beyond the peak moments of visible protest.
As an alternative media channel, WhatsApp thus provides a central infrastructure for creating news and activism circuits that operate outside direct state or mainstream media control. Participants themselves decide which reports, videos, and calls to action to produce and circulate further. Protest-oriented WhatsApp groups serve as spaces for circulating informational and counter-hegemonic content. At the same time, they also function as affective spaces for ongoing conversation, processing experiences from the field, and strengthening feelings of belonging and solidarity (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Ozawa et al. 2024; Scherman et al. 2022).
In visual terms, WhatsApp has become an important arena for citizen video journalism. Short video clips documenting events on the ground—confrontations with security forces, road blockages, or protest rituals—are produced and shared by participants themselves. Research on the Yellow Vests movement in France, for instance, shows how citizen videographers assumed responsibility for documenting demonstrations on social networks, producing hundreds of videos that focused especially on exposing police violence and constructing an alternative public image of the protest (Baisnée et al. 2022). Scholarship on video activism underscores the power of testimonial videos, mobilizing clips, and political mash-ups to shape protest narratives, spur participation, and contribute to an emerging visual archive of the struggle (Askanius 2013; Eder et al. 2025; Kotaman and Şener 2024; Ristovska 2016).
From a broader perspective, recent studies indicate that WhatsApp functions simultaneously as a news channel, a space for political discussion, and an infrastructure for civic engagement, including participation in both legal and illegal protest activities (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Ozawa et al. 2024; Scherman et al. 2022). WhatsApp should therefore be seen not merely as an everyday messaging app but as an alternative communication infrastructure and media channel that can become a central tool combining bottom-up content production, the organization of collective action, and the construction of sustained protest narratives.

3. Methodology

This study employs a qualitative single-case design combined with in-depth thematic content analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006; Yin 2018). The case is the Tikva network of WhatsApp groups, selected as an information-rich instance of WhatsApp functioning as a central communication tool for the protest movement during the 2023 Israeli anti-judicial-overhaul protests. The research period spans 29 April 2023 to 6 October 2023. The starting point was prompted by a video disseminated in the Tikva groups on 29 April 2023, which reported that the network had reached 44,000 members. This figure signaled that Tikva had become a large-scale phenomenon with a critical mass of participants, warranting systematic scholarly attention. The closing date (6 October 2023) captures the movement at its peak, the day before the outbreak of the Iron Swords War, which fundamentally reshaped Israel’s political and media landscape.
The working corpus consists of 407 videos that were downloaded to the researcher’s private computer in near-real time during the research period and that remained playable at the time of download (WhatsApp videos often become inaccessible shortly after circulation; see Barbosa and Milan 2019). Since the Tikva administrators disseminated identical materials simultaneously across all of the movement’s WhatsApp groups, the corpus was drawn from one representative group. From this corpus, sampling followed a sequential, criterion-based purposive logic aimed at identifying information-rich units (Patton 2015; Sandelowski 1995). Rather than applying a fixed sample size, videos were selected iteratively along two axes: the predefined analytic categories described below and the months of the research period. Within each calendar month, videos representing all categories were analyzed until thematic saturation was reached—the point at which additional units no longer generated new conceptual insights (Saunders et al. 2018; Strauss and Corbin 1998). This procedure, consistent with qualitative rather than statistical sampling logic, yielded an analytic sample of 250 Hebrew-language videos. Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the Tikva video corpus and the analytic sample used in this study.
Table 1. Overview of the video corpus and analytic sample.
The analysis followed a reflexive thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke 2006), combining deductive and inductive elements. Analysis was conducted through iterative coding grounded in the theoretical frameworks of digital activism, alternative media, and citizen journalism (Allan and Thorsen 2009; Atton 2004; Castells 2015; Downing 2001). In a first step, videos were coded using predefined analytic categories derived from the literature, encompassing three families of analytic categories: (1) activist functions, such as mobilization and calls to action; (2) counter-hegemonic discourse, such as criticism of political leaders, police, and mainstream media, debunking misinformation, and “us/them” language; and (3) alternative production esthetics, such as speaker identity, direct-to-camera address, field-sourced footage, and numerical rhetoric. In a second, iterative step, additional themes were developed inductively through close engagement with the corpus—for example, a “patriots” narrative and patterns related to solidarity and belonging—rather than being imposed a priori. This inductive phase involved repeated reading of the coded data within and across categories, identifying recurring patterns, and progressively clustering them into broader thematic groupings. Through this process, related patterns were organized hierarchically into overarching themes and more specific subthemes that captured different facets of the same analytic family. This deductive–inductive process underpins the three overarching themes presented in Section 4 (a list of the deductive coding categories used in the analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request).
Although WhatsApp is typically conceptualized as a private messaging platform, the Tikva WhatsApp groups operate differently. Administrators alone upload content and explicitly instruct members to submit raw materials via email or a designated phone number, rather than through the WhatsApp groups themselves. In practice, this structure creates a one-to-many broadcast channel rather than a participatory or dialogic space. Following Nissenbaum’s framework of contextual integrity, reasonable expectations of privacy in such settings are shaped not only by the platform’s technical affordances but also by the communicative norms, purposes, and patterns of use that characterize the specific context (Nissenbaum 2004).
In the case of Tikva, these norms indicate a public-facing, media-oriented setting. Through Tikva’s videos, the founder, Ran Har-Nevo, repeatedly presents the initiative as an alternative media outlet and encourages recipients to circulate its videos beyond the groups themselves. The groups therefore function less as private messaging spaces and more as bounded channels for distributing protest media. This public orientation is further reinforced by the fact that Tikva videos were also uploaded to open platforms such as YouTube and other social media, indicating that their intended circulation extended beyond the closed WhatsApp environment and into what Boyd (2010) terms “networked publics.” In this sense, the administrative gatekeeping and distribution logic in Tikva resemble the dynamics of network gatekeeping described by Barzilai-Nahon (2008), positioning the groups functionally closer to media outlets than to private interpersonal communication.
At the same time, scholarship on the ethics of researching WhatsApp and other chat apps cautions against treating content on such platforms as ethically unproblematic simply because it is widely circulated. Barbosa and Milan (2019) argue that research on WhatsApp should be guided by a “do no harm” approach that is contextual, iterative, and attentive to the specific communication infrastructure through which content circulates. Similarly, Zimmer (2010) shows that the apparent accessibility of online material does not by itself resolve ethical questions concerning privacy, consent, and the risk of re-identification. Fiesler and Proferes (2018) further demonstrate that people’s perceptions of the acceptability of social media research depend heavily on context, topic, and possible identifiability, rather than on a simple public/private distinction.
In line with these discussions, the study was designed around a set of data-minimization and harm-reduction principles (Barbosa and Milan 2019; Fiesler and Proferes 2018; Zimmer 2010). These include the exclusive use of administrator-posted protest videos, without collecting any additional platform data about group members, and a commitment not to re-identify or further expose individuals beyond what is already visible in the original videos. Given the political nature of the content, the material is therefore not treated as simply “public,” but as publicly oriented protest media analyzed under these minimizations and “do no harm” constraints.

4. Findings

The findings are organized around a set of overarching themes, structured across three analytic dimensions: the first examines WhatsApp as an infrastructure for digital activism—mobilization, commitment, and community. The second focuses on the symbolic dimension, analyzing WhatsApp as a space for alternative communication that produces critical content and counter-narratives challenging political and institutional power. The third explores the dimension of democratic production and shows how WhatsApp enables the de-institutionalization of news production (Atton 2002), positioning Tikva as an alternative news source.
To provide an overview of the analytical structure, Table 2 summarizes the three analytic dimensions and the sub-themes identified in the Tikva video corpus. The table links each sub-theme to its corresponding analytical dimension and offers a brief description of its focus. This visual summary is intended to guide the reader through the structure of the findings presented in Section 4.1, Section 4.2 and Section 4.3.
Table 2. Analytical dimensions and themes identified in the Tikva video corpus.

4.1. Digital Activism: WhatsApp as a Tool for Building a Protest Movement

Research on digital activism shows that digital platforms have become central infrastructures for recruiting participants, coordinating activity in real time, creating collective identities, and sustaining long-term engagement (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Castells 2015). WhatsApp’s role in contemporary protests has attracted growing scholarly attention, particularly due to its distinctive features: rapid circulation, a sense of intimacy, relative privacy protection, and the potential for creating decentralized networks (Milan and Barbosa 2020).
The first part of the findings examines how WhatsApp helped build the protest movement against the judicial overhaul and sustain activists’ involvement over nine months. The analysis identifies three main patterns: WhatsApp as an infrastructure for protest mobilization, fostering a sense of belonging and commitment to the movement, and building community and solidarity among protesters.

4.1.1. WhatsApp as an Infrastructure for Protest Mobilization

In the findings, WhatsApp emerges as a central infrastructure for protest mobilization, both in logistical-operational terms and in emotional-community terms. Beyond serving as a communication channel, the app functions as a mechanism for transforming raw information from the field into timed calls to action directed at supporters of the struggle.
One dimension of mobilization manifests in calls for immediate action during moments of crisis. In a video circulated during a demonstration on Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv (11 July 2023), on-the-ground footage of police violence is combined with captions such as “Unbearable police violence now on Kaplan” and “Come now to help the protesters.” The direct second-person address and the explicit imperative verbs (“Take a flag,” “Come now,” “Share”) generate a sense of personal urgency and are designed to recruit activists to the site of confrontation within minutes. Other videos document “detainee alerts”—calls to come to police stations, sing, make noise, and support those arrested—turning encounters with law enforcement into focal points for further mobilization.
Another dimension focuses on organizing participation in ongoing events and encouraging “bottom-up” initiatives. During a four-day march from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, videos documented progress in real time, combining drone shots that visualized the scale of participation with route information and maps, alongside an emphasis on the growing number of participants joining along the way. The videos also showed nearby residents voluntarily providing food and sleeping infrastructure for the marchers, creating an image of a broad community rallying around the event. This pattern echoes other independent initiatives, such as that of an activist who created a WhatsApp group for hundreds of foreign correspondents and sent them translated materials about the protest. In a related video, he describes this initiative and calls on activists to consider how their own skills can contribute to the struggle. In both cases, the videos highlight individuals who not only “respond to a call” but also independently build new infrastructures of support and action around the protest.
Overall, the findings show that WhatsApp plays a key role in the protest’s mobilization ecology. It enables immediate calls to rally at sites of confrontation, supports the construction of mass participation in ongoing events, and encourages independent “bottom-up” civic initiatives. In this sense, WhatsApp functions not only as a recruitment and distribution channel but also as a decentralized “war room” infrastructure for managing a prolonged struggle, connecting the digital sphere and collective action in the streets.

4.1.2. Fostering Belonging and Activist Commitment

The circulation of videos in WhatsApp groups of activists and supporters enabled the rapid transfer of visual representations of the protest to those directly involved in it, thereby strengthening participants’ sense of belonging and commitment to the movement. A protest movement that operates over many months requires active maintenance mechanisms to prevent activist burnout, especially when the struggle involves weekly demonstrations at hundreds of locations and frequent “days of disruption” that demand substantial time and emotional resources. The findings indicate that one central function of the videos was to translate personal effort into a sense of collective pride and to depict each participant as part of a broader historical process.
A striking example is a video from the protest’s 25th week (24 June 2023), which relies on what could be seen as a “politics of numbers” tactic. The video moves from an image of a dark, empty tunnel to broad drone shots of Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv packed with tens of thousands of protesters. On top of the footage, large captions appear stating “225,000 protesters” and declaring “The largest demonstration in the country’s history,” followed by the concluding message “Stepping it up.” The visual shift from isolation to mass mobilization, combined with quantitative indicators and a closing call to intensify the struggle, frames each protester as part of a “critical mass” and reinforces the sense that their personal effort is present, visible, and documented within a collective story larger than the individual.
Additional videos strengthen the sense of belonging by consistently representing the protest’s nationwide spread through fast-paced montages of dozens of demonstration sites across Israel, showing crowds waving flags and marching on bridges under chants of “Democracy.” Others summarize the protest’s achievements, such as halting legislative processes or garnering international support, framing these outcomes as the product of a broad popular effort. Further videos highlight the social and political diversity of participants—religious and secular, women, Arab-Israelis, and right-wing activists—thereby challenging the media image of the protest as a “secular leftist” struggle and expanding the boundaries of the collective with which viewers can identify.
By means of visual representations of massive crowds, emphasis on national spread, documentation of concrete achievements, and the portrayal of diverse supporter identities, the WhatsApp videos aim to reinforce participants’ sense of “being part of a broad movement” and build a stable collective identity around the struggle. Belonging to a movement and its principles, however, is not identical to everyday experiences of closeness, care, and mutual support among individual protesters. Sustained protest also requires emotional mechanisms of fraternity and shared courage on the ground—the focus of the following sub-theme.

4.1.3. Community and Collective Solidarity on WhatsApp

Whereas the previous sub-theme addressed the creation of belonging to the protest movement as a broad collective and the translation of personal effort into movement-level pride, the present sub-theme shows how WhatsApp videos create an emotional mechanism that promotes collective community and solidarity. This occurs through depictions of mutual support between protesters, mobilization for detained or injured participants, and the highlighting of shared courage in the face of violence and repression.
In this context, videos that emphasize solidarity with injured or detained protesters are particularly prominent. For example, in the video “For every detainee, a thousand will come” (27 June 2023), protesters stand outside a police station with Israeli flags, drums, and banners supporting those arrested. On the video, red captions appear: “The rules of the game have changed, solidarity will beat the hate machine. For every detainee, a thousand will come. Take a flag and come show support.” The combination of a singing crowd and a direct second-person call frames the protesters as a fighting community that protects its detainees and invites viewers to move from passive watching to physically joining the circle of solidarity.
Many videos also document severe injuries sustained by protesters during demonstrations and their transformation into heroic figures. One example is Michael Fish (8 July 2023), who speaks from his hospital bed about losing his eyesight and urges others not to give up on the protest. Other videos, such as “We Won’t Stop” (16 June 2023), focus on individual faces—a child holding a sign, a young woman shouting, and a man standing in front of a water cannon—and conclude with slogans like “Just keep walking” and “We won’t stop!!!,” emphasizing perseverance and willingness to pay a personal price as part of a shared struggle. By presenting the human faces of the struggle and conveying anger, tears, and frustration, the videos aim to generate deep emotional identification among viewers and to maintain a sense of solidarity with protesters. In this way, the WhatsApp protest videos create a mechanism of community and solidarity that helps sustain activist engagement over time by underscoring bravery and perseverance in the face of violence and repression. These findings challenge conceptions of “clicktivism” that view digital activism as shallow and emotionally thin. In this case, WhatsApp functions as a platform for constructing an emotional mechanism that translates personal vulnerability—injury, arrest, and exposure to violence—into a collective story of civic heroism, aiming to deepen commitment and reduce the risk that engagement will remain at the level of likes and shares only.
In sum, the first part of the findings shows that WhatsApp served as a central instrumental infrastructure for building a sustained protest movement against the judicial overhaul. Videos in the Tikva groups enabled immediate mobilization to sites of confrontation, coordination of participation in ongoing events, and encouragement of “bottom-up” civic initiatives, while strengthening feelings of belonging, commitment, and solidarity. These dynamics reflect an effort to build a stable collective identity around the movement and to encourage ongoing activist engagement over time. In doing so, the videos transformed participants’ personal investments into a source of collective pride and power, framing ongoing participation in a protest that lasted many months as an expression of this collective strength. WhatsApp thus emerges not merely as a distribution channel but as a key mechanism of emotional and organizational mobilization; the next part shows that the same videos not only recruit and connect activists but also serve as vehicles for critical discourse and counter-narratives challenging hegemonic political and media discourse in Israel.

4.2. Challenging Dominant Discourse: Counter-Narratives on WhatsApp

Alternative media are often associated with the production of counter-narratives—stories intentionally constructed to contest dominant narratives promoted by powerful actors (Atton 2002; Bamberg and Andrews 2004). These narratives conduct systematic discursive work by deconstructing official messages and reassembling them in contexts that call their credibility into question, in line with what Snow and Benford (1988) describe as diagnostic framing, whereby social movements identify a problem and attribute responsibility to specific actors.
This section examines how Tikva WhatsApp videos generate narratives that challenge dominant political and institutional discourse. The analysis identifies five recurrent patterns: de-legitimizing politicians, criticizing the police, constructing a patriotic identity for protesters, using national symbols as a legitimizing resource, and drawing sharp discursive boundaries that distinguish protesters from “others.”

4.2.1. Criticism and De-Legitimization: Framing Politicians as Untrustworthy

The Tikva WhatsApp videos embody a key feature of alternative communication: the production of critical discourse that challenges the dominant narratives of political power holders and offers alternative framing of events. In contrast to mainstream media, which tend to maintain restrained rhetoric, the videos use direct language, satire, and tactics of culture jamming (Atton 2002, 2004), presenting politicians’ own words and turning them against them.
One prominent pattern is the portrayal of Prime Minister Netanyahu as presenting a false picture to the public. In a video edited from an interview with the British network Sky News (9 June 2023), the interviewer confronts Netanyahu with data about the depreciation of the Israeli shekel, a drop in high-tech investment, and a downgraded credit outlook, while Netanyahu responds with denials. The video’s producers add captions that refute his statements in real time, alongside a clip of the Governor of the Bank of Israel explaining the economic costs of the judicial overhaul. The video thus undermines Netanyahu’s credibility and exposes the gap between the official narrative and economic reality. Another video, titled “Liar Son of a Liar” (10 July 2023), uses Netanyahu’s own words about “selective enforcement” against him: under the caption “And now, the facts,” archival footage of violence from past protests is shown, ending with the statistic “Six months of struggle, thousands of demonstrations, zero violence against police officers.” Through this contrast, the video seeks to refute portrayals of the protest as violent or “anarchist.”
The personal criticism extends to cabinet ministers and relies heavily on humor and satire. In one of many videos targeting National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir (9 May 2023), a split-screen technique contrasts intensive military activity during a rocket attack (fighter jets, tanks, high-level security meetings) with footage of Ben-Gvir attending social events at the same time. Protesters label him “the TikTok minister,” while captions such as “No one counts you,” “They sideline you,” and “This is too big for you” present him as irrelevant and incompetent. Another video about Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (7 May 2023) strings together negative economic headlines before culminating in the caption “The most failed finance minister in Israel’s history.” Epithets like “liar,” “zero,” “TikTok minister,” and even “terrorist” reflect a willingness to challenge hegemonic norms of political discourse not usually crossed by mainstream media, which aim to maintain a “statesmanlike” tone.
In sum, the examined videos show how WhatsApp serves as a space for circulating critical content and building anti-hegemonic narratives vis-à-vis those in power. Through ironic editing, the use of data and archival footage, and direct, sometimes harsh language, content creators seek to undermine the legitimacy of the country’s leadership and frame the protest as a justified civic struggle. In doing so, the findings extend discussions of culture jamming and alternative media: strategies of disruption, counter-interpretation, and creative use of official materials (often analyzed in the context of brands and corporations) are here applied directly to the Prime Minister and his ministers, challenging not only their personal credibility but also the authoritative status of institutional discourse as such. The de-legitimization of political elites is accompanied by ongoing criticism of the police, presented as an enforcement arm serving the regime rather than the public—the focus of the next sub-theme.

4.2.2. Critical Discourse Against the Police: Serving the King, Not the Kingdom

A rich body of research on media coverage of protests documents the “protest paradigm”—a pattern whereby mainstream media rely heavily on institutional sources, depict protesters as violent, and present the police response as reluctant and proportionate (Chan and Lee 1984; Hertog and McLeod 1995; McFarlane and Hay 2003). Alternative media often invert this perspective, positioning citizens in the street as heroes and the police as a repressive arm of the regime. The videos analyzed in this study clearly demonstrate such an inversion.
One example is “Serving the Kingdom, Not the King” (9 June 2023), which intercuts a speech by one of the protest leaders with footage of protesters marching with flags and scenes of police violence (pushing, choking a protester on the ground, and aggressive arrests). The speaker describes a “chain of command” that begins with the government and descends to “the last police officer,” criticizing “disproportionate police violence” and “humiliating treatment” of citizens. Yet he addresses officers as “our brothers and sisters” and calls on them “to serve the kingdom, not the king”—an explicit allusion to Netanyahu as an authoritarian monarch. In this way, the counter-narrative separates the institution of the police from the political leadership that directs it.
A second video, “We Won’t Stop” (16 June 2023), offers a more visual and emotional counter-narrative, presenting first-person footage of clashes with police, water cannons, and aggressive arrests alongside diverse faces of the protest—young and old, children, pride flags alongside Israeli flags—and ending with the caption “We won’t stop until the threat is removed.” Here, criticism of the police is conveyed mainly through images of excessive force against citizens, casting the police as an instrument of repression rather than public protection.
Together, these videos illustrate how WhatsApp enables the production of counter-narratives to the protest paradigm. They present “the truth” through authentic field footage, position protesters as protagonists, and cast security forces as serving the regime rather than the public, thereby offering viewers an alternative framing to that of mainstream media. This finding adds a unique layer to discussions of the protest paradigm: not only does the citizen’s camera “provide the other side,” it also consciously constructs an alternative narrative in which the police are positioned as a political arm rather than a neutral professional body, undermining one of the pillars of representative democracy—public trust in law-enforcement institutions as actors above partisan conflict. To counter attempts at de-legitimization by politicians and media, the videos do more than criticize state institutions: they also construct a positive patriotic identity for protesters themselves, as the next sub-theme shows.

4.2.3. The Patriots Narrative: Military Service as a Source of Legitimacy for Protest

One of the most prominent counter-narratives in the WhatsApp videos is the construction of a patriotic identity for protesters, as a response to attempts by government members to label them “refuseniks” (Israelis who refuse military service on grounds of conscience or protest) and “traitors.” In the Israeli context, where military service constitutes a central criterion for full citizenship and social status, the videos turn it into a discursive resource that legitimizes the protest and neutralizes efforts to stigmatize protesters as disloyal. In the terms of Benford and Snow (2000), this constitutes motivational framing—building a rationale for collective action through symbols and identities that carry recognized moral weight.
One salient pattern in this context is the use of military service—both active-duty and reserve—as an indicator of patriotism and moral entitlement to criticize the government. In many videos, reserve pilots and members of “Brothers in Arms” (a reserve organization) explain their decision to suspend service, presenting it as a painful act motivated by commitment to democracy rather than refusal to serve. In that context, WhatsApp videos construct a patriotic identity for these protesters in response to efforts to label them “refuseniks” or “traitors,” thereby reversing the hegemonic narrative. When such figures are injured by police, the videos stress their military roles, turning harm inflicted on them into further evidence of the gap between their patriotic contribution and their treatment by state institutions.
This pattern is not limited to reservists and pilots; it extends to civilian sectors not initially associated with security discourse, most notably the high-tech industry. In a video from 18 May 2023, a high-tech entrepreneur speaking before a Knesset (Israel’s parliament) committee about the economic risks that political instability poses to the high-tech sector and the Israeli economy opens by declaring that he is a Zionist and that he and his children serve in the army—a symbolic “entry ticket” that protects him from the “traitor” label and enables him to criticize the overhaul from a position of full legitimacy.
These findings indicate that military service functions in the WhatsApp videos as a central discursive resource, unique to the Israeli context, from which protest spokespersons—pilots, reservists, and high-tech entrepreneurs alike—derive moral authority to criticize the government and shield themselves from de-legitimization. In Bernstein’s (1997) terms, this constitutes identity deployment—the strategic use of a recognized, positive group identity to secure legitimacy in the public sphere.
The contribution of the Israeli case to this discussion lies in illustrating how a military-patriotic identity becomes, in the videos, almost a precondition for legitimate political criticism: only those who have met the demands of “good citizenship” are allowed to criticize the government without being classified as traitors. This finding highlights a tension between using a military identity as a source of movement power and the risk that democratic legitimacy becomes overly tied to membership in security-economic elites. At the same time, this concern with a predominantly military-patriotic narrative is partially tempered by the videos’ broader symbolic repertoire, which extends patriotism beyond military service to the wider Israeli public and adds a separate civic frame alongside the military one as an additional way of constructing a patriotic identity. This civic frame is the focus of the next sub-theme.

4.2.4. “#To Be a Free People in Our Land”: National Symbols as a Legitimizing Resource

Beyond the military-patriotic framing, the Tikva WhatsApp videos also rely on a rich civic symbolic repertoire designed to locate the protest within—rather than outside—Israeli national identity. The videos consistently and deliberately use national symbols—the Israeli flag, the Declaration of Independence, the national anthem, and slogans such as “Democracy,” “No security without democracy,” and “Democracy or rebellion”—to frame the protest as a patriotic struggle to defend democracy. The phrase “To be a free people in our land,” from the national anthem “Hatikva,” appears as the closing caption in every Tikva video, anchoring even the harshest critical content within a framework of national commitment. In Gamson’s (1992) terms, these videos construct a collective action frame that combines injustice (the overhaul as a threat to democracy), agency (citizens’ capacity to halt the process), and identity (defining protesters as freedom fighters). The use of national symbols is meant to position protesters as defending the state’s foundational values—democracy, freedom, and civil rights—thereby neutralizing attempts to label them “anti-Israeli” or anarchists.
A video from 30 April 2023 documents demonstrations at dozens of locations across Israel, where people everywhere hold Israeli flags. Over images of crowds and protest signs bearing the words “Shame” and “Democracy,” the speaker declares: “The government of Israel has chosen to turn against Israeli stateliness,” and later: “We are recharging the blue-and-white (colors of the flag) with its deep and original core values.” The video concludes with the caption “Whoever rises up against Israeli democracy will meet us across the country,” as a drone shot reveals a giant banner reading “We’ve only just begun” under a stylized Israeli flag. The rhetoric distinguishes between political institutions and the state’s foundational values: criticism is directed not at Israel as such, but at government policy, framed as deviating from the country’s constitutive principles. The flag becomes a symbol that enables harsh criticism while maintaining national pride and belonging, as expressed in another video stating: “We are the last line of defense for democracy”—a phrase that positions protesters as guardians of the values on which the state was founded, rather than as a threat to it.
The findings demonstrate that this patriotic repertoire functions not only as a shield against de-legitimization but also as an offensive resource that allows the protest movement to claim symbolic ownership of “the real Israel” and cast the government as deviating from its founding values. At the same time, the use of national symbols is intertwined with dichotomous rhetoric that draws sharp boundaries between supporters of the struggle against the judicial overhaul and “everyone else.” In a speech documented at one demonstration (30 April 2023), a speaker tells the crowd: “While we carry the burden of reserve duty and taxes, groups of messianic people called us an empty cart. […] Our cart is loaded with the values of freedom and equality regardless of religion, race, and gender. Our cart is packed with love of the land.” This quote illustrates how patriotic symbols underpin a clear line between “us”—those who bear the burden and love the country—and “them,” a discursive dynamic that forms the basis for the next sub-theme.

4.2.5. “We Are the People We’ve Been Waiting for”: Discursive Boundaries Between Light and Darkness

One of the central discursive features of the WhatsApp videos is the systematic use of dichotomous language that constructs a separation between “us” and “them.” Van Dijk (2012) describes this as the ideological square—a discursive structure that emphasizes the positive attributes of the in-group and the negative attributes of the out-group. In the analyzed videos, “we” are the protesters—citizens who love the country, are democratic, and bear the societal burden—while “they” are the government and coalition members, depicted as a dark, messianic, disconnected force acting against Israeli society.
This pattern appears in a structured and consistent manner across many videos. In a video from 3 May 2023, the first part is built as a series of accusations, each beginning with “They are harming…”—the people’s army, women, LGBTQ people, the future of all—over offensive remarks by pro-overhaul politicians. The second part shifts to drone footage of crowds waving flags and chanting “Democracy,” contrasting “they,” the politicians inside the Knesset, who are detached from the people, with “we,” the protesters who fill the public space outside as an unstoppable force. A closing call to demonstrate under the slogan “To be a free people in our land” links dichotomous language with national symbols and the moral elevation of one side.
The same logic appears in videos dealing with different issue areas. In a video calling for support for participants in the Jerusalem Pride Parade (1 June 2023), archival clips of coalition MKs expressing homophobic positions are juxtaposed with colorful parade footage, positioning protesters as “the enormous liberal camp” defending equality and human rights against a “dark government.” In another video (23 May 2023) about coalition budget allocations, “we” are defined as “productive,” caring about the country’s future, while “they” are depicted as a distant, harmful body engaged in “bribery” and “plundering” the public purse. In these cases, the distinction between “us” and “them” is consistently accompanied by sharp value-laden language and messages about moral responsibility toward democracy.
In a video marking six months of protest (8 July 2023), captions over drone shots of massive demonstrations declare: “Six months of struggle. We will not surrender. We won’t give up. We are the people we’ve been waiting for.” This final sentence captures the full force of the dichotomous language: it grants protesters the status of historical agents and presents joining the protest as an almost total moral choice between “light” and “darkness.” As Gamson (1992) notes, the identity component of a collective action frame is typically defined in relation to an opponent; the dichotomous rhetoric in the videos is thus not a side effect but a deliberate framing strategy that creates moral and emotional distance from the out-group and presents viewers with a binary moral choice—to join a just struggle or be complicit in harming democracy. In this sense, the findings point to a paradox: a protest mobilized in defense of liberal, pluralist democracy relies on sharply dichotomous language that minimizes “gray zones” and frames participation in the protest as an almost absolute moral imperative, underscoring the tension between the mobilizing needs of protest movements and the democratic ethos to which they appeal. At the same time, these dynamics raise concerns that closed, trust-based communication spaces may reinforce selective exposure and echo-chamber effects, as participants are primarily exposed to like-minded voices and emotionally charged in-group narratives. While the present study does not directly examine such processes, the findings point to the need for further research on how closed messaging infrastructures intersect with polarization and the narrowing of perceived legitimate viewpoints.
In summary, the second part of the findings demonstrates that the Tikva WhatsApp videos are used to construct counter-narratives to the hegemonic discourse of the government and mainstream media. Through criticism and de-legitimization of politicians, critical framing of the police, construction of a patriotic identity for protesters, intensive use of national symbols, and the drawing of sharp boundaries between “us” and “them,” the videos offer an alternative framing of Israel’s political reality and redefine who is considered legitimate in the public sphere. The next part of the findings examines how WhatsApp also serves as a platform for democratic news production, through which citizens and activists become citizen journalists and producers of alternative knowledge.

4.3. Democratic Production: Citizen Journalism and WhatsApp as an Alternative News Source

Alternative communication concerns not only narratives but also the democratization of production processes, whereby citizens who are not professional journalists become news producers and active participants in shaping public discourse. While journalists in mainstream media undergo professional training and adhere to established work norms, alternative media often adopt an “anyone can do it” model characterized by de-professionalization and de-institutionalization (Atton 2002), in which eyewitnesses and social activists document, report, and publish their experiences, sometimes in real time. In the struggle against the judicial overhaul, this model is clearly visible: citizens documented events on the ground and sent raw materials to Tikva, which edited them into videos. As a text accompanying a 4 May 2023 video states, “We receive from you hundreds of videos throughout the day [...] so that we can tell our story ourselves,” while a 30 May 2023 video features Tikva founder Ran Har-Nevo explaining the need “to bring news” and “to bring stories that mainstream media no longer deal with”—an explicit statement of Tikva’s role as an alternative news outlet.
Since the Tikva team is small and largely volunteer-based, footage sent by protesters enabled daily reporting throughout the nine-month struggle and helped overcome production constraints. A 4 June 2023 text notes: “Like every week, our deal with you is simple: you send us your videos from every point in the country and we show them to everyone,” highlighting activists’ role as full partners in creating media content. In this part, this journalistic practice blends bottom-up reporting with a distinctive esthetics of authenticity, positioning Tikva as a credible alternative news source.

4.3.1. In the Field: Real-Time Reporting and Citizen Witnessing

Many Tikva videos report from the field in real time, in line with practices of citizen witnessing (Allan 2013). For example, a video from 24 July 2023 documents the arrest of protest leader Moshe Radman by police during a demonstration in Jerusalem, followed immediately by Har-Nevo calling on anyone in the city “to block all entrances to the Knesset… now!!!” This video illustrates the unique combination in Tikva’s output between immediate news reporting and calls to action—a combination unusual in professional journalism but characteristic of citizen journalism in times of protest.
Consistent with the principles of alternative communication, the preferred sources of information in Tikva videos are eyewitness accounts from “ordinary people”—social activists, protesters, local residents—rather than official sources that dominate mainstream media (Wolfsfeld 1997), with the aim of legitimizing bottom-up voices. Alongside citizen testimonies, Tikva conducts interviews with experts from academia and from law and economics, providing in-depth information often absent from the concise coverage of institutional mainstream media. The strategy of using independent experts aims to grant an “objective” veneer to the information disseminated in the videos. For instance, in the video “Our mortgage is going to go up and up” (16 May 2023), archival footage of Netanyahu repeatedly saying the word “mortgages” is juxtaposed with economic analysis by a professor of economics speaking to the camera, accompanied by captions and numerical data linking the judicial overhaul to rising interest rates in Israel. The contrast between political rhetoric and expert-backed figures reinforces the expert’s role as an authoritative interpreter of reality.
Other videos feature constitutional law professors or independent journalists explaining controversial bills or tracing political maneuvers, sometimes in the format of short investigative reports. This recurring pattern—eyewitness testimony, independent experts, and investigative segments—serves to construct journalistic authority and position Tikva as an alternative news source in which citizens and activists play an active part in producing knowledge about political reality. Beyond content, the videos’ esthetic also contributes to establishing their credibility and authority as journalistic output, as demonstrated in the next sub-theme.

4.3.2. Esthetics of Authenticity: Exposing “Truth” and Constructing Journalistic Authority

Tikva seeks to establish journalistic authority not only through content but also through a consistent strategy of exposing “truth” and debunking misinformation. Many videos present clips from speeches by Netanyahu and his ministers alongside data, archival materials, and field footage that challenge their statements and credibility and position Tikva as a trustworthy source. In videos where Moshe Radman responds to speeches by Netanyahu or Justice Minister Yariv Levin, he addresses the camera directly, quotes their statements, and then refutes specific claims (for example, about the number of protesters arrested) using contradictory data and past documentation. This systematic debunking practice—placing direct quotes from elected officials next to counter-evidence—models citizen fact-checking and reinforces Tikva’s status as a reliable information source.
Another means of bolstering credibility is the use of numerical data perceived as “hard facts.” In the video, “What can you buy with 13.5 billion?” (20 May 2023), the initial frame presents the sum “13,500,000,000 NIS in coalition funds,” followed by a rapid sequence of images showing what this amount could finance—hospitals, schools, daycare centers—before shifting to an image of a crowded ultra-Orthodox yeshiva under the caption “Crippling the economy and creating a third-world country for years to come.” The video transforms an abstract budget figure into concrete public resources and constructs a message of injustice and missed opportunity, using numbers as a tactical resource to present data-based “truth” as a counterweight to perceived disinformation.
Filming and editing techniques also contribute to a strong sense of authenticity and credibility. Unlike traditional journalism, characterized by classic camera angles and high technical quality (Schudson 2003), Tikva’s videos rely heavily on selfie-style footage of speakers addressing the camera directly, creating a sense of intimacy and peer-to-peer conversation. Testimonies from protesters who experienced police violence are interwoven with on-the-ground footage that corroborates their accounts, creating alignment between narrative and visual evidence. In videos documenting arrests and use of force, shaky camera work and unconventional angles signal “uncensored” documentation of clashes between protesters and police. This “unprofessional” esthetic functions as a source of authority, suggesting raw, authentic coverage rather than polished, potentially manipulative production.
Tikva does not claim neutrality; its narratives clearly reflect a particular ideological stance. Yet by combining expert interviews, systematic debunking of misinformation, numerical data, and an esthetic of authentic footage, it seeks to establish itself as a credible and authoritative news source—a form of citizen journalism in which protesters and activists become central producers of knowledge about political reality.
This chapter has shown how WhatsApp simultaneously functions as an organizational infrastructure, a symbolic arena, and a democratic production space within the protest against the judicial overhaul. Instrumentally, videos in the Tikva groups enable rapid mobilization, long-term commitment, and the construction of belonging and community among protesters. Symbolically, these same videos generate alternative discourse and counter-narratives—criticizing and undermining the legitimacy of powerholders, framing protesters as patriots, and drawing sharp boundaries between “us” and “them.” In terms of production, the findings demonstrate a model of WhatsApp-based citizen journalism, whereby citizens and activists supply raw materials, bear witness from the field, and participate in debunking misinformation, thus challenging mainstream media’s monopoly over news production. Taken together, these practices point to the emergence of a decentralized civic “newsroom” that performs many of the traditional functions of broadcasting infrastructures—gathering raw materials, editing, producing, and distributing to target audiences—and blurs the boundaries between source, reporter, and editor. Across all three dimensions, WhatsApp appears as a key component in understanding the interplay between digital activism, alternative communication, and democracy in this struggle.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

The present study shows that the Tikva WhatsApp groups are best understood as a hybrid alternative media infrastructure that combines bottom-up content production, affective mobilization, and targeted broadcasting to defined publics. This framing advances existing understandings of WhatsApp’s role in contemporary protest movements by shifting attention from interpersonal coordination to its function as a broader media infrastructure. In line with work that highlights the centrality of digital platforms for recruitment, coordination, and identity construction in contemporary protests (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Castells 2015; Gerbaudo 2012), the findings demonstrate that WhatsApp served not only as a logistical tool but also as an organizational backbone for building and sustaining a protest movement. The videos that circulated in the Tikva groups connected real-time footage from the streets with immediate calls to action. At the same time, they translated individual efforts into a story of collective pride and historical agency, which helped address the risk of burnout in a long struggle.
These dynamics extend prior work on WhatsApp as a “backstage” infrastructure for protest coordination and everyday activism (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Milan and Barbosa 2020; Scherman et al. 2022; Treré 2020). Existing studies emphasize the role of WhatsApp in logistical updates, rumor circulation, and emotional support within small groups, treating the platform primarily as a mobilization and coordination tool. The present case shows that WhatsApp supported a significantly broader repertoire of functions: beyond recruitment and logistics, the Tikva groups served to build collective identity, sustain long-term activist commitment over nine months, and produce alternative citizen journalism—three functions that have received far less attention in the WhatsApp literature. In this sense, the study nuances debates about the fragility of “signal-heavy” but organizationally weak movements (Tufekci 2017). It illustrates how a closed messaging infrastructure can help build enduring organizational capacities and shared narratives, rather than only short bursts of visibility.
The findings also relate to literature on digital activism and affective publics (Makhortykh and González Aguilar 2020; Papacharissi 2014). Existing work on affective publics has focused primarily on open, algorithmically curated platforms such as Twitter (now X) and Facebook. The present study extends this literature by showing how affective publics are constructed in a closed, trust-based environment, anchored in nationally specific symbols and a militarized patriotic identity rather than in open viral diffusion. The Tikva videos cultivate intense emotional identification through images of crowds, individual faces, and scenes of injury, arrest, and solidarity. By repeatedly constructing a “we” of patriotic citizens and a “they” of a dark, messianic government, the videos map the conflict onto a moral binary that echoes Van Dijk’s (1998, 2011) “ideological square,” yet here it is anchored in a uniquely Israeli repertoire: the flag, the Declaration of Independence, and the anthem’s aspiration “to be a free people in our land.”
At the same time, the findings show that affective publics here are closely tied to militarized and patriotic identities. Many videos foreground reserve pilots, members of “Brothers in Arms”, and high-tech entrepreneurs who emphasize their army service before voicing criticism. In Bernstein’s (1997) terms, this is a form of strategic identity deployment, in which a respected identity is mobilized to gain a legitimate voice in the public sphere. The current study suggests that, in a protest mobilized around democracy, military service functions as a powerful—sometimes almost necessary—resource for framing dissent as legitimate and shielding protesters from labels such as “traitor” or “refusenik.” This creates a tension between two co-existing communicative strategies. On the one hand, the patriotic repertoire foregrounds military and economic elites and uses their service and sacrifice as a counter-weapon against right-wing politicians and mainstream media. On the other hand, the same videos also invoke a different strategy of legitimation by giving visibility to minorities and peripheral groups (including religious and right-wing Israelis, who are typically associated with opposition to the protest) and presenting the protest as a broad, all-Israeli mobilization. In this sense, one strand speaks in the language of elites to elite actors such as politicians and journalists, while another addresses the wider public through an inclusive image of “the people.”
Beyond identity and emotion, the findings make a contribution to scholarship on alternative media and citizen journalism (Allan and Thorsen 2026; Atton 2002, 2004, 2011; Downing 2001; Wall 2015; Wiesslitz and Ashuri 2011). Tikva demonstrates how alternative communication operates both at the level of content and at the level of production. On the content side, the videos systematically construct counter-narratives that challenge the hegemonic discourse of political elites and mainstream media. Through ironic editing, culture jamming, and the juxtaposition of politicians’ statements with economic data and archival clips, they de-legitimize political leaders, invert the protest paradigm by centering protesters as protagonists, and reframe the police as serving “the king and not the kingdom.”
On the production side, the case documents the emergence of a WhatsApp-based newsroom that is distinctive in the citizen journalism literature: whereas most studies of citizen journalism focus on open platforms such as YouTube or Twitter (X), the Tikva case shows how de-institutionalized news production operates inside a closed, encrypted messaging environment. Protesters across the country act as citizen journalists, recording events and sending raw footage that Tikva edits into daily videos. Tikva openly positions itself as an alternative news source that “brings news” that mainstream outlets no longer cover. It employs classic journalistic tools, such as independent expert sourcing, fact-checking, and data-driven refutation of political claims, to build credibility and authority. This extends understandings of citizen journalism as “moral witnessing” (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013; Wiesslitz and Ashuri 2011) by highlighting the aspiration to be recognized as legitimate journalists in their own right.
Beyond content and production, a key theoretical contribution of the study lies in its conceptualization of WhatsApp as a hybrid alternative media channel that departs from its usual portrayal as an interpersonal, multi-directional chat service. Whereas YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram distribute protest videos to broad, often anonymous publics through feeds and recommendation systems, exposure on these platforms is largely governed by pull dynamics: users must search for content, follow pages, or rely on opaque algorithms to “discover” protest footage. By contrast, the Tikva groups operate as closed, push-based channels in which videos are sent directly to identified participants whose phone numbers and names are known. This design enables activists to construct and maintain a defined pool of recipients, rather than hoping that algorithms will generate reach. Because the videos circulate in closed groups rather than public feeds, they are less exposed to algorithmic filtering, platform moderation, and hostile counter-speech, and they reach a pre-committed audience directly on personal devices. This structural configuration positions Tikva as a form of targeted broadcast: citizen-journalist producers program and distribute near-real-time news packages not to a mass anonymous audience, but to a pre-mapped community of viewers bound by trust and familiarity. Theoretically, these findings extend recent work that frames WhatsApp as an alternative communication infrastructure distinguished by closed groups and pre-existing ties (Milan and Barbosa 2020; Ozawa et al. 2024; Scherman et al. 2022), which has focused primarily on its role as a space for intimate, bidirectional political conversation. The present study shows that WhatsApp can also function as a “closed broadcast channel”, where the one-to-many distribution logic of mass media is combined with the intimacy and trust of small, bounded networks. This hybrid media model suggests that messaging apps should be integrated more centrally into theories of alternative media and platformed protest, rather than treated as peripheral or secondary to open social networks.
Taken together, the findings indicate that WhatsApp, in the struggle against the judicial overhaul, functioned as an organizational backbone for a sustained protest movement, as a symbolic arena for constructing patriotic and dichotomous counter-narratives, and as a democratic production space for citizen journalism that challenges institutional media and political elites. More specifically, the findings suggest that Tikva’s WhatsApp network operates as a hybrid broadcast channel that is closed, trust-based, push-driven, and targeted. In this configuration, WhatsApp is not only an ad hoc coordination tool for protest events but also a critical infrastructure for sustaining organizational capacities over time, preventing activist burnout, and maintaining emotionally engaged activist communities within a bounded environment. The channel simultaneously functions as a site for producing and distributing citizen journalism and as a platform for nurturing ongoing commitment, belonging, and solidarity, thereby extending existing research that primarily conceptualizes WhatsApp as a logistical or conversational tool. It enriches research on alternative media by documenting a WhatsApp-based newsroom that combines moral journalism with verification and expert sourcing. It advances debates on digital activism by showing how a mobile messaging app can support long-term movement-building rather than only episodic coordination. In addition, it refines understandings of WhatsApp as an alternative communication infrastructure by reconceptualizing the platform as a closed and intimate broadcast channel in the hands of protest movements. Finally, methodologically, the study departs from the dominant survey-based approach in WhatsApp research, which relies primarily on self-reported data (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Scherman et al. 2022), by offering direct content analysis of videos circulated within protest groups over a sustained nine-month period, providing insight into what is actually produced and distributed inside these closed networks across an extended and ongoing protest movement.
Several limitations should be noted. First, the analysis focuses on a single protest movement in a particular national and cultural context, where military service and patriotic symbols have distinctive meanings, which may limit the transferability of the findings. Second, the focus on one family of WhatsApp groups does not capture cross-platform dynamics or the ways in which Tikva content interacts with other social networks. In addition, because the analysis focuses on a closed messaging environment, it does not assess potential risks commonly associated with such settings, including polarization, selective exposure, or echo-chamber dynamics. Third, the study does not aim to establish a causal relationship between the rise, scale, or success of the protest movement and the use of WhatsApp. Rather than measuring the impact of WhatsApp videos on levels of participation or protest outcomes, the analysis focuses on how the platform was used as an alternative communication channel and on the functions and meanings of the videos within the protest’s broader media ecology. In this sense, the findings speak to WhatsApp’s communicative role in articulating counter-hegemonic narratives, sustaining digital activism, and supporting a hybrid alternative media infrastructure. However, they are not meant to determine whether, or to what extent, these videos directly “drove” protest mobilization or how their influence compares with that of other media channels such as mainstream news outlets or YouTube. Fourth, the study relies on content analysis of videos and does not include interviews or surveys with group members or audiences. As a result, it does not examine how different publics interpreted the videos, appropriated them in their everyday practices, or connected them to their own decisions about protest participation and political attitudes.
Future research could address these limitations by conducting comparative studies across movements and countries and by mapping how protest videos circulate across multiple platforms. Furthermore, combining content analysis with interviews and surveys on activists’ media use and their self-reported sources of motivation and information could help to examine more directly how exposure to WhatsApp videos relates to protesters’ engagement and perceptions of the movement. In addition, given the rapid integration of AI tools into video production and moderation, future research should address ethical and epistemic challenges related to authenticity, manipulation, and verification in citizen-produced protest videos, examining how activists appropriate generative tools and how these practices reshape norms of consent, privacy, and epistemic authority in networked protest media.

6. Concluding Remarks

This study has shown that, in the struggle against the judicial overhaul, Tikva’s WhatsApp network functioned as an organizational backbone for a sustained protest movement, as a symbolic arena for constructing patriotic and dichotomous counter-narratives, and as a democratic production space for citizen journalism that challenges institutional media and political elites. Taken together, these findings suggest that WhatsApp can operate as a hybrid broadcast channel that is closed, trust-based, push-driven, and targeted, rather than merely an ad hoc coordination tool for protest events.
The article thus contributes to three strands of scholarship. It enriches research on alternative media by documenting a WhatsApp-based newsroom that combines moral journalism with verification and expert sourcing. It advances debates on digital activism by showing how a mobile messaging app can support long-term movement-building rather than only episodic coordination. And it refines understandings of WhatsApp as an alternative communication infrastructure by reconceptualizing the platform as a closed and intimate broadcast channel in the hands of protest movements.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

The study analyzes protest videos disseminated by Tikva administrators in broadcast-style WhatsApp groups and on open social media platforms. No additional platform data about group members (such as membership lists or contact information) were collected or analyzed, and individuals are not re-identified beyond what is already visible in the original videos. In line with current discussions of ethics in social media and messaging app research, the project was designed around principles of data minimization and “do no harm,” as detailed in Section 3.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created for this study. These materials are not owned or controlled by the author for the purpose of open data sharing, and the raw videos themselves are therefore not made available as a separate public dataset in connection with this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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