You are currently on the new version of our website. Access the old version .

Games, Volume 16, Issue 5

2025 October - 15 articles

Cover Story: We study stochastic cooperation between non-mutually dependent sellers via a hybrid game class parametrized by the exogenous probability of cooperation. Both sellers, aware of this probability, simultaneously choose prices that determine their endogenous threats, i.e., conflict profits, but cannot condition on whether or not there is cooperation. We show that the independent seller earns higher expected profits when cooperation is more likely. In contrast, the dependent seller earns lower expected profits when the likelihood of cooperation is below a threshold that we characterize, and higher profits are earned thereafter. These findings suggest that, within our framework, antitrust concerns may be mitigated. Since dependent sellers can incur losses from cooperation, and collusion attempts become less viable in markets with one-sided dependency. View this paper
  • Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list .
  • You may sign up for email alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
  • PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Reader to open them.

Articles (15)

  • Article
  • Open Access
1 Citations
1,752 Views
17 Pages

Optimal Vaccination Strategies to Reduce Endemic Levels of Meningitis in Africa

  • Alfredo Martinez,
  • Jonathan Machado,
  • Eric Sanchez and
  • Igor V. Erovenko

1 September 2025

Meningococcal meningitis is a deadly acute bacterial infection caused by the Neisseria meningitidis bacterium that affects the membrane covering the brain and spinal cord. The World Health Organization launched the “Defeating bacterial meningit...

  • Feature Paper
  • Article
  • Open Access
1,193 Views
64 Pages

Test Me If You Can—Providing Optimal Information for Consumers Through a Novel Certification Mechanism

  • Ulrike Vollstädt,
  • Patrick Imcke,
  • Franziska Brendel and
  • Christiane Ehses-Friedrich

29 August 2025

Certifiers such as Stiftung Warentest (Germany), Which? (UK), and Consumer Reports (US) reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by providing credible information about product quality. However, due to their limited testing capacities...

  • Feature Paper
  • Article
  • Open Access
954 Views
21 Pages

A Theoretical Analysis of Cooperation Incentives for Non-Mutually Dependent Sellers

  • Lorenzo Ferrari,
  • Werner Güth,
  • Vittorio Larocca and
  • Luca Panaccione

27 August 2025

This paper examines stochastic cooperation in markets with two sellers who exhibit one-sided dependency. The independent seller’s pricing influences the dependent seller’s demand, but not vice versa. We study the one-dimensional hybrid ga...

of 2

Get Alerted

Add your email address to receive forthcoming issues of this journal.

XFacebookLinkedIn
Games - ISSN 2073-4336