Games, Volume 16, Issue 3

Health care systems rely on geographical boundaries that secure financial stability and adequate planning. Quality differences across regions often arise for efficiency reasons, causing patient flows if mobility is free. In this paper, a theoretical...

In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: n∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, an...

Establishing a partnership necessitates agreeing on how to divide future profits or losses. We consider parties who wish to contract on the division of uncertain future profits. We propose to divide profits according to the Raiffa–Kalai–S...

This paper experimentally investigates the relationship between an investor and a project manager. Project managers choose from a pool of projects, the success probabilities of which are uncertain. Investors can change projects, but also have to chan...

One of the main goals of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents in a stable manner. Stability means that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned match. The outcome of such a match can have significant...

This paper studies a class of two-player all-pay contests with externalities that encompass a general version of duopoly price competition. This all-pay contest formulation puts little restriction on production technologies, demand, and demand ration...

This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale–Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab...

Comparing mobility is an important but controversial issue. In this paper, we argue that in a specific and relevant case, there exists a univocal and non-controversial definition of greater (exchange) mobility that allows for unambiguous comparisons....

This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer’s incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the pr...

Human cooperation is ubiquitous and instinctive. We are among the most cooperative species on Earth. Still, research mostly focuses on why we cooperate, instead of understanding why some of us do not do so. The public goods game can be used to map hu...