Games

37 pages, 498 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A General Model of Bertrand–Edgeworth Duopoly

by Blake A. Allison and Jason J. Lepore

Games 2025, 16(3), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030026 - 19 May 2025

This paper studies a class of two-player all-pay contests with externalities that encompass a general version of duopoly price competition. This all-pay contest formulation puts little restriction on production technologies, demand, and demand rationing. There are two types of possible equilibria: In the first type of equilibrium, the lower bound to pricing is the same for each firm, and the probability of any pricing tie above this price is zero. Each firm’s equilibrium expected profit is their monopoly profit at the lower bound price. In the second type of equilibrium, one firm prices at the lower bound of the other firm’s average cost and other firm prices according to a non-degenerate mixed strategy. This type of equilibrium can only occur if production technologies are sufficiently different across firms. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium and use these conditions to demonstrate the fragility of deterministic outcomes in pricing games. Full article

36 pages, 447 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Procedural Information as a “Game Changer” in School Choice

by Yoan Hermstrüwer

Games 2025, 16(3), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030025 - 12 May 2025

Viewed by 221

Abstract

This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale–Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increases truth-telling and stability under the Gale–Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to the prevailing assumptions in matching theory, the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural transparency and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be sufficient to foster fairness and mitigate litigation risks. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

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21 pages, 901 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions

by Michele Bernasconi, Giulio Cinquanta, Valentino Dardanoni and Vincenzo Prete

Games 2025, 16(3), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030024 - 8 May 2025

Viewed by 154

Abstract

Comparing mobility is an important but controversial issue. In this paper, we argue that in a specific and relevant case, there exists a univocal and non-controversial definition of greater (exchange) mobility that allows for unambiguous comparisons. We conducted a questionnaire experiment to investigate whether people’s perceptions of social mobility align with this definition, and we found that people’s choices are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

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7 pages, 202 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Role of Reputation in Sequel Production

by Khac Minh Duc Do and Dmitriy Knyazev

Games 2025, 16(3), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030023 - 8 May 2025

Viewed by 162

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer’s incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the previous installment exceeds a quality threshold, capturing the idea that consumers base future consumption on past success. Although high-productivity producers create higher-quality originals and sequels, the conditioning on successful originals still makes sequels, on average, worse than their predecessors. This aligns with evidence of sequel underperformance in media markets. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization)

21 pages, 4424 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

New Categories of Conditional Contribution Strategies in the Public Goods Game

by Klaudia Schäffer, Adrienn Král and Ádám Kun

Games 2025, 16(3), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030022 - 6 May 2025

Viewed by 215

Abstract

Human cooperation is ubiquitous and instinctive. We are among the most cooperative species on Earth. Still, research mostly focuses on why we cooperate, instead of understanding why some of us do not do so. The public goods game can be used to map human cooperation as well as to study free riding. We acquired data through an online, unincentivized questionnaire which prompted respondents to choose how much of an initial endowment to contribute to a common pool. The respondents contributed, on average, 54% of their initial endowment to the common pool. The usual categorization scheme of the elicited conditional contribution pattern discerns unconditional free riders who do not contribute irrespective of the contributions of others and calls everyone a conditional cooperator who correlates their contribution with that of the others. However, someone consistently offering less than the others should not be called a cooperator. Consequently, based on the conditional contribution patterns among our respondents, we suggest a recategorization of contribution patterns into the following categories: unconditional cooperator (1.5%), unconditional free rider (10.6%), perfect conditional cooperator (42.6%), hump-shaped contributor (0.7%), V-shaped contributor (0.4%), conditional cooperator (16.6%), conditional free rider (13.6%), conditional contributor (6.4%), negative conditional contributor (0%), and others (7.6%). We only call someone a cooperator if the respondent at least matches others’ contribution, and call everyone consistently offering less a free rider. Furthermore, we found no difference between the contributions of women and men. No correlation of contribution with age, educational attainment, and size of the residential settlement was found. Students’ contributions were not different from non-students’ contributions. We found a significant correlation of the contribution to the common pool with hypercompetitive orientation (negative correlation) and the self-assessed willingness to take risks in general (positive correlation). Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

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46 pages, 527 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Strategic Complementarities in a Model of Commercial Media Bias

by Anna Kerkhof and Johannes Münster

Games 2025, 16(3), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030021 - 23 Apr 2025

Viewed by 445

Abstract

Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a standard model of commercial media bias, qualities of media content are strategic complements, whereby investments into quality can crowd in further investments and engage competitors in a race to the top. Therefore, financially strong public service media can mitigate commercial media bias: the content of commercial media can be more in line with the preferences of the audience and less advertiser-friendly in a dual (mixed public and commercial) media system than in a purely commercial media market. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mass Media Industries: The Economic Games)

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Games, Volume 16, Issue 3 (June 2025) – 6 articles

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