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Games, Volume 16, Issue 3

June 2025 - 11 articles

Cover Story: This study examines how information about incentive properties and procedural transparency affect student behavior and perceived fairness in school admissions. Using a lab experiment, the Gale–Shapley and Boston mechanisms, which are both common in the US and EU, are compared. The impact of information about the mechanism itself, optimal strategies, or both is tested. The results show that strategic and full information boost truth-telling and stability under Gale–Shapley mechanisms. However, equilibrium strategy adoption under the Boston mechanism is unchanged. Unexpectedly, the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness, challenging matching theory assumptions. These findings highlight the importance of transparency and suggest that eliminating justified envy alone may not ensure fairness or reduce litigation risks. View this paper

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1,365 Views

46 Pages

Strategic Complementarities in a Model of Commercial Media Bias

Anna Kerkhof and
Johannes Münster

Games2025, 16(3), 21;https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030021

23 April 2025

Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a...

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