Games, Volume 14, Issue 3

Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty. Characteristic functions thus assign a closed interval instead of a real number. This study revisits two interval game versions...

The theoretical literature on risk aversion and Expected Utility Theory is extensive; however, the analysis of this behaviour with natural experiments could be more comprehensive. In this paper, we use data from 120 episodes of the Portuguese version...

We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productive efforts, but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must choose prizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggr...

In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the m...

This experiment examines the relationship between payment systems and the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. By using a real-effort task to stimulate the decision making of service providers, the study finds that pay...

In the game of rock-paper-scissors with three players, this paper identifies conditions for a correlated equilibrium that differs from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and is evolutionarily stable. For this to occur, the correlation device attache...

Training in firms has an effect on the productivity of employees who receive the training, and depending on the production technology, on the other employees as well. Meanwhile, changing the remuneration structure within a team can change the stabili...

This paper theoretically studies the interaction between an informed borrower and an uninformed lender facing possible default of a loan application. The lender is motivated to invest cognitive resources before making a lending decision. If the regul...

The stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already well established and stable due to sanctions imposed on non-conforming members. Thus, how does...

Autonomous driving (AV) technology has elicited discussion on social dilemmas where trade-offs between individual preferences, social norms, and collective interests may impact road safety and efficiency. In this study, we aim to identify whether soc...

When there is direct competition for a position of power (promotion, elected office, etc.), competitors are tempted to cheat to increase their chances of winning. If they do so successfully, then how they rationalize their cheating can determine how...

We point out an equivalence between a class of games in which players negotiate while fighting and a class of games in which a buyer and seller negotiate over terms. Importantly and perhaps ironically, bargaining before fighting is strategically dist...

The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players’ present-bias will affect bargaining ou...

In transportation networks, incomplete information is ubiquitous, and users often delegate their route choice to distributed route planners. To model and study these systems, we introduce network control games, consisting of multiple actors seeking t...

We study the strategic similarity of game positions in two-player extensive games of perfect information by looking at the structure of their local game trees, with the aim of improving the performance of game-playing agents in detecting forcing cont...

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we sho...

A smart contract can be defined as a computer program, stored on a blockchain, which allows a transaction or an agreement—defined ex-ante—to be self-executed when some conditions are met, and without the need for a central authority to en...