Special Issue "Economics of Motivated Beliefs"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 September 2022 | Viewed by 2003

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Xiaojian Zhao
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, Monash Business School, Monash University, VIC, Australia
Interests: economics of motivated beliefs; behavioral and experimental economics; contract theory; applied microeconomics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

People tend to hold a positive self-view or a rosy world-view, by processing information in a biased way. The economics of motivated beliefs has been growing very fast in the past decades, producing new insights in psychology and economics. In this area, researchers aim to answer the question of why and how individuals are cognitively “irrational” in the literature of behavioral economics. This Special Issue of Games is devoted to the economic analysis of motivated beliefs by applying - but not limited to - game theory, or experimental/empirical approaches. We welcome authors with research of this topic to submit their manuscripts to this Special Issue of Games.

Dr. Xiaojian Zhao
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • motivated beliefs
  • behavioral economics
  • experimental economics
  • cognitive psychology
  • awareness

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

Article
Memory Recall Bias of Overconfident and Underconfident Individuals after Feedback
Games 2022, 13(3), 41; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13030041 - 23 May 2022
Viewed by 933
Abstract
We experimentally investigate the memory recall bias of overconfident (underconfident) individuals after receiving feedback on their overconfidence (underconfidence). Our study differs from the literature by identifying the recall pattern conditional on subjects’ overconfidence/underconfidence. We obtain the following results. First, overconfident (underconfident) subjects exhibit [...] Read more.
We experimentally investigate the memory recall bias of overconfident (underconfident) individuals after receiving feedback on their overconfidence (underconfidence). Our study differs from the literature by identifying the recall pattern conditional on subjects’ overconfidence/underconfidence. We obtain the following results. First, overconfident (underconfident) subjects exhibit overconfident (underconfident) recall despite receiving feedback on their overconfidence (underconfidence). Second, awareness of one’s overconfidence or underconfidence does not eliminate memory recall bias. Third, the primacy effect is stronger than the recency effect. Overall, our results suggest that memory recall bias is mainly due to motivated beliefs of sophisticated decision makers rather than naïve decision-making. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Motivated Beliefs)
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