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Games, Volume 14, Issue 4

August 2023 - 7 articles

Cover Story: Finding a balance between efficiency and fairness is a crucial aspect of environmental disputes. In our study, we examine how the observability of contracts between plaintiffs and their attorneys affects both efficiency and fairness of such conflicts. Using two specific game-theoretic models—an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game—we discover two key results. First, contract unobservability may decrease the efficiency of legal efforts in environmental disputes. However, second, unobservability may also improve the fairness of the outcome by enhancing the plaintiff's chance of winning. Our study provides critical insights into how contract observability relates to the legal framework and the resolution of environmental disputes. View this paper
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Articles (7)

  • Article
  • Open Access
2 Citations
1,923 Views
10 Pages

28 July 2023

We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific gam...

  • Communication
  • Open Access
2 Citations
2,249 Views
9 Pages

Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets

  • Harold Houba and
  • Françeska Tomori

11 July 2023

Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies th...

  • Article
  • Open Access
4 Citations
2,167 Views
6 Pages

Evasion Differential Game of Multiple Pursuers and a Single Evader with Geometric Constraints in 2

  • Gafurjan Ibragimov,
  • Marks Ruziboev,
  • Ibroximjon Zaynabiddinov and
  • Bruno Antonio Pansera

29 June 2023

We investigate a differential evasion game with multiple pursuers and an evader for the infinite systems of differential equations in ℓ2. The control functions of the players are subject to geometric constraints. The pursuers’ goal is to...

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Games - ISSN 2073-4336