In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between ga...
Motivated by the concept of cooperative equilibria with a single objective, we introduce the concepts of weakly cooperative equilibria and strong cooperative equilibria of multi-objective population games. We give some examples to explain the differe...
In this paper, we obtain an existence theorem of general strong noncooperative equilibrium point of vector-valued games, in which every player maximizes all goals. We also obtain an existence theorem of strong equilibrium point of vector-valued games...
In stochastic games, the player’s payoff is a stochastic variable. In most papers, expected payoff is considered as a payoff, which means the risk neutrality of the players. However, there may exist risk-sensitive players who would take into ac...
We study the class of directed simple games, assuming that only integer solutions are admitted; i.e., the players share a resource that comes in discrete units. We show that the integer nucleolus—if nonempty—of such a game is composed of the images o...
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so tha...
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, it is shown, for the first time, which types of nonsmooth functions are characterized by all vector critical points as being efficient or weakly efficient solutions of vector optimization problems in constra...
We propose a model of network formation as a two-stage game with chance moves and players of various types. First, the leader suggests a connected communication network for the players to join. Second, nature selects a type vector for players based o...
Players’ choices in quantum game schemes are often correlated by a quantum state. This enables players to obtain payoffs that may not be achievable when classical pure or mixed strategies are used. On the other hand, players’ choices can...
In the classical approach of von Neumann and Morgenstern to cooperative games, it was assumed that the worth of all coalitions must be given. However, in real-world problems, the worth of some coalitions may be unknown. Therefore, in this study, we c...
In order to improve the autonomous lane-changing performance of unmanned vehicles, this paper aims to solve the problem of inaccurate decision classification in traditional support vector machine (SVM) algorithms applied to the lane-changing decision...
A class of solutions are introduced by lexicographically minimizing the complaint of coalitions for cooperative games with transferable utility. Among them, the nucleolus is an important representative. From the perspective of measuring the satisfact...
This paper studies the characterizations of (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games with a vector-valued potential function called multiobjective potential population games, where agents synchronously maximize multiobjecti...
We design a mechanism of the players’ sustainable cooperation in multistage n-person game in the extensive form with chance moves. When the players agreed to cooperate in a dynamic game they have to ensure time consistency of the long-term coop...