Businesses

China’s revised Environmental Protection Law, adopted in 2014 and effective on 1 January 2015, strengthened the institutional framework for environmental governance. This article integrates bibliometric mapping with a systematic literature review to assess the law’s economic, business, environmental and financial consequences. A PRISMA-informed search of the Web of Science Core Collection identified 70 English-language journal articles in relevant fields available through 1 August 2026. This English-language, WoS-indexed evidence base is concentrated on listed firms, so the synthesis describes that literature rather than the full population of businesses affected by the law. Publication statistics, word frequency analysis, a six-topic Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model, VOSviewermapping (1.6.21), and article-level synthesis were applied. Studies report higher ESG scores, green investment, disclosure, patenting, and biodiversity risk attention in some settings. However, ESG improvements may concentrate in the environmental pillar, patent quantity may rise as quality declines, and disclosure responses vary with political protection. These corporate indicators do not themselves demonstrate lower emissions or ecological recovery. Financial and economic findings concern leverage, financialization, profitability, risk, capital costs, employment, labor-income shares, productivity, outward investment, and political behavior. Outcomes vary with firm characteristics, local enforcement, financing capacity, measurement, and research design. Overall, the evidence concerns multiple adjustment channels rather than a common net policy effect. Future research should measure realized enforcement, separate overlapping policies, connect corporate indicators to environmental outcomes, and broaden coverage beyond continuously listed heavily polluting firms.

This paper examines how senior executives perceive the conditions under which an organization becomes data driven, and how those perceptions can be organised, through an explicit procedure, into candidate strategic orientations. An exploratory descriptive survey of twenty-five items built on five pillars of the data-driven organization was completed by fifty executives across ten sectors. Frequencies are read as indicating the prevalence of a reported perception within this purposive panel, not as measures of capability, importance or effect; factors are selected and classified under written rules, with every judgement reported alongside its alternative. The conditions most widely reported were descriptive analytics, cloud or hybrid infrastructure, training and awareness programmes, and data being available daily or in real time; the constraints most often reported were a data strategy not strongly aligned with the business strategy, data accuracy problems, resistance to change, a shortage of qualified talent, and data fragmentation. Respondent-level comparisons qualify two of the study’s own interpretations. Crossing these conditions through the TOWS matrix yields four candidate orientations; because the external quadrants are thinly evidenced, the two that cross the single threat are the most provisional. The output is a perception-based conceptual framework that distinguishes what respondents reported, what the researchers coded, what was inferred and what remains to be validated, and it requires external validation.

In multinational fast-moving consumer goods firms, marketing, legal and IT depend on the same brand data but need it at different levels of detail. Marketing needs it by variant and territory to measure campaign returns; legal to prove valid territorial licensing; IT prefers aggregation to cut cost. No framework names an owner, so IT decides by default, on an objective that excludes the costs it imposes. We model the conflict as a non-cooperative game grounded in property rights and transaction cost economics, show that aggregation is strictly dominant, and explain why negotiation fails: the decisions are frequent and individually small, their value is privately known, and their cost is realised quarters later. A Monte Carlo simulation of 100,000 paired iterations, calibrated on public benchmarks and a listed multinational’s accounts, evaluates two archetypes differing 90-fold in size. Under the assumed parameters, reassigning the decision is worth about half a percent of sales almost regardless of size, of which 91–93 percent comes from restoring lost detail. Centralised governance outperforms negotiation, chargeback and veto rights, and that ordering survives removing the assumed revenue response to detail, which the magnitudes do not. We also supply a protocol for measuring detail already lost.