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Brain Sciences
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Defining Emotion: A Collection of Current Models
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Defining Emotion: A Collection of Current Models

A special issue of Brain Sciences (ISSN 2076-3425). This special issue belongs to the section "Cognitive, Social and Affective Neuroscience".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 November 2025 | Viewed by 5876

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Peter Walla

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Faculty of Psychology, Sigmund Freud Private University, Freudplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria
Interests: non-conscious affective; cognitive brain processes, memory, perception; self-referential processing, olfaction
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The existence of numerous definitions for the term "emotion" has the potential to engender a number of challenges, as well as confusion and misunderstandings. The absence of consensus among researchers regarding a unified definition of "emotion" can impede efforts to synthesize and compare findings across diverse studies, thereby hindering progress in our understanding of the human brain and its associated behaviors. Some understand an emotion as a subjective experience including internal feelings. In contrast, others perceive emotions as physiological (affective) responses, involving bodily changes, such as an increased heart rate or changes in facial expression. A third perspective suggests that emotions influence our actions and behaviors. Some researchers emphasize the cognitive aspects of emotions, while others strictly separate cognition from emotion. While all these phenomena undoubtedly occur and are interconnected, it is imperative that we delineate the term "emotion" more distinctly and clearly differentiate it from the terms "feeling" and "affective responses". In summary, the field of emotion research appears to be excessively complex, which is an issue that should be addressed, especially given the pervasive use of the term "emotion".

Prof. Dr. Peter Walla
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • emotion
  • affect
  • affection
  • affective processing of feelings
  • mood
  • cognitive processing

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Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

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15 pages, 282 KB  
Article
Emotional Skills and Nursing Training: A Study on Italian Students and a TRI-COM-Based Educational Model
by Giulia Savarese, Giovanna Stornaiuolo, Alessandro Vertullo, Carolina Amato and Luna Carpinelli
Brain Sci. 2025, 15(9), 961; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci15090961 - 3 Sep 2025
Viewed by 629
Abstract
Background/Objectives: Emotional competence is a crucial skill in nursing education, yet it remains underdeveloped in academic curricula. This study aims to (1) propose and preliminarily apply the TRI-COM model as a conceptual and educational framework to operationalize the definition of emotions within nursing [...] Read more.
Background/Objectives: Emotional competence is a crucial skill in nursing education, yet it remains underdeveloped in academic curricula. This study aims to (1) propose and preliminarily apply the TRI-COM model as a conceptual and educational framework to operationalize the definition of emotions within nursing contexts, and (2) explore the multidimensional structure of emotional competence among nursing students. Methods: A cross-sectional study was conducted with 233 nursing students (M_age = 23.79, SD = 5.19) from various Italian universities, with 82.8% identifying as female. The participants completed an online questionnaire including the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) and the Jefferson Scale of Empathy—Health Profession Student (JSE-HPS) version. Descriptive statistics, t-test, ANOVA, and Pearson’s correlation analyses were performed. Results: The overall mean TAS-20 score was 60.36 (SD = 11.22), which is close to the clinical threshold (cut-off = 61). The EOT subscale showed the highest mean (M = 26.48, SD = 3.16), suggesting a tendency toward externally oriented thinking. The mean JSE-HPS total score was 87.05 (SD = 7.88), with higher scores for Perspective Taking (M = 60.95, SD = 7.42) than Compassionate Care (M = 18.92, SD = 6.40). A significant gender difference was found in Perspective Taking (female: M = 61.54, male: M = 58.10; p = 0.007). The ANOVA results showed no significant differences in empathy across academic years, but the DIF subscale of TAS-20 showed a trend near significance (p = 0.053). Significant negative correlations were observed between age and TAS-20 scores (e.g., age–TAS-20 total: r = −0.23, p < 0.001). Conclusions: The findings suggest a general tendency toward rationalization and emotional detachment among students, possibly as a coping strategy in emotionally demanding contexts. The TRI-COM model—an original pedagogical framework inspired by tripartite theories of emotion—was used as a conceptual lens, providing a preliminary framework to interpret emotional competence in nursing education. Further research is needed to validate its educational relevance and explore practical applications within curricula. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Defining Emotion: A Collection of Current Models)

Review

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15 pages, 877 KB  
Review
A Call for Conceptual Clarity: “Emotion” as an Umbrella Term Did Not Work—Let’s Narrow It Down
by Peter Walla, Angelika Wolman and Georg Northoff
Brain Sci. 2025, 15(9), 929; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci15090929 - 27 Aug 2025
Viewed by 869
Abstract
To cut a long story short, the term “emotion” is predominantly employed as a comprehensive designation, encompassing phenomena such as feelings, affective processing, experiences, expressions, and, on occasion, cognitive processes. This has given rise to a plethora of schools of thought that diverge [...] Read more.
To cut a long story short, the term “emotion” is predominantly employed as a comprehensive designation, encompassing phenomena such as feelings, affective processing, experiences, expressions, and, on occasion, cognitive processes. This has given rise to a plethora of schools of thought that diverge in their inclusion of these phenomena, not to mention the discordance regarding what emotions belong to the so-called set of discrete emotions in the first place. This is a problem, because clear and operational definitions are paramount for ensuring the comparability of research findings across studies and also across different disciplines. In response to this disagreement, it is here proposed to simplify the definition of the term “emotion”, instead of using it as an umbrella term overarching an unclear set of multiple phenomena, which is exactly what left all of us uncertain about the question what an emotion actually is. From an etymological perspective, the simplest suggestion is to understand an emotion as behavior (from the Latin verb ‘emovere’, meaning to move out, and thus the noun ‘emotion’ meaning out-movement). This suggests that an emotion should not be understood as something felt, nor as a physiological reaction, or anything including cognition. Instead, emotions should be understood as behavioral outputs (not as information processing), with their connection to feelings being that they convey them. Consider fear, which should not be classified as an emotion, it should be understood as a feeling (fear is felt). The specific body posture, facial expression, and other behavioral manifestations resulting from muscle contractions should be classified as emotions with their purpose being to communicate the felt fear to conspecifics. The underlying causative basis for all that exists is affective processing (i.e., neural activity), and it provides evaluative information to support decision-making. The essence of this model is that if affective processing responds above a certain threshold, chemicals are released, which leads to a feeling (e.g., felt fear) if the respective organism is capable of conscious experience. Finally, the communication of these feelings to conspecifics is happening by emotion-behavior (i.e., emotions). In summary, affective processing guides behavior, and emotions communicate feelings. This perspective significantly simplifies the concept of an emotion and will prevent interchangeable use of emotion-related terms. Last but not least, according to the current model, emotions can also be produced voluntarily in order to feign a certain feeling, which is performed in various social settings. Applications of this model to various fields, including clinical psychology, show how beneficial it is. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Defining Emotion: A Collection of Current Models)
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27 pages, 339 KB  
Review
Synthetic Emotions and the Illusion of Measurement: A Conceptual Review and Critique of Measurement Paradigms in Affective Science
by Dana Rad, Corina Costache-Colareza, Ruxandra-Victoria Paraschiv and Liviu Gavrila-Ardelean
Brain Sci. 2025, 15(9), 909; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci15090909 - 23 Aug 2025
Viewed by 1324
Abstract
The scientific study of emotion remains fraught with conceptual ambiguity, methodological limitations, and epistemological blind spots. This theoretical paper argues that existing paradigms frequently capture synthetic rather than natural emotional states—those shaped by social expectations, cognitive scripting, and performance under observation. We propose [...] Read more.
The scientific study of emotion remains fraught with conceptual ambiguity, methodological limitations, and epistemological blind spots. This theoretical paper argues that existing paradigms frequently capture synthetic rather than natural emotional states—those shaped by social expectations, cognitive scripting, and performance under observation. We propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes natural emotion—spontaneous, embodied, and interoceptively grounded—from synthetic forms that are adaptive, context-driven, and often unconsciously rehearsed. These reactions often involve emotional scripts rather than genuine, spontaneous affective experiences. Drawing on insights from affective neuroscience, psychological measurement, artificial intelligence, and neurodiversity, we examine how widely used tools such as EEG, polygraphy, and self-report instruments may capture emotional conformity rather than authenticity. We further explore how affective AI systems trained on socially filtered datasets risk replicating emotional performance rather than emotional truth. By recognizing neurodivergent expression as a potential site of emotional transparency, we challenge dominant models of emotional normalcy and propose a five-step agenda for reorienting emotion research toward authenticity, ecological validity, and inclusivity. This post-synthetic framework invites a redefinition of emotion that is conceptually rigorous, methodologically nuanced, and ethically inclusive of human affective diversity. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Defining Emotion: A Collection of Current Models)
52 pages, 1790 KB  
Review
Emotion, Motivation, Reasoning, and How Their Brain Systems Are Related
by Edmund T. Rolls
Brain Sci. 2025, 15(5), 507; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci15050507 - 16 May 2025
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2226
Abstract
A unified theory of emotion and motivation is updated in which motivational states are states in which instrumental goal-directed actions are performed to obtain anticipated rewards or avoid punishers, and emotional states are states that are elicited when the (conditioned or unconditioned) instrumental [...] Read more.
A unified theory of emotion and motivation is updated in which motivational states are states in which instrumental goal-directed actions are performed to obtain anticipated rewards or avoid punishers, and emotional states are states that are elicited when the (conditioned or unconditioned) instrumental reward or punisher is or is not received. This advances our understanding of emotion and motivation, for the same set of genes and associated brain systems can define the primary or unlearned rewards and punishers such as a sweet taste or pain, and the brain systems that learn to expect rewards or punishers and that therefore produce motivational and emotional states. It is argued that instrumental actions under the control of the goal are important for emotion, because they require an intervening emotional state in which an action is learned or performed to obtain the goal, that is, the reward, or to avoid the punisher. The primate including human orbitofrontal cortex computes the reward value, and the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in learning the action to obtain the goal. In contrast, when the instrumental response is overlearned and becomes a habit with stimulus–response associations, emotional states may be less involved. In another route to output, the human orbitofrontal cortex has effective connectivity to the inferior frontal gyrus regions involved in language and provides a route for declarative reports about subjective emotional states to be produced. Reasoning brain systems provide alternative strategies to obtain rewards or avoid punishers and can provide different goals for action compared to emotional systems. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Defining Emotion: A Collection of Current Models)
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