From Spatial to Nodal Connectivity: Nuclear Connectivity in the Age of Transition ^†

Abstract

This paper examines nuclear infrastructure as a distinct form of connectivity within the evolving literature of International Relations and International Political Economy. While existing scholarship largely conceptualizes connectivity through spatial networks such as corridors, pipelines, and transport routes, far less attention has been paid to nodal forms of integration characterized by deep systemic embedding. Addressing this gap, the paper argues that nuclear connectivity represents a commitment-heavy model of interdependence that may stabilize interstate relations rather than render them strategically weaponizable. It advances three mechanisms to explain this stabilizing effect: exceptionally high sunk costs, dense institutional entanglement within broader infrastructure ecologies, and temporal lock-in generated by multi-decade operational commitments. Together, these features raise the costs of disruption and constrain short-term coercive strategies. By differentiating between leverage-prone spatial connectivity and stabilization-oriented nodal connectivity, this paper contributes to debates on infrastructure, interdependence, and geopolitical behavior, suggesting that the strategic consequences of connectivity vary according to infrastructural form.

1. Introduction

Connectivity emerged as a central theme in International Political Economy (IPE) as well as in Geopolitical studies, particularly since the 2010s. This development coincides with debates on the structure of the international system, which reflects an implicit shift toward assumptions of multipolarity, especially in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Perceptions of a relative decline in U.S. hegemony have consequently raised concerns about the future of the Liberal International Order, prompting greater scholarly attention to alternative modes of economic interaction. Within this evolving context, large-scale connectivity initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the EU’s Global Gateway seek to reshape patterns of trade, investment, and economic interaction by promoting infrastructure development across the Global South.

The concept of connectivity implies both physical connectivity like infrastructural projects and non-physical items such as digital assets, cyber, satellite systems, fiber-optic cables, and educational connectivity [1,2]. At the same time, the competitive dynamics surrounding these initiatives have led scholars to interpret connectivity projects as emerging instruments of geopolitical influence. As great powers invest in transnational infrastructure, connectivity increasingly functions not only as a mechanism for facilitating flows across space but also as a means of structuring long-term economic and political relationships.

Despite this expanding body of scholarship, the literature has largely privileged the spatial dimensions of connectivity, focusing primarily on corridors, pipelines, and transport networks. Far less attention has been paid to connectivity forms that operate through strategically embedded infrastructures rather than through the extension of transnational routes. This nodal dimension, characterized by the deep integration of critical systems within national energy, regulatory, and industrial frameworks, remains under examined.

The neglect is particularly visible in the case of nuclear energy. With few exceptions, existing studies tend to situate nuclear cooperation within broader discussions of initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative [3,4], rather than conceptualizing it as a distinct mode of connectivity in its own right. Addressing this gap, the present paper advances the concept of nodal connectivity to analyze nuclear infrastructure as a commitment-heavy form of integration that restructures long-term political and economic alignments between states.

2. Forms of Connectivity: From Corridors to Embedded Systems

Connectivity infrastructures do not operate according to a single spatial logic. Existing literature often implicitly assumes that connectivity is primarily achieved through the extension of trade routes such as corridors, pipelines, railways, and maritime networks designed to facilitate the movement of goods, commodities, and energy across borders.

China’s BRI exemplifies this approach. When China launched the BRI in 2013, its primary objective was to promote trade connectivity within an increasingly Sino-centric economic landscape. To this end, the initiative was structured around large-scale investments in partner countries, with transportation infrastructure and cross-border pipelines emerging as central components. Consequently, connectivity was initially framed in strongly physical terms, particularly through the construction of transportation corridors linking China to Europe via Central and South Asia.

However, the initiative expanded beyond purely physical infrastructure in 2015 with the announcement of the Digital Silk Road, encompassing fiber-optic cables, 5G networks, and satellite communications. This expansion suggested that connectivity can be strengthened not only through physical assets but also through strategically embedded systems. Similarly, the European Union’s investments in renewable energy and satellite programs in Central Asia as part of the Global Gateway indicate that connectivity is not confined to spatial extension alone but also involves nodal forms of integration.

Despite these developments, such forms of connectivity remain theoretically under-examined compared to the extensive literature on corridor geopolitics and the strategic ambitions of great powers. Nuclear connectivity, in particular, represents one of the least explored areas within connectivity studies, even though nuclear cooperation features in major international initiatives such as the BRI. In this regard, this paper argues that the relative scarcity of research on nodal and especially nuclear connectivity stems from the distinctive nature of nuclear integration itself, which is characterized by deep systemic embeddedness rather than infrastructural flexibility.

Connectivity projects typically serve a dual purpose. While sponsoring states or entities often seek to establish a self-centered economic order, recipient countries pursue such initiatives to promote development or sustain economic stability. Although these arrangements may initially appear mutually beneficial, connectivity projects can generate forms of asymmetrical interdependence, which is conceptualized as weaponized interdependence in the literature [5]. Consequently, beyond their economic rationale, connectivity initiatives are increasingly interpreted as instruments with geopolitical implications. Nevertheless, participating countries engage in these projects not only to foster economic growth but also to expand their strategic room for maneuver, including balancing relationships with more powerful states. Consequently, connectivity is associated with asymmetrical interdependence and the possibility of strategic leverage. In other words, spatial connectivity may create such dependencies.

However, interdependence may function less as a source of coercive power and more as a mechanism of long-term stabilization. Nuclear infrastructure represents one of the clearest examples of this alternative logic. Nuclear infrastructure represents an extreme case of embedded connectivity. Unlike corridor-based projects that facilitate flows across space, nuclear cooperation integrates technological, regulatory, and financial systems for decades, significantly raising the cost of disruption for all parties involved. Under such conditions, interdependence becomes less amenable to weaponization and more conducive to long-term stabilization.

3. Nuclear Infrastructure as Stabilizer in Connectivity

Unlike spatial or data-based forms of connectivity, nuclear connectivity may generate stabilizing effects rather than asymmetrical dependencies or geopolitical leverage for three main reasons.

First, the reinforcing effect of nuclear connectivity is significantly stronger than that of flexible infrastructure projects due to exceptionally high sunk costs. Although the operational costs of nuclear energy are relatively low compared to fossil fuels, the capital expenditure required for constructing a nuclear reactor is substantially higher than for most other energy sources. This is driven not only by material expenses but also by the lengthy construction timelines. Consequently, unlike flexible infrastructures such as transport corridors, nuclear projects are difficult to interrupt once construction has begun, even during periods of political tension. Exit costs therefore become extremely high for both investors and recipient states, raising the threshold for strategic disengagement.

Second, nuclear cooperation subsists within wider infrastructure ecologies [6]. Accordingly, nuclear projects are not isolated technical investments but components of broader networks connected through shared resources and institutional structures. Regulatory regimes, safety frameworks, fuel supply arrangements, and technical training systems become deeply embedded within these projects, requiring extensive coordination across technical and administrative domains. As a result, nuclear connectivity demands a higher degree of integration in areas such as technological expertise, regulatory alignment, and research and development. This dense institutional entanglement transforms interdependence into a form of shared governance that constrains the strategic usability of leverage and mitigates power asymmetries. In other words, since nuclear cooperation generates path dependence, disengagement becomes not only economically costly but also institutionally disruptive.

Third, closely related to the previous mechanism, nuclear cooperation generates temporal lock-in through extensive post-construction engagements. Unlike many physical infrastructures that can be renegotiated, replaced, or even operated by third parties, nuclear facilities require sustained cooperation for safety upgrades, workforce training, technological modernization, waste management, and other specialized functions. This enduring commitment raises the costs of disruption and reduces the attractiveness of short-term coercive strategies. In turn, temporal lock-in reshapes the strategic calculus of states by privileging long-term system reliability over immediate geopolitical gains.

In brief, nuclear connectivity is shifted away from the flexible leverage dynamics often associated with spatial corridor-based infrastructures when economic, institutional, and temporal lock-in are combined. Nuclear connectivity, instead, embeds governments into dense, long-term cooperation structures that encourage interdependency rather than power asymmetry and weaponized interdependence. Thus, interdependence becomes more structurally stabilizing and less strategically exploitable in such circumstances.

4. Conclusions and Future Research Agenda for Nodal Connectivity

Connectivity has emerged as a central theme in International Relations and International Political Economy, with energy connectivity occupying a particularly prominent place on the contemporary agenda. Existing scholarship has largely concentrated on pipeline networks and, more recently, renewable energy projects supported by initiatives such as the European Union’s Global Gateway. However, spatial connectivity does not exhaust the forms that connectivity may take, just as energy connectivity extends beyond hydrocarbons and renewables. Nodal connectivity constitutes an equally significant dimension of both existing and proposed infrastructure projects. In this context, nuclear cooperation is increasingly expected to become an important component of China’s BRI. Yet the establishment of nuclear connectivity presents substantial challenges for both investors and recipient states. High sunk costs, dense infrastructure ecologies, and long-term lock-in collectively complicate cooperation while simultaneously reshaping the strategic incentives that underpin it.

Future research may further examine how different infrastructural projects and proposals shape the strategic usability of interdependence, particularly in Eurasia. Therefore, greater attention to the temporal, institutional, and economic characteristics of nodal infrastructure could help clarify why nodes of connectivity lend themselves to geopolitical leverage while others incentivize restraint. Such an approach would move the debate beyond generalized assumptions about dependency or weaponized interdependence toward a different understanding of how infrastructural design conditions state behavior. This distinction may become increasingly important as states balance the pursuit of strategic autonomy with the practical necessity of long-term cooperation.