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5 November 2026

17 Pages

Info-Computation and Observer-Agency in Quantum

1
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology | University of Gothenburg, 412 96 Göteborg, Sweden
2
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Health Sciences, Mälardalen University, 721 23 Västerås, Sweden

Abstract

Quantum theory places observation within the physical interactions through which values of physical variables are established. Relational interpretations make this explicit by describing physical facts as relative to interactions among systems. This article develops an info-computational account of this relationality within the Info-Computational Cognitive Naturalism (ICON) framework. Its central proposal is observer-agency: every interaction has a receptive direction, in which a system detects input and undergoes change, and an active direction, in which it acts and contributes to change in other systems. At the fundamental physical level, observer-agency provides the reciprocity from which more organized forms of observation and action develop. Perspectival relationality is distinguished from constructive relationality, in which interactions alter the organization conditioning later interactions. Quantum measurement exemplifies this through nested physical, cognitive, social and technological processes. Relational objectivity (intersubjectivity) is achieved through reproducible and world-constrained relations among situated observations. Extending the analysis across organizational levels establishes generative continuity. Morphology embodies constraints as Natural Logic, while computation unfolds this logic through transformation processes. Cross-domain logical continuity in the organization of constraints is interpreted as a form of Logical Permeationism.

1. Introduction

Scientific knowledge divides nature into domains where different phenomena require different concepts, methods, and formalisms. Quantum theory, chemistry, thermodynamics, molecular biology, evolutionary theory, cognitive science, and neuroscience each identify structures and regularities appropriate to particular scales and forms of organization. This descriptive plurality raises a question: is it possible to construct a continuous natural history from the present differentiated descriptions without either reducing every domain to one privileged level or treating the domains as disconnected? The problem is especially visible in quantum physics. Quantum theory places observation within physically realized interactions and makes the conditions under which those interactions become informative part of the description. Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) responds by treating values of physical variables as relative to interacting systems rather than as absolute properties possessed independently [1,2]. The relevant observer need not be conscious or human. Any physical system can stand in the relation through which a fact is established. Other informational and reference-frame approaches differ from RQM in ontology and interpretation, but likewise make relations among systems, operations, and informational constraints foundational [3,4,5].
Once observers are included within physical nature, however, two problems arise. First, what constitutes observation when an observer can be any physical system? Second, how can observer-dependent processes support scientific objectivity? These questions are often answered at different explanatory levels. Quantum foundations concern the physical relation between systems and measurement contexts. Epistemology relates cognitive agents, evidence, and knowledge. Philosophy of science involves instruments, models, and scientific community practices. A coherent account must relate these levels. This article develops such an account from Info-Computational Cognitive Naturalism (ICON), a framework in which morphology, information, computation, and observer-agency are mutually dependent aspects of natural organization [6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. Morphology is organized physical structure. Computation is the transformation or dynamics of morphology. Observer-agency is a property of constituent parts of morphology capable of registering inputs and acting. An observer-agent both undergoes change and contributes to change in systems it interacts with. The term is minimal at the fundamental physical level. It does not ascribe beliefs, intentions, or goals to microscopic particles. It identifies a relational architecture that acquires additional capacities as organization becomes increasingly complex and takes chemical, living, cognitive, technological, and social forms. Information is a difference that makes a difference to an observer-agent. It is relative to the level of organization.
The article advances three connected claims. The first is that observation and agency should be understood as two directions of the same physical interaction. Treating observation alone encourages an image of passive reception, whereas every registration requires a state change in an organized system and occurs within reciprocal coupling. The second claim is that relationality in nature is a constructive process. An interaction does not only establish a fact or perspective at one moment; when its effects persist, it changes the organization from which later interactions proceed. The third claim is that scientific objectivity is relational rather than observer-independent. Objectivity is achieved as intersubjectivity through controlled and repeatable relations among observations, instruments, models, and observers that remain answerable to further interaction with the world. These claims support a broader thesis of generative continuity. Physical interactions generate structures that become conditions for subsequent processes. Chemical organization introduces selective constraints through molecular morphology. Living systems incorporate physical and chemical processes into self-maintaining organization in which past interactions affect regulation, development, memory, learning, and action. Human observers add symbolic representation, instruments, formal reasoning, and collective practices. Later forms remain physically realized through earlier processes while introducing capacities that require level-appropriate descriptions. Continuity therefore lies in generative process, not in descriptive uniformity. This conception bears directly on the question of how logic can be relevant across different natural and scientific domains. If logic is restricted to formal calculi, permeation can mean only the successful cross-domain application of humanly constructed formalisms. ICON suggests a deeper interpretation. Morphology embodies constraints and possibilities: its organization permits, channels, or excludes particular interactions and transformations. This organization constitutes Natural Logic. Computation is the unfolding of this Natural Logic through transformations of morphology. Formal logic is a later organizational achievement of natural cognitive agents, continuous with these fundamental embodied constraints. The argument does not propose the ICON framework as a new interpretation of quantum mechanics or as a substitute for its mathematical formalism. Its aim is conceptual: to connect the physicalization of the observer in relational quantum approaches with a multilevel account of measurement, objectivity, and the emergence of formal reasoning.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 situates observer-agency within relational quantum physics. Section 3 develops the ICON cycle of morphology, information, computation, and constructive relationality. Section 4 applies the framework to quantum measurement and relational objectivity. Section 5 extends the analysis across organizational levels. Section 6 develops the corresponding interpretation of Natural Logic and Logical Permeationism and clarifies the scope of formalization. Section 7 discusses the implications and scope of the proposed account and summarizes its main conclusions.

2. Relational Quantum Physics and the Physicalization of the Observer

Relationality did not enter physics with quantum mechanics. Classical mechanics defines velocity relative to a frame via Galilean transformations, and relativity extends reference dependence to spatial and temporal quantities via Lorentz transformations. Dependence on the frame of reference is not subjective. Descriptions obtained from different physical perspectives are related by transformation rules that preserve invariant structures. The lesson is methodological as well as physical: relational scientific objectivity need not require a view from nowhere if the relations among situated descriptions are themselves constrained.
Quantum mechanics deepens the issue because measurement is not the passive disclosure of a property independently of the interaction through which it is observed. RQM formulates this point directly. Physical variables take values relative to systems in interaction, and events are facts for the systems involved [1]. Di Biagio and Rovelli [2] distinguish relative facts from the conditions under which facts become stable enough to be shared or compared. The observer in this framework is physical. Nothing in the definition requires consciousness or conceptual knowledge. This physicalization is important, and it reveals different levels at which observerhood is realized. The word observer can refer to a quantum system, detector, complete apparatus, scientist, or scientific community. These are not interchangeable entities. A quantum system can participate in an interaction that establishes a relational fact. A detector can respond selectively and stabilize a physical change. An apparatus can organize coupling so that a specified quantity becomes measurable. A scientist can interpret a record within a conceptual and theoretical framework. A community can calibrate instruments, reproduce procedures, and evaluate claims. They instantiate observerhood at different levels of organization, from minimal physical interaction through detection and measurement to scientific interpretation and collective validation.
Goyal’s informational approach brings the boundary problem into focus [5]. The classical ideal imagines that an observer can, in principle, acquire arbitrarily detailed information while causing negligible reciprocal change. Quantum measurement instead limits information acquisition and generally changes the state of the measured system. The interface between observer and system therefore belongs to the physical problem. This raises the question of which physical processes count as measurements and whether measurement requires a macroscopic observer. Scientific measurement involves additional capacities such as control, selectivity, stabilization, interpretation, and comparison.
Matsuno’s internalist approach to physical information addresses a related limitation of the external-observer perspective. His distinction between external and internal measurement emphasizes that a natural process unfolds through interactions within nature rather than from the standpoint of an observer possessing a completed description of the process [14]. In later work with Salthe, this internalist perspective is extended toward material agency, where chemical interactions themselves participate in the production and transformation of relations [15]. This brings the problem closer to observer-agency: if observation is physically internal to nature, the participating system is not merely a passive recipient of information, but itself contributes to the interaction through which change occurs. ICON develops this reciprocity explicitly as observer-agency.
ICON separates the physical basis of observation from the organization of measurement. Consider two systems that interact. Each has a morphology—a structure, set of properties, boundary conditions, and dynamical organization—that constrains how it can enter the interaction. Each is changed in a way conditioned both by its own organization and by the other system. From the standpoint of either participant, the process has two inseparable directions: change received and change produced. ICON calls the receptive direction observation and the active direction agency. Their conjunction is observer-agency. At this minimal level, observation means only a state change through interaction, while agency means the contribution of that system to change in another. The terminology is functional, not anthropomorphic. A minimal physical observer-agent has no implied beliefs, representations, experience, autonomy, or intentions. Its response depends on its organization, and that organized response contributes to the coupled process. A photon interacting with a receptor, an electron interacting with a molecule, and a molecule participating in a reaction can instantiate this minimal reciprocity without being cognitive observers. Cognition emerges first with life.
Observer-agency is more than a purely perspectival formulation. Observation considered alone describes how one system is affected relative to another. Agency makes explicit that the observing system is not an inert point of view but participates physically in the relation. The magnitude and practical importance of reciprocal change can vary. In many classical contexts it is negligible enough to ignore, while in quantum measurement it becomes theoretically salient. The claim is not that every observation radically disturbs its object. It is that registration is a physical process and therefore cannot be wholly detached from interaction. This account agrees with RQM that a conscious subject is unnecessary for the physical relation, but it does not identify all physical interactions with scientific measurements. Minimal observation occurs when a system undergoes change through interaction. In the relational quantum-mechanical (RQM) sense, physical interactions between systems already constitute measurements, establishing relative facts without requiring a macroscopic observer. Scientific measurement is an organized process in which selected changes function as records of specified quantities. A detector’s morphology determines the range of signals to which it is sensitive. Amplification transforms a microscopic event into a stable difference. Storage preserves that difference. Calibration relates the detector state to a measurement procedure and reference structure. Interpretation places the record within an experimental and theoretical question. These additions are organizational, not a separate substance inserted into physics. The distinction between signal and information clarifies the transition. A signal is a physically realized event capable of producing change. It becomes information for an observer-agent when the difference it carries is effective within that agent’s organization. The same type of physical signal can therefore generate different information for differently organized receivers or no relevant information for a system for which it makes no effective difference. This relational conception does not make information arbitrary. The observed system, the interaction, and the receiving morphology jointly constrain the resulting change. Burgin’s general theory likewise defines information through the transformations it can produce in a receiving system [16], while ICON embeds this relation within natural computation and observer-agency, developed in greater detail in [17].
Several interpretations and reconstructions of quantum theory use informational language, but they differ from ICON. QBism treats quantum probabilities as an agent’s personal expectations concerning experience [3]. RQM considers facts as relative to physical systems [1]. Quantum reference-frame approaches formalize descriptions relative to physical reference systems [4]. Informational reconstructions ask which operational constraints characterize the theory [5]. Their ontological commitments differ. For the present argument, the common point is narrower: physical description cannot treat the relations among systems, operations, and informational conditions as an afterthought. ICON contributes a multilevel developmental question to this landscape. If minimal observer-agency is physical, how do more organized forms arise without losing continuity with their physical basis? Quantum interaction is not offered as a universal model for life, cognition, or science. It is a limiting case that makes the embeddedness of the observer unavoidable. The task is to explain how physical reciprocity becomes organized into selectivity, persistence, memory, interpretation, and eventually knowledge.

3. ICON: From Interaction to Constructive Relationality

ICON treats morphology, information, computation, and observer-agency as distinguishable aspects of one recursive process. Morphology constrains interaction; interaction makes differences effective for an observer-agent; informational processes unfold as morphological computation, transforming morphology. Transformed morphology changes subsequent possibilities of observation and action. An organized system embodies the results of previous processes. Morphology is used in a broad physical sense. It includes spatial configuration, material composition, boundaries, fields, molecular geometry, network topology, bodily form, technological architecture, and the dynamical relations through which a system maintains or changes its organization. The morphology of a system determines which couplings are possible, which differences it can register, and which effects it can produce. A molecule binds selectively because of its geometry and charge distribution; a membrane permits some exchanges while inhibiting others; a detector responds within a restricted sensitivity range; a nervous system integrates signals according to its connectivity and current state. Constraints embodied in morphology are both limiting and enabling. They exclude many possible transformations while making others accessible and stable. This organization of constraints and possibilities constitutes the system’s Natural Logic. It is not an additional structure imposed on morphology but a property of its organization: what the existing morphology permits, excludes, and conditions. These relations are realized through the organization of physical processes. This point becomes important at higher levels, where a component participates in a network or organism whose organization changes the conditions under which the component acts. The same molecule can enter different reaction pathways in an unstructured solution and in a regulated cell, always obeying physical laws.
Information is correspondingly relational. A difference becomes information only where it is effective for an observer-agent. At the minimal physical level, effectiveness means state change. With life, differences acquire relevance to maintenance and viability. Life entails cognition, and information becomes integrated with memory, anticipation, and action. Human symbolic systems allow information to be represented propositionally, mathematically, pictorially, and technologically. The realization changes across levels while the relational structure remains. Information is a difference whose effects depend on the organization for which it is informative.
Computation is the transformation of informational morphology. It is the process through which the Natural Logic embodied in morphology unfolds or expresses itself in actual transformations. The possibilities and constraints belong to the existing organization; computation realizes transformations within that organization and can, in turn, change the morphology from which subsequent possibilities arise. This is natural computation [8,10,18,19], which appears at physical, chemical, biological/cognitive, and social levels as transformations of informational structures/morphologies. Digital computation is a special regime in which physical states are engineered into discrete symbols, rules, memory structures, and controlled transitions. Its implementation is physical, but its organization is designed to realize an abstract computational architecture. Natural computation proceeds in the opposite methodological direction: it begins with inherent physical transformations and asks what computational relations can be individuated in them.
Morphological computation makes substrate dependence explicit. The physical form and material of a system contribute to the transformation being performed. Molecular shape, material elasticity, bodily geometry, network topology, and environmental coupling all participate in generating the dynamics [6,7,11]. Describing these processes computationally does not entail that nature as a whole is digital, implements a Turing machine, or computes a predefined mathematical function. It claims that changes in organized informational structure can be expressed as computation at the relevant level.
Observer-agency connects this account of information and computation to reciprocal interaction. An observer-agent is an organized system whose morphology conditions both its sensitivity to incoming differences and its capacity to produce effects, that is, to act. Observation and action are two directions of coupling that become increasingly differentiated as organization in nature develops. Chemical organization introduces selective reaction pathways. Living systems introduce self-maintenance, regulation, and adaptive action. Nervous systems integrate information across wider spatial and temporal scales. Human observer-agency adds symbolic representation, explicit reasoning, instruments, and social coordination. Artificial systems add engineered regimes of learning, reasoning, sensing, and action.
The recursive info-computational relation becomes historically significant when interaction leaves a persistent change. This is constructive relationality. A relation may be merely perspectival when it specifies how a quantity or state is described relative to another system while leaving the relevant organization unchanged. A constructive relation changes the participating system so that later relations begin from changed conditions. Some examples are a chemical reaction producing structures with different reaction possibilities, a cell altering regulatory activity, a nervous system modifying connectivity, a scientific instrument producing a record and ending in a different state, and a community revising its models and procedures. Not every interaction produces a lasting reorganization. Some changes are transient or reversible, and the threshold of persistence depends on the scale.
Constructive relationality identifies the temporal pattern in which an outcome becomes part of the conditions for what happens next. Current morphology carries effects of prior processes, while future possibilities depend on current morphology. Consequently, when constructive interaction changes morphology, it also changes the Natural Logic embodied in that morphology: the possibilities and constraints relevant to subsequent interaction. History is thereby physically effective without being an independent causal force. Information becomes causally relevant through its embodiment in organized matter and energy. A receptor can redirect signaling, signaling can change transcription, transcription can alter protein composition, which can change cellular morphology and future sensitivity. At each step physical processes realize the change, but organized differences channel which processes occur. The same principle applies to a scientific record. A measured value changes later practice only because it enters an organized network of concepts, instruments, standards, and institutions. Information has effects through the morphology of the observer-agent. Constructive relationality resolves a common tension between constructivism and realism. To say that interaction constructs a relational fact is not to say that an observer freely invents the outcome. Construction means constrained physical generation. Neither the measured system nor the apparatus alone determines the record independently of their interaction. The outcome is not arbitrary, because the possibilities are bounded by the organization and dynamics of both. This is compatible with a realist stance that the world exists independently while rejecting the idea that information simply exists in an isolated object and is transferred unchanged (mirrored) to a passive recipient. The process can be summarized as a feedback relation. The morphology of the existing universe presents a space of possible interactions. Interactions change participating systems through computational processes. The difference generated by that change is information relative to the system involved. Natural computation transforms informational morphology. Where the transformation persists, it changes later sensitivity and action. Observation is one direction of the interactions through which physical processes act. The resulting morphology embodies a correspondingly changed Natural Logic, which conditions the next cycle of interaction and transformation. This feedback relation is minimal at the fundamental physical level but becomes more complex with life. Living systems continually maintain and reconstruct the morphology on which their future interactions depend. Their activity changes both internal organization and the environment from which later signals arise. Memory and learning stabilize aspects of interaction history; development changes the space of possible responses; evolution changes the organization through which further variation is produced. Scientific inquiry later instantiates the same temporal architecture in a different form. Observations revise models, revised models redirect experiments, and new instruments reorganize what can be observed. These are not the same mechanisms, but they share a generative relation between organization and subsequent possibility.

4. Quantum Measurement and Relational Objectivity

Quantum measurement provides a test for the framework because it joins a microscopic physical event to a scientific record. ICON does not claim to solve the formal measurement problem. Questions concerning definite outcomes, probability, decoherence, and consistency among observers remain questions for quantum theory and its interpretations. The relevant question is how a physical interaction involving situated systems becomes part of a measurement process capable of supporting scientific knowledge.
At the microscopic level, an interaction can establish a fact relative to the participating systems, as RQM proposes. Constructive relationality adds a temporal emphasis: the state changes created by the interaction enter subsequent interactions. A detector that registers an event has a different physical organization from the one with which it began. That changed state can be amplified, transmitted to a circuit, stored in a medium, processed by software, displayed, and interpreted. The measurement chain is constructive because one state change becomes a condition for the next. This progression is best understood as nested observer-agency. The measured system and detector participate in reciprocal coupling. The detector’s morphology selects which interactions can produce a record. The wider apparatus constrains the experimental context and connects selected changes to an operationally defined quantity. Amplification and storage stabilize traces beyond the microscopic timescale. Computational processing may filter, aggregate, correct, or visualize the data. A scientist interprets the record against a model and an experimental question. A community establishes calibration standards, error procedures, replication practices, and criteria of evidential relevance. Each level contributes capacities specific to its organization while remaining integrated with the others in the measurement process.
The layered account avoids two reductions. It does not attribute scientific interpretation to a microscopic system, and it does not make human consciousness the source of the initial physical fact. A detector does not understand a theory; a scientist does not directly register every microscopic event; a scientific community cannot substitute agreement for physical interaction. Scientific measurement emerges from coordination across physical, technological, cognitive, symbolic, and social levels of organization. Measurement is selective at each stage. An apparatus does not address every property of the investigated system. Its morphology converts a limited class of physical differences into changes that can be stabilized and related to a measurement scale. Its Natural Logic, the possibilities and constraints embodied in its organization, conditions which interactions can become records and how those records can be transformed further. The result is shaped jointly by system, apparatus, coupling, and context. This does not jeopardize realism. Calibration, experimental design, and physical law constrain the space of possible records. An apparatus cannot legitimately produce any result whatsoever. But the information recorded is relational because it exists as an effective and interpretable difference only within this organized process.
Observer-dependence does not imply subjectivity. The appropriate contrast is not between observer-dependent and objective descriptions, but between dependencies that can be specified, transformed, tested, and compared and those that cannot. Relativity theory already provides a model in which different frame-dependent quantities belong to one objective structure because relations among frames are systematically constrained. Quantum theory complicates the analogy because interactions may help establish the facts compared, yet the central epistemic lesson remains: a description can be situated and observer-dependent without being arbitrary.
Relational objectivity (intersubjectivity) is the organization of reliable relations among situated observations. It depends on reproducible procedures, calibrated instruments, explicit models, controlled interactions, traceable records, and independent testing. Agreement is part of this organization but does not constitute truth. Two observers may agree and still be wrong. Scientific claims remain answerable to future interaction with the world: improved precision, changed conditions, new instruments, or failed predictions can reorganize what a community accepts. Johansson’s naturalized epistemology is relevant here because it places knowing agents within nature, where intersubjective agreement does not guarantee truth [20]. What is accepted as knowledge represents our “best current knowledge” and is expected to improve with the development of experiment and theory.
Scientific observation can be described as socio-materially augmented perception [21]. Bodies, instruments, practices, and other observers participate in producing what a scientist can perceive and establish. ICON places this insight in a broader hierarchy. Instruments extend biological sensitivity into spatial, temporal, and energetic domains unavailable to unaided perception. Computational systems transform and aggregate records. Symbolic notation stabilizes relations across individuals and generations. Such augmentation does not eliminate observer-dependence. It organizes it so that the conditions of observation can be disclosed, repeated, varied, and scrutinized. Scientific inquiry is constructive even in the sense that it changes the conditions of its own future observations. New instruments make previously inaccessible processes detectable. New concepts render previously unnoticed relations salient. Models guide which experiments are built and which measurements are sought. Results can confirm, modify, or undermine those models, after which reorganized knowledge conditions the next step of inquiry. Observation and agency are therefore embodied not only in the measurement apparatus but in the whole methodology and history of science.
The resulting objectivity is neither a standpoint outside nature (from a “God’s-eye view”) nor a closed circle of community validation. It is a regulated openness to correction through further interaction. Observer-agents construct measurement situations, but the investigated processes constrain what those situations can yield. Models mediate access, but models can fail. Instruments transform signals, but the transformations must remain calibrated and physically accountable. Relational objectivity thus connects epistemology to ontology without identifying them: the world does not depend on consensus, while knowledge of it is generated through organized relations in which observers materially participate and negotiate. This interpretation is particularly useful in quantum foundations because it separates three questions often compressed into one. What establishes a physical fact relative to interacting systems is a question at the quantum level. What stabilizes and amplifies a trace is a question about apparatus and open-system dynamics. What makes the trace a scientific measurement is a question about organized experimental and epistemic practice. ICON relates these questions through nested observer-agency while preserving their different explanatory tasks.

5. Generative Continuity Across Organizational Levels

The account of measurement raises a wider naturalistic question. Human scientific observation depends simultaneously on physical interaction, chemical organization, living processes, cognition, instruments, symbolic systems, and social practices. These forms of organization differ, yet they belong to one natural history. Their continuity cannot be captured simply by using the vocabulary of quantum interaction at every level, nor by treating higher levels as ontologically detached from their physical realization. Generative continuity in ICON provides an alternative: existing organization constrains interaction; interactions can generate new organization; and what has been generated becomes part of the conditions for subsequent processes.
Chemistry provides a direct illustration. Molecular structures arise through physical processes, but once formed, their geometry, bonding, charge distribution, and energetic organization constrain later reactions. Nothing ceases to be physical, yet the relevant space of possibilities has changed. A product of one interaction becomes a condition for others. Chemical description is indispensable because it identifies relational organization not fully expressed by elementary constituents alone.
Life complexifies this pattern. A cell is entirely realized through physical and chemical processes, but those processes participate in an organization that maintains and reconstructs the conditions of its own continuation. Membranes regulate exchange, metabolism transforms matter and energy and signaling and regulatory networks coordinate activity under changing conditions. Autopoietic theory and work on biological autonomy analyze this recursive production and the role of constraints in living organization [22,23]. At this level, observer-agency takes on a new character: differences encountered in interaction can matter relative to viability, and the system can act to preserve or change the conditions of its continued organization. A chemical difference affects a cell through molecular interactions, but its consequences depend on the organization in which those interactions occur. A signal may change metabolism, transcription, movement, repair, or development. The resulting response can alter both the organism and its environment, thereby changing what information later interactions generate. Information is effective because an organized system transforms physical differences into changes that redirect subsequent activity. History becomes increasingly important as such changes persist. Development alters morphology; regulation changes internal organization; memory and learning modify later sensitivity and action. Organisms also reshape their environments, producing new conditions of interaction. Present morphology can therefore embody consequences of previous processes while constraining future possibilities. Constructive relationality is path-dependent: the order of interactions matters because each step may reorganize the conditions of the next.
Matsuno’s internalist stance, introduced earlier in relation to observer-agency, becomes particularly important here because it adds temporality to the distinction between internal and external measurement. An external scientific observer can represent a completed trajectory or a space of possible histories, whereas a natural observer-agent proceeds from its currently realized organization within an ongoing process [14,15]. It does not first possess a complete external description and then act. Observation and agency occur within the process: each local interaction changes participating systems and thereby contributes to the conditions under which later interactions become possible. This internal temporality is especially clear in living systems, whose regulation must continue while both internal state and environment change.
Natural induction offers a mechanism through which interaction history becomes embodied. Buckley and colleagues describe spontaneous adaptive organization in which repeated exposure to environmental regularities changes a system so that its later responses reflect those regularities [24]. What has been encountered becomes physically effective through changed organization. This process should not be identified with scientific induction, which involves concepts, inference, theory construction, and shared evaluation. The connection is structural and temporal: in both cases, previous interaction changes the organization from which future response proceeds.
Evolution extends this relation across generations. Existing developmental organization affects which variations can be produced, while organisms alter selective environments and inherited conditions. Watson and Szathmáry [25] show how evolution can acquire learning properties by changing not only current phenotypes but the organization through which future variation is generated. The space of effective possibilities is therefore conditioned by natural history.
Generative continuity clarifies the relation between bottom-up generation and top-down constraint. New organizations are generated through already available processes. Molecules form through physical interaction; cells through organized chemical processes; cognitive systems through living organization; symbolic practices through embodied social agents. Once a higher-level organization exists, it changes the conditions under which its components act. A molecule in a regulated cell participates in a different network of relations from the same molecule in solution. Neural events are conditioned by bodily state, connectivity, past activity, and environmental coupling.
Noble’s principle of biological relativity rejects a privileged causal level in living systems [26], while work on top-down causation analyzes how organized wholes constrain component dynamics [27]. Within ICON, bottom-up and top-down descriptions are temporally connected aspects of one constructive process. A constraint at one moment is itself a product of prior processes. Physical realization does not entail explanatory reduction. Cooper’s discussion of emergence and incomputability warns that dependence on a physical substrate does not guarantee that higher-level behavior is derivable in practice from a lower-level computational description [28].
Observer-agency develops within this history. Reciprocal physical interaction provides the minimal relation. Chemical morphology introduces selectivity. Living organization integrates interaction with maintenance and viability. Memory and learning extend the influence of past interactions; cognitive systems integrate information over broader spatial and temporal scales. Human agents externalize distinctions in language, mathematics, diagrams, records, instruments, and computational systems. Scientific communities stabilize these structures across individuals and generations. Generative continuity is continuity through differentiation. It does not claim one mechanism, vocabulary, or formalism for every level. It claims that generated organization remains physically realized while altering the constraints and capacities relevant to subsequent processes. As morphology changes, so does the Natural Logic embodied in its organization: new structures introduce new possibilities and constraints while remaining physically continuous with the processes through which they arose. This conserves ontological naturalism without erasing explanatory plurality. The sciences describe different organizations within one developing nature, and their plurality can reflect genuine differences rather than a temporary failure to discover one universal language.

6. Natural Logic, Logical Permeationism, and Formal Scope

Generative continuity leads to the philosophical question: in what sense can logic permeate domains whose organization and formal description differ? If logic means only a formal system of symbols, propositions, and rules of inference, logical permeation can refer to the successful application of the same or related formalisms across several sciences. Such cross-domain application is real and powerful, but it does not by itself show that the systems described share a mechanism or that formal similarity constitutes ontological unity.
A naturalistic inquiry begins before formal systems. Natural processes exhibited regularities and dependencies before the emergence of symbolic reasoners. Existing structures permit, channel, or exclude interactions. With life, constraints became integrated into self-maintaining systems capable of memory, discrimination, learning, and adaptive action. Explicit formal reasoning appears much later. This history suggests that the applicability of logic to nature is not wholly external, because the capacities that generate formal logic are themselves products of natural organization.
Natural Logic characterizes this continuity, but the term must be restricted carefully. It is not a hidden calculus executed by nature. Particles do not manipulate propositions, cells do not apply proof rules, and evolution does not perform symbolic deduction. Natural Logic is a property of morphology: it refers to the organization of possibilities and constraints embodied in a system’s structure and relations. Some interactions and transformations are possible, some are excluded or constrained, and others become possible only after transformations change the morphology [12]. Its distinctive content lies in the relation among current possibility, realization, and changed possibility.
A comparison between formal reasoning and natural processes helps clarify the role of Natural Logic. In a syllogism, a conclusion follows from premises according to rules of inference. In a natural process, physical consequences follow from initial conditions and interactions determined by the morphology of the participating systems. The two kinds of logic, formal and natural, are related. Formal reasoning symbolically reconstructs relations that cognitive agents discover in nature, relations that operate throughout nature, including in cognitive agents themselves. When a formal logical description adequately represents physical conditions and processes in symbolic form, its conclusions agree with the corresponding physical consequences. Within ICON, formal logic is itself a product of natural cognitive processes. It emerges within nature. With living cognition, possibilities are not only realized through interaction but also anticipated by cognitive agents; increasingly developed cognitive capacities enable the representation of possible alternatives and counterfactual reasoning. Natural Logic refers to the organization of possibilities and constraints physically embodied in morphology, which governs how natural computational processes unfold [12].
Computation is the process through which Natural Logic unfolds in transformations of morphology. Morphology structures possible interaction, interaction realizes particular possibilities through computational processes, and where those processes change morphology, the resulting organization embodies changed possibilities and constraints. Constructive relationality identifies the case in which such changes become conditions for what can follow. A chemical reaction produces new reactants and constraints; development generates morphology that conditions later development; learning reorganizes future perception and action; evolution changes developmental systems and the variation they can produce; scientific theories redirect the experiments through which later evidence is generated.
In Essays in Logical Semantics [29], Johan van Benthem defines Natural Logic as a system of reasoning operating directly on natural language syntax, utilizing semantic properties of determiners rather than translating into artificial formal languages. Van Benthem’s Natural Logic thus concerns a highly developed cognitive and linguistic level of organization. In the broader naturalistic sense proposed here, it can be understood as a later manifestation of constraints and possibilities that, at more elementary levels, are embodied directly in morphology [29].
Brenner’s Logic in Reality offers one possible theoretical perspective on the relations that ICON characterizes as Natural Logic, extending the understanding of logic beyond abstract propositions to the possibilities and constraints embodied in physical morphology and their transformation through natural processes. It analyzes real processes through dynamic opposition, actualization, potentialization, and emergence [30,31,32]. ICON approaches the issue through morphology and interaction. The two frameworks share a philosophical commitment: relations commonly treated logically, like possibility, incompatibility, dependence, transition, consequence, and emergence, may characterize real processes and not only descriptions of them.
Natural Logic and morphological computation characterize two inseparable aspects of organized physical processes. Natural Logic is embodied in morphology as its organization of possibilities and constraints; morphological computation is the dynamics through which this organization unfolds in transformation. Molecular geometry, material structure, network topology, bodily organization, and environmental coupling participate in determining the transformation. When computation changes morphology, it thereby reorganizes the Natural Logic conditioning subsequent interactions. Observer-agency defines the relational direction: systems encounter possibilities through situated interaction, and the result changes how they can subsequently register and act.
Formal logic is continuous with this history but constitutes a genuine novelty. Human observer-agents can externalize relations in symbolic systems, stabilize them independently of the immediate situations in which they arose, and manipulate them through explicitly specified rules. Formal systems can be inspected, transmitted, implemented mechanically, compared, and evaluated for properties such as consistency and completeness. They are not Natural Logic merely written down. They are new organizations generated by embodied cognitive and social agents [29]. This account supports logical pluralism at the level of scientific representation. Different domains identify different objects, scales, constraints, and explanatory aims, and no assumption guarantees that one logic is uniquely correct for all of them. Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism concerns the legitimacy of more than one consequence relation under different conditions, while the present claim is broader and naturalistic: plural formal systems should be expected where scientific observer-agents model different forms of organization [33]. Formal plurality need not fragment nature if the domains described remain generatively connected.
Against this background, four possible senses of the proposed term Logical Permeationism can be distinguished. Formal permeation occurs when the same mathematical or logical structure successfully represents phenomena in different domains. Conceptual permeation occurs when terms such as relation, information, constraint, or computation remain applicable across domains while changing their concrete realization. Organizational permeation occurs with recurrent patterns, such as organization constraining dynamics and dynamics transforming organization in distinct systems without requiring identical mechanisms. Generative permeation is the interpretation most directly connected with the present framework: one organization participates in generating another, and earlier constraints become part of the conditions from which new constraints and capacities arise. Generative permeation has a temporal dimension absent from formal resemblance. A formalism can model multiple domains without showing that one domain generated another. Equally, a later level can be generated through physical processes while requiring a different formal description. The connection at issue is therefore not formal identity but continuity of organization through transformation. Physics remains operative in chemistry, chemistry in biology, and biological organization in cognition, while each generated level changes the relational possibilities of its constituent processes.
Biology is an important case in point. At the basic physical level, constraints can be described without invoking viability or goals. In formal reasoning, logical relations are explicit and symbolic. Living systems occupy the domain in which physical constraints become integrated into self-maintaining and historically organized observer-agency. Information becomes effective relative to viability, memory changes later response, and agency alters the environment from which later information is generated. Biology thus shows how natural constraint can become flexible and context-sensitive.
The proposal does not assert that a single logic governs all reality. Its usefulness depends on identifying structured relations among possibilities, exclusions, dependencies, transformations, and changes in the organization of those relations. Permeation specifies which relation persists across domains, how its realization changes, and whether the connection is formal analogy, organizational recurrence, or historical generation. The same principle governs formalization of ICON. Because the framework is multilevel, no single formalism represents all of its concepts. Quantum theory, statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, classical mechanics, and relativity already employ different mathematical descriptions appropriate to different regimes. Moving through chemistry, biology, cognition, and social domains, including scientific practice, adds further structures and explanatory demands. Formalizations are plural, local, and explicit about the scale and individuation of their variables.
Existing approaches provide specific resources. Memory Evolutive Systems use category theory to represent changing multilevel organization, emergence, and memory, making them relevant to constructive relationality [34,35]. Dynamical systems and network models can represent temporal development and distributed interaction. Information theory can quantify specified relations once systems, variables, and channels are defined. Modal structures can represent accessibility and possibility. Computational models can address adaptation, learning, and transformation. Actor-spectator approaches to epistemic computation emphasize computational processes characterized through relations to knowledge-generating observers [36,37]. These formalisms answer different questions. A state-transition model may describe dynamics within a fixed space, while constructive relationality requires representing changes in the organization that determine which transitions are effectively accessible. An encompassing external model might specify many trajectories in advance, yet the system itself still proceeds from locally realized organization shaped by its history. Matsuno’s distinction between external description and internal measurement is relevant here: representing possible histories and explaining how a system generates its next conditions are not identical tasks.
Successful mathematical analogy must likewise be separated from generative continuity. Similar equations can describe physically different systems, and their similarity may yield important science without establishing a common mechanism. Conversely, systems connected through one physical history may need different mathematics at different organizational levels. ICON therefore treats models as products of scientific observer-agency: selective symbolic and computational structures constructed to represent relations specific to a particular problem. The scope of ICON is consequently broad but bounded. It does not replace quantum theory, chemistry, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, or their established mathematical methods. It supplies a vocabulary for describing how morphology, information, computation, and observer-agency are realized across the domains studied by those sciences. Minimal physical observer-agency should not be endowed with biological cognition; biological information should not be equated automatically with Shannon information; human reasoning should not be projected onto cellular regulation. Higher-level organization should not be detached from the physical and living processes through which it operates.
Further work should develop the framework through concrete cases. In quantum physics, the task is to relate observer-agency to mathematically defined interactions, relative facts, records, and comparisons among reference systems. In chemistry, molecular recognition and reaction networks offer cases where morphology constrains transformation and where roots of learning can be found. In biology, regulation, development, natural induction, and anticipation illustrate how previous interactions alter later possibilities. The value of Natural Logic and generative permeation depends on whether these relations can be specified rigorously enough to produce distinctions, models, or empirical questions unavailable from generic descriptions of complexity or emergence.

7. Discussion and Conclusions

The physicalization of the observer in quantum theory raises a fundamental problem: if an observer can be any physical system, what constitutes observation, and how does it differ across the levels extending from elementary physical interaction to scientific knowledge? Relational Quantum Mechanics establishes an important starting point by treating physical facts as relative to interacting systems without requiring a conscious or human observer. Observer-agency develops this insight by making explicit the reciprocity of interaction. A system undergoes change while at the same time contributing to change in another system. Observation and agency are thus two directions of the same physical interaction. At the fundamental physical level, this relation requires neither cognition nor representation. The differences between a quantum system, detector, apparatus, scientist, and scientific community arise from their different organization and capacities, not from the introduction of a fundamentally different relation between observer and observed.
This distinction helps resolve a second problem: how elementary physical interaction is related to measurement and, ultimately, to scientific observation. In the RQM sense, interaction between physical systems can already establish a relative fact without requiring a macroscopic observer. Scientific measurement involves additional capacities. Detection introduces selectivity; amplification and storage stabilize physical changes; experimental arrangements relate them to specified quantities; cognitive agents interpret records; and scientific communities establish procedures for calibration, comparison, replication, and evaluation. These processes form nested levels of observer-agency. Their continuity does not make them equivalent: scientific interpretation is not attributed to an elementary system, while the physical event does not depend on a scientist for its occurrence. The transition from quantum interaction to scientific knowledge can therefore be understood without either projecting higher-level capacities downward or introducing an epistemic observer outside the physical world.
A further problem concerns the status of information in such an observer-dependent account. If information depends on an observer-agent, it might appear to become subjective or arbitrarily constructed. This does not follow. A difference becomes information through its effects on an interacting system, but both the difference and its effects are physically constrained. The morphology of the observer-agent conditions what it can register and how it can respond, while the properties and dynamics of the interacting systems constrain the possible outcomes. Information is therefore relational without being arbitrary. It is neither a property residing independently in an isolated object nor something freely imposed by an observer; it is generated through physically constrained interaction.
This provides a basis for addressing the apparent tension between observer-dependence and scientific objectivity. If all observation is situated, objectivity cannot mean elimination of the observer. It can instead be achieved as intersubjectivity through reproducible interactions, calibrated instruments, stable records, explicit models, comparison among observers, and continued testing. Agreement alone does not establish truth, since observations, models, and interpretations remain answerable to further interaction with the world. The same physical reality can be accessed through different observer-agents and instruments, while transformation, calibration, and comparison establish relations among their results. Relational objectivity therefore replaces the ideal of a view from nowhere with controlled and corrigible relations among situated observations.
The extension from quantum systems to living and cognitive observer-agents raises a different problem. Continuity across organizational levels can easily become either reductionist, if the properties of higher levels are treated as already present at the fundamental physical level, or fragmented, if each level is treated as disconnected from those from which it develops. Generative continuity offers an alternative. Physical processes generate structures that become conditions for subsequent processes. Chemical organization introduces new constraints and possibilities through molecular morphology. Living organization integrates interaction with maintenance, regulation, memory, learning, and action. Cognitive and scientific observer-agents extend these capacities through representation, formal reasoning, instruments, and collective practices. Higher-level capacities are not present as such at the fundamental physical level, but neither are they detached from it. They arise through transformations of organization that remain physically realized while changing which subsequent interactions become possible.
The generative account also clarifies the relation between bottom-up generation and top-down constraint. Existing organization constrains the interactions of its components, but that organization is itself the result of earlier processes. A molecule in a living cell obeys the same physical laws as elsewhere while participating in a different organization of possible interactions. Development, learning, and evolution similarly transform the conditions under which subsequent processes occur. Bottom-up and top-down descriptions therefore address different temporal and organizational aspects of the same natural history rather than competing causal principles. The resulting continuity is continuity through differentiation, not identity of mechanism or description.
The role of Natural Logic follows from this relation between morphology and transformation. Morphology embodies possibilities and constraints: its organization makes some interactions possible, excludes others, and conditions their consequences. This constitutes its Natural Logic. Computation is the process through which these possibilities unfold in transformations of morphology. When morphology changes, the possibilities and constraints relevant to subsequent interactions change as well. Natural Logic is therefore not an additional mechanism or a formal calculus attributed to nature. It expresses the organization of possibilities embodied in morphology, while formal logic emerges much later when cognitive observer-agents represent and manipulate relations symbolically. This distinction is important for evaluating the proposed notion of Logical Permeationism. Cross-domain logical continuity need not imply that one formal logic governs physics, chemistry, biology, cognition, and scientific reasoning. Formal permeation can occur when the same or related formal structures successfully describe different domains. Conceptual and organizational permeation can occur when related concepts or patterns recur with different realizations. Generative permeation concerns a stronger historical relation in which one form of organization participates in generating another and thereby contributes to the conditions from which new possibilities and constraints arise. For the present account, this generative relation is the most relevant form of permeation. It explains continuity without requiring either formal identity or uniformity across domains. The proposed solutions also delimit the scope of the argument. Observer-agency does not provide a new interpretation or formalism for quantum mechanics, and generative continuity does not replace domain-specific explanations in chemistry, biology, cognition, or computation. Nor does Natural Logic supply a universal formal system. The concepts developed here address relations among levels: how physical observation can be understood without an external observer, how observer-dependence can support objectivity, how information is generated through interaction, and how increasingly complex forms of observer-agency can arise without either reduction or discontinuity. Formal development must therefore remain specific to the systems, scales, and problems being investigated.
In conclusion, the central proposal of this article is that info-computation and observer-agency provide a naturalistic account of observation in quantum physics. Quantum interactions are physical interactions in which participating systems both undergo and contribute to change. Observer-agency makes this reciprocity explicit, while info-computation characterizes the relational generation of information and the transformations of informational morphology through interaction. The observer is therefore neither external to the physical process nor restricted to a conscious or human subject. At the fundamental physical level, observer-agency is instantiated in interaction between physical systems. Through increasingly organized forms of info-computation, it develops into the richer capacities involved in measurement, cognition, and scientific knowledge. Quantum physics thus provides a particularly clear domain in which info-computation and observer-agency can be understood together as aspects of a relational and physically embedded account of observation.

Funding

This research received no external funding. The article processing charge (APC) is covered by the Swedish Bibsam Consortium.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. During the preparation of this manuscript, the author used OpenAI Codex (GPT-5, accessed on 26 August 2026) for language improvement, editorial assistance, and reference formatting. The author reviewed and edited all outputs and takes full responsibility for the content of this publication.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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